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I N T R O D U C T I O N
'Anotherf piece of work on the American Civil War and Reconstruction 
perhaps requires a word of explanation. In recent years, a number of 
scholars have rewritten the history of the period, and found an honourable 
place for men and events once regretted or reviled. So successful have they 
been, that there is now no need to rescue 'Radical' Republicans from charges 
of trafficking in the politics of hate, or to defend their works from any 
other criticism than that they did not go far enough towards raeial justice.
The result of so much scholarly activity could have been to overwork or 
saturate the field. Instead, the debate has become more exciting, as the 
paths to yet unanswered questions become clearer.
This thesis is concerned with the transition from slavery to freedom.
Again, it is a familiar theme. Some historians have been concerned with the 
question as one of politics, tracing the story from General Fremont's 
Proclamation to the Thirteenth Amendment; others have treated it as the 
central theme of Reconstruction, and documented the various Reconstruction 
acts as they affected the South, and the freedmen; still others have con­
centrated on the question as it relates to black history, and the unfulfilled 
promise of justice. It would hardly be possible to take up the theme without 
due attention to these aspects of it. But to concentrate on Reconstruction 
solely from a 'Southern' or 'black' angle is to isolate them from the wider 
process to which they belong - the adaptation of the whole federal system 
to cope with the transition from slavery to freedom.
Historians are coming more and more to realise how far the Reconstruc­
tion process was a national one. Most of the legislation from the Confiscation
1 1 ,
Acts of 1861 and 1862 through to the 1875 Civil Rights Act applied to all 
parts of the Union. There were ills which had to be remedied in hew York 
as well as South Carolina. Far from being an exclusive Southern disease, 
'states rights' was the federal problem. Northern states defied the 
T'dgitive Slave haw in the l850's. During the war, states rights in the 
North jousted occasionally with the national authority, as when state 
courts exercised habeas cornus jurisdiction to release men from the Union 
army, or harassed federal officers in their courts for alleged offences 
against state law. For that reason, there is a place in this dissertation 
for a chapter on the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863. This act v/as passed to 
protect federal officers from state action by allowing them to transfer 
suits against them from state to federal courts.
So what does this have to do with the transition from slavery to 
freedom? Every step taken to free the slaves during the war sharpened 
the Republicans' awareness of the problems of making freedom permanent.
The negative side of the work T/as to strike dov/n the roots of slavery in 
state law. The positive side was to make freedom national and to maintain 
it against infringements by states or individuals. Slavery was 'black' 
and with the exception of the border states, a 'Southern' problem. But when 
the problem was not slavery, but freedom, it ceased to be either regional 
or racial in a narrow sense. Most historians ask wîiat freedom meant for 
the newly emancipated slave. But the other side of the question, is what 
did freedom mean to Americans, white and black who were already 'free' 
and whose status would presumably be relevant to those who now joined 
their ranîcs for the first time? Chapter VI attempts some answers. The 
answers until 1866 came from the states. All questions touching the 
rights and duties of Americans were decided there. But the failure of the 
South to observe anything more than the emptiest form of freedom, defined
IJ L l .
as the absence of slavery, brought the federal government into t)ie area of 
individual rights. Rights said the Republicans, were inherant in freedom.
In 1866, the Civil Rights Act attempted to define these rights, and extend 
to all Americans, the equal protection of them in law. The act was about 
a.'three-Amy federal relationship - no longer about nation and state, but 
about nation, and state and individual. The situation and the formula v/as 
similar to that of the federal officer under the Habeas Corpus Act - a 
right and a remedy guaranteed to the individual by the nation.
One of the connecting themes in all the pieces of legislation which 
I have examined is the nature of the remedy. To enforce the national 
authority, to protect those who represented it in the states, those freed 
by it, and those whose only hope of justice lay in its enforcement, Congress 
expanded the jurisdiction of the federal courts. My starting point is the 
Confiscation Acts of I86I and 1862. In those acts, the federal courts were 
given jurisdiction of cases involving the confiscation of property. But 
more than that, the whole area of 'khe nation-state relationship on the 
question of legal guarantees of freedom to the individual was explored for 
the first time, A remedy was suggested •» 'the guarantee to the freednan of 
a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. As it was presented at the 
time, the remedy was insufficient, and the final act in 1862 left the role 
of the courts undefined. But it was only 'khe beginning of the education 
of Congress to the na'fcure of the problems, and the adequacy of the remedies.
The theme is followed up through the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, the 
Wade-Bavis Bill, the Thirteenth Amendment, the Freedmen*s Bureau Act, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 - all of which are familiar to students of the 
politics of the period. But the ways in which they are inter-connected, 
both in their judicial features, and their implications for the Reconstruction
of the whole Union, are less well understood. TOien those acts are brought 
together and studied as part of a wider constitutional process, the results 
lend substance to the view expressed recently by Professor Harold Hyman., 
that Reconstruction begins shortly after the bombardment of Fort Sumter 
rather than after Appomattox, and that there is no magic dividing line at 
Lincoln's death.
The use which successive Congresses made of courts, also demands the 
breaking dovm of some barriers between 'political' and 'legal' history.
The history of these acts must not end with their passage. It fell to 
federal and state courts to interpret the acts, to discover the boundaries 
of their respective jurisdiction under them, and by reference, the boundaries 
of the nation-state relationship. Bench and bar thus find their place in 
Reconstruction, It is necessary to study both the legislative intention, 
and the judicial application.
Hopefully, from this perspective, familiar material will yield new 
light on the relationship between politics and law, Congress and courts, 
and state and nation in a period of transition.
1, Harold M. Hyman, ed., The Radical Republicans and Reconstruction. I86I- 
1870. (N.Y .Î Bobbs“Merri11. 1967)0 Introduction.
AND FEDER .'1 f CM, AFD CO'TItTo
Successful reconstruction of the Union depended on somebody learning
something from the American Civil Far. To have adopted the conservative
slogan of restoring "Tie Constitution as it is, the Union as it was" would
have been to stand still, to wait until the next c?cisi.s rent both asunder.
More thoughtful Americans addressed themselves instead to a study of v/hat
had gone wrong with the Constitution and Union, and to profiting from that
study. In many ways it was a new experience for them to speak of flaws and
defects. Anerleans, said F. L. Godkin in I864, seemed to be under the
impression that, "when the Federal Constitution was framed, the canon of
political revelation was complete".^’ They congratulated themselves on
having secured their liberties in constitutional government, but never
stopped to analyse its component parts, or watch how it grew and changed.
As a Kentucky lawyer put it in I86I,
they have sailed upon a smooth sea, without the experience 
of a single storm to waken serious apprehension for their safety, and 
have never examined the vessel which has borne them, to understand 
the great timbers and braces that hold it t o g e t h e r .
There had, however, been occasions in the past which might have
suggested the need for such a study. But the fact that a compromise was
worked out before the Hartford Convention, or the South Carolina Nullification
Controversy broke the bonds of Union, delayed the nation's education. Though
slavery was the one issue explosive enough to defy compromise and bring the
constitutional structure to the point of collapse,^' the important questions
it had been posing for federalism for many years beforehand had gone unanswered,
1. E.. L. Godkin, The Constitution and its Defects, North American Review,
July 1864, p.122. Hereafter cited as Godkin, The Constitution and its 
Defects.
2. Quoted in Harold K. Hyman (ed.) The Radical Republicans and 
Reconstruction I86I-I87O, (N.Y, r Bobbs-Herrhi 1, 19o7j~P<.28. Hereafter 
cited as Hyman, The Radical Renublleans.
3j See Arthur Bestor, The American Civil ".'an as a Constitutional Crisis,
Anerican Historical Review, Vol. IXIX, Jan. I964.
In all these strains on the system, a common factor Uii.ght have becai
of
revealed. So much attention had 'been paid to ways/protecting liltorty
in the skakes hy restraining the federal government, that the balance had
gone too far in the other direction, Not "centralization", but an
overbearing notion of "state" - this was the flaw.' ° In the wake of the
Nullification Controversy the government found difficulty in protecting
its OlAn revenue officers from harassment and prosecution in state courts
for no other crime than enforcing the nation's laws. Over slavery, it was
powerless to guarantee a free white citizen of Massachusetts the right to
freedom of speech in South Carolina, or prevent Northern judges from
issuing writs of habeas corpus to release prisoners detained under a
2 .
federal law - the Fugitive Slave Law. * Secession confirmed that, though 
slavery was bad for the black man, its relationship to "State" v/as 
disastrous for federalism.
It was not quite true that no thinking had been done on the subject.
The trouble was that the people v/ho had thought about it, and come up with 
a proposal to revolutionise the balance between state and nation, v/ere not 
the right sort of people, according to E, L. Godkin. Veneration for the 
Constitution he argued, had turned Americans into a nation of constitutional 
lawyers, at the expense of legislative science. Thus he went on,
the study of the law as it is has attracted all the keenest 
intellects in the country, while the consideration of v/hat the law 
ought to be have been left, strangely enough to newspaper editors and 
clergymen - two classes singularly ill-fitted for the task.^’
1. This is Godkin's conclusion in The Constitution and its Defects. See
also Philip Shaw Paludan, Lavi- and Equal Rights: The CiviJ. far Encounte:
(Unpublished Ph.D. disseration, University of Illinois~T96^Ü~~P*20f.
2. Conflicts of Jurisdiction in these fugitive slave cases are discussed 
by Charles Darren, Federal and State Court Interference, Harvard Law 
Review, Jan. 1930.
3. Godkin, the Constitution and its Defects, p.122. Jolm C, Hurd in
Theories of Reconstruction, /mierican Law Review, Vol. I, Jan. 186?
makes a rather similar point with respect to the Constitution, that 
it had been regarded as an object of legal knowledge, to be referred 
to like a statute, rather than as the instrument of a living ])olitical 
comnact.
Prominent among these "ill-fitted" men were the abolitionists, whose
constitutional thought has been the subject of important research by
Jacobus Ten Broek and Howard J. Graham.^' They find that the elements of
the Republican attempt to adapt federalism to freedom in the Fourteenth
Amendment, were directly descended from abolitionist thoughts on the subject
as early as the l830's. The abolitionists began with a moral precept, rather
than a constitutional theory. Dhen they looked at the slave, or the free
black they saw a man, degraded, but posessing natural rights as a man.
Broadly, these were the rights of the Declaration of Independence, and the Bill
of Rights - of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, with the means to
secure and maintain them, fhen they looked at the Constitution and laws as
they were, their response was not veneration, but anger at their sanction of
injustice. The black man was deprived of his natural rights by positive
state law. The white man whose voice was raised to protest was deprived of
his fundamental rights by violence in the streets, or prejudice in the courts.
Here was the denial of the Lockean principle that governments are instituted
to protect fundamental rights. The abolitionists stressed that since these
rights were held equally by all men, government owed them equal protection.
Equal protection, argues Ten Broek, was understood as a double-edged concept;
first, the negative duty of government not to pass laws abridging fundamental
rights; second, and more important, the positive duty to provide full and
ample protection, implying a "quality control", or substantive interest in 
2,
legislation. '* They placed this duty firmly with the national government. 
Implicit in this was the idea, vague as yet, of a national citizenship, to 
which attached fundamental rights and which included all persons. They 
found the power to make good the nation's protection of their rights against 
all-comers, in the Constitution, But it was not the Constitution so venerated 
by their fellow countrymen. Different anti-slavery Avriters stressed
1. Jacobus Ten Broek, The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
(Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), hereafter 
cited as Ten Broek, Antislavery Origins. Howard J . Graham, Everyman's 
Constitution (Madison: State Historical Soc. of Wisconsin, 1968).
2.Ten Broek, Antislavery Origins, p.98.
4.
different grants of power, the due process clause of the Fifth Aiiendment 
being the most common, as well as the preamble, the comity clause, the
power to guarantee the States a republican form of government, and the
"necessary and proper" clause. Here were the seeds of a federal revolution, 
standing in direct contrast to the accepted notions of relationships between 
state and nation, and the pronouncements of the Supreme C o u r t . T h e y  were
proposing to alter the balance in favour of the national government, to clothe
it v/ith the power to protect its citizens against the states if need be, and 
enforce its laws.
Synthesizing the ideas of the abolitionists into the tidy formula of
equality before the law, perhaps obscures the way they stumbled towards it,
and the déficiences of their blending moral outrage with constitutional
theory. Similarly, making too facile a transition of these ideas from the
"ill-fitted" clergymen and newspaper editors to the legislators, would obscure
the more painful and haphazard education the latter endured through the needs
of war. Clearly there are connections. In his speeches in the 1850's, John
A. Bingham shared with the, abolitionists the concept of natural rights/due
process/equal protection. And he v/as the principal drafter of the Fourteenth
2
Amendment which wrote that concept into the Constitution. . But Bingham 
arrived at the Amendment in the company of the North and the Republican Party 
as well as the abolitionists. Tliey had come far, it seemed, from President 
Lincoln's Inaugural Address, and the Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of I86I, 
claiming preservation and not change as their goal. V/hat happened in the 
middle, with respect to the transition of these ideas, has still to be 
documented.
It is important to establish, however, that an important difference
1. In Barron v. Baltimore 7 Peters 243 (l833), the Court held that the Bill 
of Rights v/as a limitation on the federal government, not on the states,
2, Bingham's speeches of I856, 1857 and 1859 (Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1 sess., 
app. p.124; 3 sess,, app., pp. 135-140; 35th Cong., 2 sess., pp.981-985) are 
used to relate his concept of equal protection and due process to the 
intention behind the Fourteenth Amendment in Howard J . Graham, The 
"Conspiracy Theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Yale Law Review 1938.
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between the abolitionists and the Republican party in reaching some of the
same conclusions, was the breadth of their concerns. The abolitionists were
concerned with slavery and freedom, Congress with a very much wider field of
politics and law, Union and Constitution. The comparative complexities of
Congress' task can be illustrated by events which had no^parent connection
with slavery. During the war, the government's ability to raise an army to
defend itself was questioned by state courts in the North, notably in New
York and Pennsylvania, who issued writs of habeas corpus for the release of
their citizens from service in the Union Army.^ ' Again, Union officers in
the field found themselves prosecuted in state courts for often petty offences,
2 .
allegedly committed under orders, * The villain v/as not the South and slavery 
alone, but the spirit of state anarchy in the nation as a whole. To cure the 
greater disease, a more comprehensive and national reconstruction than 
historians have commonly recognised had to be undertaken. The Habeas Corpus 
Act of 1863 designed to protect federal officers from state action, the 
Constitutional Amendments, and the I866 Civil Rights Act applied to all parts 
of the Union, and were part of an attempt to bridge the gap between state and 
nation in the federal system as a v/hole.
This is not to put the Republican party in the position of selfless 
constitutional theorists, approaching war and reconstruction from the vantage 
point of Harvard Law School. They were politicians responding to public 
opinion, leading it, acted upon by events and shaping them, engaged in a 
present-minded political contest to assert majority rule - their rule - but 
concerned for the quality of the Union and Constitution they left to the future,
1. See, for example, Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa,238 (1863), discussed along 
with similar cases in Chapter III.
2. James G, Randall in Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (N.Y.;
D. Appleton & Co., I926) pp. 193-194 says that there were 3,000 such suits 
pending by September I865.
The most striking feature of the party was its ability to "grov/'h
Not only is there a distance of understanding from the Crittenden-Johnson
resolutions^'‘ to the Fourteenth Amendment, but a distance in the legislative
expertise which E. L. Godlcin found to be wanting before the war. Congr-ess
got through a staggering amount of business, ranging from equipping an army,
to Homestead, and Pacific Railroad legislation, Rhere did their expertise
come from? A glance at the composition of the Thirty-seventh Congress
reveals that about half the Republicans had experience in state legislatures,
perhaps a doubtful commendation. But fifty-four percent of the "young"
Republican party, compared with only thirty-one percent of the Democrats,
had previous experience of a national Congress. A high percentage of both
parties were lawyers - approximately sixty-four percent in the House, eighty
2 .
percent in the Senate. ' Again the value of their legal training v/as doubtful. 
Many would receive a backwoods education in the law, amounting to not much 
more than a passing acquaintance with Blackstone. Donald Morgan also suggests 
that the individual, lawyer or not, v/as not asked to weigh constitutional 
principles, but was often quite unfamiliar with the detailed contents of the 
bills he voted,on, having left such considerations to specialist committees,^* 
These committees were the real schoolhouses of legislative expertise. During 
the war their numbers rose to thirty-seven in the House, twenty-two in the 
Senate. It was in committee, rather than in debate, that the real business 
of shaping and drafting legislation proceeded. Charles Sumner's importance 
was as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, rather than as an 
eloquent Pied Piper for Radicalism on the floor. For the same reason, their
1. The resolutions, sponsored by Crittenden in the House, and Johnson in the 
Senate, were the first statements of Congress' views on the nature of the 
war. There was to be no interference with "the rights and established 
institutions of the States", but simply the preservation of Union and 
Constitution, In defence of it. Senator Johnson said the government had 
no more right to interfere with slavery than with the condition of serfs 
in Russia. Cong. Globe, 37 Cong, 1 sess., p.260 July 25 l86l.
2. Compiled from A Biogranhical Congressional Dictionary 1744-1911 
(Washington; 1913)
3. Donald G. Morgan, Congress and the Constitution; A Study of Responsibility 
(Cambridge; Balknap, 19667”pp. 134““i36.
status on powerful committees, John Bingham, Lyman Trumbull, and rilliairi 
Pitt Fessenden were more prominent architects of reconstruction.
Continuity of both problems and personnel must have added to Congress' 
growing expertise. Tliis carry-over is more evident between the Tliirty-eighth 
Congress (1863-1865) and the Thirty-ninth (1865-I867), than between the 
Thirty-seventh (186I-I863) and Thirty-eighth, Only thirty-seven Republicans 
who served in I86I were returned in 1863«■ Nevertheless, even that small 
group contained a group of tv/enty-five Republicans who would go on to serve 
in the Thirty-ninth Congress. It included the important parliamentarians 
John F. Yïilson of the Judiciary Committee, Schuyler Colfax, Speaker of the 
House in the Thirty-eighth Congress, Henry Dawes of the Election Committee, 
Thaddeus Stevens of Ways and Means, Thomas Eliot, architect of the Freedmen's 
Bureau, George Julian of the committee on Public Lands and James Ashley from 
the important Committee on Territories. The real continuity, v/as the 
seventy-five Republicans v/ho sat in both the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth 
Congresses, the Congresses of the Wade-Davis Bill, the Thirteenth Amendment 
resolution, the Freedman's Bureau Acts, the Civil Rights Act, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. They became receptive to legislative patterns designed 
to meet familiar problems. I9hat they learned about the difficulties of 
protecting Union officers in Kentucky courts, they would apply to the 
business of protecting freedmen and loyalists in Alabama courts.
Their understanding of the issues is a difficult transition to pinpoint. 
The flanks of the party moved at different paces and embraced a spectrum of 
opinion on the nature of the Union, the Constitution, slavery, and the 
priorities of the relationship of these things. It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to analyse these differences in terms of answering the 
question, "Kho were the Radical Republicans?" The old view of a distinct, 
cross-eyed, club-footed core of Jacobins, presiding over a spiteful 
Reconstruction is, hopefully, well on its road to extinction.^* Professor
1. The best historiographical essay is Harold M. Hyman's introduction to 
The Radical Republicans and Reconstruction I86I-I87O, itself a 
significant contribution to the revision of old attitudes.
David Donald bas pioneered an interesting approach to the question in
The Politics of Reconstruction,^ ' Analysing the voting performance of the
Republican Party on specific issues, selected to test their radicalism,
he finds the edges of that radicalism blurred, and the phenomenon related
more positively to the size of constituency majorities than individual
motivation. Radicals, he claims, had safer seats than moderates. There
was, of course, a sense at the time that some Republicans were "purer" in
motive than others, specifically on the slavery question. A list of these
morally in favour, might be compiled with reference to the frequency with
which certain Republicans were quoted in the antislavery Liberator.
Republicans themselves seemed conscious of an unofficial order of merit,
causing Representative Abram B. Olin to remark after a brush with Thaddeus
Stevens, that he was "more than suspected by my friend from Pennsylvania of
2 .not being in regular standing in the Republican Church." * In the same way, 
Lyman Trumbull's temperament and zeal differed from Charles Sumner's. But 
the historian is still left with a long list of measures which found both 
men on the same side, along with other apparently incompatible colleagues. 
Important questions have still to be answered concerning divisions inside 
the party, how gr-oups actually functioned, what influences they exerted on 
committees and so on. But equally important questions have to be answered 
about what kept the party together and moving in the same direction.
They did begin with a common belief that Republicanism v/as more than 
a political "mixed bag", flung up from the wreck of parties in the I85O 's 
to meet the crisis of disunion. It v/as a party with an idea. As George
1. David Donald, Hie Politics of Reconstruction I863-I867 (Baton Rouge; 
Louisiana State University Press, I965)
2. Cong, Globe, 37th Cong. 2 sess. p.570 Jan. 28th I863
Julian said in 1863y
Republicanism is not like a garment, to be put on or laid 
aside for our own convenience, but an enduring principle, which 
can never be abandoned without faithlessness to the country. It 
is not a succession of "dissolving views", brought on to the 
political stage to amuse conservative gentlemen, or to dazzle 
and bewilder the people, but the fixed star which should guide 
us through the shifting phases of Americ am politics and the 
bloody labyrinths of v/ar.^  '
Broadly this principle, from the rhetoric of Republican speeches was
"progress", "enlightenment", "humanity", "democracy", "the spirit of the
nineteenth century", "Clnristian civilization", "free institutions", "liberty
under law." Professor Donald suggests a cruder common factor of "simple
2 ,
antislavery zeal". * But really, it v/asn't so simple. To understand the 
broader ground of the reconstruction they undertook, their antislavery 
position should be understood, as they themselves understood it, in the wider 
set of notions which shaped their course of action when their ideas collided 
with the exigencies of war.
President Lincoln regarded his paramount duty as the saving of the 
Union. And so, he said in' reply to Horace Greeley's Prayer of Twenty 
Millions in August 1862,
if I could save the Union without freeing any slave I 
would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves 
I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and 
leaving others alone I would also do that.8*
The idea of making such a priority of an empty form of government, 
relegating freedom to "military necessity" shocked some of his contemporaries,
1. Ibid., 3 sess. pp. 1064“1066 Feb. l8th 1863»
2, David Donald, "The Radicals and Lincoln", in Lincoln Reconsidered
(Hew York; Vintage, I961), p.126.
3* Roy P. Basler (ed.) Collected Yorks of Abraham Lincoln (Hew Brunswick;
Rutgers Univ. Press 1953 9 volsTJ™V p.333-9 Aug. 22nd 1862 Hereafter
cited as Lincoln Forks.
But to Lincoln, the Union was more than a form of government* It was 
"the last, best hope of earth" - the great democratic experiment of the 
nineteenth century.Unless it could be demonstrated that government for 
the people by the people could work in so large a territorial unit, the
2,
disappointment would be one for the hopes of "the whole family of man"*
The Union was a place where opportunity and advancement were open to all, 
even a humble rail-splitter from Illinois. It was a place where the 
propertyless and the labourer had common cause with the man of property 
and capital, because he could so easily become his equal, with a bit of hard 
work and virtue*. It was a land full of resources, and people with the 
energy to develop them. Looking to the day when America would be the foremost 
of nations in industry, commerce and power, Lincoln said, "The struggle of 
today is not altogether for today - it is for a vast future also".^* These 
were the benefits of Union that secession threatened to destroy. Emancipation, 
to preserve them was, to the conservative Lincoln, no debasing mix-up of 
priorities.
The same attachment of values to the idea of Union, took the Republican 
party in the same direction, if a little faster, Rejxiblican speeches are 
full of associations between the ideas of "free institutions", democracy and 
U n i o n , F o r  them, free presses, spreading education to the masses, along 
with freedom of expression, were the cornerstones of democracy. Slavery denied
1. Ibid,, IV p,426 July 4th, l86l.
2, Ibid., VII pp*259-260 March 21st, I864.
3* Ibid., V pp, 51-53 December 3rd, I86I. The. Lincoln Works abound in 
similar statements to these on the nature of the Union.
4- The idea is well expressed by Senator Morrill, Cong.-Globe, 37th Cong.,
2 sess., pp,1074-10?7, March 5th, 1862, by Thad Stevens, Ibid., pp.439-441 
January 22nd, 1862, and in George Julian's many Speeches on Political 
Questions (lI.Y. Hurd & Houghton, I872) But the implication is present 
in so many Republican speeches, that singling out a few of them is a 
fruitless task.
11,
them to the whole Union. As Representative Lansing said,
the system (slavery) cannot live in the midst of free 
speech and a free press. Wrong is ever aggressive and violent.
Slavery is a great wrong, and can only sustain itself by warring 
upon free principles and free institutions.^'
"Free Labour" was part of the idea, and an important lead into their
antislavery position. 'Radical* Henry Winter Davis and self-styled
conservative William Cutler agreed with the Republican ethic that there
2 .was a community of interest among all labouring people. ' President Lincoln 
shared it, saying to the Hew York working men who had rioted in 1863, killing 
blacks,
Hone are so deeply interested, to resist the present 
rebellion as the working people. Let them beware of prejudice, 
working division and hostility among themselves. The most 
notable feature of the disturbance in your city last summer, 
was the hanging of some v/orking people by other working people.
It should never be so. The strongest bond of human sympathy 
outside of the family relation, should be one uniting all 
working people, of all nations and tongues and kindred.^'
The war was characterised then, as one of class against mass, aristocracy 
against democracy. Slavery degraded all labour by degrading that of the 
black man. Lest the white labourer should feel that idea a little remote, 
Henry C. Y/right reminded them of the South's attitude to labour in general, 
quoting George Fitzhugh - "Slave labour, black or white, is right, Ha'bure
has made the weak in mind and body for slaves," or "Make the laboring man
a slave and he v/ould be far better off. Instead, the Republicans would 
elevate all labour, make consummers of former slaves, and expand man's 
mastery of his environment, towards the millenium when Henry Winter Davis
1. 37th Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2274 May 22nd 1862.
2. Examples are Davis speech, Cong. Globe 37th Cong., 2 sess., pp. 1107-HOB 
and Cutler's, Ibid.. App. pp. 114-118 April, 23rd l862.
3. Lincoln Forks VII pp. 259-260 March, 21st I864.
4. Henry C, Fright in the Liberator, October 7th I864.
"would give each laborer, not a human, but an iron slave.""’
Comparisons between the freedoms they cherished in the idea of Union, 
and the antithesis of them in Southern society led many Republicans to the 
point of view that self-preservation and the best security for the future 
lay in the reconstruction of a Union founded on harmonious principles. 
Thaddeus Stevens agreed,
the principles of our Republic are wholly incompatible with 
slavery. They cannot live together. Uhile you are quieting this 
insurrection at such fearful cost, remove the cause, that future 
generations may live in peace.
Emancipation was seen as an avenue to other freedoms, the breaking down 
of what the Negro leader Frederick Douglass called the "Chinese v/all" at 
the South, and by it, the creation of a more perfect Union.
That is not to make of their hopes and assumptions a pre-arranged plan 
to turn the war into one for emancipation, but rather that when the war 
created the opportunities and the converts, it found a party whose general 
philosophy of 'Union' disposed it to accept, even welcome the challenge.
Nor is it to say that the Republicans were against slavery before they were 
for Union. The war made such a corollory of these things that Representative 
Martin P. Conv/ay stood alone in posing them as a choice, v/hen he declared in 
1863» "I would sacrifice the Union to freedom any morning before breakfast."^
Apart from relating slavery to Union, the Republicans did also find the 
idea of property in man abhorrent to their enlightened nineteenth century 
minds. Happily, their views pre-dated "scientific proof" of the inferiority
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., p.ll07 March 6th 1862.
2. Ibid., p. 441 Jan. 22nd 1862.
3. Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, Atlantic Monthly Vol. XVIII Dec.
1866 p.764.
4. Martin F, Conway to the Editor of the New York Tribune, 29th May I863 
quoted in the Liberator, June 12th 1863.
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of the Negro, and most Republicans shared with the abolitionists the view 
that the Negro was a man, whose capabilities had never been tested because 
of the prejudices which slavery had engendered both North and South. Thomas 
D. Eliot said of them,
their social degradation compelled by slavery, their trustful 
nature, their thirst for knowledge, their willingness to work for 
the wages of labor, their yearning after what the white man also 
covets - position and property which will secure position - we know 
these things. But we do not know, and will not until we give them 
the rights of man, what are their full capacities for that life which 
is above the material life and that "pursuit of happiness" which aims 
at ends beyond the horizons v/hioh slavery defines.
They were optimistic that any race which could adapt itself to slavery,
2.as Senator Pomeroy put it, could adapt itself to freedom, * Samuel 'Sunset* 
Cox and the Democrats were quite wrong in equating this optimism with a 
desire to amalgamate the races'^in social equality. The Republicans were men 
of their times, as well as elected representatives of a prejudiced public. 
Replying to Cox's charges of 'miscegenation', Republican Hutchins fairly 
reflected the sentiments of his party when he said,
because we are willing to do justice to the humblest in 
society, does it follow that we are bound to extend to them the 
same social and political privileges v/hich we enjoy? Because my 
colleague is disposed to pay his humble washerwoman a just compensation 
for her labor, shall I reproach him with the inclination to marry her, 
or invite her to his table?3*
V/hatever their private views, they were all representatives of the people, 
Radicals, argues David Donald, were elected by larger majorities than 
moderates.^* Tliey were goaded into action by their constituences, as well as 
being educators of them. Very soon after Sumter, the cry which abolitionists
1. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess,, pp. 567-73 Feb. 10th I864.
2. Ibid., 38th Cong. 2 sess., pp. 959-60 Feb. 21st I865.
3. Ibid., 1 sess., pp. 567-73 Feb. 10th I864.
4. David Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction.
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had raised for emancipation as an act of justice was swelled by a public 
opinion, which though it did not always stem from purity of moral purpose, 
or even a perception of the relationship between slavery and federalism, 
did understand that there was a connection between emancipation and winning 
the war. The quashing of General Fremont's limited proclamation of 
emancipation in August 1861, brought a storm of popular disapproval. The 
North found a new, and less embarrassing public image for emancipation, based 
on patriotism rather than philanthropy. The people discovered that "salus 
populi est suprema lex" well before Lincoln immortalised the rule in the 
Emancipation Proclamation of 1863.^*
George Selden Henry, Jr., has demonstrated that many constituences,
2 .
especially in the Northwest, were both antislavery and anti-negro, * The 
last thing that they wanted was an influx of freed negroes from the South, 
and because of geography, this was a more controversial issue in the north 
and mid-west that it was in New England. Against this background, Republicans 
had to emphasise 'necessity' and go cautiously on "equality". lUnose to whom 
the argument of the dignity of free labour was directed had to be convinced 
that their jobs would be safe from black competition.^' Emancipation was, 
therefore, presented by no less 'radical' gentlemen than Thaddeus Stevens 
and William Kelley as a means of keeping the Negro in the S o u t h . H i s  love 
of the sun became proverbial as the Republicans sought v/ays of securing 
freedom at the same time as side-stepping more searching issues of race relation:
The point at which 'Union', 'enlightenment' and 'justice' met with
1. This new public image was proclaimed by the N,Y, Tribune in the winter
of l86l - "this is no longer a question of morals, but one of common
sense and common safety." Quoted in the Liberator,- Nov.?2nd l86l.
2. George Selden Henry, Jr., Radical Reoubliean Policy Toward the Negro
During Reconstruction 1862-1872 (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale 
University 1863).
3. See also William U. Lofton Northern Labor and the Negro During the Givi]
War, Journal of Negro History Vol. XYKIV. Jly. 1949»
4* Cong. Globe, 37 Cong. 2 sess. p. 439~44i Jan. 22nd 3862; Ibid. p. 596
Jan. 31st 1862.
15.
demands for action v/as the war. And the war was a "stern and terrible
1 oteacher". ' As early as Bull Run in July I86I, Congressmen were able to 
ask, whether it was not like fighting with one arm tied behind their backs 
not to strike at slavery. Tlie immediate result w^ as the Confiscation Act 
of August 6th, 1861, which took the first hesitant steps towards emancipation, 
freeing slaves actually used in the rebellion. But the argument became more 
convincing as the Northern armies blundered through the first two years of war 
without much to show for their superior numbers and resources. Emancipation 
was urged to strike at the power of the rebellion, to lift Northern morale 
and win European sympathy by dignifying the conflict with a cause. Whatever 
arguments went on in Washington as to the powers of Congress to do anything
I
about' it, the advance of the army into parts of the seceded territory disrupted
the relationship between master and slave and sent thousands of slaves flocking
behind Union lines. But the relationship between the army and emancipation
did not remain accidental. The first proclamation of emancipation for military
reasons came from the generals - Fremont in August I86I, Hunter in May 1862.
The army became a powerful complement of the party which cared about winning
2,
the war and lending them every support to do it - the Republicans. ' And so 
the war took the Republicans from the Confiscation Act of August 6th I86I to 
the Thirteenth Amendment.
Events, however, soon demanded that it would have to take them further. 
There v/as more to the question of dissolving the relationship between slavery 
and federalism than emancipation. As Frederick Douglass said in I865, the war 
would end, and slavery would end, but the spirit of state anarchy would not
1. Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, Atlantic Monthly Vol. XVIII Dec.
1866 p. 762.
2. Harold M. Hyman (ed.) Radical Reconstruction pp. 50-51.
end with it. He predicted,
That spirit will still remain, and whoever sees the Federal 
Government extended over those Southern States will see that 
Government in a strange land, and not only in a strange land, but 
in an enemy's land, A post-master of the United States in the 
South will find himself surrounded by a hostile spirit, a United 
States marshal or United States judge v/ill be surrounded there by 
a hostile element.^*
And of course if the South were left alone to determine the fate of the
freedmen, there was no question what would happen to him surrounded by this
"hostile spirit". In 1866 the Report of the Joint Committee of Reconstruction
2 .
confirmed the worst fears of the Republicans, and Douglass' prediction.
Black codes threatened to make freedom an empty word. Loyalists and federal 
officers were harassed. The South was unrepentant. The old argument which 
related emancipation to military necessity, was soon extended to relate 
positive safeguards of civil rights in law, to future security against 
disunion. The new relationship which had to be worked out v/as between freedom 
and federalism.
But what did the Republicans mean by freedom? In their wartime speeches, 
they assumed a body of "natural", and "inalienable" rights attaching to a 
man by reason of his existence. But it was only when events in the South 
demonstrated hov/ alienable these rights were, that they had to spell them 
out, and thinlc about how to make them less alienable. A black man v/as clearly 
not free if he could not own property, earn his own living, sue and be sued, 
travel freely, marry, or defend himself in court. Nor was a white loyalist 
or a Union officer able to enjoy his natural rights if he too could not expect 
a fair trial from his peers. The problem, then was not strictly a "black" 
one. It v/as the problem of extendingthe protection of the laws to all men
1. Frederick Douglass, Speech, quoted in George L. Stearns, (comp.),, The 
Equality of AID Men before the Law Claimed and Defended; In Speeches by 
Fill jam D, Kelley. Fendell Phillips, and Frederick Douglass, (Boston;
Rand & Avery 18657 P» 37*"”
2. Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction at the First Session of 
the Thirty-Ninth Congress (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866).
17.
in the maintenance of their civil rights. The Civil Rights Act of April 
1866 for the first time defined some of these rights, the rights of a free 
man, black or white, in Massachusetts as well as Georgia, For the first 
time the nation accepted responsibility for the protection of the rights 
of the individual. It made them adjudicable in the federal courts. The 
concept of equal protection of the laws had ceased to be a sermon, and 
become positive law. Justice demanded it. But so too did political expediency. 
In the South the state judges, juries and legislatures who denied the freedman 
justice and harassed the loyal, were their former enemies. The return of the 
old ruling class was to be avoided at all costs. Before the v/ar, they had 
exercised too much power for the Republicans' liking. Now, with the vestiges 
of slavery removed from the Constitution by the Thirteenth Amendment, they
I
might wield even more, since the freedman would count as one man, instead of 
three-fifths, for the purposes of representation. Such a possibility would 
be anathema to the Republican party, whose ovm political future would be dim 
indeed. To break the hegemony of a privileged class, loyal men, black or 
white, had to be independent, free from black codes, or prejudiced courts.
He must, therefore, have recourse from the state to the nation in defence of 
his rights. And so the Civil Rights Act gave him access to the federal courts 
where he could get no satisfaction from the courts of the state.
This transition to the "equal protection" position of the pre-war 
abolitionists, was accomplished without casting the Constitution overboard 
(though the Democrats had their doubtsj) Instead, they found in the 
Constitution an instrument powerful enough to hold the Union together on 
the basis of freedom where it had failed on slavery. By oath and by conviction, 
the Republicans were servants of the Constitution - or nearly all of them. 
Representative Albert G. Riddle had doubts as to the potential of that 
instrument to supply the power to save the nation, saying
I revere and venerate the Constitution, but I love my 
country a million times more. The one was formed and may be 
dissolved by the breath of men. Tlie other is the creation
lü.
and. the growth of God; and rather than that mere constitutional 
names should stand, in the way of the nation's salvation, letter a 
thousand times solemnly roll the Constitution up and lay it 
reverently away.-•
He accurately added, "Ihese too are not sentiments of my party."
For they were not. An impressive list of statements in defence of the 
Constitution would include almost the whole party.
Even .A. G. Riddle was really talking ahout what he would do if the
possibility ever arose of the v;ar leaving behind it an empty document and
no nation. Most Republicans, including Lincoln recognised that it might be
necessary to amputate a limb to save a life. As George Julian said, "Cases
may arise in which patriotism itself may demand that v/e trample under our
2.
feet some of the most vital principles of the Constitution". * But the 
Republicans did not seek out such "cases" and very little "trampling" was 
done, even in the question of arbitrary arrests.^*
Tliey were faced with the problem of deriving enough power to save and 
reconstruct the Union, from an instrument accustomed to supplying restraints. 
The only alternative would have been the "laws of war." Such a law was 
frequently referred to, and illustrated with quotations from the publicist 
Vattel but even Thaddeus Stevens only claimed it as a supplementary power 
to the Constitution.^* The problem with the "laws of war", or "the laws of 
nations" was that, however vague and sweeping, they were both temporary - 
and. the province of the Executive and the jlrmy! To maintain a more permanent 
interest in the peace as well as the war, and to assert the superiority of 
civil procedures over the military, the Constitution v/as much more satisfactory.
1. Cong. Globe 37th Cong. 2 sess, p. 499»
2. Cong. Globe 37th Cong. 2 sess. p. 329 Jan. 14th l8o2.
3. Even James G. Randall, no friend of "emergency" legislation, concludes
that there was no wholesale denial of Civil liberties. Randall, 
Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, pp. 920-921.
4» Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess. pp. 439-441 Jan. 22nd 1862.
Tlie Constitution they invoked, however, was not that from which 
slavery drew its power, but a Constitution re-fashioned for a free people.
Tlie power to suppress insurrection was clearly constitutional - to raise 
and support armies,call forth the militia, to suppress insurrection, and 
repel invasion - but so too was the power "to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper" to execute these other povvers. And when the North 
decided that emancipation v/as both of these things, the power v/as there. To 
answer the question of the government's power to maintain that freedom, and 
the rights of all her citizens, they turned like the abolitionists, to 
interpret the Constitution in the light of its preamble, "to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, ensure domestic Tranquillity, provide for 
the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity Other parts of the Constitution,
the power to guarantee the States a Republican form of government, the comity 
clause and the Bill of Rights were complementary to this objective. When it 
came to reconstruction theory, whether they believed that the States had 
committed suicide, or were only temporarily out of their proper practical 
relation to the Union, the Republicans had something in common, Tliey 
derived the power to set conditions for the return of the states to their 
proper relation to the Union, from the Constitution, and they agreed on the 
return of the states acknowledging a Constitution with the power to protect 
the equal rights of all citizens.
Tlie very nature of this objective ensured that reconstruction would be 
the business of both the lawyer and the legislator, of both courts and 
Congresses. The concept of equality of rights in law presumed adjudication 
of these rights in courts. Political considerations, of disloyalty in the 
South, and turbulence in the border states, demanded that these courts of lav/ 
be federal, where justice could not be obtained in the states. It v/as
1. The relationship of the various theories to the Constitution, is
discussed in John C. Hurd, Theories of Reconstruction, American Law 
Review Vol. I Jan. I867.
impossible to station a federal officer at every crossroads. Uallace D. 
Parnhajii, in referring to the federal government as "a weakened spring" in 
the nineteenth century, is quite right to challenge the idea of wartime 
centralisation, saying that, "in this respect as in others the war brought 
fewer changes than it is now fashionable to believe."^' Yiar and 
Reconstruction brought the creation of no permanent bureaucratic machinery.
The Freedmen's Bureau was temporary, and staffed mostly by regular army 
officers. Immediately after the war the army itself was reduced to its 
peacetime size of 16,000 men - a mighty occupation force.' Hie enforcement 
machinery of reconstruction legislation was the federal courts - the only 
permanent presence of the nation in the States.
|Until recently, historians were satisfied with the traditional
interpretation of the Supreme Court's impotence during Reconstruction.
According to Charles barren and others, the Court never recovered its
prestige after the torrent of criticism unkeastBd on it after the Bred Scott 
2.opinion. ’ In office, the Republicans set about getting their own back by 
packing the Court and reducing its influence. So successful were they that 
the Court played a weal{ and submissive role in the Reconstruction era.
Stanley Kutler has offered a convincing reinterpretation,^, Without denying 
Republican dissatisfaction and anger v/ith the Court over Bred Scott, he 
points out that Republicans distinguished between Taney's opinion and the 
institutional relevance of the Court itself. Senator John Hale, Representative 
Thaddeus Stevens and a fev; others, may have carried their annoyance to an 
attack on the Court itself, but they never carried the Republican party with
1. Wallace B. Farnham, "The Weakened Spring of Government": A Study in
Nineteenth Century American History, American Historical Review April
1963, p. 680
2. Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (Boston
Little Brovm & Co. I96O 2 vols,).
3. Stanley J . Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago
Univ. of Chicago Press, I968), hereafter cited as Kutler Judicial Power.
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them in any designs to destroy, or signlfJ.cantly weak-n the Court. Ykiat 
the party as a viiole wanted, was to make the Court responsive to t?ieir 
own interests, and those of an expanding Union, rather than to the political 
demands of slavery, o,nd mi overrepresented South.
Republican Representative Albert G. Riddle reflected the attitudes of 
his party towards the Court, and especially their grasp of the national 
perspective of the problems they faced, when he said,
I know it (the Court) needs reconstruction, I believe 
it answers pretty well the purposes of a common-law and 
commercial court - or would, with an addition to its force.
It certainly has, through some misfortune that I care not to
discuss, fallen below the respect of the nation. Do you
propose now to reconstruct the Federal judiciary? Rhy, sir, 
the very map is dissolving about us. The Government is a 
/unit, it cannot exist in broken parts; and v/hoever strikes 
/ it down in South Carolina strikes it dov/n in Massa,chussetts.
I If you cannot enforce its laws in New Orleans, it is idle to
adjudicate them in New York. I know that by common consent 
we may continue to obey them; but the essential sanction, 
found only in national sovereignty is gone; so that a 
patriotism limited to the narrow boundaries of a State binds 
us to the inexorable necessity of restoring all the States 
under the national sovereignty; for it is only through that 
means that the integrity and safety of our own States can be 
preserved. "
The Supreme Court might not be perfect, but as the editor of the Nation
said, better leave questions of constitutionality to its jurisdiction, rather
than to a Congress sitting in thirty-hour long sessions, its members often
2 .ignorant of v/hat they were voting for. * Besides, Roger B. Taney died, 
somewhat unlamented, in I864. A mood of optimism, that there would be no 
more Bred Scott decisions, greeted the appointment of his successor Salmon 
P. Chase, a former Republican Secretary of the Treasury, with a long 
history of attachment to the principle of equal rights under law."'
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong,, 2 sess. p. ^00 Jan, 27tb 1862.
2. T1t0 Nation Vol. 10 p. 24 Aug, 15th 186?» "
3. Chase Papers LC Vol. 93» Secretary of the Navy Gideon Voiles, was less 
optimistic. He thought Chase a "sycophant", and "likely to use the 
place for political advancement Gideon hollos, The Diary of
Gideon Relies ed. by Howard K. Beale (ih?.: Norton & Co. I96O 3 vols)
II pp.' 192^193 Bec.61864,
2 2 .
But the new Chief Justice never linked his name to a Supreme Court 
opinion as notable for equal rights as Bred Scott was for slavery. The 
Court's record will be exajnined in the following chapters. It is sufficient 
to notice here that in the question of civil rights, the Court in the long 
run deferred to State police power. Stanley Kutler is probably right in 
arguing that, from a broader perspective on judicial business, the Court 
was not as "states rights" minded as historians have believed. In many 
other areas, admiralty jurisdiction, wartime licensing taxation, municipal 
bonds, and indemnification cases, it v/as willing to make a modest but 
"unprecedented" use of federal judicial p o w e r . B u t  they did not use it 
consistently in the service of equal rights. As a Court of law, the Supreme
Couri had to wait for cases. The State police power never slept. Wendell
I
Phillips put the matter quite succinctly when he said of the "freedom" 
granted by the Thirteenth Amendment,
many abolitionists have said that, "with the prohibition 
of chattel slavery, and an abolitionist for the Chief Justice, 
the negro is safe." How unwise! On the other side the State 
fence is Robert Small- and Governor Aiken. On this side is 
Salmon P. Chase and the Federal Constitution. Rhy, if Governor 
Aiken has got any brains, he can grind Robert Small to powder 
in nine hundred and ninety nine different ways without
trespassing on the Anti-Slavery Amendment; and until he does,
Salmon P. Chase cannot interfere.^*
Finally they had their own conservatism to reckon with, having been 
educated in the tradition of judicial comity, and respect for the 
traditional (large) spheres of state jurisdiction.^* Politically, although 
Chase retained his attachment to equal rights secured by impartial 
suffrage, in the late l860's, he increasingly looked to the Democrats to 
secure it - with universal amnesty. He had tired of military tribunals
1. Kutler, Judicial Power, p.1^2
2. In George L. Stearns (comp.) The Equality of All Men before the Law 
Claimed and Defended (Boston: Rand-Avery, 1865T p.31
3. The principle of judicial comity is discussed by Charles Warren
Federal and State Court Interference, Harvard Law Review Vol. XLVIII
Jan. 1930.
in the states, felt that Congress was assuming dangerous hegemony in
Johnson’s impeachment trial, and he looked forward to a speedy restoration
of the s t a t e s T h e r e  was nothing in these symptoms to mnhe him a had
Chief Justice, just a fairly conservative one. And he was only one of
nine men. Four of his colleagues in his first years a,s Chief Justice,
Nelson, Grier, Ifayne and Catron, had concurred with Taney in the Dred
Scott opinion. Nathan Clifford was a Buchanan appointee, and regarded
2.as something of a "doughface", ' Although Lincoln’s and later Grant's 
appointments helped redress this conservative balance, it still did not add 
up to a Court willing to undertake federal revolution.
It was the lower federal courts which became the real workhorses of
Reconstruction, and the Republicans began their education on how to use them 
as early as the Confiscation Acts of I86I and 1862. Thereafter, they became 
a regular feature of legislation. Twelve Acts were passed between I863 and 
1875 removing certain classes of cases from state to federal courts. It 
was not so surprising that Congress should react to conflict within the
federal system, by enlarging the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Article
III Section II of the Constitution contained a broad grant of federal 
judicial power, extended to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States and Treaties made 
or which shall be made, under their Authority ...". The surprise perhaps, 
was how little this power had been used. The circuit and district courts 
dealt mainly with admiralty cases, and cases in which there was diversity 
of citizenship. In times of crisis, however, the government's response had 
been to enlarge their jurisdiction. In I815, at the time of the Hartford
1. See Salmon P. Chase to Hamilton Fish. May 27th I868, Chase Papers
LC Letterbook Vol. II7 pt. 2 pp. 417-418 and Chase to August Belmont,
May 30th 1868, Ibid., pp.408-413.
2. Kutler, Judicial Power pp. 14-20
24-
Convention, Congress passed its first removal act since the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. Under it, revenue officers prosecuted in state courts could 
remove their cases to the federal courts. A similar act v/as passed in 
1833) again as a response to a crisis in federalism, the Nullification 
Controversy. Once again, in 1855) a removal act was proposed, though not 
passed, to deal with violations of the Fugitive Slave Law.^' In the past, 
when federal officers were unable to receive a fair trial because of 
hostility in the states to the laws they represented, the government made 
its courts the alternative. And this is exactly what they did in 1863, to 
protect Union officers under the Habeas Corpus Act, and in I866, to protect 
negroes and Southern Unionists under the Civil Rights and Freedraen's 
Bureau Acts.
It put the federal courts in the front line of the nation - state
conflict. Earlier crisis had come and gone without leaving very many
precedents. The history of the federal court system had been one of avoiding,
rather than joining conflicts. The courts of nation and state had generally
refrained from interfering with each other's process and officials. While
the judicial supremacy of the nation's courts in federal questions had been
asserted under the nationalist Chief Justices Marshall and Taney, there were
recognised limits, among them the prohibition on issuing writs of injunction
to stay proceedings in state courts, and the duty of respecting state laws
2,
where they applied to cases in federal courts.
There had to be mutual respect, while the judicial system were so 
inter-related, and the government relied on state courts to do much of 
its business. In I884, a writer in the American law Review looked back to
1. Charles Warren deals with the history of these acts in Federal and 
State Court Interference, Harvard Law Review Jan. 1930 and Federal 
Criminal Laws and The State Courts, Harvard Law Review March, 1925.
2. Ibid." ~
a time when,
,c. the doubtful policy of the founders of the government 
and of their successors, until a period comparatively recent, 
committed the execution of tlje Federal laws in part to the 
judicatories of the States; made the justices of the peace of 
the States the examining magistrates in criminal cases for the 
Federal tribunals; made the judges of the States Federal 
magistrates for the purpose of executing extradition treaties 
with foreign countries, for the purpose of naturalizing aliens, 
and in some cases for the purpose of executing the criminal 
statutes of the United States; and made the jails and prisons  ^
of the states the jails and prisons of the Federal Government.
With the removal acts of the i860's, the federal courts were called 
upon to do more business normally within the jurisdiction of the state 
courts. Offences against state Criminal law/ by Union officers, negroes 
and others, cases between citizens of the same state, and cases involving 
the rights of citizenship, could be brought to the federal courts. Officers 
of State courts who refused to relinquish jurisdiction could be imprisoned - 
after eight decades of mutual respect! Of course, the nation could still 
not afford to lose the services of the state courts in doing its business.
The object of the legislation wus to demonstrate the government's ability 
to have its laws enforced in the states - to teach the states a lesson when 
it was necessary - but preferring that they learn for themselves. Tlie record 
of the federal courts in that respect will be examined in the following 
chapters. Like the Supreme Court, they did make use of their new powers, 
but never really crossed Vfendell Phillip's "state fence" with respect to 
the Negro's equal rights under law.
Certainly, mutual respect between the courts of state and nation had 
broken down with secession and war. The federal courts were the Union's 
courts, staffed by an independent and generally better educated judiciary.
1. Thomson, Abuses of the Frit of Habeas Corpus, l8 iimerican Law 
Review p.3 (l884T~quoted in barren, Federal and State Court 
Interference p. 353-
Attorney-General Bates hob some scathing criticisms to make of tî)e
inefficiency of the federal courts, but generally they had a reputation
for reliability.^' Paid by the government and appointed for life, their
traditional obligation was to the law. State court judges were elected for
brief terms, and respect for them dwindled when it appeared that their
obligation was to their constituences rather than the law. The 'people'
who elected them were the lawbreakers who seceded. They were the Copperheads
in the border states v/ho defied the government ' a attempts to raise a,n army
and win the war. The judges who reflected them in their judicial opinions,
were those v/ho refused to transfer cases to federal courts under the removal
acts, and denied the constitutionality of all measures designed to secure
civil rights, so that a federal officer, a Southern Unionist, or a negro
was denied justice in their courts. It had not always been so. Kent and
Shaw belonged to an era of great state judges. But in I87O, a writer in the
Saturday Review could v/rite, "Few things are full of uglier omen for the
future of the United States than that growing disrespect for the judicial body
2,
which seems to be spreading itself through the country."
Professional journals at this time are full of laments for the effects 
of democracy on the state judiciary. Where the original state constitutions 
had provided mostly for the appointment of judges for life, or "during good 
behaviour", by the Governor andj or the legislature, by the l880's, only New 
Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Delaware retained this procedure. 
The rest had succumbed to the tides of the democratic urge to elect all 
public servants, including the judges.^' John F. Dillon found that the effects 
of this change on the standards of the state judiciary was one of the few
1. Edward Bates, The Diary of Edward Bates ed. by Howard K. Beale
(Washington; U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1933) P- 356.
2. Quoted in The Albany Law Journal, March, 19th I87O p.219
3. W. Raymond Blackard, The Demoralization of the Legal Profession in
Nineteenth Century America, Id Tenn. Law Review, 194-8 PP- 315-316 
hereafter cited as Blackard, Demoralization of the Legal Profession,
Iblemishes in a century of American Law J' ' Contemporary critics agreed "Uiat
it tied judges too closely to the interests of the people who elected them
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and stood in the way of the efficient administration of justice. ' Not all 
comment was unfavourable. Tie Yale jurist Simeon Baldwin had enough faith 
in the people to think that although they might not choose more wisely than 
the legislature, they might choose more honestly.^' Secession after all, had 
not put state legislatures in any happier a light than "the people". Most 
of the new state constitutions altered the balance of power within the state 
by hedging in the legislatures with more restrictions. And so James Schouler 
felt that the direct election of judges made them more independent, and more 
efficient, by freeing them from the influence of the legislature.^'* By the 
time he wrote, however, in 1897, the states were trying to temper democracy 
with "sober sense". New York's 1873 constitution extended the tenure of 
judges to fourteen years, and Pensylvania's constitution of the same year to 
twenty-one.
There were, of course, exceptions to this blanlcet condemnation of state 
judges. Max v/e 11 Bloomfield cites the career of Isaac F. Redfield, chief 
justice of the Vermont Supreme Court, as an example of a distinguished jurist, 
annually re-elected from 1835 to i860 yet often opposing the political current 
of his state. * Judges Sidney Breese in Illinois and Thomas McIntyre Cooley 
in Michigan had fine reputations. During the reconstruction period, there 
were even loyal judges in disloyal districts, but the evidence suggests that 
they were often "carpetbaggers", nominated to the court by governors or
1. John F. Dillon, A Century of American Law, 13 New York Bar Assoc.
Journal (I89O) p. 251.
2. Daniel Chamberlain, "The State Judiciary, Its Place in the American 
Constitutional System in Constitutional History of the United States as 
seen in the Development of American Law. (N.Y , 188^ George C . Barret,
The Administration of Criminal Justice, Journal of Social Science, 
Transactions of the American Assoc., Vol. 2, I87O.
3. Simeon E. Baldwin, Recent Changes in Our State Constitutions, Journal
of Social Science, Transactions of the American Association, Vol.10 1879 p.l
4. James Schouler, Constitutional Studies, State and Federal (N.Y. Dodd, Mean
& Co. 1897) pp. 289-292.
5. Maxwell Bloomfield, Law Vs. Politics - The Self-Image of the American Bar
(I83O-I860), American Journal of Legal History, Vol. 12 Oct. I968 p.3CS 
hereafter cited as Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics.
state conventions, rather than by direct vote of the people» One of these
men, George Andrews, served on the Tenossoe Supreme Court from I869 to
I87O5 and endeavoured to serve the cause of impartial justice.^* Albion
Tourgee served on the North Carolina Supreme Court from I868 to I876,
later describing his stand against political currents there as a "Fool's 
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Errand," ‘ There must have been variations, and a great deal more work on 
the lives of individual judges will have to be undertaken before a satisfactory 
judgement can be made on their competence. But there certainly was a wide­
spread feeling that the integrity, perhaps more than the competence of the 
state judges had fallen lower than ever before.
The task of securing equal justice in law, involved the bar as well as 
the ^ench. Yet, says tï. Raymond Blackford, the crisis of the mid-nineteenth 
century found the legal profession "demoralized" and ill-equipped to meet it. 
The Jacksonian "cult of incompetence" bred a hostility to professionalism 
in the law. Every right-thinking man could be his ov/n lawyer, butcher, balcer, 
or even President of the United States. Standards of admission to the bar, 
which were high in the Revolution period, were eroded in the first half of the 
Nineteenth century. Alexis de Tocqueville had observed in the l830's that 
the laxvyers were America's aristocracy, but by the middle of the century, it 
seemed to later observers, they merged with the mediocrity of "democratic" 
society. In Indiana, a prospective candidate for admission to the bar needed 
no professional qualifications. Elsewhere, property, age and educational 
standards were lowered. Lawyers meddled in politics. Deprived of the 
leadership of a respectable bench, they presented a sorry picture of 
incompetence. Blackard concludes that, "The lowest ebb in the downward course 
was reached shortly after the bar between the States".^*
1. Harold M. Hollingsworth, George Andrews; Carpetbaggers, Tennessee 
Historical Quarterly Vol. 28 1969 pp. 310-323.
2. Albion Y. Tourgee, A Fool's Error, ed. by John Hope Fr‘anltlin (Cambridge: 
Belknap, I961).
3. Blackard, Demoralization of the Legal Profession.
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Yet obviously this judgement conceals a wide difference in
professional standards. Perry Miller points to the rising standards of
law schools in the 1820's, and the fine leadership of Kent, Storey and
Hoffman in legal scholarship, as a contrast to lax standards especially
in the Ilest.’* This could not be so easily submerged by the democratic
ethos of Jacksonianism. Maxwell Bloomfield has recently suggested some of
the ways in which this professionalism was not lost, but grew between I83O
and i860. Bar associations increased. So too did legal periodicals, which
worked hard to promote a suitable professional image to allay popular fears
of their mystique, or aristocracy. The image was one of hard work, integrity,
utility, of a profession open to all, but demanding high standards. By i860,
the lawyers had acquired a new respectability, and a self-awareness. Only
2,
third-rate lawyers combined a legal and political career.
These developments are worth noting. The professional pride of the 
1870's exemplified by the New York Bar Association must have had roots in 
the past. An attempt to describe a trend in professionalism, either up or 
dov/n, fails to take account of real variations in standards. Be Bussy 
Professor of Law at Harvard, Emory Washburn was impressive, when he called 
upon the legal-profession to fulfil its duty to the times. He said,
such a violence has been done to our institution such a strain 
has been made upon the strength of the common bond that bound us 
together as a nation, that it will require the wisest counsel, the 
calmest judgement, and the most devoted patriotism to restore the 
government again to anything like harmonious action.
These were the qualities of the lawyer, rather than the politician or 
businessman.
1. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America (N.Y.: Harecurt, Brace & 
World Inc. I965) pp. 134-143.
2. Bloomfield, Law vs. Politics.
3. Emory Washburn, Reconstruction: The Duty of the Profession to the Times, 
26 Monthly Law Reporter 278 (1864I
Incredibly, it is the same profession that Gilbert Pillsbury wrote
about in a letter to Salmon P. Chase in 1867, when he asked his advice
on drawing up a constitution for South Carolina. The convention, he
said, "... will be composed, no doubt, mainly of loyal men; but we do
not know a single loyal man of the legal profession in the state, who will
be likely to participate in the deliberations of that body",^° And surely
not because they had all forsaken politics for legal professionalism!
Another correspondent of Chase's wrote that the bar of Maryland was "generally
2.disloyal", in a state which never left the Union,
Policies conceived in distant Washington had to take their chance in
the courts all the way down the system, and proverbially there was "many
a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip," Justice depended on so many parts of
the system working on its behalf, that Congress' legislative expertise and
good intentions could quite easily be negated by a judge and court v/ho came
to interpret the Civil Rights Act, either ignorant of law, or hostile towards
blacks. Aware of that possibility, the Republicans sought v/ays of avoiding
the wealcest part of the system - the state bench and bar. By expanding the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, they gave the litigant an alternative
means of securing justice, and the government a foot in the states to see
to the execution of its laws - the execution of their reconstruction
policies. The education of the Republican party in legislative possibilities,
and/
the nature of the xvar, their ov/n powers, the use of federal courts began 
very soon after the v/ar began - with the Confiscation Acts of August l86l 
and July 1862.
1, Gilbert Pillsbury to Chase, Sept. 24th I867, Chase Pacers LG Vol. 99
F . I 4 9 5 9 .
2. Hugh L. Bond to Chase, Nov. 13th 3865, Chase Papers LC Vol.96 f.14355
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C H A P T E R  I I  
■ CONFISCATION
Looking back on the Confiscation Acts of I86I and 1862, Republican
Senator John Sherman concluded that they had "little influence upon the
result of the w a r " ' Very little property was actually confiscated. The
emancipation sections of the acts were quickly overshadowed by Lincoln's
Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment. Knowing this, historians have
seemed unwilling to unravel the lengthy debates on an issue which consummed
the energies of the Republican party for quite a long time. Those who have,
notably James G, Randall, have come to the same conclusions about the
ineffectiveness of the acts, as Senator Sherman, differing from him only in
2.
seeing confiscation as a vindictive, and ill-considered war measure.
Yet it is perhaps because Republicans in the winter of 1861-1862 could 
not have known where events would take them, that the subject deserves close 
attention. Confiscation and emancipation provided the first real forum for 
a debate on the nature of the war. But because it involved asking questions 
about v/hether they were fighting enemies, or subduing traitors, persuading 
them back by offering them their old constitutional liberty, or reaching 
for a new constitutional liberty for all men as the fruits of victory, 
they were also talking about reconstruction. Perceptively, Republican 
Representative Albert G. Riddle recalled the first steps,
already the two Houses, twin giants, congenitally bound 
to act together, helpless when divided, all powerful v/hen in 
harmony, were beginning to awaken end but half seeing in the 
twilight, were clumsily fumbling about, for the unaccustomed 
weapons, which they felt must be within reach somewhere.
1. John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and 
Cabinet (Chicago: The Ternsr Co. 1895 2 vols) I pp.314-315"
2. James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana: 
University of 111iîîoïs Press, I964) Ch.XII, hereafter cited as 
Randall, Constitutional Problems.
3. jVlbert G. Riddle, Recollections of far Timeso Reminiscences of Men 
and Events in Washington 1960-1865 (N.Y.: G. P . Putnam 1395)' P.75•
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Confiscation was a belligerent right, exercised during the Revolutionary
War with Britain, confirmed by the Supreme Court under Marshall,^* and
expounded by the publicists of the law of nations. Yet to admit that
the United States v/as at war with an independent Southern Confederacy,
was to recognise secession, and undercut the objective of restoring states
to a Union from which such secession was argued impossible. But to
exercise only the sovereign power, to conduct the war as a grand assize
to bring individual traitors to justice was absurd. Looking to efficiency
in waging the v/ar, the Republicans in effect accepted the "dual status"
theory later expounded by Justice Grier in the Prize Cases, that the United
2 •
States possessed both belligerent and sovereign powers over the rebels.
The simplicity of the theory does not reflect the confusion of Congress in 
combining the two legal concepts in the one piece of legislation, as they 
did in the Confiscation Act of 1862,
Supporters of a vigorous confiscation policy, like Lyman Trumbull in 
the Senate,, or Thomas Eliot in the House, could advocate it as a measure 
of co-ercion, justified under the war power of the Constitution, without 
waiving the sovereign power to deal with traitors by ordinary judicial 
process. The problem lay with the.conservatives. Democrats and 
Republicans, v/ho were more willing to use sovereign than belligerent powers 
over the Confederacy* . It was not that they denied the power to confiscate - 
even slaves - in times of military necessity. But the power belonged to 
the executive as commander-in^chief of the armed forces, and confiscations 
made under his authority were temporary, the title reverting to the ov/her
lo Brown Vs U.S. 8 Granch 143*
2. The Prize Cases 67 U.S. 633*
3. Leading speeches to this effect are those by Lyman Trumbull, Cong.
Globe, 37th Cong., 942-944 February 25th, 1862, and Rep. Thomas
Eliot, Ibid., p.2235 May 20th, 1862.
3.3.
'■hen the' emergency was over. Otherwise, property could not he seized without 
due process, or compensation, or a jury trial over a certain amount. Rebels 
were subjects who retained their constitutional rights. If caught and 
found guilty of treason, then by the 1790 law, they forfeited their lives, 
but under the Constitution they kept their real estate. The Constitution 
stated that no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood,
or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted". Not all 
the rebels, conservatives like Browning and Cowan wisely insisted, should 
pay the ultimate judicial penalty. Looking to a forgiving peace, they 
sought to change the lav; of treason, to mitigate its penalty by providing 
alternatives of imprisonment and fines for lesser crimes, leaving discretion 
in its application to the courts. But since this was an exercise of 
sovereign power, its enforcement would have to wait until that power was 
re-established, and its courts open. It was no war measure. Thus, while 
armies were raised to shoot down rebels, compromise had to be made with 
those v/ho would take lives, but not land and slaves without due process 
and the benefit of common law. That compromise, the Confiscation Acts of 
August 6th, l86l, and July 17th, 1862, was an unsatisfactory patchwork of 
the two concepts of sovereign and belligerent powers.^'
A second area of confusion and conflict, was in the association of
"confiscating" property and persons. The right to do both could be argued
under Congress's war powers, of raising and supporting armies, making rules
concerning captures on land and water, and doing all things necessary and
proper to make these powers effective. Solicitor of the War Department,
William ihiting argued that there was no legal distinction between different
2
kinds of property, including slaves, in their liability to confiscation.
1. Leading speeches on the conservative constitutional view are those by 
Edgar Cowan Ibid., pp. 1050-1053, March 4'On, l8o2, .and Orville Browning 
Ibid., pp.1136-1141, March 10th, 1862.
2. William Yhiting, Tar Powers Under the Constitution (Boston: Lee& 
Shepard, I871), p.oO. Hereafter cited as 7,hi ting, Tar Powers.
34
Some Republicans would argue that if an ox could be confiscated, why not
a slave?^* Nevertheless the acts made no attempt to confiscate slaves, or
to transfer title in them to the government. The Confiscation Acts employed
quite different machinery in the case of persons than property. The house
argued emancipation in a separate bill from confiscation; the title of
the original Senate bill was one "to confiscate the property and free the
slaves of rebels". It was conservatives like Senator Garret Davis who
lamented, "All that the Union slaveholders ask for slave property is, that
it shall be treated by Congress and the Government and the Army impartially
2,
and equally like other property".
For, while property was subject to condemnation in the federal courts, 
the freeing of the slaves rested on no judicial process. To have included 
slaves in confiscation proceedings would have been to recognise property 
in man, and make emancipation ineffective by subjecting slaves to the delays 
and uncertainties of judicial proceedings. The debate reveals quite clearly 
that the Republicans intended this emancipation to be irreversible, this 
national law to take precedence over all existing state or national lav/.
And so in both acts they attempted to extend some kind of judicial guarantee 
to the freedmaii against re-enslavement. That they did so awkwardly and 
inadequately is not surprising. In this first contest between freedom and 
slavery, the legislators were entering a sensitive area of nation-state 
relations. Slavery existed under state law, until now immune from the 
government’s interference. As yet there was no alternative of national 
responsibility for freedom. Congressmen were often confused therefore, 
about the legal questions involved in the emancipation sections of the
1. Fernando Beaman, Cong. Globe,'2 sess., App. pp.203-205, May 24th, 1862.
2. Ibid., P0I763, April 22nd, 1862.
j)
Confiscation Acts. If title to the slave had not been transferred to the
government, did it belong to the slave or the owner? In what courts, and
against whom - the government or the slave - would an owner bring suit? 
Questions such as these remained with Congress until the Thirteenth Amendment 
permanently extinguished the owner’s title to his slave.
Fewr Congressmen grasped the complexities of these issues when they
passed the first Confiscation Act, which became law on August 6th, l86l.
Most Republican members could accept the limited objective of confiscating 
property and divesting the title of owners to slaves actually used for 
insurrectionary purposes. There was no debate on the little-known 
judicial machinery which the act employed. After the President had caused 
property, anywhere in the Union, used for such hostile purposes, to be 
seized, its condemnation and forfeiture v/as to talce place in federal 
district and circuit courts, and the property sold, the proceeds going 
to the Treasury. The proceeding was to be in rem, and not dni personam - 
in other words an action against guilty property, not resting on the actual 
criminality of the owner. No jury trial was necessary to establish his 
guilt. The court was only concerned with the predicament in which the 
property was found. This machinery, drawn from revenue acts, was to become 
a major cause of disagreement in the debates on the second Confiscation Act. 
But in 1861, it passed unnoticed, perhaps because Congressmen foresaw no 
difficulty in the court's identifying the guilty predicament of property 
actually used in rebellion, or perhaps because they were so unfamiliar with 
the procedure.^'
Tîhen Trumbull introduced the bill from the Senate Judiciary Committee
1, Defenders of the same procedure in the second Confiscation Act often 
made the point that there had been no objection to it in August, I86I. 
Representative U. F. Thomas, who had been on the Judiciary Committee, 
and voted for it then, opposed it in 1862, making the point that 
under the August act, the guilty predicament of property actually 
used in rebellion would be clear. Ibid.. App. p.202, May 24th, 1862.
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on July 20th, it contained no reference to slaves. The fact that his 
amendment to the hill, emancipating slaves employed in aiding or promoting 
insurrection, was adopted by 33 votes to 6 on July 22nd by a Senate 
deliberating the Johnson resolutions, can be partly attributed to the 
impact of the Bull Run disaster the previous day. Ten Eyck said that 
although he voted against the amendment in committee, the recent reverse 
had caused him to change his mind. Representative Me d e m a n d  argued that 
if Confederate horses could be confiscated, why not slaves?^*
But the judicial machinery for freeing a slave differed from that for
seizing a horse. The House did not adopt Representative Kellogg's amendment
to put the two on the same footing by "confiscating" claims to service
or labour, rather than "discharging" the slaves in Senator Trumbull's 
2.original wording. ' Section four of the Act, as finally amended by the 
House and accepted by the Senate, neither "discharged" nor "confiscated", 
but provided that when slaves were employed in any military or naval 
services whatsoever, the owner would forfeit his title to the slave, state 
or United States law to the contrary notwithstanding, There the title went, 
was left unsaid. The slave, it seemed could not bring suit against his 
owner to establish his freedom under the act. It presumed escape. After 
that, the slave's guarantee of defending his freedom rested on the provision 
that it was sufficient answer to an owner's claim, to establish the use of 
the slave for the such hostile and insurrectionary purposes described in 
the act.^*
Conservative Senator Pearce noted that emancipation did not involve 
the legal sentence of any tribunal, and doubted what good it would do the
1. The amendment passed on July 22nd Cong. Globe, 1 sess., p.218 July 22nd,
l86l; Ten %ck'a speech, Ibid., p.219 July 22nd, l86l; and McClernand's; 
Ibid., p.411 August 2nd, l86l.
2. Ibid., p.410 Aurmst 2nd, 1861.
3. 12 U.S. Stat. 319.
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slave. Tie argued, quite perceptively in the light of later experience of 
conflict "between federal and state law,
the state courts would undoubtedly set it at defiance. If 
you could cause the individual to be discharged in such a State, 
it is most probable that the State laws would immediately be put 
in operation against him and that he would be subjected to a 
procedure by which he would again be remanded to the condition 
of servitude.
Against this, that section of the act malcing the fact of the use of
the slaves for insurrectionary purposes an answer to the owner's claim
for his services, seems a poor guarantee. In the priorities of the special
session of Congress in the summer of I86I, the business of effectively
suppressing the rebellion took precedence over emancipation, and much
more so over a quest for its legal guarantees to the slave. The act passed
both Houses with near-unanimous Republican support, and became law on
August 6th, 1861. It was a limited undertaking, confined to places where
the United States could assert its authority, and even there rarely 
2,
enforced. ‘* Senator Ben Tade later referred to it as "a scoff and a 
by-word of contempt throughout all rebeldpm".^*
But events between August, I86I and July, 1862, when Congress passed 
its second Confiscation Act, moved in favour of those who advocated 
sterner measures. Increasing military involvement meant that more slaves 
were coming behind Union lines. General Butler's use of the term 
"contraband" to describe those slaves the army had captured at Ft. Monroe, 
helped po%)ularise the connection between emancipation and confiscation as 
twin war measures. Edy/ard L, Fierce wrote in November, I86I
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 1 sess., p.219, July 22nd, I86I.
2. Enforcement of the act is best covered in Henry B. Shapiro, 
Confiscation of Confederate Property in the North (N.Y.; Cornell 
Unlveivsity Press, 1952) pp. 15-2'^
3. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., po2203, May 19th, 1862.
the venerable gentleman v-ho wears gold spectacles and reads
a conservative daily prefers confiscation to emancipation .....
His whole nature rises in insurrection when Beecher preaches in 
a sermon that a thing ought to be done because it is a duty, but 
he yields gracefully when Butler issues an order commanding it 
to be done because it is a military necessity.
At a time when public opinion was clamouring for action from General
McClellan, it seemed that he and Halleck were using the army for little
more than rounding up escaping slaves to return to their masters. By
contrast, generals like Fremont, Butler and Hunter, who freed slaves and
confiscated property, won popular approval. They also won the tacit support
of the V/ar Department. Indeed, General Tovmsend claimed that Secretary of
War Stanton had prepared a proclamation declaring forfeit all slaves and
other property of persons engaged in rebellion. But because of confusion
and friction over such military orders, he instead "... instigated the
2,
Second Confiscation Act".
If the Forth was slow to take the war seriously, the South v/as not.
In August 1861, the Confederate Congress passed a Confiscation Act which
was less sensitive towards'Northern property rights than the Union Congress’
policy proved to be towards the rebels. Confederate Attorney-General Judah
3.P. Benjamin proceeded to enforce it vigourously against loyal men, * To 
the North, the policy of confiscation and emancipation, as weapons against 
a rebellion based on land and slaves commended itself more and more. It 
v/ould also help to raise money to defray the cost of the v/ar - though this 
was only a secondary argument.
Responding to these events, and the rising tide of public opinion in 
favour of emancipation, both Congress and the President moved to a more
1. Edward L, Pierce,' Tie Contrabands at Fortress Monroe. Atlantic 
Monthly, Vol. VIII, November, I86I.,
2. Benjamin P. Tnomas and Harold M. Hyman, Stanton: Ute Life ^.d Times
of Lincoln's Secretary of V/ar (N.Y.; Alfred A. Knopf, I962), p.234-246.
3. Tie Confederate Confiscation Acts ai*e printed in Vi 11 lam Tnitirig, Tar 
Powers, pn.411-424) James G. Blaine in Twenty Years of Congress 
{Norwich: The I'enry'Bill Publishing Co., I884, 2 vols.) I pp.348-349 
cites it as a reason for the passage of a sterner bill in 1862.
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vigourous policy. Republicans in the second session of the Thirty-seventh 
Congress passed an act for emancipation of slaves in the District of Columbia, 
an additional article of war prohibiting the armed services from returning 
fugitive slaves, and a resolution to aid emancipation in the border states. 
Though Lincoln's interest in emancipation was tempered by his concern for 
border state opinion, there was nothing to suggest that he was hostile to 
Congress's right to legislate on confiscation. Supporters of such a policy, 
like Loomis in the House of Representatives, and Wilkinson in .the Senate 
could point to the fact that although Lincoln asked General Fremont to 
modify his proclamation of August 30th, it was to conform to the Confiscation
Act of 1861,^ * Writing to Senator Browning of Illinois, the President
objected to Fremont's permanent confiscation of titles to property and 
slaves as a political action, rather than temporary orders under military 
necessity. "He said that he was not denying the propriety of Congress 
passing such an act, or even saying that as a member of Congress he would 
not vote for it, but
what I object to is that I, as President, shall expressly
seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the
government = ^ .
By March 1862, Lincoln v/as making moves towards the border states 
to persuade them of the benefits of gradual, compensated emancipation. And 
although he revoked General Hunter's emancipation proclamation of May 19th, 
1862, he took the opportunity of appealing to the border states to 
emancipate in the light of these "signs of the times".
It v/as against this background that Congress debated the second 
Confiscation Bill, Despite public opinion in favour of strong measures,
1. Cong. Globe, 37tb Cong., 2 sess., App. p.l80, May 23rd, 1862;
Ibid., pp.2990-2992, June 28th, 1862.
2. Roy P. Busier (ed.), Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (Hew 
Brunswick; Rutgers University Press, 1953, 9 volsj, IV pp.531-533 
September 22nd, I86I. Hereafter cited as Lincoln, Collected "Vorkso
3. Proclamation to the border states. Ibid., V pp.145-146, March 6th,
1862; revocation of Hunter's proclamation. Ibid., V.pp.222-223, May
19th, 1862,
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it took six months of debate, two Judiciary Committees, two Select 
Committees, and a Committee of Conference of the two Houses to produce 
the act. The final compromise was the bill which became law on July 17th, 
l862o The first four sections related to punishments on conviction of 
treason, providing alternative, lesser penalties at the court's discretion 
for the crime of inciting, assisting or engaging in rebellion. This 
section, dealing with persons convicted of crime by regular judicial 
process, was an exercise of the sovereign power* It was also the contri­
bution of a divided Senate to the bill. Sections five to eight set out 
procedures for the condemnation and forfeiture of the property of designated 
classes of rebels immediately after the passage of the act, and of all 
rebels who did not return to their allegiance after sixty days. As in the 
August 6th act, the jurisdiction of the federal courts was extended to 
these in rem proceedings against property. The guilt of the owner was not 
to be judicially ascertained. That phrt of the act rested on the war 
powers, later confirmed by the Supreme Court in Miller Vs ÏÏ.S. in 1870.^*
It also represented the House contribution to the act. Sections nine to 
twelve dealt with slaves. Slaves of persons thereafter engaged in 
rebellion, escaping behind Union lines, deserted or captured were to be 
deemed "captives of war" and declared "forever free". Ovmers reclaiming 
their services were required to prove not only the validity of their 
claim, but past loyalty to the Union. A further section authorised the 
President to make provisions for the voluntary colonisation of slaves 
freed by the act. Lacking judicial proceedings to emancipate, it was, 
therefore, an exercise of the v/ar powers. These sections, and an authorisa­
tion to the President to grant amnesty to rebels, represented areas of
compromise between House and Senate. Tlie act concluded with a, grant of
2,
full power to the federal courts to carry these powers into effect.
1. Miller Vs. U.S. 78 U.S. 268 (I870).
2. For the provisions of the act see 12 U.S. Stat. 589.
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Senator Trunbull never intended suoh a patchwork affair. On January
15th, ho reported a bill from the Senate Judiciary Committee, to which
seven confiscation proposals had already been sent in the opening week
of the session* Explaining this bill to the Senate on February 25th,
Trumbull stressed that it was a measure for the vigourous suppression of
rebellion, based not on "necessity" but on powers derived for this purpose
from a quite adequate Constitution*^' But it had nothing to do with
on
treason. Respecting the constitutional limitation'^attainder of treason 
working corruption of blood or forfeiture beyond the life of the person 
attainted, the bill proposed to leave traitors to the judgment of the 
courts where they could be tried, l^ iere they could not be reached, he 
invoked the right of confiscation, by the army in disloyal areas,and by 
in rem proceedings in district courts where their property was situated 
in the loyal states. This procedure, already used in the August 6th act, 
was borrowed from revenue laws which extended admiralty jurisdiction over 
seizures of smuggled goods, without trial of the owner for crime. In the 
case of The Palmyra in 1827, Justice Story's made just the distinction 
between the concept of guilty property and the trial of persons, which 
Trumbull now made between confiscation and treason proceedings v/hen he 
said,
the practice has been, and so the court understands the 
law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and 
wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding in personam.2-
Although Trumbull now proposed the extension of federal court 
jurisdiction to the condemnation, forfeiture and sale of property under 
a confiscation law, there was to be no enlargement of the courts' discretion. 
There were to be no juries, no trial of persons, and the bill mentioned
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., pp.942-943, February 25th, 1862.
Tie text of 5 153 is printed in the Globe, Ibid., p.1758, April 22nd, 
l862o
2o Tie Palmyra 12 wheaton 1 (l827).
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no crimes. It was for Congress, not the Executive, the courts, or the 
army, to get 0. law on the subject. In an argument similar to that which 
Republicans would later draw on from the Supreme Court opinion in Luther 
Vs Borden to support congressional reconstruction policy, Trumbull cited 
Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion in Brown Vs U.S. that the right to 
confiscate resided in the sovereign power, and that the judicial department 
must give effect to its will.^* Trumbull concluded
it does not lie in the mouths of the courts to question 
the right of the sovereign power to confiscate property. Then 
it resolves itself into a question of policy.2.
There was a v/ar on. This was essentially the case of those who ranged 
behind Trumbull as he opened the six-month struggle for an efficient law. 
Immediately, it became quite clear that the issue was a divisive one for 
the Republican party, as the debate opened out to a conflict over the nature 
of the war, rebel status, legislative powers, and reconstruction.
Conservative Senators Edgar Cowan of Pensylvania, Jacob Collamer of 
Vermont, and. Orville Browning of Illinois, were the most prominent opponents 
of the bill - though not, they claimed, of confiscation. They agreed that 
under certain circumstances, it was necessary to confiscate under the 
jus belli. But to legislate on the subject, v/as to interfere with the 
President's sole power as commander-in-chief, to authorise such seizures 
by the army. Titles to property, of course, remained unaffected by 
temporary confiscation.^* A writer in the Monthly Law Reporter argued 
that all "respectable v/riters" recognised a broad distinction in the law
1. Luther Vs Bordon 7 Howard 47 arose out of the Dorr rebellion and
related to Congress' powers to determine what was a "republican form 
of government". Chief Justice Taney expressed the opinion that it was 
a political question to be decided by Congress; Brown Vs U.S. 8 Crunch 
143 - opinion rendered by Chief Justice John Marshall in I8I4, on a 
case concerning seizure of British cargo at the outbreak of the 1812 war. 
2* Cong, Globe, 37th Cong., 2 -sess., p.944> February 25th, 1862,
3. See speeches by Cowan, Ibid., p.1053 March jib, 1862; Browning,
Ibid., pp.1136-7, Mwrch 10th, 1862; and Collamer, Ibid., pp.l8C8-l8lO 
April 24th, 1862.
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of nations between the capture of real and personal property. Only the 
latter could he seized under the power of the commander-in-chief. Title 
to land could not he extinguished without the constitutional safeguards 
of due process, jury trial and compensation.^'*
The proposed jn rein proceeding violated the constitution on all these
grounds. Senator Browning referred to ’^this newly-invented, India-ruhher
in rem proceeding". His colleague Collamer called it "hocus pocus".
Garret Davis and Edgar Cowan both argued that the property itself yielded
no clue to its guilt from appearances, without the trial of persons.
Trumbull's bill, they said, was in fact about the guilt of persons - but
it was a legislative assumption of this guilt. Congress having taken upon
2,
itself the functions of judge and jury. * Senator Carlile added that, in 
so reducing the discretion of the court,
.■ it would seem as if the authors of the bill, conscious of
the unconstitutionality of the proposed measure, purposely framed 
it so that its constitutionality could not be pronounced upon by 
the Supreme Court.3*
It did, .he said, what the Constitution prohibited - it executed itself.
The conservatives foresaw a different role for the courts. Clever in 
rem proceedings, they said, could not disguise the crime they were talking
about. Only the courts could try the guilt of traitors. The accused was
entitled to the safeguards of criminal law, and if convicted, to the 
constitutional prohibition on forfeitures of real estate beyond life,^' It'was 
not that they proposed a mass hanging. Since their reasoning was based 
firmly on the idea of not offending future neighbours, by taking their 
property, or their lives, they distinguished always between the guilty
1. Anon. Tne Power of Congress to Confiscate and Emancipate. Llonthly 
Lavi Reporter, Vol 24, June, 1862.
2. Comments by Browning, 37'th Cong. p. 1859 April 29th, 1862, Collamer,
Ibid., pp.1808-1810 April 24th, 1862, Davis, Ibid., pol?62 April 22nd,
1662 and Cowan, Ibid., pp.2959-2963 July 27th, 1862.
3. Ibid., p.1157 March 11th, 1862.
4o See especially the speech by Democrat Henderson, Ibid., p.1573 
April 8th, 1862, and Republican Cowan, Ibid., pp.1052-1053 March
.4th, 18620
-fev/ who led. the rebellion, and, the "deluded masses" who followed.^' To 
all they would offer their constitutional rightsi Tiiis view would of course 
have negated confiscation as a policy for fighting the war. The courts in 
most rebellious districts were closed.
Point for point, supporters of a vigourous policy met these objections.
Though they claimed the right of confiscation as legislative rather than
executive, it did not necessarily imply conflict with Lincoln. To avoid
the problems of each commander on the spot formulating his ov/n policy,
and to ensure the permanent transfer of title. Republican Senators like
Trumbull, Howard and Morrill wanted a law on the subject. Indeed, Senator
Howard saw the bill as coming to the rescue of the President in putting
2,down the rebellion, ' Solicitor V/illiam Whiting of the War Department 
recognized the powers of both branches of the government to confiscate and 
saw no need for conflict,^* Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, 
expressed a familiar Republican sentiment when he said he would "not allow 
any discrimination anywhere but in the law"
Tlie procedural guarantees of criminal law to the individual had to be 
weighed against the business of putting down a rebellion which threatened 
to destroy all law. They were at war, and the Constitution did not restrict 
them to fighting it according to common law. If that were the case, said 
T7illiam Tbiting, the President ought to convert his armies into lawyers and 
juries and send "Greetings" instead of rifle shot. Heither did the 
Constitution have to be thrown overboard, for, said a writer in the Monthly 
Law Reporter the "salus populi suprema lex applies to constitutional as 
to all other law". Whatever safeguards the Constitution contained, as 
to treason trials, due process, jury trials and so on, these existed side
1. A recurrent theme in conservative speeches, but typically expressed 
by Browning, Ibid., pp.1136-1137 March, 10th, 1862.
2. Ibid., pp.1714-1720 April 18th, 1862.
3. lAilliam tbiting, V7ar ? owners, pp<>27~2S.
4. Cong. Globe, 37th Gong., 2 sess., pol897 May 1st, 1862.
5. billiam V,hi ting, tar Ro'-ers, p.50. •
by side with specific povors to put down rebellion. The document, he said 
should be understood as a whole, concluding
cry not peace, peace when there is no peace. Let us not 
hear the special pleading of the courts of judicature in the 
counsels of war.^ "
Besides, Charles Sumner, Radical Senator for Massachusetts, v/as 
one of several Republicans who defended i_n rem proceedings as quite proper 
procedural due process in courts of lav/, and claimed that the rights which 
the federal government exercised against enemies did not negate their
2 .rights towai'ds them as criminals, where common law safeguards would apply.
But, they insisted - this bill was not about treason.
If less sensitive towards the peacetime constitutional rights of 
rebels in time of war, supporters of a vigourous confiscation policy were 
no less aware than the conservatives, of the future role of rebels as 
neighbours and of the distinctions between the leaders and the led. The 
bill was amended on April 26th to make that distinction.^* Malice was 
not their intention. As Senator Howard said, "77e conquer but to save".^*
To the bill's supporters, it was a question of policy to accomplish a 
"démocratisation" of the South which would benefit those with no active 
interest in preserving the rule of a privileged class. It was a rebellion 
led by landowners and slaveowners, with vested political and social privileges. 
Although there were many Southerners, quite apart from four million slaves, 
with no such interests or privileges, they could not take advantage of the 
technical democracy of having a vote where traditions of political leader­
ship were firmly rooted in the hereditary ownership of land and slaves. 
Discussing the relationship between the war and democracy, Senator Morrill
1. Anon. The Rlrht to Confiscate and Emaneirate. Monthly Law Reporter 
Vol.24 September, 1862, p.648.
2. Cong. Globe,. 37th Cong., 2 sess., pp.2138-2196 May 19th, 1362.
3. Ibid., p.1814 April 24th, 1862. The vote was 26 to 12.
4 . Ibid., p.1720 April 13th, 1362.
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proposed breaking the power of the ruling class by confiscation, 
and all other means. But to the people they had misled he would
give the assurance of amnesty, protection, and the privileges 
of free institutions, free schools, homesteads, even-handed justice 
and equality of political rights, privileges that enable and 
elevate the masses into the dignity of a sovereign people, and 
give to popular government a secure support,3*
Senator Howard also talked about the parcelling out of these huge 
estates to small proprietors, drawing a comparison with confiscation during 
the french Revolution in teaching the world
that liberty and equality are no dream, and that there is 
no patriotism so strong as that which arises from a sentiment 
of brotherly kindness, and a consciousness of equality before 
the law.8•
But these homestead suggestions were not followed up in practical 
terms in the Confiscation Act. In June 1862, an act for the collection 
of taxes on abandoned property proposed the sale of land taken under it, 
to loyal citezens and members of the armed forces. But Republicans like
Charles Bumner later regretted that confiscation had been a, lost opportunity
\
for making lands available to freedraen. On this subject he wrote in I865, 
"from the beginning I have regarded confiscation only as ancillary to 
emancipation",^* But, quite apart from the way in which confiscation 
measures were watered down before they became law on July 17th, 1862, 
Sumner's idea of land for the freedmen, was never crucial to the deba.te.
It lingered as the vision of a number of Republicans.
It v/as difficult enough to get a concensus on emancipation. Senator 
Browning would go so far as to admit that slaves could be confiscated, 
where military necessity demanded it.^* But like temporary seizure of
1. Ibid., pn.1074-1077 March 5th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.1715 April iSth, 1862.
3. Sumner to John ‘"right, March 13th, I865, quoted in Edward L. Pierce, 
Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner (London, I878 A vols.) IV p.229-
4. Cong. Globs, 37th Cong., 2 sess., pp.1136-1137 March 10th, 1862.
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property, there v:as no transfer of title. State laws, and state 
institutions were inviolable on any more permanent basis. , Yet the 
Judiciary Committee's bill was drafted with a view to the non-return of 
the slaves freed by it. They were, after the commission of the act of 
forfeiture by the person claiming this service, "discharged therefrom, 
and become forever thereafter free persons". Tie onus was put on the 
slaveowner to prove both legitimacy of his title, and his loyalty during 
the rebellion. Once again, while confiscation and emancipation were 
argued together for the sake of self-preservation, urged under the same 
powers to suppress rebellion, and uttered in the same breath by supporters 
of both; the connection v/as deceptive. Senator Collamer charged that 
confiscation was being used only as a vehicle for abolition, and went 
on to draw attention to the difference in procedure under the proposed 
bill,
it is not provided that these slaves are to be taken or 
brought into any court or in any way adjudicated upon. There is 
not any proceeding rem required upon them nor any other proceeding. 
If that is not depriving a man of his interest in a slave without 
any conviction of himself, and v/ithout any process of law, and 
operating as a punishment on him, and yet leaving him to be hanged,
I do not understand it.^*
He was right. The government was not assuming title to the slave, 
and there v/as no question of proceeds from his sale going to the Treasury. 
Clumsily, Republicans were striking at state law, the support of slavery, 
without defini.ng clear alternatives in federal law. What was emerging in 
the debate, however, were two quite different philosophies of constitutional 
law. Against what Browning, Cowan, Collamer and others were saying about 
depriving rebels of land and slaves without due process, other Republicans
1. Ibid., p.1811 April 24th, l8o2.
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were posing a. different interpretation of due process, and deprivation of 
rights. Senator Howard argued that slavery existed under local law which 
the government need not observe in time of war. Tlie slave was free, he 
said
for the local law having ceased he resumes his natural right 
of freedom, of which he cannot afterwards be deprived by the 
Government of the United States.^'
For, while some Republicans would argue from Vattel, that whether 
slaves were considered property or men made no difference in their 
liability to "confiscation", in practice it made a considerable difference 
as to whether the owner or the owned had the benefit of due process. 
Charles Sumner put the case for the slave,
the slaves of rebels cannot be regarded as property, real or 
personal. Though claimed as property by their masters, and though 
too often recognized as such by individuals in the Government, it 
is the glory of our Constitution that it treats slaves always as 
"persons: At home, beneath the lash and local laws, they may be
chattels; but they are known to our Constitution only as men".
And, Sumner concluded,- "Being men they are bound to allegiance and ' 
entitled to reciprocal protection".^'
Yet, what flimsy 'protection’ they were being offered - hardly enough 
to justify the conservative response that the federal government was 
trampling state laws and constitutions underfoot.^* Any owner, seeking 
to enforce his claim to an escaped slave's service, had to establish his 
title and his loyalty. There was some confusion in Congress as to the 
precise effects of this section of the act. 'In April 1862, writing of the
effects of martial law, the distinguished jurist Joel Parker argued that
if a slave availed himself of the opportunity to escape, the master's 
claim would then be against the government, whose military operations
1. Ibid., pn.1714-1720 April l8th, 1862.
2. Ibid., pp.2188-2196 May 19th, 1862.
3. See coirments to t'ris effect by Senator Carlile, Ibid., p.1885 
April 30th, 1862.
terminated the relationship, rather than against the slave. He could make
no claim under the Fugitive Slave Law. But,he concluded, if the slave
remained, and martial law ceased, emancipation would be temporary. The
slave could assert no right of freedom under the laws of the United States.^*
What effect the proposed confiscation bill would have, is not clear, and
was not clear at the time. The provision recurred in Senator Collamer's
substitute bill. Unlike Joel Parker, he saw it as "a part, an addition,
2 .an amendment, of the fugitive slave law". * Charles Sumner, however, 
had insisted on the form of that section of the bill including the words 
"the trial" of the owner’s claim to service, deliberately to avoid
recognition of the Fugitive Slave Law.^* Either way, it was no sure
guarantee of freedom. Like the August 6th act, it still presumed escape.
It did not seem that a slave could sue for freedom under the act, although 
of course this was the necessary price of avoiding the delays and 
impractical!ties of making emancipation dependent on the decision of 
a court, as property was. But at least they were making some attempt to 
ensure that once the slave took his freedom, he kept it.
Many would have preferred to remove the problem out of sight altogether. 
One section of the proposed measure contained a provision which was 
recurrent in nearly all the other emancipation measures they considered - 
the voluntary colonisation of slaves freed under the act. Colonisation 
was enjoying some support in Congress, and an appropriation for that 
purpose had been included in the act to emancipate slaves in the District 
of Columbia in April 1862. The President’s support was well-known. It 
had, too, a practical advantage in drawing some moderate and conservative
1. Joel Parker, Constitutional Law. Horth American Review, Vol. XLIV 
April, 1862.
2. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., p.l8l2 April 24th, 1862.
3. Ibid., p.946 February 25th, 1862.
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Republican support, both because of antipathy to Megroe in their 
constituencies, end because it seemed less of an interference with the 
institution of slavery v/hen state laws requiring the removal of freed 
slaves beyond their borders were at least partly respected. More honourably, 
Tpumbull thought that abroad, ïïegroes would enjoy the rights and privileges 
of free men denied them at home.^* But there was a good dead of 
opposition from Radicals on the grounds of principle. Senator Pomeroy 
suggested it would be more sensible to deport■the slaveowners, whose 
presence would be least missed!^’ Democrats took the opportunity of 
accusing the moderates of hypocrisy in their philanthropy, and the radicals 
of a more sinister design to amalgamate the races.* But on the whole their 
antipathy to taxation almost rivalled their antipathy to Negroes. T/zo 
attempts by Senators Willey and Doolittle to provide sufficient funds 
for the project were unsuccessful.^* An act, passed on July l6th, 1862, 
did include slaves freed under the Confiscation Acts in a general 
appropriation of ^^00,000 for the purpose of colonisation. Nevertheless 
it did not seem that Congress in 1862 was seriously willing to finance 
what would have been an enormous task. Nor were they as yet ready to 
face the more positive questions about the nature of freedom, how to 
effect it, and how to maintain it. Most Republicans at this time, 
including those who voted for colonisation, believed that the title of 
the slave belonged to the slave as a man, that as a man he possessed 
natural rights of life and liberty; that the government had a duty to 
protect him. But there was a war to be won, before the need for more 
positive definitions would have to be met. None of the many substitute
1. Ibid., p.1604 April 10th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.945 February 25th, 1862.
3o Ibid., p.1604 April 10th, 1862; Nilley later withdrew the proposal. 
Also, Doolittle’s proposal, and speech in favour of colonisation. 
Ibid., App. pp.94-101 April 11th, 1862.
bills offered to the Senate in April proposed any fimier guarantee for 
freedom*
By April, the Senate was reaching deadlock* It seemed that every 
Senator who dissented from Trumbull’s bill had written his objections 
in the form of a substitute bill, varying from Harris’ moderate proposal 
extending ^  rem proceedings to areas in rebellion as well as in loyal 
areas, to Cowan's proposed outlawry procedures, or Collamer*s bill imposing 
alternative punishments for treason, and forfeiting lands through fines.
Of this last proposal, around which conservative Republican support was 
crystallizing, Trumbull objected, "... just call it a fine, and you may 
take the real estate forever". Treason proceedings, he argued, were not 
what was needed to fight a war. The enforcement of such a bill as Collamer*s 
would await peace, and the opening of the courts in rebellious districts.
He went on,
I believe that no bill is worth the paper on which it is 
written that hesitates to take the property of traitors and rebels 
before they are convicted in your courts of justice, "Why, sir, it 
is because you have got no courts of justice in the South that 
this war is upon us.
Such was the confusion in attempting to cope with alternatives, and 
Trumbull's frustration with his conservative colleagues, that the Senate 
finally accepted Clark's motion to refer all the proposals to a select 
committee. Attempts to do this had begun as early as March 14th, but 
Browning recorded in his diary that this move, in caucus, had been defeated 
by the "ultras".^* A further attempt by Cowan was defeated on April 30th,
1. Sherman's substitute bill is published in the Globe, Ibid., p.l604 
April 10th, Harris' p.1655 April 14th, Collamer's p.l8l4 April 24th
and Cowan's informal proposal, p.l870 April 30th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.1959 May 6th' 1862.
3. Theodore C. Pease and James G. Randall (eds.) The Diary of Orville
Hickman Browning.(Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library,
1929, 2 vols.Jl p.534' Hereafter cited as Browning, Diary.
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and agreement on May 6th to Clark’s proposal was reluctant,^' Trumbull’ s 
refusal to serve on the committee deprived it of the leading advocate of 
an effective bill. The new committee was chaired by Clark, who had 
distinguished himself by saying almost nothing on the subject. On May 14th, 
the battle for an efficient confiscation measure was finally seen to be 
lost in the Senate when Clark reported the Select Committee bill.
It was no war measure, no confiscation bill, but one to modify the
punishment for treason through imprisonment, the loss of slaves, and fines,
which on non-payment could result in forfeiture of property beyond life -
the choice of penalty being left to the discretion of the court. Ttiough
property could be seized, transfer of title had to await judicial proceedings
against the owner when he was caught, and the courts opened. An
emancipation proclamation could be issued at the discretion of the 
2 ,President. * To Trumbull, Wade and others, this was a poor substitute 
for an efficient bill, not designed it seemed, to be executed, and only 
to be voted for as a last resort.^* It raised the problem of finding 
loyal judges and juries in rebellious districts, both problems avoided 
in Trumbull's bill by ^  rem proceedings in loyal areas. Trumbull asked,
and do you want to put it in the power of the judge of the 
district of Georgia, who yet holds his office, as I was informed 
to-day, and who has probably done no act for which you can impeach 
him - do you want to put it in his power to say whether he shall 
fine and imprison Mr. Toombs, or whether he shall make him answer 
to the scaffold for the atrocious crimes he has committed against 
his country?^*
The question derived added force from the fact that Congress was
1. Cowan made two such proposals, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong,, 2 sess., 
p.1846 April 28th, Ibid., p.1856. The motion was defeated on 
April 30th by 22 votes to I8, Ibid., p.l886. The final vote to 
refer it there v/as 24 in favour, I4 (all Republicans) against.- Ibid., 
p.1965, May 6th, 1862. Though Charles Sumner came round to the idea
that it was a necessary move, in view of the mass of alternatives,
Trumbull had no faith in the venture, refusing to serve on the 
committee. He was replaced by Harlan. Ibid.,, p.1991, May 7th, 1862.
2. The bill is printed Ibid., p.2l65 May.l6th, 1862.
3. Comments by Trumbull, Ibid., n.2226 May 20th, 1862, Wade, Ibid.,
p.2203 May 19th, 1862.
4* Ibid., p.2172 May l6th, 1862.
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at the same time impeaohlng a United States district court judge, West
H, Humphreys of Tennessee, whose crimes included enforcing the Confederate
Confiscation Ict,^’ Debate on the substitute b^Il continued sporadically
until May 21st, when Congress voted by 33 votes to 9 to abandon it in
2
favour .of the tax bill.
Meanwhile the House of Representatives faced the same issues during 
these months of debate, in a separate attempt to legislate on confiscation 
and emancipation. Where the Senate Judiciary Committee had at least 
succeeded in reporting a bill, the House Judiciary Committee, to which 
several proposals had been referred in December l86l, reported only 
their disagreement on March 2 0 t h . J o h n  A. Bingham attempted to get 
House consideration of two substitute bills, one to institute i^ rem 
proceedings in federal courts against rebel property, the other to emancipate 
the rebels’ slaves. The scant debate does illustrate a little of the con­
fusion in Congress regarding the relationship between confiscation and 
emancipation proceedings. Though Bingham resisted the efforts of his 
colleague Porter to have the slaves included in the rem procedure,'^' 
doubts were expressed by Schulyer Colfax of Indiana that the courts would 
nevertheless associate property and slaves in the one process. Recalling 
the shame of the Supreme Court's pronouncement on slave status in the Dred
Scott decision, he argued that such a construction should be settled by
5.Congress and clearly put beyond the scope of the court's jurisdiction.
When the Democrat McKee Dunn took up the argument, Bingham replied simply 
that although he regretted the Chief Justice's opinion, it was only an 
opinion, obiter dicta, not law - and it marred the career of a fine judge.
1. Report on the Impeachment of Judge West IT. Humphreys, House Reports
No.44 37th Cong., 2 sess. Vol. 3, and articles of impeachment. House
Miscellaneous Documents No.76 37th Cong., 2 sess.
2. Cong Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., pp.2253-4 May 21st, 1862.
3* Ibid., p.1303 March 20th, 1862,
4. Ibid., p.1768 April 22nd, 1862. Bingham objected that his bill was
about persons, not property.
5. Ibid., p.1789 April 23rd, 1862.
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Bingham v/as "... willing to forgive, and would, if I could, forget his
error of judgment" - hut he would not maiœ it an excuse for not legislating.^'
The House accepted Bingham’s separate confiscation hill on April 22nd, 1862.
The following day, it was unexpectedly tabled by 56 votes to 49 in a half- 
2
empty House. * The emancipation bill was not brought to a vote at the 
same time.
Like the Senate, the House had reached deadlock. Representative Olin’s 
resolution to refer the matter to a select Committee was adopted by 90 votes 
to 31 on April 24th. Olin declined to serve as chairman, and Thomas Eliot 
of Massachusetts became the chairman of what Wickliffe described as "a 
well-selected committee", which in contrast to the Senate Select Committee, 
bore a more radical tinge than the original Judiciary Committee.^* Thus,
on May 14th, the same day that the Senate produced its weak substitute for
Trumbull's bill, the House committee presented from the twenty bills under 
consideration two separate measures for emancipation and confiscation which 
revived hopes for an efficient bill. They were debated togeiher, confused 
with each other, and voted on separately.
The Confiscation Bill designated classes of rebels, whose property, 
wherever found could be forfeited, along with all rebel property in the 
loyal states. After a 60-day period of grace for rebels not listed in the 
bill to return to their allegiance, the President was authorised to con­
fiscate their property too, anywhere in the Union, Forfeiture was again 
to be accomplished by in rem proceedings in the federal courts.^'
Eliot and Hoell, of the select committee, led the debate along
1. Ibid., p.1793 April 23rd, 1862.
2. Ibid., p .1771 April 22nd, p.1788 April 23rd, 1862.
3. The vote was taken on April 24th, 1862, Ibid., p.1820. The new
committee had several strong friends of confiscation: Eliot,
Hutchins, Beaman, Sedgwick and Noell (usefully, from the border 
states); Ibid., App, p.260 May 26th, 1862.-
4. The bill is printed Ibid., pp.2232-2233» May 20th, 1862.
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Senator Trumbull’s well-worn path, disclaiming the bill as one to punish 
persons for treason, or any other crime. It was no attainder, simply a 
procedure - due process in its ovm right - against property. It was 
justified under the constitution and the war power, but left the sovereign 
power intact to deal with rebels. The ground by May of 1862, was so well- 
worn - a fact which neither deterred Congressmen from a relentless duplication 
of arguments, nor made in rem proceedings any clearer for them. To Babbitt, 
a friend of the bill, it meant the exclusion of a jury from the proceedings. 
His colleague Hoell claimed that, according to Brightley's Digest, a jury 
trial was allowed if a man made a personal appearance.^* One way or the 
other, the arguments did not convince conservative Benjamin F. Thomas that 
justice would be done. As a member of the Judiciary Committee, he had 
voted for the August 6th act which included the same procedure, but had 
now awakened to the scope of it, lamenting,
Magna Carta is soiled and worm-eaten. Tlie Bill of Rights, 
the muniments of personal freedom, habeas corpus, trial by jury, 
what are they all worth in comparison with this new safeguard of 
liberty, the proceeding in r e m ? 2.
Congress may have been influenced by the co-incidence of the debate 
with the publication, in May, of the Report of the Joint Committee on the 
Conduct of the War. Representatives Loomis, Arnold and others used 
atrocity evidence to back up their arguments for sterner measures.^’ On 
May 26th, 1862, the measure passed the House comfortably by 82 votes to 68.^*
The bill to emancipate, significantly perhaps on a separate vote^ 
was narrowly defeated on the same day by 78 votes to 74- Though
1. Among the more specific speeches in defence of these procedures, are 
those by Eliot, Ibid., pp.2233-2237 May 20th, Hoell's, Ibid., pp.2237- 
2240, May 20th and Babbitt’s, Ibid., App. pp.l66-l68. May 22nd, 1862.
2. Ibid., App. p. 220 May 24th, 1862.
3. Sargent, Loomis and Arnold all cited this evidence, Ibid., App.pp.175- 
179, 179-182, 182-184, May 23rd, 1862.
4. Ibid., pp.2360-2361, May 26th, 1862.
5. Ibid., p.2363 May 26th, 1862.
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there was mounting emancipation sentiment in both Congress and the
country, more conservative Republicans were still hesitant on the question
of interfering with an institution, for so long surrounded by constitutional
taboos. Again, the measure differed from its companion bill on confiscation,
in that there were no judicial proceedings for divesting the owner of his
title to the slave, or transferring it elsewhere. It simply declared the
slaves of those engaging in rebellion forever free- that freedom guaranteed
only by provisions making the insurrectionary activities of the owner an
answer to suit for re-enslavement and requiring him to prove both ownership
and loyalty.^* Again there is evidence that Republicans intended that
this law should permanently supercede all other law on slavery, and that
the black man's title to himself should be inalienable. The Constitution,
said Republican Hanchett, was the means of executing the Declaration of
Independence, so that "American liberty is the rightful, God-given heritage
2.
of man, not because he is an American citizen, but because he is a man".
By whatever means the slave might win his freedom out of war, Samuel Fessenden 
was equally sure that it could neither be taken away nor regarded as anything 
less positive than freedom with rights and responsibilities. He said,
we propose to let them know that every husband may have his 
own wife, that every wife may have her own husband; that all parents 
may have their own children; that they may earn wages, and receive and 
demand wages, if withheld, which their labor entitles them to receive; 
that they may have all the benefits accruing - from living under the 
administration of just laws, and that they may breathe God's free air 
as white men breathe this air.8«
John A. Bingham was another who maintained the right of any natural
born citizen to protection.in his fundamental rights - as an American
4. ■
future. ' Hot all Republicans believed it possible, and would have preferred
1. The bill is printed Ibid., pp.2232-2233 May 20th, l862.
2. Ibid., App. p.209 May 26th, I862.
3. Ibid.. App, pp.148-150 May 22nd, 1862.
4. Ibid., App, p.193, May 24th, 1862.
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that the freedmen he left to secure these rights in Africa or Central 
America. As in the Senate, an attempt was made to shelve the issue of 
race relations, by authorising the President to colonise slaves freed 
by the act, on a voluntary basis. But such a scheme, promoted by Francis 
Blair, and which included putting freedmen under a system of regulations 
until such arrangements could be made, was defeated 95 votes to $2 by a 
combination of Radicals and Conservatives.^'
As in the Senate, however, the time had not come for serious considera­
tion of civil rights. Behind the rhetoric lay confusion on the more 
pressing question of how to make emancipation effective against the owner’s 
claim. Democratic Representative Clements insisted that since state laws 
remained in force, only the courts, not Congress, could take a decision on 
the validity of title. He asked,
the question will arise as to where the title to the slave 
exists. Is it in the rebels, in the Federal Government, or in 
the slaves themselves? This is a question, as the laws now are, 
that can only be decided by our courts. The Government cannot 
own slaves, and has no right to sell them. Then has a slave a 
right to bring suit against his rebel master for his freedom, or 
what right has the rebel master to claim his return under the laws 
he has taken up arms to destroy?^*
But the House did consider these questions more fully than the Senate, 
and E. P. Walton proposed a bill which included a legal guarantee of 
freedom. Unfortunately it was attached to a confiscation measure which 
was more conservative than the select committee bill preferred by the House, 
Walton's bill provided that slaves freed under judicial proceedings for 
treason, or by a proclamation issued at the discretion of the President, 
should have a remedy in the federal courts, against re-enslavement. The 
court was to issue the slave with a certificate, valid in all courts, state
1. Ibid., p.2361 May 26th, 1862.
2. Ibid., App. pp.191-193 May 24th, 1862.
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or federal# Any person thereafter illegally seized was to have his release 
on a writ of habeas corpus issued by any court or judge of the United 
States, The judge acting on the writ was to commit the would-be claimant 
for kidnapping. Without such a guarantee, Walton said, "Emancipation will 
be in vain if every slave state may again fasten the chain have broken". 
But the conservative bill to which it was attached was defeated on May 26th 
by 121 votes to 29, the same day on which the Select Committee’s emancipation 
bill was defeated.^*
On Representative Porter’s initiative, however, the bill was
recommitted to the Select Committee on June 4th, 1862. Tlie new bill
reported by Eliot on June l8th narrowed the scope of emancipation to
conform to the property section of the confiscation bill they had just
passed. But it drew its enforcement procedures from Walton’s bill, and
a similar proposal by Representative Morrill. Tlie President was to
compile lists of the slaves affected by the act, and return them to the
federal district courts. If owners did not appear in court to claim their
slaves, or if they failed to prove their loyalty, the court was to issue
certificates of freedom, valid in all courts. Conscious of the lack of
guarantees in the August 6th, l86l act, slaves and their descendants freed
by that act were included in the right "always" to be entitled to release ■
on a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. Tlie price of this judicial
remedy to the slave, was of course that the giving as well as the defending
of his freedom was linked to procedure in court. The President was also
authorised to negotiate lands for voluntary colonisation. The bill was
2.
adopted on June 18th by 82 votes to 54*
1. See Walton's bill, Ibid., p.2362, May 26th, 1862 and his comments
on the need for legal procedures. Ibid.. App, p .264 llay 24th, 1862,
and vote on the bill Ibid,, p.2362 May 26th, 1862.
2. Tlie text of the bill and the vote on its passage is in the Globe,
Ibid., p .2793 June l8th, 1862.
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Five days later, the Senate took up the House confiscation hill for
consideration. Opponents of an efficient measure, like Browing,
reiterated the principle of their original criticisms of Trumbull's bill,
rarely touching on the specific provisions of the House bills. Wade,
Trumbull, and Sumner, for the same reasons, urged the House bills.
1.
There was nothing new to be said.
On the question of security for freedom, Sumner did propose an
amendment allowing the testimony of Negroes in federal courts on all
confiscation and emancipation proceedings. But it was defeated on June
2
28th by 25 votes to 14» without debate. * On the same day, Trumbull 
attempted to persuade the Senate to adopt the legal safeguards, contained 
in the House emancipation bill. On June 30th, he said that he would with­
draw his proposal to substitute the House emancipation bill for the Senate 
confiscation bill if someone proposed an amendment, including these legal 
guarantees against re-enslavement. But no one did, including Trumbull.
And he withdrew his proposal.^* On June 30th, the Senate agreed by 28 
votes to 13 to the Select Committee's weak treason bill in preference to 
the House bill. Trumbull voted "yea" because it was better than nothing, 
Sumner, because he hoped the House would stand firm.^*
Tlie House did stand firm, and on July 3rd, refused to concur with the 
Senate amendment. The Senate having refused to recede and agree to the 
House bill, a Committee of Conference was appointed. The result was the 
Confiscation Act of July l?th. Its weakness came from the inclusion 
of the treason section from the Senate bill. It drew whatever strength it
1, See the remarks of those Senators, Ibid., pn.2919-2924, June 25th, 
pn.3000-3002 June 28th, pp.2971-2972, and 2963-2965 June 27th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.2995 June 28th, 1862.
3* Ibid., p.3000 June 28th, p.3006 June 30th, 1862.
4» Ibid., p.3006 June30th, 1862.
5. The House refused on July 3rd, Ibid., pp.3106-3107, and the Senate
on July'8th, Ibid., p.3166. The House concurred by 84 votes to 42 
on July 11th, Ibid., pp.3267-3268, and the Senate the following day, 
Ibid., p.3276, For provisions of the bill see 12 U.S. Stat, 589.
had from those sections borrowed from the House bill authorising the con­
fiscation of property by in rem proceedings in the federal courts, and 
from its positive declaration of freedom to the slaves of rebels. (The
Senate version only authorised the President to issue a proclamation of
the
emancipation.) The judicial guarantee of freedom was/now familiar 
requirement that the claimant should prove both ownership and loyalty. The 
Conference Committee report yields no clue as to v/hy the House guarantee 
of a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court was not included. The 
final section of the act, however, gave to the United States courts full 
power to institute proceedings., make orders and decrees, issue process 
and do all other things necessary to carry the act into effect.
James G. Randall argues that this was never intended to extend the
judicial machinery of the federal courts to emancipation under the
1.
Confiscation Act, ’ There were, he says, no provisions for issuing 
certificates of freedom, the federal courts in the South were closed, 
and even when they opened, the courts could not hope to deal with the 
volume of complaints, or the slave afford to make them. Yet the provision 
does apply to the whole act. Another section - section 8 - gives the 
federal courts specific powers over the forfeiture and sale of property.
It is unlikely that the Conference Committee would attach a second grant 
of power to the courts over the whole act if they did not mean the whole 
act. The House at any rate, had demonstrated its willingness to use the 
federal courts in the emancipation bill they had just passed. In termsof 
Professor Randall's practical objections, if the federal courts were closed 
for emancipation, they were equally closed for the treason proceedings 
included in the act. As for over-running the federal court dockets, there 
were no more slaves affected by the act than there were traitors7 This 
is not to say that the Republicans deliberately designed that part of the 
act with a view to carrying actions under the emancipation sections into 
the federal courts. It was quite usual for Congress, faced with a crisis,
1, Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp.359-363.
to adopt a loose form of wording, leaving the responsibility for a more 
specific construction to the courts if and when an individual case came up 
to test the law.^* Clearly there was a duality in the Republican attitude 
to the courts. It had been one of Lyman Trumbull's concerns that the 
federal courts, trying traitors in their own districts, should not have 
the discretion as to whether leading rebels should be hanged or fined. 
Schuyler Colfax and others in the House had expressed some fears that in 
the confusion over the relationship between proceedings involving property 
and slaves, the latter might be held as property. Nevertheless, by com­
parison with the presumed fate of the freedmen under State law and in 
State courts, the federal courts held out the greater probability of 
sympathy for national law. All that can be said at this stage in Congress's 
education was that they had not yet become familiar with the means of 
using the courts most effectively.
They may have had no clearer idea of the meaning of the last section
of the Confiscation Act, granting full powers to the federal courts, than
Joshua Tevis, the United States Attorney for Kentucky. In January I865,
he wrote Attorney-General James Speed, asking for a construction of that
section. He wanted to Icnow whether it authorised a proceeding in the
federal court to establish the freedom of a Negro emancipated under the
act, or whether his protection v/as left to the general laws of the land
for the protection of other free Negroes, and finally, whether or not it
meant that an original action or suit could be brought to secure any right
2.
granted by the act. * Unfortunately, the Letterbooks of the Attorney- 
general contain no reply. This is not surprising, in view of the volume 
of enquiries from district attorneys and private citizens on a wide range
1, Donald Morgan in Congress and the Constitution: A Study of 
Responsibility (Cambridge; Belknap Press 1966) makes a similar point.
2. Joshua Tevis to Hon, James Speed, Attorney-Generals Papers. Record 
Group 60, Nat. Archives, Letters Received (Kentucky).
of matters. Generally, the Attorney-General declined to ansv/er, both 
because of the amount of business, and because his opinion could be sought 
officially only by government departments, that opinion carrying some legal 
weight. Nevertheless, the questions asked by the District Attorney for 
Kentucky, are worth the historian's asking, even to come to the same 
position as he did when he ended his letter with another question. "Ought 
not the act to be amended so as to secure the freedom of the slave?"
The question of security for freedom, was a recurrent one until the 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
After six months of debate, the final hurdle for the bill's supporters 
was to escape President Lincoln's veto. Scheduled to finish the session 
on July 15th, Congress agreed to remain for a further two days at Lincoln's 
request. The President wrote Solomon Foot in the Senate, and Galusha Grow 
in the House to explain that he was considering the confiscation bill, and 
went on,■
I may return it with objections, and if I should, 1 wish 
Congress to have the opportunity of obviating the objections, 
or of passing it into a law notwithstanding them.^*
Senator Browning had discussed the bill with the President on July
2.14th, and expressed his view that it ought to be vetoed.
Knowing Lincoln's views, several senators took advantage of the fact 
that the House was now considering an explanatory resolution on the bill, 
to attach a modification along the lines of Lincoln's objections. On 
July 16th, claiming that he was "authorised" on the nature of these 
objections, Clark moved the amendment, "Nor shall any punishment or 
proceedings under said act be so construed as to work à forfeiture of the 
real estate of the offender beyond his natural life".^' This objection
1. Lincoln, Collected Works. V p.325, p.326. July 15th, 1862,
2. Browning, Diary, p.558.
3. Cong. Globe,, 37th Cong., 2 sess. p.3374 Jnly l6th, 1862.
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had been advanced to every proposal by opponents of confiscation.
Trumbull had recognised it. But it was the insistence of the conservatives 
on having a treason bill that made the explanatory resolution necessary* 
Both Trumbull's original bill, and the House bill, had sought to avoid 
such objections through bills proceeding against property and not persons.
Apart from wealcening the act, Trumbull thought that the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the amendment provided a bad precedent for
relations between the executive and the legislature. Some signs of
dissatisfaction with the Executive's use of power had become apparent
in the last days of the debate on confiscation. In speeches claiming
the power for Congress, both Trumbull and Howard had criticised the
President's appointment of military governors, without the advice and
consent of the Senate, as encroachments on the legislative powers.^'
Now Trumbull objected to the Executive shaping policy in Congress,
2.
through conversations with its members. * But the resolution passed on 
July l6th,^ and Lincoln signed the bill on July 17th, sending Congress 
a copy of his proposed veto message.
The message revealed that Lincoln liked ^  rem proceedings no better 
than the conservative opposition in Congress. But his major objection, 
to the forfeiture of real estate beyond the life of anyone attainted for 
treason, was obviated by the joint resolution Congress had just passed.
As for emancipation, he found it "... startling to say that Congress can 
free a slave within a state". He would rather have had the title to the 
slaves transferred to the nation, prior to freeing them.^* But Lincoln 
himself was moving towards emancipation as a military necessity. A 
correspondent of the Liberator noted that the country's antislavery senti-
1. Ibid., pp.2972-2973 June 27th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.3380 July l6th, 1862.
3- Ibid., p.3383 July I6th, 1862.
4* Lincoln, Collected Works V, pp.328-331 July 17th, 1862.
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ment rose and fell in inverse proportion to its military success. He 
wrote sarcastically,
the disaster at Bull Run brought out the Confiscation Act 
of 6th of August, 1861 - a specimen of human folly which would 
disgrace an assembly of Hottentots ... A series of successes on 
the Mississippi, and we forgot our bondsmen ... And Congress 
labored three months, and labored in vain, to pass a, more stringent 
■ confiscation act. Next comes McClellan's strategic movement from 
Richmond, a new fangled name for defeat, and the late confiscation 
act is born in a day.I*
Ttie writer accurately forecast that it would never be effective.
Lincoln used it only as a lever to persuade the states to return to their
allegiance. On July 22nd, he presented his first emancipation proclamation
to the Cabinet. On the 25th, he issued a warning to the rebels, based
on the first section of that proclamation, that unless they returned to
their allegiances, they would be subject to property forfeiture under the
Confiscation Act. Lincoln made a similar use of the act when he issued
his preliminary emancipation proclamation on September 22nd, which
contained en order to the armed forces to enforce the emancipation clauses
of the July 17th act. On January 1st, I863, he issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, v/hich, despite exemptions in various areas, represented
2.
executive sanction for the principle of the act. * Its force depended 
equally on military success to free slaves beyond Union control. As an 
executive proclamation, it lacked even the uncertain judicial sanctions 
of the Confiscation Act, Addressing a delegation of Chicago Christians 
on September 13th, Lincoln said of the advisability of his issuing an 
emancipation proclamation,
is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual, that 
would be influenced by it there? (in the South). And, what 
reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the 
slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which 
offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who 
come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused 
a single slave to come over to us.8*
1. A "Radical Abolitionist" in the Liberator, August 22nd, 1862.
2. The proclamations are in Lincoln, Collected Yorks V, pp.336-7 
p.341, pp.433-436, pp.28-30.
3. Ibid., V pp.419-425.
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But it is unlikely that Lincoln issued his proclamation because he 
feared for the legal defects of the Confiscation Act. On the contrary, 
Republicans had more confidence in law than edicts - if only the President 
and his Attorney-General would enforce it!
During the confiscation debate, and before the issue of the Executive
proclamation, Representative Samuel Blair said that the Supreme Court
might sustain the President's power to emancipate by military edict, but
1*
thought it safer to "remove all doubts by needful legislation". * Taken 
together, however, the act and the proclamation marked the turning point 
of the war. Thereafter, Congress would become committed to finding the 
legal guarantees for permanent emancipation, which they had reached for 
in the various Confiscation bills, and which had remained unanswered in 
the Proclamation.
The treason and confiscation sections of the act were not enforced
2 •
with vigour or regularity.^* Confederate leaders, far less the led, 
did not hang. Although long lists of indictments for treason, and "aid 
and comfort" reached the Attorney-General 's office and the newspapers, 
they were destined to be entered as "nolle prosequi" i.e. dismissed. The 
Government could afford neither the embarrassment nor the expense of 
prosecuting all these cases in areas v/here loyal juries were difficult to 
find. Politically, there were times when justice had to be tempered with 
mercy. Lincoln issued the first Proclamation of Amnesty in December 1863, 
which exempted those who took it from hanging for treason. Even where 
successful prosecutions could have been made, the "success" of winning 
the legal battle had to be weighed against the dangers of making martyrs
1. Cong. Globe,, 37th Cong., 2 sess., p.2300 May 22nd, 1862.
2. The problems of enforcement- are dealt with by James G, Randall,
Some Legal Aspects of the Confiscation Acts A.H.R, Vol.18 October, 
1912, and Henry D. Shapiro, Confiscation of Confederate Property in 
the Forth (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, I962).
in troubled areas. As Attorney-General Bates v/rote,
it is far better policy, I thinic, when you have the option 
to prosecute offenders for vulgar felonies and misdemeanours, 
than for romantic and genteel treason. The penitentiary will 
be far more effectual than the gallows.^.
Yet political wisdom also demanded, that while order was difficult
to maintain in areas coming under Union Control, and while federal officials
trying to execute the laws were being harassed in State courts, at least
a few cases be kept on hand against leading rebels. The authority, as
well as the generosity of the federal government had to be demonstrated.
The trial of Jefferson Davis - under the 1790 law of treason, not the July
17th, 1862 Act - was surrounded by such political considerations. But the
amnesty proclamation of Christmas I868 included all former rebels and brought
2.
an end to indictments and trials for treason.
The implementation of confiscation was subject to mary of the same 
political considerations, as well as a lot of confusion arising from the 
complex legal questions which the acts involved. Attorney-General Bates 
himself, whose duty it was by a Presidential order of November 1862, to 
supervise confiscation proceedings, seemed a little unsure about the in 
rem procedures to be dravm from admiralty and revenue cases. He ivrote, 
requesting information, to four district attorneys with special knowledge 
of the subject.^* But although unfamiliarity with the procedure caused 
practical problems, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality 
of the Confiscation Act. T?hen the property of Samuel Miller, a deceased 
Confederate officer was condemned by default under the acts of August 6th
1. Attorney-General Bates to R. J. Lackey, district attorney for western 
district of Missouri^ January 19th, I863, Attorney-Generals Papers. 
Letterbook 4» A typical letter of advice was sent to James Broadhead, 
also in Missouri, saying that for political reasons, he was in no 
hurry to prosecute. Ibid., April 10th, 1862.
2. Randall, Constitutional Problems, Chapter III - IT.
3. Bates to Richard Dana, S. D, Smith, George Coffey and 77illiam Price, 
Attorney-Generals Papers, Letterbook 4* 1st December, 1862.
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and July 17th, the case was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ of 
error, alleging that Miller’s loyalty could be proved, and that property 
could not be taken without a jury trial and so on. Justice Strong, 
delivering the opinion of the court in Miller Vs United States in I87O, 
reiterated Senator Trumbull's view that the Confiscation Act was a war 
measure, not a municipal regulation, and as such, was not subject to the 
limitations of the Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.^* In rem proceedings 
against property could therefore be made against property without a jury 
trial of the personal guilt of the owner. Justices Field and Clifford 
dissented, arguing along the lines that Senators Browning and Cov/an had taken, 
that the act was about treason. They opposed the legislative assumption 
of guilt involved in these in rem proceedings. Justice Davis also dissented, 
without giving reasons. The Court, however, again sustained the acts in 
Tyler Vs Defrees in I87O, and the Confiscation Cases in 1873*^* But 
when a defendant actually turned up to assert his loyalty in McVeigh Vs 
United States in I87O, Justice Swayne held that the question of his guilt 
was material to the case, and that the district court of Virginia had 
been wrong in disallowing his appearance.^* In two other cases, the 
Chief Justice directed that new trials conform to the course of common 
law regarding trial by jury.^*
But, despite judicial sanction for the acts, very little property 
was actually confiscated, though some successful suits were brought in 
the North, and the areas first brought under Union control, where the 
courts re-opened. The very inadequate statistics of the Solicitor- 
General for 1867, show that, under the Act of July 17th, 1862, only
1. Miller Vs U.S. 78 U.S. 268.
2. Tyler Vs Defrees 78 U.S. 331, The Confiscation Cases 87 U.S. 92.
3. McVeigh Vs U.S. JB U.S. 259.
4. Union Insurance Co. Vs U.S. 6 Wall. 759, Armstrong's Foundry 
6 Wall. 767.
^29,680 v/as deposited in the Treasury, and the cost of proceedings reduced
even this t o t a l . T h e  "business of enforcing the act was left to district
attorneys on the spot, as the Attorney-General constantly reminded those
who wrote for his advice! Confused by the complex legal questions, the
cost of proceedings, and the unpopularity of the task, local officers
often declined to commence suits on their own initiative. Where they
did, any advice they received from the Attorney-General was to go cautiously,
to be sure of not embarrassing the Government by failure, and often, just
to dismiss proceedings altogether. The Administration, both Lincoln’s and
Johnson's, did not seek wholesale confiscation at a time when they sought
2,
to inspire loyalty rather than hatred.
The army showed more zeal for confiscation than the legal departments 
did. Of the ^29,680 deposited in the Treasury, over half was drawn from 
confiscations in Louisiana, This can be attributed to Louisiana's being 
one of the first states to be brought within Union Control, but also to 
General Banks’ efficiency in drawing up lists of property to be used for 
confiscation proceedings.^* Conflicts between civil and military 
jurisdiction were frequent and arose in Louisiana, the District of 
Columbia, and Virginia. Attorney-General Bates advised "mutual forbear­
ance and comity", but stressed the need for civil rather than jurisdiction 
over military,^* He suggested that Secretary of War Stanton order military
5
commanders to deliver confiscable land over to the civil authorities.
In 1864, he objected to General Lew Wallace’s confiscation orders in 
Maryland, since they went beyond the recognised right of
1. Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp.288-291.
2. Typical of such advice are letters from J, Hubley Ashton to the 
district attorneys in Missouri and elsewhere to refrain from confiscate 
proceedings, April 22nd, I865, Attorney-Generals Papers, Letterbook D, 
and Henry Stanbery to Bennett Pike in Missouri, August 14th, I866, to 
the same effect; Letterbook F.
3. Banks general orders 71 and 76. •War of the Rebellion; Official Records
of the Union and Confederate Armies (l28 vols., I88O-I9OI) V0I.I5 pp.971-575
4. Bates to Benjamin H. Smith, D.A. in Virginia, March 1862, A 
General Papers. Letterbook 4*
5. Bates to Stanton, January 21st, 1863, Ibid.
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the axmy to malce temporary seizures, and assumed jurisdiction over titles 
to property. Bates drew the General's attention to the Confiscation Acts, 
advising him against any actions which would give rise to accusations that 
the President was above the law, to painful conflicts of jurisdiction, and 
eventually to a crop of suits against army officers for illegal actions.
In reply, General Wallace offered to put his own books, detectives and so 
on at the service of the Attorney-General, so that he could enforce the 
Confiscation Acts!^*
Bates complained to Stanton about similar conflicts of jurisdiction
with the army in East Virginia. There was, he said, no excuse for such
conduct, since the United States district court was fully organized and
2
holding sessions in Norfolk. * But Judge John C. Underwood, of the 
United States district court of Virginia was no happier than the army
about the government's lack of vigour. On April 28th, I865, he wrote of
these matters to Chief Justice Chase,
... our great need is a vigorous administration of the laws 
punishing treason. It seems to me that a little vigor now would 
be worth more than much hereafter and I confess to considerable 
surprise and dissatisfaction, on reading what seems to me to be 
the gingerly and over cautious letter of the Attorney-General I 
send herewith - I cannot believe it reflects the views of the 
President, and taken in connexion with what the Attorney-General 
told me the day before the assassination of î/îr. Lincoln - that 
he thought of sending a circular to the District Attorneys, 
forbidding the further seizure of real rebel property for purposes 
of confiscation, I really fear the judiciary may not be properly
sustained or permitted to exert its due influence in the re- ^
establislment of order and in suppressing the spirit of rebellion.' *
Shortly afterwards the government did encourage the enforcement of 
confiscation in Virginia. Advising the district attorney of Norfolk to 
go ahead with one of these prosecutions, against the editors of the
1. Official Records of the Rebellion Ser. Ill, Vol.4 pp. 407-408,
413-415.
2. Bates to Stanton, April 7th, I864, Attorney Generals Papers. Letter­
book 5 •
3. John C, Underwood to Salmon P. Chase, April 28th, I865. Chase 
Papers, L.C.
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Richmond Whig and Lynchhurg Virginian, Attorney-General James Speed 
wrote an unusually strong letter, saying that though he had hoped 
Virginians had suffered enough, it appeared some had not, "Now", he 
added, "they must be taught that the Government and law are stronger 
than they are".^*
Apart from the times when the government admitted the necessity for 
"teaching the rebels a lesson", there were no mass confiscations.. Presidents 
Lincoln and Johnson, and their Attorney-Generals did not want it. It was 
expensive, and an embarrassment to their policy of a generous peace. The 
various proclamations of pardon and amnesty between 1863 and Christmas of 
1868, did not necessarily exempt those who took them from confiscation 
proceedings, in the way that id did with respect to treason charges. In 
the Supreme Court case of Armstrong's Foundry, in I867, Attorney-General 
Henry Stanbery, appearing as special counsel for the United States, put the 
argument that a pardon had no effect on the proceedings, since, under the 
Confiscation Act, no criminal offence was involved - simply the guilty 
predicament of property. Chief Justice Chase, however, rejected the argument 
in giving the opinion of the Court. The effect of pardon was a question for 
judicial construction. The Attorney-General advised his departments that 
where the court held that a pardon relieved the defendant's property from 
confiscation, they should not make an appeal.^* Finally, in the light of 
the Supreme Court's decision on the Armstrong's Foundry case, and the grant­
ing of full amnesty to all rebels on December 25th, 1868, Attorney-General
1. James Speed to L. H. Chandler, D, A. Norfolk, Virginia, July 15th,
1865, Attorney-Generals Papers, Letterbook Vol.E. The Attorney-General 
also directed the marshal at Norfolk to go ahead with confiscation in 
the spirit of a recent presidential order regarding Virginia.
2. Armstrong's Foundry 6 Wall. 767*
3. James Speed to G. V/. Hall, U.S. Attorney, Knoxville, Ten, January 11th,
1866. Attorney-General Papers. Letterbook Vol.E.
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William Evarts notified the district attorneys to dismiss all confiscation 
proceedings.^'
It took Congress six months to pass a law which in its emancipation 
features was eclipsed by an executive proclamation, and in its treason 
and property sections left largely unenforced. But the debates on the 
various confiscation bills provided a forum for defining the aims of 
war and peace, and the varying degx-ees of commitment to these aims inside 
the Republican party. Moreover, the volume of bills on the subject must 
have been an educating process for Congress in translating these aims 
into law. Significantly, the first steps were taken towards the extension 
of federal court jurisdiction. The fate of property, they discovered, was 
too important to be left to juries in disloyal districts. For some 
Republicans, so too, was freedom. Though the final Confiscation Act of 
July 17th did not contain the House Bill's extension of federal court 
jurisdiction to releasing freedmen on writs of habeas corpus, the 
procedure was not discarded. It was revived in the Wade-Davis Bill, and 
it was implicit in the Thirteenth Amendment.
1. William K. Evarts to all U.S. District Attorneys, March 2nd, I869. 
Attorney-Generals Papers ‘ Letters Sent.
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C H A P T E R  I I I
THE HABEAS CORPUS ACT OP 1863
As long as the federal government refrained from passing controversial 
laws, relations between state and nation could be amicable. Rut the war 
necessitated the passage of laws which could not meet this requirement, even 
in many of the loyal states. Confiscation was one such issue. Senator 
Trumbull and his colleagues had quite sensibly foreseen that here was a 
national law which stood small chance of impartial enforcement if it were 
left to the loyalties of state judges and juries in the areas where the 
property was situated. To avoid the possibility of a clash of jurisdictions 
between state and nation, the issue was taken out of the hands of the states 
altogether. The federal courts took exclusive jurisdiction of confiscation 
cases. Similarly, the question had been raised during the debate, that the 
emancipation of slaves under the Confiscation Act of July, 1862, required 
guarantees against the dissent of the states. Slavery was supported by 
state laws - laws by definition in conflict with this piece of national 
legislation. Unfortunately, but understandably in these early stages, the 
Republicans did not think the issue through. Unsatisfactory questions 
remained as to the degree of protection which the nation would afford the 
freedman, and the extent to which federal court jurisdiction could be 
asserted on his behalf against that of the states. But already in 1862, 
the right questions were being asked. The question was no less than 
whether the writ of the nation’s government could run in the states, and 
upon the answer, the survival of the nation depended.
Confiscation was only the visible part of the iceberg. By late 1862, 
early 1863 the question was being raised in a different form, this time in
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connection with the nation's ability to protect its armed forces against 
harassing suits in state courts. In law, servants of the federal govern­
ment, from army officer all the way up to President, could be held responsible 
in civilian courts, for official acts leading to private injuries. Whatever 
ethical importance that principle has (and the Nuremburg or %  Lai trials 
in recent times demonstrate the inadequacy of pleading "orders” as an 
escape from responsibility) - nevertheless there is a fine line between 
an honest civilian concern for the preservation of the rule of law and 
democracy, and the harassment of an army to the point where the democracy's 
ability to mobilise men in its defence is seriously undermined. The latter 
is more appropriate to the question of suits against federal officers during 
and after the American Civil V/ar. James G. Randall's estimate that there
were 3,000 suits pending by September I865, is a clue to the nature of the
1.
problem. * Not gas chambers, but alleged thefts of chickens and pigs, 
temporary confiscations, trespass and false imprisonment were the most 
common charges on which federal officers found themselves indicted in local 
courts* These courts were the courts of the Union - or at least of those 
parts of the Union where Republican conduct of the war was strongly criticised. 
The cases came from three types of region - from Copperhead areas in the 
Midwest; from Kentucky, a special situation in the extent of disloy^aJ-ty 
and proslavery sentiment in the state; and from states which were loyal, 
but under Democratic administration, like New York.
A further, and related problem for the federal government in protecting 
its army from state courts, was the practice of these courts to claim and 
exercise the right to issue writs of habeas corpus for the release of
1. James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Urbana; 
University of Illinois Press, I964) pp.193-194, hereafter cited as 
Randall, Constitutional Problems.
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enlisted men, usually minors, from service in the Union array, ’ State 
sovereignty stood in need of discipline.
For guidance, the past history of the federal system threw only a 
little light on the subject. Federalism was a delicate instrument of govern­
ment. The French observer Alexis de Tocqueville noted how its conflicts 
resolved themselves into judicial questions, or, as the more recent 
historians of American constitutional law, James Landis and Felix Frank­
furter write of a more specific aspect,
the happy relation of State to Nation - constituting as it
does our central political problem - is to no small extent dependent
upon the wisdom with which the scope and limits of the federal courts
are determined.2*
In theory that scope was wide - wide enough to leave no doubt that such 
interference as many of the state courts were displaying, need not be 
tolerated. The Constitution provided that "the judicial power of the 
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior 
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish" and that this 
power "shall be extended to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution and the laws of the United States".
The past, however, had played down the 'scope* of this power, and 
emphasised its 'limits*. Although the framers of the I789 Judiciary Act 
could have chosen to malce the jurisdiction of all these questions exclusive 
of the state judiciaries, they did not.^* Although Federalists at the time of
1. The question received exhaustive treatment in a Wisconsin case, In re 
Tarble, 25 Wis. 390 in I87O, where the judge claimed such a power of 
investigation and release on a habeas corpus writ from a state court.
The judgment was later reversed by the Supreme Court, in re Tarble,
80 U.S. 397 (1871), and such state jurisdiction denied once and for all.
2. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme 
Court. A Study in the Federal Judicial" System (N .Y .; McMillan & Co.,
1927) p.2., hereafter cited as Pranlcfurter and Landis, The Business of 
the Supreme Court.
3. John Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the 
United States (Boston & N.Y.: 1886 9th ed.) pp.621-622, hereafter cited 
as Pomeroy, Constitutional Law.
the debate on the Constitution and the First Judiciary Act might argue
for a judicial power co-extensive with the legislative and executive arms
of government, in practice both were limited by the fears of aggrandisement
of central powers^ displayed by states rights adhérants from the Constitutional
Convention onward.^' The limited legislative powers of the nation were
reflected in the limited jurisdiction of her courts. The whole range of
rights of person and property belonged chiefly to the states, while the
nation legislated chiefly on collective matters - treaties, revenue laws,
admiralty business and so on. The courts of the states had jurisdiction
in all areas of the law not expressly prohibited to them by the Constitution
and laws. And in practice, Congress chose to allow the federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction in only a few areas - cases arising under Treaties,
cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, controversies to which the United
2.
States was a party, and controversies between two or more states.
These were not two separate and independent jurisdictions. They 
touched and overlapped to become a dual and compound system of judicature, 
whose boundary lines were neither clear or settled. In two all-embracing 
fields to which the judicial power of the United States extended - "Cases 
arising under the Constitution" and "Cases arising under the Laws of the 
United States" - jurisdiction was shared by state and nation. Between the 
two, the 1789 Judiciary Act built a bridge. For the sake of uniformity, 
and the supremacy of the national will, it was necessary that though 
jurisdiction was concurrent, the nation's judiciary should have a reviewing
1. Charles Hl'arren, in New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789, Harvard Law Review, Vol.37» 1923-24, demonstrates the 
compromises with states rights which form the backcloth to the framing 
of that act.
2. The relative extent of state over federal jurisdiction is well discussed 
in Daniel H. Chamberlain, "The State Judiciary. Its Place in the 
American Constitutional System" in Constitutional History of the 
United States as Seen in the Development of American Law (N.Y.: I889)
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power over the decisions of the states* Section 25 of the I789 Judiciary 
Act provided for the removal of a suit from the highest state court to 
the Supreme Court of the United States where the validity of a treaty or 
law of the United States was dra,wn into question, and the decision had 
gone against their validity, or where a State law was held to he repugnant 
to the U.S. Constitution, and the decision had gone in its favour, or where 
the question was the construction of a clause of the Constitution, or a law 
of the United States where the decision went against the party claiming a 
right under such a law. Similarly, for the sake of uniformity, and so that 
a citizen of Massachusetts should have impartial justice in New York, 
Section 12 of the Judiciary Act provided for the removal of a suit by a 
citizen of one state against a citizen of another, from the state court 
in which it was commenced, to the federal circuit court. In the one case, 
federal court jurisdiction depended on the subject matter involved in the 
suit; in the other it depended on the parties. But in both, it brought 
state and national law, and the courts of each, into contact and possible 
conflict.^*
To avoid collisions, in day to day business where jurisdiction was
2
shared^ the courts applied the rules of courtesy. * They developed the 
idea of judicial comity - that no court should interpose its process to 
take out of the hands of another co-ordinate court a cause of which the 
latter had taken prior jurisdiction. The federal courts for their part 
applied the early admonition which Congress gave in a law of 1793,^'against 
interference with the state courts by issuing writs of injunction. The
1. See Pomeroy, Constitutional Law pp.621-632,
2. The subject is fully discussed in Charles Warren, Federal and State 
Court Interference. Harvard Law Review, Vol. XLVIII 1930» hereafter 
cited as Warren, Federal and State Court Interference.
3. 1 Stat. 335» Section 5.
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other side of the coin was that the federal courts had to assert an equal 
right to freedom from interference hy the state courts in matters affecting 
federal officials and causes. Here the arrangement did not prove entirely 
satisfactory. State courts claimed and exercised a right to issue ^vrita 
of habeas corpus for the release of men held under the national authority. 
In the famous Booth case in 1859, Chief Justice Taney had to deliver a 
censure, and deny the right of a Wisconsin State court judge to release 
a fugitive slave held under a national law, the Fugitive Slave Act.^* 
Taney's opinion did not stop the state courts from continuing to release 
men on writs of habeas corpus. The problem was at its worst during the 
civil war, when they invoked the right to release soldiers from service 
in the Union army.
If the federal courts nursed their grievances at times when the rules
of courtesy broke down, the state courts had theirs. Though the Judiciary
Act had provided for the removal of diversity of citizenship suits into
the federal courts, the fears of the states as to possible judicial
centralisation were allayed by the proviso that in these cases, "the
statutes of the states and their fixed and received construction by the
state courts are to govern the courts of the United States in administering
2.
the local law within the respective states". * But in the decades prior 
to the war, the federal courts in a number of cases had broken av/ay from 
the rule in some circumstances, on the grounds either that there was no 
"settled" state law on the subject, or where that law was held to be in
1. In the Booth case, 3 Wis. 157 (1855) the judge of the state court 
authorised Booth's release from the custody of a U.S. marshal who 
had arrested him for helping a fugitive slave to escape. Chief 
Justice Taney denied such a right where a federal officer acted 
under orders or process from a federal court - 21 How. 506 (l859).
2. Section 34, Judiciary Act, I789.
conflict with the Constitution.^* The case which perhaps worried the
states most was Swift v. Tyson, adjudicated in the Supreme Court in I842.
In this diversity of citizenship case over a negotiable hill of exchange,
the
Justice Story held that even if/N.Y. court precedents had been settled on
the subject, it was not necessary that the federal court should follow it,
since decisions were not laws, but only evidence of the law. The provision
of the Judiciary Act applied only to positive statutes of the states, and
to titles having a permanent locality. The federal courts, then, were
asserting an independent judgment in general commercial law - a departure
2,
which the state courts resented until the decision was reversed in 1938.
But this was hardly judicial centralisation. The wonder was how few 
oases came within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Originally, 
a much broader removal power had been proposed for the first Judiciary Act.
One Senate version allowed a defendant sued in a state court in a case 
involving a Federal question, not only to remove the case before trial into 
a Federal Circuit Court, but also to appeal after trial to the Supreme 
Court on a writ of error. The 1789 diversity of citizenship clause 
restricting the power to parties rather than subject matter was a compromise.^* 
Not until 1875, was this original proposal implemented. But in the interven­
ing years the removal power was broadened in a piecemeal fashion.^*
1. Thus in Groves v. Slaughter I6 Peters 449, the Supreme Court construed
the Constitution of Mississippi as affecting the validity of a note given 
for the purchase of slaves imported to that state, since there were no 
state court decisions on that point at the time; and even after the state 
courts rendered decisions contrary to Groves v. Slaughter, the Supreme 
Court refused to conform to these decisions. In Rowan v. Runnels, 5 
Howard 134, Taney held that a judicial construction adopted by the state 
court was in affect in conflict with the U.S. Constitution. Judge Grier 
in Pease v. Peck, I8 Howard 595, said, "when the decisions of the state 
court are not consistent, we do not feel bound to follow the last, if it 
is contrary to our own convictions".
2. Swift V. Tyson I6 Pet. 1 (I842). For a di cuss ion of the case, see Mitchell
Wendell, Relations Between the Federal and State Courts (Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Columbia University 1949) pp” n 5 “128, hereafter cited as 
Wendell, Federal and State Courts. The trend was followed up in I864, by 
the important case of Gelpke v. Dubuque 1 Wall. 175, a municipal bonds 
case where a state statute was overriden by the Supreme Court, exercising 
an independent judgment. The decision in Swift v. Tyson was finally 
reversed by Eerie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
3. Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 
.1789, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 37 p.62.
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Bat however much history of judicial federalism had been geared 
to avoiding, rather than joining conflicts, by avoiding exceeding the 
political possibilities of federalism - nevertheless the nation had 
never abandonned its potential judicial power under Article III Section II 
of the Constitution* The nationalist Chief Justices Marshall and Taney 
kept the possibilities within sight. As Marshall reminded the Court, and 
the country, in Martin v. Hunter,
it is manifest that the judicial power of the United States 
is unavoidably in some cases, exclusive of all state authority, 
and in all others may be made so at the election of Congress.
In 1861 and 1862, Congress had elected to put property confiscations 
in that class. The federal courts were given exclusive and original juris­
diction. Prosecutions of federal officers were in a slightly different 
category, since they involved questions of concurrent jurisdictions. These 
men were accused of violations of state law, and hence, prosecution already 
begun in the state courts. The situation, however, was not entirely 
unfamiliar, as the Senate Judiciary Committee quickly discovered in its 
search for precedents. Twice in fairly recent history, the removal power 
had been invoked beyond the familiar diversity of citizenship cases. In 
1815, in the wake of the New England secessionist feeling after the Hartford 
Convention, and again in 1833, at the time of the South Carolina Nullification 
Controversy, the federal government had found difficulty in protecting its 
revenue officers from harassing suits in state courts for alleged offences 
while enforcing the national law.
In both these cases. Congress invoked a little of the dormant judicial 
power of the Constitution. The revenue acts of 1815 and 1833, allowed a 
federal officer, or innocent third party, prosecuted in a state court, in 
a civil or criminal case, to remove that case from the state court to the
1. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304 (I8I6).
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federal circuit c o u r t . T l i e  federal court was to proceed as though 
the suit had been brought there by original jurisdiction, and further 
proceedings by the state courts were null and void* The I8I5 act provided 
no explicit machinery for co-ercing the states into handing over jurisdic­
tion to the federal courts, but the 1833 act provided for the issue of a 
writ of habeas corpus to take the prisoner out of the hands of the state 
courts and into the federal court, should the necessity arise. There was 
fuel indeed for conflict. But the whole area of ultimate sanctions against 
delinquent states was not explored at that time. According to Charles 
Warren, only about ten cases came up under the 1833 act. * The judicial 
crisis passed when the political crisis which produced it passed.
The legacy of the past was this. There were few precedents for a 
sustained conflict between state and nation. Where conflicts arose, they 
were closely related to politics, specifically to the states rights 
challenge to national sovereignty. In I815 and 1833, in circumstances 
very similar to the problem which now faced the government in protecting 
its army officers, Congress reacted by enlarging the jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts, to take cases on the grounds of their involving a 
particular federal question - in other words on the grounds of subject 
matter rather than the citizenship of the parties. But no guidelines had 
been left on the perennial problem of enforcement. The federal judiciary 
was not an independent arm of government. Though they represented the 
nation inside the state, and hence the only machinery for the enforcement 
of federal law there, if the states courts could not be relied upon to
1. Acts of February 4th, I815, 3 Stat. 195 and March 2nd, 1833, 4 Stat.
632.
2. Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, pp.366-370*
81.
observe it, nevertheless, as Mitchell Wendell writes,
in the final analysis, whether federal law would be obeyed 
in the states depended on the extent of national power. This 
fact becomes plain when we remember that it was force that over­
came the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, the Nullification Movement in 
South Carolina, and the attempt at secession of I86l-l865.^*
Though force might remain the ultimate sanction of law over rebellion 
in any government structure, the Civil War Congresses sought to make 
federalism less susceptible to such confrontations by strengthening the 
machinery of the nation's laws inside the states - the nation's courts. 
Borrowing from the acts of I815 and 1833, designed to protect revenue 
officers, these Congresses passed twelve acts between I863 and 1875 increas­
ing the range of federal questions which could be removed from state to 
federal courts. * As the nation's legislative power extended to matters 
once beyond its jurisdiction, to civil rights and conditions of citizenship, 
the judicial machinery was extended to see its laws enforced. The first of 
these acts was the Habeas Corpus Act of March 3rd, 1863.^’
The first three sections of the act concerned the question, much 
debated by pamphleteers at the time, and historians ever since, as to when, 
and by v/hom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus might be suspended. 
Eloquent speeches in Congress and outside, invoked the great principles 
of liberty contained in Magna Carta, and traced its misunderstood history 
through to the United States Constitution, to support Presidential or 
Congressional authority, to make the suspension.^' The first section of
1. Wendell, Federal and State Courts p.26
2. These acts are listed in Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the
Supreme Court pp.61-67*
3. 12 U.S. Stat. 756.
4. The Attorney General upheld the President's right to make the suspension
11 Opinions of the Attorney General 297. Horace Binney's pamphlet, The
Privilege of the V/rit of Habeas Corpus Under the Constitution
'('phil ade 1 phi a ; Sherman & Son, 1862 2nd ed. ) backed up the Executive 
in this, and sparked off a controversy, joined by numerous jurists and 
politicians. Among them, Sydney G. Fisherbreply, denying the President's 
power, is among the most relevant -Sydney G. Fisher, The Suspension of 
Habeas Corpus During the War of the Rebellion. Political Science 
Quarterly, September 1888. For a synthesis of the discussion, see 
Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln Chapter 6,
üd:,
the Act ambiguously go:anted Congressional 'authority' to the President 
to suspend the privilege. Tlie following tv;o sections mapped out a, safe­
guard procedure against lengthy detainments of prisoners without cause shown, 
The Secretary of State, and the Secretary of War were to supply the judges 
of the federal district and circuit courts with a list of those held under 
federal authority as political prisoners. Where a grand jury sat in 
such an area, and terminated its session without finding an indictment 
against such a person on the list, the prisoner was to be discharged, 
having taken an oath of allegiance.
But it is in the subsequent sections of the act, less familiar ground 
to historians, but in its broad implications no less important for liberty 
than the guarantees against arbitrary arrests, that the federal officer 
found his protection. It is not by accident that these sections reveal 
a strong resemblance to the removal acts of 1815 and 1833. Senator Jacob 
Collamer of Vermont, closely concerned with the drafting of the act, 
revealed in the course of the debate that these earlier acts had been 
followed as precedents.^’ The fourth section of the act provided that 
any order of the President, or more broadly "under his authority" should 
be a defence against suits for search, seizure, arrest or imprisonment 
committed under such an order or under any law of Congress. The following 
sections elaborated on the procedure for taking suits where such a defence 
was pleaded, from the state courts to the federal circuit courts. Where 
an action, civil or criminal, was begun in a state court against a federal 
officer, "or any other person" for such offences under the authority of 
the President or an act of Congress, the defendant could file a petition 
on those grounds, for the removal of his case into the federal court.
That done, the state court must proceed no further in the case. The suit
1. Cong Globe,, 37th Cong,, 3 sess., pp.534*535 January 27th, 1863.
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was to be tried as though it were an original suit in the federal court - 
in other words, tried both as to the facts and the law of the case. Such 
a removal could be made by the defendant while the case wa,s pending in the 
state court, but either party could remove the case after final .judgment 
in the state court to the circuit court (except in criminal cases where 
judgment went in the defendant's favour). An ultimate appeal could be 
made from the decision of the federal circuit court, to the Supreme Court 
on a writ of error. The act concluded with a two-year statute of limitation. 
Suits had to be commenced within two years of the wrong complained of.
Democratic critics of the act complained bitterly that here was an 
act designed to immunise, rather than indemnify federal officers for their 
actions in the course of suppresssing the rebellion, that it was railroaded 
through Congress before members realized what it contained or could voice 
their opposition, that in application it afforded no remedy to the injured 
party, and that it impinged on the judicial power of the states.^’
Clearly, even the bare terms of the act refute some of these objections. 
It did not deny the plaintiff a remedy. Either party could remove the suit 
after final judgment in a state court, except in criminal cases where the 
verdict went against the plaintiff. Surely discrimination was less likely 
to be exercised against the plaintiff in a federal court than against the 
defendant in a state court. The balance was hardly over-corrected by 
placing most of the initiative for removal in the hands of the defendant. 
Secondly, to accept the charge of 'immunisation', the partiality of the 
federal court would have to be assumed, A defence of acting under orders 
was to be established there - not presented as a reason for stopping further 
investigation. As for the Republicans railroading the bill through Congress,
1. Ibid,, p,535* 537) comments of Senators Powell and Bayard.
with members ignorant of its contents, there seems to be no grounds for 
this charge. issue was sufficiently aired in both houses between
December 1862 and March I863 when it wus passed. There was no reason 
for members to be any more or less ignorant of its contents than they 
were of any other bill they voted upon*
The necessity of passing some legislation to deal with a mounting 
crop of suits wa.s clear by the time Congress tackled the problem in the 
winter of I862* Frequent requests caeie to the Attorney-General's office 
from the War Department, to supply counsel in suits against officers.
In January I863, Attorney-General Edward Bates wrote to Lyman Trumbull of 
the Senate Judiciary committee, enclosing a copy of a bill on the subject, 
which he had drawn up, apparently at the request of several members of 
Congress. He mrote, "Some such bill is, I think, absolutely necessary 
for the judicial peace of the country, and for the reasonable safety of 
the officers of the Government".^' By that time, however, the Congressional 
committees of House and Senate were working on the problem*
On December 8th, 1862, Thaddeus Stevens introduced a brief indemnifi­
cation bill. It said simply that there had been occasions when the privilege 
of the writ had been suspended* Since there was some doubt as to which 
branch of the government might lawfully do this, all arrests made during 
these periods were confimed and made valid. The President, Secretaries, 
and all persons concerned in making the arrests were indemnified and
discharged from suits and prosecutions* The bill concluded with an
2,
authorisation to the President for future suspensions. * In some ways 
then, Stevens' bill was a limited undertaking, applying only to past 
arrests* In another sense, it was, more fittingly than the final act of
1. Edward Bates to Lyman Tiumbull. January 7th, I863. Attorney-Generals 
Papers, Letterbook 4 pp.310-311. Record Group 60, National Archives.
2. The bill is printed in Cong. Globe., 37th Cong., 3 sess., p.529 
January 27th, l863o
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March, an 'immunisation* rather than an indemnification, since it
contained no court procedure, \9hat ohance such an unsophisticated
immunisation would have had in a state court, however, is open to serious
question. Of this bill, a charge of railroading might also be made
more justly, since it was passed by $0 votes to 45 on the day of its
introduction, with virtually no debate.^* Stevens himself insisted that
it was not a bill to indemnify everybody who had committed a trespass in
the name of the Government, but simply those who had made arrests at a
time when the suspension of the habeas corpus privilege had possibly been 
2.
illegal. * His protestations did not allay the misgivings of Thirty-seven 
Democrats, led by Clement Vallandigham, who signed a protest at the 
passage of a bill which "proposes to deprive the courts of the power to 
afford .,. protection". *
Senator Trumbull, on January l6th, 1863, reported a substitute by way 
of an amendment to the House bill, - one which brought the courts back into 
the picture, though not in a way which would bring Vallandigham and the 
Democrats much comfort.^" The Senate version contained the essence of 
the final bill - the procedure for removing suits under a defence of 
Presidential authority, (or authority under an act of Congress as it was 
quickly amended to), from state to federal courts, ^here Stevens bill had 
provided an extrajudicial procedure only for arrests made while the habeas 
corpus privilege was suspended possibly illegally, this bill extended 
protection to federal officers and third parties for future as well as 
past offences. Trespasses, seizures and so on fell within its scope, as 
well as arrests.
1. Ibid., pp.20-22 December 8th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.22 December 8th, 1862.
3. TbTd., pp.165*166 December 22nd, 1862.
4. Ibid., p.321 January l6th, I863.
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Daring the debate considerable attention was paid to the
technicalities of removal procedures which must have been unfamiliar
to most Congressmen. Conservatives were quickly alerted to a danger of
"judicial centralisation". Their alarm was sparked off by a proposed
amendment of Senator Harris’ on January 27th, to include criminal as
1 .
well as civil cases in the removal procedure. * In fact this was not
an innovation. The 1833 revenue act had explicitly included criminal
cases. But, didn't such a proposal break the rules of non-interference
between state and federal courts? % e r e  the Supreme Court exercised a
reviewing power over the decisions of state supreme courts, it adjudicated
the law of the case. "Where the federal circuit courts had diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction, they were bound to apply the laws of the state
in which the matter of controversy was situated, except in very exceptional
circumstances. But this bill proposed to take cases of violations of
state criminal law, out of the hands of the courts of the states, and
into the federal courts. The federal court was to treat the case as
though it had come there under original jurisdiction, to be tried both
as to the law and the facts of the case. The case would be tried ^  novo
in a federal court, with no guaranteed application of state law, and yet
with no alternative federal laws to cover the situation. There was no
federal law for example on the subject of murder, yet such a case was
within the scope of the act. There had been, as Charles Warren demonstrates,
many occasions when Congress had passed penal statutes which enlisted the
state courts to enforce them. State courts had been accustomed to applying
federal criminal law - but the federal courts were new to the business of
2.
applying state criminal law. * It was a monstrous intrusion on the states'
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong,, 3 sess., pp.534*5 January 27th, I863.
2. Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and The State Courts. Harvard 
Law Review, Vol. 38 March 1925 * hereafter cited as Warren, Federal 
Criminal Laws. Warren traces the history of several federal laws in
which state courts appied penalties for crimes of embezzlement, robbery 
of the mails etc.
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criminal jurisdiction, the conservatives objected.
In 1055, the conservatives had taken a quite different position, 
when Congress considered a proposal to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act 
by removing cases against its enforcers from state to federal courts, 
Theicproposai then included criminal cases, and brought forth this 
interesting protest from Republican Salmon P. Chase, to become Chief 
Justice in I864,
it is a bill for the overthrow of State-Rights, to establish 
a great consolidated Federal Government, a step, or rather a stride, 
towards despotism •* There is scope enough for your experiment 
without usurping the criminal jurisdiction of the States. Do not 
undertake to arrest the sovereignty of the States when employed in 
its highest duty of investigating and punishing wrongs to life or 
property within its jurisdiction .. This bill is the monstrous birth 
of a bad time. The clearest and widest separation possible under the 
Constitution of the sphere of the National from that of the State 
judiciary is the true means of peace and harmony. But this bill 
expresses the very wantonness of contempt for this principle. It
is framed as if its express design was to bring on a desperate
conflict between the Courts of the States and those of the United
States .. Vthat if the State Courts refuse to grant a removal? The
end of the road is ruin.
But bad precedents on behalfof slavery made good ones on behalf of
democracy, bad Democratic ideas, good Republican. Lyman Trumbull was one
of the few who refrained from joining the ’about turn’ of the parties. In
1855 he opposed such inroads into the state judicial power. In 1863, he
continued to do so, on the grounds that there was no federal law on murder,
etc., or provision for administering state criminal law in United States 
2,
courts. * In defence of the amendment, Senator Harris quoted Chief Justice 
Marshall from Story’s Commentaries,to the affect that federal court 
jurisdiction extended to both civil and criminal cases. His colleague 
Collamer agreed, resting the case on the revenue acts on which this bill 
was modelled.^*
1. Cong. Globe, 33rd Cong., 2 sess., App. p.211, quoted in Warren,
Federal Criminal Laws.
2. Cong. Globe., 37th Cong., 3 sess,, pp.534*5 January 27th, I863.
3. Ibid.
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Precedents, however, hardly satisfied opponents who were fearful 
for the consequences to the state judiciary. Democratic Senator Powell 
held, referring perhaps to the case of Prigg v. îbmsylvania that,
it has been decided by the Supreme Court that no jurisdiction 
over crimes against the United States has been delegated to the 
State courts; and, by parity of reasoning, it would certainly be 
held by any enlightened court that crimes against the States cannot 
be transferred to the jurisdiction of the United States courts.^*
Time would prove him wrong on that point of law. In 1879» the case 
of Tennessee v. Davis came up under the 1833 removal provisions of the 
revenue act. Justice Strong held that in this case, where a revenue 
officer was indicted for murder in the course of enforcing the revenue 
act, the removal power applied equally to criminal and civil cases, and 
that
it is in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts of 
the United States jurisdiction of such a case, although it may 
involve other questions of fact or of law.^*
For the present, however, what compounded the sin for the bill’s 
opponents, was not only the inclusion of criminal cases, but that removal 
of cases could be made both before and after final judgment had been 
rendered in a state court - to be tried again as to both law and fact. 
Senator Bayard objected that this
must lead necessarily to the entire destruction of the States 
as regards their own criminal jurisprudence.3*
1. Ibid., p.535 January 27th, 1863* Charles Warren writes that the state
courts began to object to sharing the load of federal criminal
jurisdiction. He cites cases in Connecticut, Kentucky and Missouri 
in the late 1820’s, early 1830’s to the effect that "no respectable 
Government ever yet undertook to execute the criminal code of another". 
In Prigg V. Pennsylvania in I842, the Supreme Court held - simply
that the states could not be compelled to enforce such laws - I6 Pet, 
539* See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws pp.580-58l.
2. Tennessee v. Davis 100 U.S. 257 (1879)*
3. Cong. Globe., 37th Cong,, 3 sess., p.537 January 27th, I863.
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Republican Orville Browning added the protest,
I do very much doubt the power in the first place, and very 
much more strongly the expediency, if the power exists, of going 
so far as to annul absolutely the final judgments and decisions 
of the State tribunals, talce the case de novo int£ the Federal 
courts, and try the whole thing over again there.
On this point at least, the Supreme Court was to prove more sympathetic
to the bill's opponents. The question at issue in the I869 case of the
Justices V, Murray was whether that part of the 1863 act allowing removal
after final judgnent was constitutional, and whether the Seventh Amendment,
(that no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court
of the United States than according to common law) applied to facts tried
by a jury in a cause in a state court. Justice Nelson, for the Court,
gave the opinion that it was, and that the part of the Habeas Corpus Act
which provided for removals after final judgment v/as unconstitutional and
void. Tie proper appeal from a final decision of a state court was a
2.
writ of error to the Supreme Court. * And so at least one branch of govern­
ment would not ride roughshod over the states criminal jurisdiction! But 
removals could still be made before final judgment.
At the time of the debate, however, the Republicans were not intent 
on violating the Seventh Amendment, but rather on making provision for 
the enforcement of the constitutional authority of the United States inside 
the states. Working in new territory, they were not always sure of 
authorities and precedent. Despite objections, they carried the amendment 
to include criminal cases, by 27 votes to 15 on January 27th.
1. Ibid., p.539 January 27th, I863.
2. Tlie Justices v. Murray 9 Wallace 274 (I869). The original opinion of
the federal circuit court in Murray v. Patrie, Fed. Cas. 9» 9^7 (I866) 
was to the contrary. There Judge Nelson cited Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat, 
346*350, and Osborn v. Bank of U.S. 9 ?;heat, 821-828, as authority for 
the correctness of removals after, as well as before judgment. In 1879, 
a federal court held in re Hurst (Fed. Gas. 6, 926) that a federal 
officer had been wrongfully imprisoned by the state court. The court
held that the state court had no jurisdiction to try such a case, and
that he was entitled to be discharged » although he was already 
undergoing sentence.
3. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3 sess., p.538 January 27th, I863.
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To determine vhat exactly the Republican supporters of the bill did
want, the whole context of war policy must be considered. For the debate
spanned the whole range of Republican policy on arbitrary arrests,
confiscation and emancipation. In the House debate, when Representative
Wadsworth criticised George Julian for speaking generally of the war and
causes of the rebellion, rather than sticking to the subject at hand,
Thaddeus Stevens interpolated that the discussion quite properly was
%
about the whole policy of the Government.
For in one straightforward sense, the avowed object of everything 
the Republicans did was to restore the integrity of the government, to 
see to it that the law was respected in the states, that the Union should 
be a viable instrument of government again. And to this end, the protection 
of federal officers was very relevant. In this vein. Senator Collamer 
explained the intentions behind the bill,
we thinlc that a villain ought to be arrested; that a thief 
should be arrested, and all breakers of the law; and especially 
that that law in which the vital existence of the Government is
involved should be enforced. Obedience must be enforced, or there 
is an end of Government.
Of federal court jurisdiction he went on,
if that provision of the Constitution which gives jurisdiction 
to the courts of the United States to decide those questions has 
any force in it, they are the proper tribunal; and the bill is dravm 
with a view to carry those questions there ... Gentlemen who really 
think that this Government should be preserved against violence by 
the use of governmental force, I take it, will assist us to perfect 
and carry through this bill.2*
And so for Collamer a commitment to the existence of government and 
law was the only prerequisite for support of the bill. It did not imply 
consent to every specific policy of the Republican administration, nor
1. Ibid., p.1067 February l8th, I863.
2, Ibid., p .536 January 27th, 1863.
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was it to be a blanlcet of legality around every act. Conservative 
Republican Senator Cowan agreed. He said that though there were times 
he believed the law impolitic, he would obey it while he struggled for 
its repeal. The will of the individual must respect the will of the 
people, expressed in law by their elected representatives. Otherwise, 
government could not exist.
But the Democrats accused the Republicans of a more devious connection 
between "war policy" and "law". In both Senate and House, they argued that 
the bill must not be taken in isolation, but be seen for what it was - 
part of a wider plot to throw a curtain of legality around things which 
they believed illegal, to make permanent acts which their understanding 
of the law would have made very temporary. Senator Garret Bavis of Kentucky 
connected the President’s September 1862 Proclamation suspending the 
privilege of the writ, with the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, as,
a comprehensive scheme devised ostensibly to aid in suppressing 
a great insurrection, and reducing the insurgents to obedience to 
the Constitution and laws, but in reality to abolish negro slavery 
everywhere.^ •
The Republicans were indemnifying the executors of that policy, and 
by implication giving these policies a firmer base. The fear of permanence 
of things done under military orders, or executive proclamation was the 
corollory. Bavis went on,
it would strike everybody as absurd to say that the military
occupation and use of land would extinguish the title and divest the
property of the owner. It would be no less false to assume such a 
position in relation to slaves. To free them ... would not extinguish 
the title and divest the property of the owner, which the Constitution
declares shall not be done in any mode than "by due course of law".3'
1. Ibid.. pp.1467*1469 March 2nd, I863.
2. Ibid.. pp.529*534 January 27th, I863. A similar connection was made by
Representatives Stiles in the House, Ibid., pp.l087-1088 February 19th, 
1863. The jurist B. R. Curtis also wrote of these emergency measures 
that "they establish a system. ' They do not relate to some instant 
emergency - they cover an indefinite future", and went on to warn against 
indemnity for illegal acts. B.R. Curtis, Executive Powers (Boston: Little 
Brown & Co., I862).
3. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3 sess., pp.529*534 January 27th, I863.
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Of course proclamations and acts of Congress could not be legalised
by indemnifying those who acted upon them. Individually they would have
to stand the test of law. But the enforcement of the policy they represented
was very closely related to the ability of the government to protect the
agents of its laws. In that sense, the Democrats were right. There v^ere
no plots, but a concern for backing up wider Republican policy - a concern
of which the Democratic version was a mirror, distorted but nevertheless a
mirror. For that reason, Representatives Julian, Stevens, Walker and Van
Horn did not regard their speeches calling for a vigorous v;ar policy, and
],
support for the army, as irrelevant to the bill under discussion.
For different, but related reasons, the Republicans were unanimous in 
their support for a bill to indemnify federal officers acting under the 
national authority. For Cowan and Collamer, the inviolability of the 
government was the only argument which need be presented. Speeches in the 
House went beyond that to plead a wider policy of emancipation, confiscation, 
and vigorous support for the Union army in the field. But even common sense 
would be enough to attach Representative Francis Thomas of Maryland to the 
bill, on the practical, but convincing argument,
at all events, I think that in times like these State courts 
and State juries, summoned by the sheriffs elected by themselves, 
ought not to have exclusive power to determine questions involving 
the discharge of public duty of public officers acting under the 
authority of the Government of the United States.
The Senate passed its Judiciary Committee * s amendment to the original 
House bill on January 27th, 1863 by 33 votes to 7*^" On February 19th, 
the House refused concurrence.^* The debate does not reveal explicit
1. Ibid., pp.1064*1069 February l8th, I863, Ibid., pp.1083*1086 February 
l8th, 1863, Ibid., pp.1074*1080 February l8th, I863.
2. Ibid., PP.IO8O-IO83 February l8th, 1863.
3» Ibid.♦ p.554 January 27th, I863.
4. Ibid.. p .1107 February 19th, I863.
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objections, or preferences for Stevens original extra-judicia]. bill.
Perhaps some of the conservative amendments to the Senate bill were not
to their liking, Tlie Senate had accepted Cowan’s amendment that probable
cause for arrest must be shown as part of the defence, so that preventative
1.
arrests could not be made. * Certainly neither the principle of indemnifi­
cation, nor the removal procedure was disapproved by the House, for when 
the Committee of Conference reported the final bill embodying that procedure, 
it was accepted by 9 9  votes to 4 4  on March 2n d . 2 .  The Senate accepted the 
conference report on the same day by a viva voce vote. * The Habeas Corpus 
Act became law on March 3rd, 1863*
It had been duly considered and debated. It was not ’’Radical” 
legislation, Jacob Collamer, the Vermont Senator who had a hand in drafting 
the indemnification clauses of the bill has been variously styled a moderate, 
or conservative, but never an extremist. ’’Judicial centralisation” was not 
their objective, but rather to cut through anarchy and see that questions 
vitally affecting the federal government were adjudicated in its courts. 
Rather than, as Senator Davis charged, doing anything to encourage a 
neglect of anyone’s right to ’’due course of law”, they were concerned 
that the men who served the government should also have that right.
Perhaps they were a little naive in thinking that the Habeas Corpus 
Act secured that right. One subject which was not fully explored in the 
debate was what possible sanctions to apply against state courts if they 
simply refused to hand over jurisdiction to the federal courts. The 1833 
Revenue Act had contained a provision for the issue of a habeas corpus writ 
to take the defendant out of the state c o u r t . B u t  the Habeas Corpus Act
1. Ibid., p.554 January 27th, 1863.
2. Ibid., p.1479 March 2nd, 1863*
3. Ibid., p.1477 March 2nd, 1863.
4* 4 H.S. Stat. 632 Section 7*
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simply required the court to stay proceedings, once a removal petition 
had been properly filed.
In the next few years, that, and other weaknesses of the act became 
abundantly clear, as state and federal courts came to interpret the act.
The act of course applied equally to all part of the Union, Laws which 
Republicans expected to be obeyed in Georgia had to be obeyed in 
Massachusetts - and even in Kentucky! Suits under the act came mostly 
from the border states, where strong local prejudice was often directed 
against federal officers in the course of their duties. Conflicts of 
jurisdiction between state and federal courts were frequent, as some state 
judges, notably in Kentucky, refused federal court jurisdiction, and held 
the Habeas Corpus Act unconstitutional. Indeed the Ken'tucky legislature 
made it difficult for the courts there to do anything else but resist.
In February 1866, they passed an enactment making it unlawful for a judge 
to dismiss a suit on the acceptance of a defence that the alleged wrongs 
were committed during the existence of martial law or the suspension of 
habeas corpus.^*
One of the most prominent arguments put forward by state courts 
refusing federal jurisdiction, was to go beyond ascertaining whether a 
defence of national authority, or Presidential orders etc. was properly 
set up, to coimnent on the constitutionality of these orders. They presumed
2,
then, to pass judgment on the President’s war powers. In Eifort v. Bevins,
an action against an officer for trespass and false imprisonment brought
to the Kentucky supreme court in 1866, Judge Robertson held their "authority”
illegal,
1, Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln p.197*
2. Eifort V. Bevins 1 Bush 4^0 (l866).
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He argued,
The Constitution of the United States being supreme over the 
President, as well as over every other citizen, every unconstitutional 
act done by him must necessarily be illegal and void, and consequently, 
no citizen or soldier can shield himself from responsibility by plead­
ing an unconstitutional order of the President, which being a legal 
nullity, could confer no authority.
In a sentence, perhaps, the Republican legislative intention is 
vindicated. If the unconstitutionality of the President's exercise of 
the war power was to be the issue which a federal officer was to risk 
imprisonment for, all vigorous action might be paralysed while troops 
pondered questions of constitutionality best left to the United States 
Supreme Court. ^Vhat the judge was doing in this case, was using the court 
as a political platform from which to attack Republican policy* Judge 
Perkins followed suit in the Indiana case of Griffin v. Wilcox,^* in 1863*
In this case the defendant, acting under orders from the Provost Marshal, 
suspended the sale of liquor to enlisted soldiers. His arrest of the 
plaintiff, Griffin, for infringements of the suspension, resulted in his 
being sued for damages. The opinion in the case, barely touched upon the 
particularities of the defendant's orders, or present plight, but remained 
on the subject of the unconstitutionality of the Habeas Corpus Act itself, 
and a general attack on the President's use of the war power.
On the more specific technicalities of the Habeas Corpus Act itself, 
the loophole which the state courts made was in the phrase "order of the 
President". Choosing to neglect other phrases which gave the act a wider 
application,— for example "or under his authority", or "any law of Congress",- 
they demanded in some cases, that the defendant actually produce a written 
order of the President. Thus, it was not sufficient to plead, as the
1. Griffin v. Wilcox 21 Indiana 370 (1863).
See also Short v. Wilson 1 Bush 350 - Hogue v. Penn 3 Bush 663*
9b,
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plaintiff did in Skeen v. Huntington, * on appeal to the Indiana supreme 
court in I865? that his "authority" for making an arrest was by virtue of 
his position as deputy provost marshal under authority of the President.
2 c
Nor did Judge Robertson in the Kentuclcy case of Short v. Wilson ’ in I866 
accept a plea of ’orders’ from a captain in the federal army who seized a 
mare. ’Authority' had to be more specific. A narrow construction of 
Presidential authority was a severe limitation on the terms of the act.
And, given the tendency of the courts to hold that authority unconstitutional, 
even where it was clearly given, the officer couldn’t win. The double 
hazard is illustrated in the case of Commonwealth v. P a l m e r , i n  the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals in I866. General Palmer was indicted for helping 
a slave to escape under his General Order Number 32. His plea was that he 
had authority from the War Department. Judge Robertson, for the court, 
objected that he had only been authorised, not specifically ordered, and 
furthermore, ".. had he pleaded a peremptory order, it could not have 
shielded him from the penal consequences of an illegal act of glaring 
usurpation".
The state courts defined military discretions, and responsibility 
under orders, by the Supreme Court opinion in Mitchell v. Harmony in 1851.^* 
The case referred to property seizures during the Mexican War. The opinion 
of the court was that private property could be taken by a military commander 
in times of such danger that it would not admit of delay, or where action 
by the civil authority would be too late. But the officer making the 
seizure could not rely on pleading orders, for "An order to commit a tres­
pass can afford no justification to the person by whom it was executed".
1. Skeen v. Huntington 25 Ind. 510 (I865).
2. Short V. Wilson 1 Bush 350 (I866)
3. Commonwealth v. Palmer 2 Bush 570 (i866).
4. lALtchell V, Harmony 13 Howard II5 (I851).
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Tlie case was widely cited and followed in the state courts.
State court judges may have been right in some cases. The mere 
fact of being a federal officer does not shield a man from all consequences 
of his action, or ensure that he will not step beyond the limits of 
discretion and commit illegal acts. The point however, v/as that such 
questions should have been adjudicated in the federal courts, once the 
proper steps had been taken to remove the case.
There are, however, some important qualifications to the idea of 
widespread intransigence on the part of the state courts, and to the idea 
that in no state court could a federal officer possibly secure a fair trial 
because of the prejudice of judge and jury. For one thing, in a number of 
cases where federal court jurisdiction was resisted, the highest court of 
the state was reversing a judgment of à lower state court, originally 
sympathetic to the defendant, and the Habeas Corpus Act. In the case 
cited above, of Commonwealth v. Palmer in the Kentuclcy Court of Appeals, 
the state circuit court had dismissed the case against General Palmer.
Again, in the Kentucky case of Farmer v. L e w i s , J u d g e  Hardin found that 
the lower court judge had been in error in instructing the jury to dismiss 
a case against federal officers, on the grounds that they had set up a 
defence of orders in the terms of the Habeas Corpus Act. The tale is 
similar in Hogue v. Penn in Kentucky, and Griffin v. Wilcox in Indiana.
The most interesting case of such a reversal, however, is in Short v. Wilson 
in 1866, again in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. For that case was 
prosecuted, for the specific reason of obtaining a reversal of a lower 
state court decision to transfer a case against federal officers to the 
federal courts. It came up under authority of a Kentucky Statute of 
February l6th, 1866 which read,
1. Farmer v. Lewis 1 Bush 66 (l866).
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either party to any suit in any court of this Commonwealth.. 
shall have the right of appeal ... from the order of any such 
court transferring ... a cause to any court of the United States, 
or staying proceedings ... with a view of transferring a cause to 
any court of the United States.I•
Arrogant behaviour by some state supreme courts, then, suggests that 
it was they, and not necessarily all state courts, who, finding themselves 
in a new position where appeals by-passed their jurisdiction into the 
federal courts, reacted with alarm to the threat of "encroachment". But 
that suggestion is made cautiously, since there are also cases, discussed 
below, of state supreme courts accepting federal court jurisdiction, after 
reversing lower court decisions refusing to hand over such jurisdiction.
Such cases provide a further qualification to a picture of complete
non-co-operation between the courts of state and nation. In these cases,
judges neither demanded written orders of the President, nor called his
policy into question. Their interest was confined to whether the defendant
had set up a proper petition under the terms of the Habeas Corpus Act. If
he had, there was an end to state court jurisdiction, and the case would 
2.
be transferred. * This was the view of Judge Conyngham in the Pennsylvania 
case of Kulp v. Ricketts,^* one of the earliest tests of the act in I863.
He held that the federal court was the proper place for the adjudication 
of this case against Ricketts for alleged v/rongful arrest under authority 
of the War Department, It m s  not his court's duty to pass upon the 
President's right to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
1. Quoted in Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln p.197.
2. According to Henry C. Black, A Treatise on the Laws and Practice Governing 
the Removal of Causes (St. Paul ; West Publishing CoTT l89'8)T pp. 312-313, 
this was the correct behaviour. He says, "Issues of fact upon the 
petition cannot be raised in the state court. That court must take the 
facts to be as they are stated in the record and the petition; it has
no jurisdiction to pass upon any such questions; that is the exclusive 
province of the federal court". On the other hand, "The mere filing 
of a petition for the removal of a suit which is not removable does not 
work a transfer". A case, he says must be made which, "on its face" 
shows that the petitioner has a right of transfer. But the federal 
court also has a question to decide if its own jurisdiction attaches 
to the cause, by reason of proper steps having been talcen to remove the 
cause. "... the decision of the state court is not conclusive".
3. Kulp V. Ricketts 5 Philadelphia Reports 305 (I863),
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They need only see that the ease is set out as required by the Habeas 
Corpus Act. That act, he maintained, created no new jurisdiction - 
jurisdiction over federal questions already existed. It only provided 
arrangements for the particular court and process of implementing that 
jurisdiction.
As Judge Leonard put the matter concisely in the I863 Hew York case 
of Jones V. Seward,^* where the Secretary of State found himself answering 
charges of false imprisonment,
we have nothing to do with the validity of the law as a 
defence to the action. It is sufficient for the state court that 
the defence involves the construction and effect of a law of 
Congress. Tlie case has then arisen when the courts of the United 
States may have jurisdiction, if Congress so directs.
And he concluded co-operatively,
it is not our duty to assert the independence of our State 
sovereignty and jurisdiction; for the final construction and 
effect of all acts of Congress may be brought before the United 
States courts by the express provision of the Constitution,
Even Kentucky’s Court of Appeals produced such a case in Edwards v,
2 ^
Ward in 1866, * where Judge Williams followed these arguments, and sustained 
a lower court decision to transfer a case against a federal officer to the 
federal court.
To cloud the question of relationships between the highest state 
courts and the inferior state courts, some of these compliant state court 
opinions were reversals of lower court decisions originally taking an 
unfavourable view of federal court jurisdiction under the act. One such 
case is particularly worth noting, since it involved Ohio’s Supreme Court's 
issuing a v/rit of mandamus to the county court to stay proceedings, in
1. Jones V. Seward, as reported in Edward McPherson, Tlie Political History 
of the United States of America During the Great Rebell i onn  Washington ;
18637 pp.185-187.
2. Edwards v. Hard 2 Bush 6O6 (I866).
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order that the case might be removed! The case was The State v. Fairfield
1 ,Court of Common Pleas in I864/ ’ where federal officers filed a petition 
for removal of a case against them for imprisonment and assault, from the 
state court to the federal. 7/hen it was refused, one of the officers, Tod, 
brought an action in the Ohio Supreme Court for a vrit of mandamus against 
the lower court. The higher court sustained both the constitutionality of 
the Habeas Corpus Act, and the right to stay proceedings in the lower 
court in this manner. Ho complete picture of the incidence of clashes 
between state courts, or the frequency with which one backed federal 
jurisdiction and the other didn't, is possible without more information, 
¥hat is apparent, however, is that there was an irregular pattern in the 
behaviour of the state courts, which suggests that there was not a complete 
black-out of justice in all areas.
Regional differences account for some of these irregularities.
Kentucky was undoubtedly the worst offender. An assistant U.S. District 
Attorney v/rote to the Attorney-General's office, in February 1866, hinting 
at the kind of judicial blaclonailing tactics which he \mB forced to employ 
there. He suggested that pardons to Kentucky rebels be dealt out very 
sparingly in order to keep a sufficient number of treason proceedings 
hanging over their heads to affect prosecutions against Union officers and 
loyal citizens. Such tactics, he said, were helping to stave off an 
attempt by the legislature to impeach Judge Goodloe, whose crime was a
1. The State v. Fairfield Co. Common Pleas 15 Ohio St. I864. iU.so in 
Jones V. Seward, the Hew York Supreme Court was reversing a lower 
state court decision refusing a motion for removal. And in McCormick 
& Others v, Humphrey, 27 Ind. 144 (I866), a motion for removal of 
this case for the arrest of a member of the Sons of Liberty was turned 
down by a lower court. Indiana's highest court reversed the judgment, 
and ordered the state court to proceed no further in the case.
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willingness to hold a fair trial. He concluded, that
the Rebels of any Southern State can be trusted sooner than 
those in Kentucky.
Even personal bias accounts for some of the irregularities. Judge 
Robertson of the Kentucky Court of Appeals delivered opinions consistently 
opposed to relinquishing jurisdiction to the federal courts. His colleague
on that bench, Judge Williams was known to construe the law more sympathe-
2. 3.tically. ’ In the Pennsylvania Conscription Cases, ' an original opinion
by Judge Lowrie denying federal court jurisdiction under the Habeas Corpus 
Act, was reversed several months later when Judge Strong, who had given a 
dissenting opinion in the case, replaced Judge Lowrie,
Regional differences, and personal bias, then, could affect the 
construction of the act in the state courts. But these things were exactly 
what the act was designed to counter - to remove the possibility of such a 
lack of uniformity by having the question adjudicated in the federal courts. 
And so the act had to stand or fall by the test of the blacksheep.
Once again, however, the picture which emerges from a study of the 
federal courts' construction of their powers under the act, is not a clear 
one. The arrival of a case on the federal court docket did not ensure 
an end to arguments of unconstitutional authority, or to a construction 
which demanded the production of a specific written order of the President.
In the 1873 California case of McCall v. McDowell,^' the judge held that 
an order of the President must be presented. The defendant claimed authority
1. Col, B, H. Bristow, Asst. H.S, Attorney, Kentucky to the Hon. James 
Speed, February 9th, 1866, Letters Received, Attorney-Generals Papers, 
National Archives.
2. Compare Judge Robertson's opinion in Short v. Wilson, 1 Bush 350» with 
Williams' in Edwards v. Ward, 2 Bush 606,
3* Pennsylvania Conscription Cases, 45 Pa. 238.
4* McCall V. McDowell, Fed. Cas. 8673.
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to malœ the arrest of the plaintiff McCall under Lincoln's proclamation 
of September 24th, 1862, suspending the privilege of the writ in certain 
circumstanceso Tiie judge overruled that as a defence, because, "... 
judicially I know that it was unauthorized and void". Even in the United 
States Supreme Court, Justice Field ruled in Bean v. Beckwith^* in 1873 
that the defendant's plea was defective in not setting forth any order of 
the President directing or approving the acts in question.
The important case of the Justices v. Murray in the Supreme Court has
already been discussed. The judge held that the sections of the act
authorising removals after the final judgment had been given in a state
court, was unconstitutional. The Chief Justice gave a similar opinion the
2.same year in McKee V, Rains, * again in the Supreme Court.
Despite these exceptions, however, where federal courts showed caution 
on the meaning of "authority", and of course where they came out absolutely 
against removals after final judgment, the federal courts in general gave a 
broad backing to the terms, and the intentions of the act. The constitution­
ality of the act was tested in 1867, in Mayor v. Cooper in the Supreme Court. 
Cooper sued the mayor and aldermen of Nashville, Tennessee for trespass on 
real estate. The defendants pleaded that they held their authority under 
the national government, and more specifically, that they acted under orders 
from the military governor. General G, H. Thomas, himself under authority 
of the War Department. The case had originally been dismissed in the state
1. Bean v. Beckwith et. al. 85 U.S. 515 (1873). Bean was charged with enticing 
soldiers to desert. Beckwith, as provost marshal, claimed authority for 
his arrest under Presidential authority. Justice Field held the plea 
defective, but the Supreme Court later in Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 289 
(1878) ordered a retrial,
2. McKee v. Rains 77 U.S. 22 (I869). A case against McKee for eviction
had gone against him in the state court. A petition for removal was
filed, and the removal made, but the U.S. circuit court had remanded 
the case back to the state court, against which McKee now brought a -writ 
of error. Chase said that the fatal objection to McKee's application 
for removal was that it was made after judgment.
3. The Mayor v. Cooper 73 U.S. 247 (I867).
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circuit court of Tennessee, on the grounds that the Habeas Corpus Act was 
unconstitutional and void. It was brought to the Supreme Court on a writ 
of error, Mr. Justice Swayne in his opinion, reversing this decision, 
approved the constitutionality of the act, and amply reflected the spirit 
of the men who framed it. He emphasised the extent of the judicial power 
under the Constitution. Far from requiring actual orders of the President 
as grounds for removal, he asserted the government's right to have oases 
which included a federal question even as an ingredient, tried in federal 
courts. This right he said,
... is essential to the peace of the nation, and to the vigor 
and efficiency of the government, A different principle would lead 
to the most michievous consequences. The courts of the several 
states might determine the same questions in different ways. There 
would be no uniformity of decisions. For every act of an officer, 
civil or military, of the United States, including alike the highest 
and the lowest, done under their authority, he would be liable to 
harassing litigation in the State courts. However regular his 
conduct, neither the Constitution nor laws of the United States 
could avail him, if the views of those tribunals and of the juries 
which sit in them, should be adverse. The authority which he had 
served and obeyed would be impotent to protect him. Such a govern­
ment would be one of pitiable weakness ,.,
This lead was followed in many more federal cases.Interpretations
of what constituted a federal "ingredient" was enlarged beyond specific
2
Presidential orders. In Fisk v. Union Pacific in I869, * Judge Blatchford 
held that the right of removal pertained to a railroad company which had
been organised under a law of the federal government. The Supreme Court
held in Mitchell v. Clark in 1883,^' that this jurisdiction under the act 
extended to a case between two civilians where they were affected by federal 
orders during the rebellion. This case involved a suit by a lessor against
1. Including Hodgson v. Mi11ward Fed. Cas. 6, 568; Murray v. Patrie Fed. 
Cas, 9> 967 (1866); Mitchell v. Clark 110 U.S. 633 (I883); Clark v. Dick 
5 Fed. Cas. 865 (1870); Beard v. Burt 95 U.S. 434 (1877).
2. Fisk V. Union Pacific Fed. Cas. 4, 827 (I869).
3. Mitchell V. Clark 110 U.S. 633 (1833).
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a lessee for rents which had been paid to the military authorities during 
the rebellion by order of the commanding general in Missouri. Judge 
Miller distinguished the case from Bean v. Beckwith, in that it was not 
necessary to set forth the language of the actual order of the commanding 
general. Such interpretations were in keeping with the terras of the act, 
which extended protection to officers, "or any other persons". Tn all these 
cases, the courts concerned themselves purely with the validity of the defence 
under the terms of the Habeas Corpus Act, leaving questions of the broader 
constitutionality of the President’s war powers to be adjudicated elsewhere 
than by the federal officer - or by the state court!
But it was one thing for the federal courts to assert the extent of their 
jurisdiction, and another to compel state courts to accept it, and stay pro­
ceedings.^* A statute of 1793 forbade injunctions to restrain the state courts, 
except in bankruptcy cases. Judge Johnson in Martin v Hunter's lessees in I816, 
was of the opinion that it was proper for a federal court to issue a mandamus to 
a lower federal court. But he did not claim such a right for a federal court 
to a state court. The I863 Habeas Corpus Act contained no machinery for
enforcing federal jurisdiction if it was resisted. In many of the cases which
2came up under it, the judge cited the authority of Gordon v. Longest'* 
against such state resistance. In this case a Pennsylvania captain was 
accused of taking a slave from Kentucky to Ohio, contrary to Kentucky law.
He was sued in the Kentucky State Court. As a citizen of Pennsylvanie, he
1. The problem of enforcement of removal acts in general is discussed in
Henry C. Black, A Treatise on the Laws and Practice Governing the Removal
of Causes (st. Paul: Y/est Publishing Co., I898) Ch,15. He writes that 
further proceedings in a state court were void after removal was 
authorised. If the state court did proceed, the defendant could defend 
his case, without forfeiting his right to trial in a federal court. If 
the case went against him, he could take it to the Supreme Court on a 
writ of error, or file a transcript of the record in the U.S. circuit 
court and require the plaintiff to litigate there even while proceedings 
were going on in the state court. In special circumstances, he says,
an injunction to the state court would be adraissable.
2. Gordon v. Longest 4I U.S. 97 (I842).
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attempted to exercise his right to have the case removed to a federal 
court, on grounds of diversity of citizenship. The state court refused.
7/hen the case came to the United States Supreme Court in I842 on a Y/rit 
of error, Justice McLean gave the opinion of the court that, when an 
application to remove the cause had been made in proper form, it was the 
duty of the state court to proceed no further in the case. Every step 
taken subsequently in that court, or the state court of appeals was coram 
non .indice. In I842, the judge was able to refer to this as -
the first instance known to us, in which a state court has 
refused to a party a right to remove his cause to the circuit court 
of the United States.
But during the civil war it became a commonplace. Gordon v. Longest was 
only a precedent, not the machinery for talcing action. In the I866 case 
of Murray v. Patrie^' in the federal circuit court. Judge Nelson issued a 
mandamus to the clerk of the New York Supreme Court for removal of the 
case to that court under the Habeas Corpus Act, But Judge Blatchford in 
Fisk V. Union Pacific in the federal circuit court in I869, refused to 
grant a writ to stay proceedings in a New York court, on the grounds that 
a United States court had no jurisdiction to issue such a mandamus. Certainly 
it was evident that neither the courts, nor the Habeas Corpus Act as it stood, 
had the answer to this problem of how to enforce federal court jurisdiction 
where it was resisted.
The problem was equally evident in the related question of habeas 
corpus jurisdiction in conscription cases. The suspension of the privilege 
of the writ by Lincoln’s Proclamation of September I863 extended to men 
enlisted in the Union army. Under the terms of the first section of the 
Habeas Corpus Act, where the privilege was suspended, no military or other
1. Murray v. Patrie Fed. Cas. 9, 96? (I866).
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officer need be compelled to make a return to the vnrit and produce the 
body of any person detained under authority of the President. On a certi­
ficate under oath that the prisoner was held under Presidential authority, 
further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus should be suspended 
by the judge or court issuing the writ, Ary further investigation and 
discharge was to await proceedings in the federal court. This, however,
did not stop the state courts from claiming and exercising a right to issue
writs of habeas corpus for the release of soldiers, usually minors, from 
service in the army, despite Section 9 of an Act of July 1866 which 
provided that only the Secretary of War could release minors. Not only 
that, but federal officers who obeyed the Habeas Corpus Act, and refused 
to make a return to the writ, might find themselves imprisoned for so
doing, as in the case of Farrand^* in the Kentuclcy courts.
Attorney-General Bates records a Cabinet discussion in September 1863, 
on the question of such conflicts of jurisdiction. President Lincoln, he 
recalls was
.. greatly moved - more angry than I ever saw him - declared
that it was a formed plan of the democratic copperheads, deliberately
acted out to defeat the Government, and aid the enemy. That no 
honest man did or could believe that the State Judges have any such 
power.8 *
Bates agreed, and suggested that the judge who issued the writ should 
be informed of the cause of imprisonment, that the officer should refuse 
to deliver the body, by force if need be. In cases of attempt to punish 
the officer for this course of action, the officer should be protected,
"by force if need be". Sanctions against the state court judges must have
1, In re Farrand Fed, Gas, 4, 6?8 (I867) - the federal officer was jailed
after he refused to hand over a recruit in answer to a habeas corpus 
writ from the State court,
2. Edward Bates, Tlie Diary of Edward Bates. 1859-1866, ed. by Howard
K. Beale (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1933) pp.306-307«
been discussed, for Bates goes on to say,
I resisted the idea, held out by some, of vengeance, or penal 
justice, by imprisoning’ the judge who issued the writ.I*
The idea was to be reviewed three years later when Congressmen discussed 
an amendment to strengthen the Habeas Corpus Act.
Once again, as a qualification to a picture of universal truculence 
on the part of state court judges, some decisions declining such jurisdic­
tion should be noted. In the important case of Spangler before the Michigan
p
Supreme Court in 1863'* - an action for the release of an enlisted minor - 
Judge Martin denied an application for a writ of habeas cornus. He ruled 
that the draft proceeded under a law of Congress, that enlisted men were 
held under the national authority, and that a state court could not issue 
a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the legality of the imprisonment. 
Though the cases In re Oliver in Wisconsin in I864, and In re Shirk in
1863 Tfere complicated by criminal offences by the enlisted man, the judges
there also declined to issue writs of habeas corpus for their release. In 
many more cases, however, state courts claimed a tradition of concurrent 
jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, a point of view eloquently argued in 
another Wisconsin case, in re Tarble in 1870.^*
In these matters, however, the federal courts showed little ambivalence. 
Of the cases which I examined, only one entertained the idea of concurrent 
jurisdiction.^' The others strongly asserted federal jurisdiction over state.
1. Ibid., p.307.
2. In re Spangler 11 Mich. 2p8 (1863).
3. In re Oliver 17 Wisconsin 68I (I864); In re Shirk 5 Philadelphia
333 (1863).
4. In re Tarble 25 Vis. 390 (I87O), again the issue v/as a habeas corpus 
writ for the release of an enlisted man from service in the army,
5. This was In re Reynolds, Fed. Gas. 11, 721 in the New York circuit 
court in I867. Here the judge was of the opinion that the state courts 
have jurisdiction to issue a writ inquiring into the cause of the 
prisoner's detention; may discharge the prisoner if it appears he is 
illegally held. Reynolds was discharged by the federal court.
The case of In re Farrand in 186? serves as an example.^" A Kentucky state 
court had issued a writ of habeas corpus for the release of an enlisted man, 
When the federal officer refused to hand over the body of the prisoner, he 
was imprisoned. The judge of the federal district court held that the 
state court had no right to release the enlisted man, when the return to 
the writ showed that he was held under national authority. The validity 
of that authority was a question for the United States courts, and not those 
of the states. Finally the state court had no authority to imprison the 
federal officer for contempt, and he was entitled himself to a release on 
a writ of habeas corpus to the state court, under the provisions of the 
Revenue Act of 1833*
In these cases, the federal court judges cited the 1859 Supreme Court
2
case of Ableman v. Booth, ' to deny state court jurisdiction, just as they 
had cited Gordon v. Longest in the indemnification cases. Chief Justice 
Taney had held then that a Wisconsin judge had no authority to release a 
man in custody under the authority of the United States - in this case a 
man held by a United States marshal for helping a slave to escape, contrary 
to the Fugitive Slave Law. Again this v^ as an opinion, not a means of stopp­
ing the state courts from issuing such writs. Certainly it was an opinion 
which gained ground in the federal courts during the war, and was capped by 
the opinion of the Supreme Court in I87I in the case of Tarble,^' when they 
firmly denied the claims of the state courts. This effectively ended the 
practice.
Broadly, the pattern which emerged from the application of the Habeas 
Corpus Act was for state courts in many cases to resist federal jurisdiction,
1. In re Farr and Fed. Cas. 4> 678 (I867)* See also In Re Heill Fed, Cas. 
10,089 (1871) and in re Fagan Fed. Gas. 4» 604 (1863)*
2. Ableman v. Booth 62 U.S. 506 (I858).
3. In re Tarble 80 U.S. 397 (l97l).
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and for federal courts in general to talce a sympathetic view of the 
framers' intentions in legislating the act. There are several qualifications 
to the idea of outright conflict between state and federal courts, or to a 
denial of justice in all state courts. There were times when state courts 
took a sympathetic view of the act. Co-operation of course could not be 
assumed, and the act was designed to work without it if need be. But it 
v;as not designed either to discourage co-operation - perhaps one reason why 
it lacked a severe enforcement mechanism. The idea was rather to demonstrate 
that the federal courts could take jurisdiction where the state courts could 
not be relied upon to adjudicate federal questions impartially. It seems 
unlikely that the federal courts in Kentucky would want jurisdiction in, or 
be able to cope with the 3»000 cases on the state court dockets. Neverthe­
less, by 1866, it was clear that a delicate balance between co-operation 
and the ability to demonstrate the nation's authority through its courts, 
was not being achieved.
A certain amount of trouble had been anticipated. An act of the same 
date, liîarch 3rd, 1863, appropriated ^100,000 for defraying expenses of suits 
under the act. It was surely needed. The bulky files of correspondence 
between the War Department and the Attorney-General's office contain 
increasingly standardised requests for counsel. Endorsements were made 
on requests for defence counsel for top military men, like Hiilip Sheridan 
for "acts done in performance of his duties as Commander of the Department 
of the Missouri", General Grant, sued in the Supreme Court of Georgia, and 
General McDowell, answering charges in the California state c o u r t . B u t  
it was not only generals who were fair game. The cases cover the whole
1, John A. Rawlins to the Attorney-General May 11th, I869, Correspondence 
between V/ar Department and Attorney-General V.9., Attorney-Generals 
Papers ; Ibid., General U.S. Grant to-Henry Stanbery February 13th,
1868; Ibid., Edwin Stanton to James Speed December 29th, I865. See 
general correspondence between the War Department and the Attorney-General's 
office for further cases.
110,
range of rank and officers. A fairly typical request came from Jackson, 
Mississippi in I87O, for a law officer to defend a second lieutenant of the 
Sixteenth Infantry in -
any action that may he brought against him on account of the 
part taken by him in recovering from Mr. E, Moody, of Jackson, 
Mississippi, the possession of a mule belonging to the United 
States.I*
Sometimes, district attorneys were confident that such cases would 
be entered as nolle prosequi, or transferred to the federal courts under 
the Habeas Corpus Act. The United States attorney in North Carolina wrote 
of his difficulties in travelling miles between state courts to defend 
federal officers personally, but assured the Attorney-General’s office 
that,
., from what I know of the judges I feel assured that if 
Nolle Prosequis are not entered (which I believe will be the case) 
that they will all be removed into the Federal Courts.2*
His optimism was the exception rather than the rule, however. In
most areas, the patience of a beleaguered army was fraying. Ttiey began to
look to their own protection, rather than to the Habeas Corpus Act, In
Kentucky in^a Deputy Provost Marshall, S. M. Angel was indicted by a Grand
Jury in Greene County for providing passes for negroes. General Palmer,
in charge of the department, and himself a frequent target of such suits,
wrote to the sheriff of the county, to the effect that ihigel acted under
legal orders and was entitled to protection from illegal and oppressive
arrests. Palmer concluded,
you are notified that Mr. Angel must not be arrested by you by 
virtue or under pretence or color of the writs issued on said 
Indictments. If he is he will be discharged by me and you yourself 
placed under arrest.3*
1. Belknap to Attorney-General, December 14th, I87O, Attorney-Generals Papers.
2. D, H. Starbuck to J. Hubley Ashton, October 8th, I866, Attorney-Generals 
Pacers. Letters received.
3. Ibid., John M, Palmer to the Sheriff of Hart County, January 27th, 1866.
111.
It was one way of "staying proceedings", but hardly likely to conuriend
itself to the civil authorities. General Palmer had asked the srmy’s
Adjutant-General to approve his action, in view of the frequency of these
harassing s u i t s . T h e  Vfar Department preferred to use more regular channels,
hoY?ever, and requested the Attorney-General's office for counsel to defend
Angel, pointing out that in the absence of martial law in Kentuclcy, General
2 .
Palmer was not empowered to carry out his threat.
A further illustration comes from Tennessee, where the district
attorney arrived in court to petition for the removal of a suit against 
Major H. W. Smith to the federal courts - only to find that the suits had 
already been dismissed by order of Major-General Thomas to the plaintiff’s 
attorney!^* (the order dismissed one of the suits in favour of the plaintiff). 
Commanding officers cla5.med the authority to intervene by reason of General 
Orders Number 3, issued by General Grant on January 12th, 1866. It charged 
commanders in rebel states (General Palmer wrongly pleaded the order as an 
excuse for his conduct in a loyal state), to issue orders to protect all 
persons under military authority from suits in state and municipal courts, 
and to protect coloured persons charged with offences for which white 
persons were not prosecuted in the same way.
For all the subtleties of the federal relationship, the question was 
raised again then - must the laws of nation over state rely on force? In 
1866, Congress sought alternatives in law. On March 13th, Representative 
Cook introduced an amendment to the Habeas Corpus Act, designed to give it 
teeth.Explaining the need for an amendment to the law, Representative
1. Ibid., John M. Palmer to the Adjutant-General, January 27th, 1866.
2. Ibid., Adjutant-General Holt to the Attorney-General, 8th February, 1866.
3. Ibid., H. II. Harrison, U. S. district attorney to James Speed, March 2nd,
1866.
4. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.1368, March 13th, 1866.
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Cook of the House Judiciary Committee spoke of
evidence before the committee that the state courts in some 
border states have held, under Section 4 of the act of which this 
is an amendment, that the order of the President^of the United States 
is necessary to justify the party doing the act. *
The amendment proposed a more liberal construction of orders to read -
any order, written or verbal, general or special, issued by 
the President or Secretary of War, or by any military officer of 
the United States holding ... commandof the ... place within which 
such seizure ... or imprisonment was made.
Cook went on to draw attention to the difficulties which had been encountered 
in removing cases from state jurisdiction. The amendment provided that if a 
State court proceeded with a case after removal, the judges and other officers 
concerned might face damages and double costs - penal sanctions against 
judges after almost eighty years of building respect for each others's 
jurisdictions, and avoiding conflict!
The Democrats instantly objected to the amendment. Representative 
Harding of Kentucky protested that it was retroactive, giving defendants 
whose cases were now pending, a broader defence ; the defence itself was too 
sweeping, putting the orders of a corporal on the same footing as the
2,
President; and finally, state judges ought to be free from prosecutions.
These charges, however, did not spark off much debate in the House. For 
the Republicans, McKee made the simple defence that the Government must be 
able to protect its men in the states, and have questions affecting them - 
and the existence of the government - adjudicated in its ovm courts.^*
Clearly the state courts could not be relied upon to see justice done. The
amendment passed on March 20th, 1866, with a display of Republican unanimity, 
by 112 votes to 31.^^
1. Ibid., pp.1387 -I388 March 14th, I866.
2. Ibid., pp.1423-1425 March 15th, 1866.
3. Ibid., p.1526 March 20th, I866.
4. Ibid., p.1530 March 20th, 1866.
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It was taken up for discussion in the Senate on April 11th, and 
became the subject of a more spirited debate than it provoked in the 
House. Opponents raised the question of penal sanctions against state 
court judges, resulting in a motion by Senator Saulsbury to strike out 
the offending clause. Republican Senator Clark didn't mince words when 
he replied,
this Government must be obeyed, and it is not worth having 
if it cannot cause itself to be obeyed. This proceeding, if attempted 
to be carried on in a State Court, in defiance of the United States 
authority, should be void and the judges and everybody else who 
undertakes to set himself up in this way - for it will not be an 
honest authority - should be punished for so doing. We have had 
about enough of this State authority to teach it to yield respect 
and obedience to the laws of the United States.
Strong words - but in 1866, the Republicans certainly had had enough
of state authority. While they debated this amendment, the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction was sitting in Washington, gathering a formidable array
of evidence of State disobedience to United States law, and the hazards
facing the minorities who did respect it. To jail a few judges did not
seem so unreasonable in these circumstances. When Senator Hendricks of
Indiana suggested that impeachment was a more appropriate censure of a 
2.judge, * Clark referred him to the situation in Kentucky, There a federal 
officer had recently submitted a resolution to the legislature that, since 
widespread amnesty had been granted to rebels, and would be used in court 
as a defence to proceedings', federal officers should have similar protection 
from proceedings in state courts. The legislature turned it down. "Now", 
said Clark, "talk of an impeachment of a judge in a state like thatl"^* His 
colleague, Trumbull, cited precedents for penal sanctions against judges. He
1. Ibid., p.2052, April 20th, 1866. The amendment was defeated, without 
a recorded vote on the same day. Ibid., p.2063.
2. Ibid., pp.2053-4, April 20th, 1866,
3. Ibid., p.2054, April 20th, I866.
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referred to a provision of a New York State Statute, and to Kent's 
Commentaries.^* But Senator Doolittle found himself in disagreement. He 
distinguished between the judicial and ministerial functions of the judge
2.
in these cases and his exemption from prosecution in the former capacity.
But the Republicans on the whole had no qualms as to the constitton­
ality, or advisability of this measure. Several Senators spoke of the 
removal procedures in general, stressing the need to have federal questions 
adjudicated in federal courts.^* Only conservative Edgar Cowan struck a 
discordant note, on behalf of the state courts, when he argued against 
the amendment,
this is a case where prima facie the State courts have not only 
clear, unquestionable jurisdiction, jurisdiction never before perhaps 
doubted, but where the United States, by the very terms of the 
instamment under which we govern the Union, have no such power.
The Senate vote on the amendment on April 20th showed him to be out- 
numbered. It passed by 30 votes to 4- Once again, however, conservatives 
had succeeded in attacking an amendment to whicn the House could not agree - 
a provision making the terms of the amendment operative only on future 
cases, and excluding from a defence of orders any acts done with malice, 
cTuelty, or unnecessary severety (which, as Republicans argued would not 
be shielded by the act in any case, and only provide another loophole for 
the s t a t e s B u t  both Houses agreed to the report of the Conference 
Committee, and the amendment was approved on May 11th, 1866.
Passage of the amendment does not appear to have taned the state courts. 
The Kentucky cases of Commonwealth v. Palmer and Short v. 7/ilson, denying
1. Ibid., pp.2055 - 6, April 20th, 1866.
2. Ibid. p.2059.
3. Speeches by Williams, Ibid., p.2055» Trumbull pp.2055-6, and Howard 
pp.2060-2061, and Johnson pp.2061-2, the most notable.
4. Ibid., p.2057 April 20th,~l866.
5. Ibid., p.2066 April 20th, I866.
6. Ibid.
federal jurisdiction, were adjudicated in the summer term of 1866, after 
the passage of the amendment. Numerous complaints from the army of 
harassment at the hands of state courts are recorded in correspondence 
between the War Department and the Attorney-General's office after 1866.
I can find no instances of judges prosecuted under the amendment.
The amendment was probably responsible for a broader interpretation 
of the act in the federal courts. In the Supreme Court cases of Beard v.
Burt in 1077» and Mitchell v. Clark in 1883, jurisdiction was held to 
extend to cases involving tv/o civilians, affected by orders or actions 
of the federal army, since it constituted a federal question. The federal 
courts generally did interpret the terms of die act more broadly, both as 
to the meaning of "authority", and a,s to the parties who could claim the 
right of removal under it.
But the Habeas Corpus Act and its 1866 amendment were only links in 
a general trend of removal legislation. For all the problems of compelling 
state courts to accept federal court jurisdiction, the Republicans made the 
procedure an integral part of Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights, and Freedmens 
Bureau legislation through the Reconstruction period. It was a device 
which Republicans rediscovered in time of federal crisis, Jacksonian 
Democrats had used it in 1833 to enforce the revenue laws. Pierce Democrats 
attempted to use it in 1855 to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. In 1863 it 
was invoked for the protection of federal officers, and Republicans 
discovered in it, both its vital implications for the continued existence 
of government - any government - and also its potential for the implementation 
of their policies. Without the ability to protect its officers against 
harassing suits in state courts, no government could long maintain its 
integrity. Without the ability to have its laws enforced impartially, 
the policy of the administration counted for nothing.
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Confiscation and emancipation measures would be a dead letter if state 
courts who disagreed with them could insist on their jurisdiction, and 
hold the enforcers of that "illegal" policy responsible in their courts.
Of course, the state courts would not, and did not surrender without a 
fight. The Habeas Corpus Act ran a none-too-successful gauntlet in the 
state courts. Some of the difficulties arose out of the novelty of the 
situation, while others, as in Kentucky^ from a determined attempt to 
embaras8 the administration. In some areas, the state courts did co-operate, 
and justice v;as done. The federal courts on the whole fairly reflected the 
legislative intention of the act. But the problem of co-ercing the states 
was not solved. The army tried force. Congress tried threatening the 
judges with penal sanctions in the 1866 amendment. But the power was not 
used. The question of finding alternative in law to force remained. It 
was more than a question of perfecting judicial machinery. The solutions 
were political, and ha,d to rest on the consent of the people to the laws.
But the meeting ground of law and politics was in these areas of contested 
jurisdiction.
C H A P T E R  I V  
RECONSTRUCTION: THE WAJ^DAVIS BILL
The rhetoric of "state suicide" and "conquered provinces" has, in the 
past, misled historians into interpretations of Congressional plans for 
reconstruction, which centre on the punitive designs of the Radicals, rather 
than the constructive aims of the Rejpublican party. * The Wade-Davis bill, 
passed by Congress on July 2nd, I864, and pocket-vetoed by President Lincoln, 
became, in this scheme of things, a measurement of extremism, to be explained 
in terms of a Radical offensive against a moderate President in an election 
year. Lincoln offered the South generous terms for restoration. His 
Proclamation of Reconstruction and Amnesty of December 8th, 1863, looked to 
the establishment of loyal state governments, based on a nucleus of ten per­
cent of loyal men, willing to talf.e an oath of futm?e allegiance to the Union 
and Constitution, and the wartime proclamations and acts of emancipation.
Such a plan was too generous for the Radical dissidents of the party, who 
insisted that terms of reconstruction were for Congress and not the Executive 
to dictate, that by seceding, the Southern states had ceased to exist, that 
the vacuum left by their non-existence allowed the federal government to 
exercise powers over their domestic institutions and laws in an unprecedented 
invasion of states rights. The result, was a deadlock between the President 
and the Radicals which "flared into open rebellion in I864", when
the Jacobin bosses judged that the best way to control the process 
and machinery of reconstruction was to force the party to ditch 
Lincoln as its standard-bearer for I864 and secure the nomination of 
an inexorable radical.^*
Rhile the Radicals looked for their ’inexorable radical', looking first to
1. See for example, T Harry Lllliams, Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, I941T» hereafter cited as Williams, Lincoln 
and the Radicals, and James G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction 
"(boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1953).
2. Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, p.296.
Secretary of the Treasury Salmoîi Chase, and latterly, in the summer of 
1864, to General John Itemont, they prepared an alternative plan of 
reconstruction. The Wade-Davis bill demanded harsher terms of the South. 
Where Lincoln envisaged a speedy restoration, the Congressional bill would 
demand a protracted one, until fifty percent would take an oath of ■ 
loyalty to the Union. Only when such a loyal majority could be found, 
could they proceed to hold a state constitutional convention. Congress 
demanded terms of the constitution which they would produce - the most 
important of which was the permanent freedom of the slaves, ÏÏntil that 
day, Congress would authorise the President to appoint a provisional govern­
ment. T. Harry Williams does note that the bill was not the embodiment of 
every 'Jacobin' design. It restricted the suffrage to white males. It 
did not provide for the wholesale confiscations of plantations on which 
they were intent. And it did recognise that the seceded states still had 
some rights under the Constitution, although the 'Jacobins' believed in 
"conquered provinces". He surmises that for political reasons, in order 
to forestall Lincoln’s plans, they were prepared to accept the best they 
could get for the moment, leaving a 'thorough reconstruction' till later*^'
This view of the Wade-Davis bill does not lack support from contemporary
sources. Secretary of the Ha\ry Gideon Welles thought that oneof the objects
of the bill was to pull down the Administration, It was inspired by "earnest
zeal on the part of some, and ambition and intense malignity on the part of 
"?others.Representative Rrancis Blair styled it,
a bill for the permanent dissolution of the Union, to disfranchise 
the whites andenfranchise the Hegroes, to prevent any of the states from 
coming back in time to vote for tlr. Lincoln for President and to
promote the ambition of the Secretary of the Treasury.
1. Ibid., p.319*
2. Howard Iv, Beale (ed,), Diary of Gideon Welles (H.Y.î W.W. Norton & Co.,
i960, 3 vols.), II pp.95-96; hereafter cited as Welles, Diary.
3* Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess., p.1829, April 23rd, I864*
Neither observer was free from a bias of his own. On reconstruction.
Secretary Welles clung to a view of the inviolability of states rights 
which kept him well at the rear of his party, and the demands of the times. 
Francis Blair had his own political vendetta with the Radicals, and specifi­
cally with Henry Winter Davis, the bill's sponsor in the House of Représenta- 
2 .tives. * True, there were many Republicans who did seek an alternative 
Presidential candidate in 1864, many who felt that Lincoln's reconstruction 
plans fell short of a guarantee of future freedom to the slave, and peace 
to the Union, and some who fell into both categories*
But, to get beyond a partisan view of the bill, conservative or radical, 
towards an appreciation of what were the positive concerns of the Republicans 
who passed it in July I864, it is necessary to begin the story shortly after 
the bombardment of Fort Sumter, rather than in the year preceding the election 
of 1864, and to end it rather later than the veto of the bill in July, and a 
successful election for Lincoln in November I864. Professor Williams was 
right to observe that the Lade-Davis bill did not include anything as radical 
as universal male suffrage or wholesale confiscation, and that it was not 
based on any theory of state extinction. In the words of Representative 
Ashley, a supporter of the bill with a long interest in reconstruction 
measures it was not perfect but "the best we can get". * It was the lowest 
common denominator acceptable to the party as a whole, after over two years 
of labour in committee, and debates which uncovered some of the depths of 
the reconstruction problem, but left no mark on the statute book, A recent 
volume by Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union, has opened up new perspectives
1. Welles, Diary, Vol. 1 pp.412-413 when he discusses his views of state 
indestructibility as compared to the radicalism of other Republicans.
2. John G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, a History (N.Y.î 191?
10 vols.) Vol.9 PP.II3--II5 discuss the Blair-Davis feud in Maryland 
politics. Hereafter cited as Nicolay & Hay, Abraham Lincoln.
3. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess., p.1356, March 30th, I864.
on the prohlon.a, hy extending his investigation to the hills which were 
not passed between ]86l and 1864*^' While giving due attention to the
Reconstruction theory as a political issue for the Republicans in the North,
"terri toriali sati on", 
Professor Belz investigates the evolution of theories of /'stade suicide",
and "the guarantee of republican government" as attempts to tackle political
realities in the South, and find a working rational for extending the
federal government's power to cope with the novel problems which war and
reconstruction posed for the federal system.
In practical terms, as parts of Louisiana, firkansas and Tennessee 
returned to Union control, there were no loyal governors, loyal legislatures, 
judges and juries to meet the everyday demands of an ordered society. Such 
governments either had to be sent down from the North, or forged out of the 
loyal population in the South, But which? Such governments had to enforce 
the laws* But, by 1863, when the victors had committed themselves to a 
Union based on freedom, could they afford to say the,t nothing had changed 
since 1860, that local legislatures and judges could ignore the negro's 
freedom by the Confiscation Acts or the Emancipation Proclamation, and 
enforce only ante helium state laws, in flagrant conflict with these national 
laws? Yet the states were responsible for the whole range of laws which 
affected the status of their citizens. There was then, a many-sided problem 
for the federal government* bhatever terms they demanded of provisional, or 
interim governments in the South would involve invading this area of the 
state's business, or rights. The war would be for nothing if the victors 
went South to bo caretakers for black codes and slave constitutions. But, 
whatever theory the Republicans would invoke to give them the power to 
dictate conditions of restoration, they were all agreed that whenever the 
terms ware complied with, and the states were re-admitted to the Union, they
1, Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union; Theory and Practice During the 
Civil IVar (N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), hereafter cited as
Belz, Reconstructing the Union,
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were admitted in full equality with the other states* Everything, then, 
depended on the permanence of terms which could be achieved while the
power to demand them could be claimed and exercised. After that, could
the nation maintain any permanent protective relationship with the 
individual, to assure his rights against infringements by the states?
In answer to these questions, and particularly to this last, it is 
worth considering not only the abortive reconstruction measures which 
Congress debated between l86l and 1864* but also the Confiscation Acts 
and the Habeas Corpus Act, discussed at length in previous chapters. In 
so far as Republicans encountered in these acts* the problems of enforcing 
the nation's laws against conflicting state laws, or regional prejudice, 
the problems of entering the states to protect individuals under that 
national law and against that prejudice, and finally the problem of clothing 
the federal courts with the power to do it, they were engaged in a rehearsal 
for reconstruction. These acts applied to the whole Union, They used 
familiar and permanent machinery - the federal courts - to protect the 
individual in the states. It might be worth remembering for the day when
the troops left the South and all extra-ordinary powers had to be surrendered.
IShatever terms the Republicans decided to impose, these questions of 
means and ends were inextricably woven. Ultimately, it was a political 
question. The Republicans had to reach a consensus on the quality of the 
Union which they would see rebuilt, and bring the South to an acceptance 
of their political terms, The business of enforcing the Constitution and 
laws in the states rested in the final analysis on consent and on harmony 
between state and nation in their Interpretations of them. And so 
Reconstruction was about political power, about altering the balance of
povrer in‘the states to generate law ■» making and law-enforcing majorities 
there acceptable to the majority party of the victors' elected représenta- 
tives."' The gains of the war must not be lost by the return of political 
power to a slaveowning oligarchy* But the enforcement of national law 
must also be made possible in the face of conflict* For that reason, 
Republicans had to become concerned with means as well as ends, with the 
machinery as well as the content of the law » in other words not only with 
political balance, but with the balance of jurisdiction as between the 
federal and state courts* This is perhaps, to be unduly theoretical, or 
at least to state the problems in a way which contemporaries would not have 
defined them in 1864» For their awareness of the problem came slowly, and 
often only partially as'events forced them to shift their consensus on 
v/hat qualita/bive conditions of restoration must be demanded, and political 
opportunities changed the possibilities of what could be demanded* But 
various stages in their education to the possibilities and problems between 
1861 and 1864 c:-m be usefully observed as a background to the Wade-Davis 
bill,
Tixe Crittenden-Johnson resolutions of July I86I should be used very 
cautiously as an index of the Republican party's views on the nature of 
the war. It does not signify a simple commitment to restoring the status 
QUO ante be Hum* Tlie first part of the resolution assigned the responsibility 
for the war to the "disunionists of the Southern States", The second part 
ran,
1, John C, Hurd, Theories on Reconstruction, American haw Review, Vol.l, 
January'- I867 contains an interesting argument on the relationship 
between politics and law. He thought that the Republicans were fooling 
themselves when they derived theories of reconstructions from the 
Constitution to enforce its provisions, of "natural rights", "republican 
government" etc. and claim that all they were doing was enforcing the 
laws. The Constitution, he said, was a political compact, not a legal 
document; and the debate was about the terms of the political compact, 
the sovereign will from which law emanated, rather than a pre-existing 
set of rules for enforcement.
that this ?/ar is not waged upon our part in any spirit of 
oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor 
purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established 
institutions of those states; but to defend and maintain the supremacy 
of the Constitution ajid to preserve the Union with all the dignity, 
equality and rights of the several States unimpaired; that as soon 
as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease*^*
Seventeen House Republicans who were willing to vote for that part of
the resolution which apportioned blame for the war to Southern disunionists,
abstained from voting for the second part of the resolution. Others,
reputedly in favour of abolition, like Fernando Beaman voted for both 
2.parts. Its terms were loose enough to cover most consciences. The 
negative part of it, that it was not a war for interference with the rights 
and established institutions of the states might well be the point of 
emphasis for some. None could object to the positive part of it, that it 
v/as a war for the supremacy of the Constitution and the preservation of the 
Union. Many Republicans may have realised that time would quickly malce 
these two parts of the resolution self-contradictory. At any rate it would 
not tie their hands in the future. Rhile the political and military outlook 
of the North was so uncertain in these early days, with the Confederate 
Army's victory at Bull Run on July 22nd, and the border states shalqy in 
support of the war, it would not have made political sense to raise suspicions 
of a planned interference with states rights. It was not planned. The 
divergent path between past assumptions as to the inviolability of states 
rights, and coming reality came as a response to practical issues. And it 
came soon.
In the same month as Congress debated the Crittenden-Jolmson resolutions, 
the Senate Judiciary Committee produced the first bill directly concerned
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong,, 1 sess., p.209 July 19th, l86l.
2, Ibid., p.223 July 22nd, 1861.
with reconstruction in the South. The bill, S33* for the Suppression
of Insurrection v/as introduced by Senator Trumbull on July 3 0 t h . I t
sought to establish a law to follow the army into rebellious districts
which came under its control. The military authorities were authorised
to mjalce the necessary rules and regulations for the restoration of order.
Already, questions were raised as to the relationship between even the
most temporary form of law enforcing authority, and existing state law.
Because the bill contained no clear guarantee that existing state, law
would be respected, it was amended by the Judiciary Committee to provide
for the enforcement of such rules, "conforming as nearly as may be to
previously existing laws and regulations". Two points are worth noting in
the light of later developments. Although some Senators, notably Jacob
Gollamer denied that Congress could exercise control over such a military
government, and that it was the province of the Executive as Commander-in- 
2.
Chief, * nevertheless, Trumbull and other Republican supporters of the bill 
were claiming a Congressional interest in the government ofæbellious districts. 
The debate over who should control the Reconstruction process, Congress or 
the Executive did not blow up suddenly in an election year three years later. 
Secondly, though the phrase "as nearly as may be to existing laws and regula­
tions" by no means indicated a design to interfere at this stage with the 
established institutions of the states, it did hint at a practical problem.
Some discretion would have to be allowed for in an emergency situation. The 
phrase "as nearly as may be" would call for more careful thought as the 
direction of the war changed, and the freedom the Union army fought for 
made it an impossible caretaker of the laws of slavery. The emergency summer
1. Ibid., p.337 July 30th, 1861.
2. Ibid., pp.374“375 August 1st, l86l.
3. Speeches of Trumbull, Ibid., p.337 July 30th; and especially, Baker,
Ibid., pp*378-379 August 1st, l86l.
session of Congress ended in August, without a decision on the bill* And 
when Congress reconvened in December, changed circumstcinces brought changed 
proposals.
November I86I brought the capture of the Sea Islands, and Union 
victories in North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana in the first 
six months of 1862 brought parts of these states under their control*
Congress could now consider Reconstruction as a practical issue. So did 
Lincoln. He began the appointment of military governors - Stanley to North 
Carolina, Johnson to Tennessee - to meet the immediate needs for law and 
order. Meanwhile, between December I86I and March 1862, the Congx*essional 
Republicans sought to go beyond the most temporary of military arrangements, 
and probe the possibilities of setting conditions for a more permanent 
restoration of law andorder.
But, to assume the right to prescribe conditions, they somehow had to 
get round the problem of explaining the inability of the existing state to 
do so. In practical terms, there was general agreement that the state 
governments were not functioning, that they were in Lincoln's view, out 
of their proper practical relationship with the Union. But was this enough 
to warrant the federal government assuming the functions of the state? A 
more radical rationale commended itself to a number of Republicans, among 
them Fernando Beaman, John A. Bingham, and notably James Ashley, chairman 
of the Committee on the Territories. The theory of "territorialisation", 
that by seceding, the states had ceased to exist as states, and reverted 
to the status of territories, had the merit of investing Congress specifically 
with the power to prescribe terms, under their power to make rules and 
regulations for the territories. The government had jurisdiction over the 
land and the people, although the state governments had ceased to exist.
1« For a full discussion of the theory, see Belz, Reconstructing the 
Union, pp,51-70.
JL20*
Of G, number of bills which were based on this principle in the spring of
1862, the most important was James Ashley's bill from the Committee on
the Territories, introduced in March 1862.^' It looked to the creation
of entirely new states out of the old. It authorised the President to
establish temporary civil governments, on the territorial model, with full
legislative powers over the states - including the power to interfere
with slavery. Far from denying the power to interfere with the established
institutions of the states, or even enforcing their existing rules "as
nearly as may be", Ashley's bill declared tha/b laws and municipal insti'tu-
tions in conflict with the general welfare and the Constitution of the
United States ceased to exist when the state governments were destroyed.
Although the bill was tabled on March 10th, I862, by 65 votes to 56, a
2,two-thirds Republican majority opposed its tabling.
Ashley's bill did go further than any other measure to date in its 
interference with established state laws and institutions. It provided 
governments which could override them and govern by alternative rules until 
such times as acceptable new state government were provided. The theory 
was radical - yet a majority of Re;publioans were willing at least to 
consider it. The theory had been invoked, not to shock, or to trample on 
the rights of the states in every respect, but for specific ends. The 
very limited debate in the House casts a glimmer of light on the positive 
aims of its Republican supporters. Behind Fernando Beaman's championship 
of territorialisation was a desire to enforce governmental jurisdiction 
for ends which were hardly extreme - "the obligation of protection and a 
just administration of the laws".^’ ïïhen the states failed in this duty,
1* Ibid., pp.62-79•
2. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., p.1193 March 12th, 1862.
3, Ibid., pp.1951^2 April 4th, 1862,
he said, the federal government must not. Moderate Republican John A*
Bingham echoed these positive aims behind the apparently negative theory 
when he asked,
is nothing to be done beside sending conquering armies to burn 
and destroy as they go? That is a needful thing; but I would also 
send the white-robed ministers of justice. I would put them in the 
deserted temples of justice, and place in their hands the sacred 
scales, and bind them by an oath to do equal and exact justice to 
the poor and the rich, the stranger and the citizen,I*
An. obligation, of the government to protect its citizens, "equal and exact 
justice" - these things not only had ceased to exist by secession. They 
had never existed, because of slavery. And it v/as the growing commitment 
to seeing that they did exist in a reconstructed Union which led men like 
Beaman and Bingham to invoke some theory to give the government the power 
to do it. But the aim wasthe important thing. Theories changed. Terri­
torialisation became less fashionable than the "guarantee of republican 
government" clause by I864. But that too, like "state suicide", or "conquered 
provinces" aid owed the power to insist on freedom as a condition of recon­
struction. And that was the position, by 1862, towards which the Republican 
consensus was quickly moving.
One reason for the defeat of Ashley's bill might well have been that
it went further than that, to abolishing racial qualifications for juries,
and confiscating lands for loyal men, including negroes* But, that the
powers it claimed to interfere with slavery had at least the tentative
support of the party, is indicated by the fact that, when Lincoln himself
moved towards an emancipation policy later in 1862, support for the
2.territorialisation theory dwindled. * As long as emancipation was 
accomplished, it wasn't necessary to claim any more far-reaching federal
1. Ibid., p.1204 March 12th, 1862,
2. Belz, Reconstructing the Union, pp,8l-83*
power over the states than was necessary* Further evidence of the growing 
Congressional coiimitment to emancipation was demonstrated by their passing 
the bill for Emancipation in the District of Columbia in April 1862, an 
additional article of v/ar prohibiting the return of fugitive slaves by the 
arcmy, and the second Confiscation Act of July 1862, By now, Republicans 
would have agreed with the Texan loyalist Alexander Hamilton when he 
addressed a crowd in New York with,
restore the Government, its Constitution, and its laws to all, 
fellow citizens. With all my heart* Restore the Union as it existed 
for the year just proceeding the rebellion, God forbid,^*
Yet they had no cleax idea of the degree of change, or the means to 
employ to change the Union into something better. Their attempts to 
legislate came more as a response to events, than as the manifestation 
of a theory, A further attempt came in the Senate tov/ards the end of the 
session, in June 1862, Though the Republicans as a whole welcomed Lincoln's 
first steps towards emancipation, with his appeal to the border states on 
MaS-'ch 6th, 1862, and were prepared to drop the territorialisation bills, 
events on the field began to alarm them. In May, General Hunter's emancipa­
tion proclamation was revoked by the President, Lincoln's military governor, 
Stanley in North Carolina allowed inhabitants who took an oath of allegiance 
to recover their slaves, and worse still, provoked Congressional wrath by 
closing down a school for negro children at New Bern, Executive action was 
unpredictable tlien, resting too much on the whim of the commander on the 
spot. It was no substitute for a law on the subject, a uniform policy for 
the restoration of order.
Senator Ira Harris of New York introduced a bill in June 1862 for the 
provision of interim civil governments to administer the laws until the states
1. Quoted in Tne Liberator, October 24th, 1862,
] ;
were ready to return to the Union. " Though it employed a territorial 
model for the provision of governors and. judges, it wa.s not based on any 
theory of territorialisation, and in its form, tacitly acknowledged the 
existence of states. It rested instead on Congress^powers to guarantee 
the states a republican form of government* It contained no specific 
emancipation provision, and the interest of the debate was on the issue - 
which laws were binding on the provisional government?
Charles Sumner feared that the Governor and judges would be required 
to execute and respect existing state laws - black codes for example* He 
thus opposed the amendment of the Committee on July 7th which read,
and not interfering with the laws and institutions existing in 
such state at the time its authorities assumed to array the same 
against the Government of the United States further than shall be 
necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this act*
Senator Harris then proposed instead to empower the Executive to execute 
"the laws of the United States", which Sumner thought an important difference. 
For moderate Republicans there was clearly a dilema in this conflict between 
state and national law* Senator liumbull agreed with Sumner that the black 
codes must not be enforced by the provisional government* .And yet he was 
not happy about Harris' amendment either, in case it was construed as limit­
ing the provisional government to administering only United States law* He
wanted more than that, he said, Trumbull went on to express the view that 
a general interference with state law was not desirable, but he would make 
an exception of these particular laws. Yet, he concluded, it was dangerous 
to say that an Executive charged with carrying out the law, should be able 
to leave some laws unenforced.^'
Supporters of the bill did not elaborate on the position of the 
provisional courts under these circumstances* These courts were invested 
with the powers of the United States district and circuit courts but they
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong,, 2 sess*, p*2651 June 10th, 1862. For contents 
of the bill, Ibid., p.3138 July 7th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.3139 July 7th, 1862*
3. Ibid., p.3140 July 7th, 1862*
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would be"called upon to adjudicate cases arising on state law. Would they, 
like the Governor, in all circumstances, follow it? One of the bill's 
opponents, Senator Carlile, suspected the implication was that the courts 
would be able to try state cases ^  novo, and he denied the power of Congress 
to create tribunals which could adjudicate cases between citizens of the 
same state arising out of state la,w.^Senator Powell stated his suspicions 
of the bill more boldly,
the object, the scope, and the intention of it is to send judges 
and a Governor there for the purpose of indirectly abolishing the 
institution of African slavery, and overthrowing the domestic 
institutions of those states under the apparent shield and panoply 
of the law.
If this was even partly true, in the future it would have to be more 
clearly stated and more efficiently executed. The bill left too many 
questions unanswered. Tie session ended without its coming to a direct 
vote. Lincoln could go ahead in the summer of 1862 with his plans for 
reconstruction, untrammelled by a Congressional alternative.
Lincoln's policy towards those portions of the seceded states which 
were coining under Union control, was closely related to his policy of 
military emancipation. By giving advanced warning of the issue of the 
proclamation, he gave these areas the opportunity to gain exemption from 
its operation by proof of loyalty. He wrote to the military authorities
in Tennessee, Arkansas and Louisiana urging them to encourage elections
before January Ist,^* He looked to a loyal nucleus in these areas, in 
practice anticipating his ten percent plan of December 1863. In'four states, 
elections were held, and districts exempted from the Emancipation
1. Ibid,, p,3146 July 7th, 1862.
2. Ibid., p.3142 July 7th, 1862.
3. See Lincoln to Shepley in Louisiana, November 21st, 1862 in Roy P.
Basler (ed.), The Collected Dorks of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1953s 9 Vols.) V pp.904-505? hereafter 
cited as Basler, Lincoln Works,
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Proclamation* Moral blackmail of .this kind, however, was not to become 
an integral part of his reconstruction policy. It had its temporary uses 
as 3. means of fighting the v/ar rather than guaranteeing the peace. But 
the policy of encouraging elections among the loyal minority to initiate 
the restoration of loyal state governments did continue even when it was 
too late to hold out the possibility of saving slaves as an incentive to 
loyalty.
For, after January 1st, 1863, when Lincoln issued the Proclamation, 
it does not seem likely that he ever contemplated abandoiirrnxg it when the 
war ended. Avoiding what he considered the inflexibility, and embarassment 
of a theory regarding the status of the rebel states, he worked on the 
reality that although states could not secede from the Union, in practice 
their governments were not functioning, and were out of their proper 
practical relationship with the Union. Rather than assuming direct powers 
over their domestic arrangements then, he would encourage the loyal 
inliabitants to change them themselves. Getting a workable loyal state 
government was the first priority. Conditions would come later. And so, 
in relation to his showpiece, Louisiana, his efforts in 1862 and 1863 were 
directed towards drawing up a loyal nucleus to form a state government. In 
August 1863 he wrote General Banks,
I would be glad for her to raalce a new Constitution recognizing 
the Emancipation Proclamation and adopting emancipation in those 
parts of the states to which the proclamation does not apply.
Conditions were not phrased as direct demands, however. For a guarantee of 
freedom, he could only suggest that they adopt
some practical system by which the two races could gradually 
live themselves out of their old relation to each other, and both 
come out better prepared for the new.I*
1.Basler, Lincoln Y/orks, VI pp.364-36$ August 5th, I863.
132.
In November he followed this up by saying that, with respect to the 
freedme.n,
my word is out to be for and not against them on the question 
of their permanent freedom.!•
Similarly, Lincoln prodded the governor of Tennessee to forge ahead 
with elections of loyal representatives there. In Spetember 1853 he 
wrote Johnson,
get emancipation into your new State government^Constitution - 
and there will be no such word as fail in your case.
Republicans who would not countenance a reconstruction on the basis of
slavery could also take comfort from the President's Springfield letter
in August 1863, when he said that there must be no compromise on the
3
promise of freedom, that "... the promise being made, must be kept".
The Congressional Republicans were at least willing to give him the
chance to fulfil the promise. Evidence of their co-operation can be deduced
from their decision in February 1863 to admit Louisiana’s newly elected
representatives Flanders and Hahn.*^‘ This was not accomplished without
objections being raised by a minority of Republicans. Bingham doulrted
whether Louisiana could have representatives in Congress, without a state
5.government to authorise such an election there. * Porter agreed that 
elections instigated by a military governor were invalid, and further, 
expressed doubts as to whether the people were choosing representatives 
more agreeable to the President than to themselves. Without wishing to be 
cynical about the possibilities of building a state government from its
1. Ibid., VII pp.1-2 November 5th, 1863,
2. Ibid.3 VI p.440 September 11th, 1863.
3. Ibid. , VI pp.M07-409 August 26th, 1853.
4. The resolution to seat representatives from Louisiana passed on 
February 17th, Cong, Globe, 37th Cong., 3 sess., p.1036 February 17th, 186
5. Ibid.3 pp.862-866 February 11th, 1863.
loyal foundations, he understood that the South was still a "hot-hed of
lo
treason and rebellion" and in need of a strong arm,’ ' Nevertheless, the 
passage of the resolution on February 17th. was a tentative victory for 
Lincoln's efforts to build from the loyal* The forty-four representatives 
who voted against it included an unlikely combination of Democrats like 
Daniel Voorhses, and radicals like Thaddeus Stevens, brought together by 
fears of executive usurpation. Henry Dav/es, chairman of the Committee on 
Elections compared the alliance to
that memorable conciliation between the rival houses of Herod 
and Pilate, which made common cause in their efforts to overthrow 
the true gospel.
This victory for Lincoln did not signify an end to the Congressional
interest in reconstruction. On march 3rd, 1863, Senator Harris introduced
3.yet another bill to establish provisional government in the South. ' .Based 
on the guarantee clause, it provided for temporary civil governments, adnhni- 
storing state laws, until a State government was formed. But no law 
recognizing slavery was to be enforced. Additionally, and giving further 
evidence that many Republicans did attach to the idea of freedom, the idea 
of the right to equal treatment under the laws, the bill provided that laws 
for the trial and punishment of white men should be applicable to all. The 
point of departure from previous bills was that it contained a procedure 
for holding elections for a constitutional convention. The new constitution 
was to contain three conditions. Certain classes of Confederate office­
holders were to be disqualified. The freedom of slaves was to be guaranteed. 
There was to be no recognition of the rebel debt. Congress v,?as thinking
1. Ibid., pp.859-860 February 10th, 1863*
2. Ibid., p.1033 February 17th, 1863*
3. Ibid., p.1507 March 3rd I863, and see discussion of it in Belz
Reconstructing the Union, pn.122-125*
then, about more long-term issues than the immediate problems of working 
out a relationship between a temporary government and existing state law.
It moved to the problem of working out a more permanent relationship 
between nation and state, national law and state law. They could not 
invoke federal power forever to dictate terms to 'conquered provinces' or 
'territories' or whatever. By shifting their emphasis to the guarantee 
clause, they were taking a route more palatable to a generation fearful of 
the extensions of federal power. They would still set tlio terms, but the 
appearance of the state would be preserved - the state would be regenerating 
its own government, and itself writing freedom into the constitution, even 
if in practice it had no other choice. For the moment, there was little 
thinking done about the day when they would have a choice, when Congress 
admitted their representatives and recognised their state governments. It 
was hoped that the exclusion of Confederate officeholders, and tlie freeing 
of the slaves would create a different balance of power in the states, one 
which would prevent the return to power of men who would amend free State 
constitutions. Time and events would provide many more opportunities to 
think about these loopholes. Harris' bill was not taken up for serious 
consideration at this stage. Though a motion to table it was defeated, on 
March 3rd Senator Wilkinson moved to set it aside, since it was too late 
in the session to get a consensus in both houses on such a controversial 
issue without a lot of debate.^* And so the Thirty-Seventh Congress ended 
without a bill on the subject.
Their time, however, had not been wasted. They had had a chance to 
see some of the practical issues of reconstruction talce shape in Louisiana,
1. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3 sess., p.l509*
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Arkansas, Tennessee and Virginia. They sav; there some of the things they 
did not want in a reconstructed South. They did not want the federal 
government doing the work of slave governments until they were ready to do 
it themselves. They did not want to he too quick to recognise state govern­
ments of dubious loyalty which might once again threaten the peace of the 
Union, and lose the gains of the war. Bui, as they demonstrated in their 
tolerance of Lincoln's policies, they did not want to discourage loyal 
men from initiating state governments, and they would not be in a hurry 
to pick quarrels with their President just for the sake of it, while they 
themselves could offer no clear alternatives.
But already, some observations could also be made about some of the 
areas of Republican agreement. They did claim a Congressional interest 
in the terms of reconstruction - not to spite Lincoln, but because of a 
deeper faith in law. On confiscation, it will be remembered, they wanted 
a law on the subject which would transcend the irregularities and variations 
in executive military policy from area to area. Similarly, with respect 
to reconstruction, they could admit a temporary military interest in 
restoring law and order. But the sooner there was a return to civil govern­
ment the better. And there, there was a need for uniformity - a law on the 
subject. Lincoln could issue edicts. Edicts could count on armies but not 
courts for their enforcement. Only Congress could pass acts with the force 
and above all the permanence of law. And so, Senator Charles Sumner fairly 
reflected the majority of his party who had tried to find answers in law, 
when he wrote in October 1863,
in short, if a new government is to be supplied, it should be by 
Congress rather than by the President, and it should be according to 
established law rather than accord/to the mere will of any functionary, 
to the end that ours may be "a government of laws, and not of men.'
1. Charles Sumner, Our Domestic Relations; Power of Congress over the
Rebel States, Atlantic Monthly, Vol. XII October 1863, p.499? hereafter 
cited as Summer, Our Domestic Relations.
And this agreement - on the need for Congress to legislate at all, 
was intimately related to the second area of their agreement by the summer 
of 1863 “ on freedom. Qualifications for jury sexnrice, for the exercise 
of the franchise, for freedmen’s education, and for the distribution of 
lands to freedmen, were still the subject of disagreement. But they had 
reached a consensus on freedom, a point where they agreed with George 
Julian's stance of January 1862,
the rebels have demanded a "reconstruction" on the basis of 
slavery; let us give them a "reconstruction" on the basis of freedom. 
Under no circumstances should we consent to end the struggle on 
terras that would leave us where we began it,^'
There was room for disagreement on how radical a theory of federal power
over the states need be claimed to achieve it. While moderates would argue
freedom as a condition of reconstruction, they would shrinlc from Charles
Sumner's 'state suicide' theory. But, more important, Charles Sumner would
not insist on state suicide - a.s long as freedom was permanently guaranteed,
He said as much in an article of October I863, explaining his famous 'state
suicide' resolutions of February 11th, I862, when he said, "I discard all
theory" ~ as long as Congress found the power under the Constitution to
malce freedom a reality, but find it they must, by the rights of war, or
2.territorialisation, or the guarantee clause. ’ And it was this agreement 
on what they wanted the power for, rather than disagreements on theory, 
which is what mattered. Even in 1862, Congress had displayed its growing 
commitment to making emancipation irreversible, by experimenting in the 
draft Confiscation Acts, with judicial remedies for the freed slave - a 
writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. At that time, they had expressed
1, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2 sess., p.329 January 14th, 1862.
2. Gumner, Our Domestic Relations, pp.527-539» This is also the essence 
of the influential work by the Solicitor of the War Department, William 
Whiting in ïïær Powers Under the Constitution of the United States 
(Boston, & New York: Lee & Shepard, I87I %ed7y)T^
doubts that an emancipation proclamation was enough to secure freedom.
There was no guarantee that it would stand up to a Supreme Court test of 
constitutionality. The remedy lay in getting a lav/ on the subject, with 
access to courts to guarantee it. It was this concern which v/as nov/ 
projected from specific acts of wartime emancipation, to the question of 
permanent freedom in a reconstructed Union. It was the concern which 
informed both the reconstruction measures of the Thirty-eighth Congress 
which convened in December I863, and their attempts to pass a resolution 
for a Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, abolishing slavery - tv/in 
measures for a permanently free Union.
This was the point Congress had reached by December, 1863, when 
Lincoln issued his Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction,^' which 
made firmer policy out of haphazard beginnings. It was based on the 
paa:donning power, and acknowledged the existence of the states, although 
their governments had been "subverted". %hen ten percent of persons 
entitled to vote in the i860 Presidential election had taken an oath of 
future loyalty to the Union, and if they were qualified to vote under state 
law, they were to take the necessary steps to re-establish republican 
government. Acceptance of emancipation was a condition of the oath. In 
his accompanying Annual Message of December 8th, Lincoln repeated his 
commitment saying,
to now abandon them (the slaves) would be not only to 
relinquish a lever of power, but would also be a cruel and an 
astonishing breach of faith.
The proclamation left it up to the states to provide suitable temporary
arrangements for the freedmen. All this was offered in a spirit of
1. Easier, Lincoln Works VII pp.54-56 December 8th, 1863,
2, Ibid., p.51 December 8th, I863.
flexibility, as a guideline for reconstruction, not to be considered 
exclusive of all other solutions*
And on the whole, the Republican party accepted it on those terms.
There was no immediate criticism of ten percent governments as 'pocket 
boroughs' or flimsy foundations of loyal state governments. The Wade- 
Davis bill itself began its Congressional career with a similar provision, 
and was only amended to a fifty percent basis in May I864. Most Republicans 
instead fixed on Lincoln's commitment to emancipation as something to be 
welcomed. Tiie President's secretary, John Hay recorded in his Diary that !
men acted as though the millenium had come. Chandler was 
delighted, Sumner was joyous, apparently forgetting for the moment 
his doctrine of State suicide; while at the other political pole  ^
Dixon and Reverdy Johnson said the message was highly satisfactory.
Charles Sumner wrote to the English liberal John Bright on December 15th, 
1863,
the President's proclamation of reconstruction has two essential 
features, - (l) The Irreversibility of emancipation, making it the 
cornerstone of the new order of things; (2) The reconstruction or 
revival of the States by preliminary process before they take their 
place in the Union. I doubt if the detail will be remembered a 
fortnight from now. Any plan which fastens emancipation beyond 
recall will suit me.^*
So why the Wade-Davis bill? Lincoln himself had not phrased the 
Proclamation as the last word on reconstruction. It would have been strange 
if a Congress which had considered the issues for two years, and knew its 
complexities, would have accepted it as the last word, UhereLincoln's 
reconstruction policies were present-minded, part of his policy of fighting 
the war by encouraging rebels to return to their allegiance, Congress was 
concerned with the more permanent implications for future peace, Vhen the
1. Quoted in Nicolay & Hay, Abraham Lincoln. Vol.9 p.109,
2. Edward L« Pierce, Memoirs and Letters of Charles Sumner (London; 
1878 4 vols.) IV p.216. Sumner to Bright, December 15th, I863.
House of Representatives accepted Henry Winter Davis' proposal to refer 
that part of the President’s .Annual Message to a select committee for the 
purpose of reporting a bill, it was a routine, rather than a hostile 
response to Lincoln's policy* The motion was supported by ninety-one 
members, and the committee which was subsequently appointed, reflected 
the broad spectram of their views on the subject*"'
In addition to their long-term concerns, events in the eoudy weeks of
the session were to cause them to talce a more critical view of Lincoln’s
policy outlined in the proclamation. In January, General Banks rejected
the Free State General. Committee's plan for a constitutional convention
in Louisiana and ordered an election on the basis of the old constitution,
whose proslavery sections he annulled first by military decree * He
promised a constitutional convention aftea: the government was formed, and
not before, as the Radicals demanded* If federal powers of this extent
were to be assumed over the domestic arrangements of the states, would it
not be better to do it according to law, by Congress rather than by the
7 .arbitrary methods of a general?"'
Furthermore, as blanlc books were sent out to Louisiana, Arkansas and 
elsewhere to collect the oaths of loyal men, many Republicans suffered a 
diminished faith in the oath's effectiveness as a test of loyalty, indeed 
in the extent of the loyalty which could be counted upon at all south of 
Mason-Dixon* Dr. Hyman's work on Confederate oathtaking substantiates many 
of the Republicans suspicions. If it was not a simple story of evasions
1. The vote to send that part of the President's Message dealing with 
Reconstruction to a select committee passed by 91 votes to 80. Cong. 
Globe, 38th Cong,, 1 sess., p.34 December 15th, 1863. Professor Belz 
describes the balance of the committee as Davis (moderate), Ashley and 
Blow (radical), Gooch, Fenton and Smithers ("Administration"), English; 
Holman and Allen (conservatives). Belz, Reconstructing the Union, pp.
174- 176.
2. This was the point made by Fernando Beaman, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong.,
1 sess, p.1245 March 22nd, I864.
and deceits, it was not a reliable indication of loyalty either. At best, 
it was less a conviction of conscience than a grudging acquiescence 
in the verdict of battle"*^* Tie Congressional Republicans had for a long 
time worried about the permanence of emancipation by an executive proclama­
tion unlikely to stand the test of court decisions. Increasingly it 
seemed that these were feeble political arrangements to back up doubtful 
legal ones. A free state constitution could be made worthless by the too 
hasty return to power of those who were grudgingly loyal, far less those 
who were still openly disloyal. As a counterweight to such an eventuality, 
there was no national instrument of freedom, bar this doubtful emancipation 
proclamation* To this problem, political arrangements and legal guarantees 
at both ends, state and nation, the Wade-Davis bill addressed itself,
Henry Winter Davis reported the bill from the select committee on 
2 •February l6th, I864* * It was debated sporadically over the next few
months, and finally passed on July 2nd. Tie bill rested on article IV
Section 4 of the Constitution, authorising the United States to guarantee
to each state a republican form of government. Congress claimed the power
under it by virtue of Chief Justice Taney's opinion in the case of Luther v.
3.Borden in 1849» * Though Taney may have meant no more than Congressional 
authority under the clause to judge the validity of the election of its o\m 
members, his opinion was now interpreted more loosely by Davis and others 
to mean that Congress had political jurisdiction over reconstruction. It 
was a satisfactory formula for deriving power over the states, without 
embracing theories of state extinction or suicide.
1. Harold M. Hyman, Deceit in Dixie, Civil War History, V.3 March 1957, p*71'
2. Cong. Globe, 3Sth Cong., 1 sess., p.668 February l6th, I864.
3. Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard 42.
The bill authorised the President to appoint a civil governor to 
administer State law until a State government was provided* But no lav/ 
which held anyone in slavery was to be recognised or enforced either by 
the Governor or any court or officer in the state. As a positive correlation 
between slavery, and rights, the bill went on to charge the iirovisional 
government with the duty of enforcing laws for the punishment and trial 
of white persons equally to all persons. For more permanent political 
arrangements, the governor v/as to direct the marshal to supervise the 
enrolment of white male citizens in the state, and to request them to take 
an oath of loyalty to the Union, and the Constitution* Tuien fifty
percent had taken such an oath, the 'loyal white male citizens' were to
i,
elect delegates to a constitutional Convention* Known Confederate office­
holders, and those who had voluntarily borne arms against tlie United States 
were prohibited from voting, even if they offered to take the oath. This 
convention was to produce a state constitution incorporating the terms 
set by the United States for guaranteeing a, republican form of government. 
First, that no Confederate officeholder, civil or military should vote for- 
or be a member of the legislature or governor. Secondly, slavery was to 
be prohibited forever, and freedom guaranteed. Third, no State or Confederate 
debt should be recognized or paid by the State. The constitution would then 
be submitted to the people for ratification. This done, with the consent 
of Congress, the President would recognise the state government. After 
that, the state could proceed to elect representatives to Congress.
In some respects, the Wade-Davis bill was not a radical departure 
from Lincoln's policy. * Both acknowledged the existence of states. Both 
restricted the suffrage to white males. Both initiated constitutional 
conventions, and set oaths of loyalty a condition of their meeting. But
Gwi
< /^ sït'ccircwe,
3.. Representative Kelley made it à complaint against the bill "because 
it is drawn too largely from the President's plan".
the Congressional bill did enforce more rigorous political arrangements 
for the creation of loyal state governments. A. majority willing to swear
loyalty to the Union was a more solid basis from which to build than
a ten percent minority willing to swear future loyalty. It would take
time to get such a majority, and the whole process of reconstruction would
thus be protracted, long enough to make sure that the freedom they wrote
into their constitution had a chance of staying there. This was the real
raison d ’etre of the bill. Its emphasis was on the permanence of freedom,
not only in its tougher political conditions but also in its neglected
legal provisions. It attempted to provide a judicial guærantee for 
1.feeedom.
While the state convention adopted freedom as the law of the state, 
Section 12 of the bill looked after the national end of the business, 
replacing the emancipation proclama/tion with a lav/ on the subject. It 
declared all persons held to involuntary servitude in these states forever 
free. If they or their descendants were subsequently restrained from their 
liberty, the federal courts would discharge them on a v/rit of habeas cornus, 
Any person convicted of such an attempt to hold such a person to slavery 
was liable to a fine and imprisonment. Once again then, the federal courts 
found themselves with expanded powers vis a vis the state courts. Already 
in the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act, their jurisdiction had been expanded to 
trying cases under state criminal law, jde novo, not necessarily bound to 
follow the lav/ of the state. How they had habeas corpus jurisdiction with 
respect to persons held to slavery under state law. They were not asked 
to adjudicate the right of an owner to his slave under state law, or the 
validity of that law, but merely, to ascertain the facts of an attempt to 
re-enslave such a person, and release them.
1. The best outlines of the differences between the two plans is contained 
in Belz, Reconstructing the Union, uu.238-243, and, though uartisan, 
the Wade-Bavis Manifesto, in the Uev; York Tribune, August 5th, I864*
A constitutional amendment abolishing' slavery would laave secured the 
same right to a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court on a surer
foundation than a Congressional law of emancipation. It would have applied 
to the whole Union, where the Wade^bavis bill only applied to the rebel 
states, but part of the reason for the urgency behind the V/ade-bavis bill 
was that in June, the resolution calling for such an amendment to the 
Constitution, which Congress was debating at the same time, failed to 
pass with the necessary two-thirds majority, Henry Winter bavis regarded 
that failunre as an important reason for pushing througji the bill since 
apart from establishing provisional governments, it proposed to,
emancipate all slaves, to give them and their paternity the 
writ of habeas corpus in the United States courts wherenow if free 
they could seek protection,^”
Republicans felt that the session must not end, they must not go to the 
polls, without such a guarantee of a reconstruction based on freedom. That 
was important enough to risk a challenge to the Executive in an election 
year,
Ihese priorities are reflected in the debate. It was not phrased as
an attack on Lincoln's policies. The President's proclamation, said
Fernando beaman in the House, v/as a beacon light, and "T/hat he has thus
2.happily initiated we must fashion and complete", * Representatives 
Boutv/ell and bonnelly followed up this theme, praising the President for 
his growing commitment to emancipation, but « there were several important 
"buts".
1, bavis to Wade, June 21st, I864, Wade Papers, quoted in belz, 
Reconstructing Clie Union, p.216,
2. Cong. Clobe, 38th Gong, 1 sess,, p.1247 March 22nd, I864. And 
Boutwell's speech, Ibid., pp,2102-2105 May 4th, and bonnelly's, Ibid,, 
pp.2036-2039 May 2nd, Î864.
Many Congressmen did not sha3?e the President's optimism with respect 
to the loyaltjr of the defeated Southerners, on which the success of his 
policy depended. There was after all, no revolution in the South against 
going to war. Use loyal masses did secede. That was the argument of Henry 
Winter bavis, when he doubted whether ten percent of men promising good 
behaviour in the future was a sound enough basis for controlling the other 
ninety percent. He argued,
there is no fact that we have learned from any one who has 
been in the South and has come up from the darkness of that bottom­
less pit which indicates such repentance. There is no fact that any 
one has stated on authority at all reliable that any respectable 
proportion of the southern states now in rebellion are willing to 
accept any terms that even our opponents on the other side of the 
House are willing to offer them,^*
Fernando Beaman pointed out tliat many Southerners might talce the oath to
avoid punisliment, save their estates, or get control of the new government
for their own purposes. He warned that, "the oaths of men whose hands are
2.dripping with innocent blood should be received with great caution".
}jTeedom rested on a shalty political basis then. Hot only that, but, 
as Beaman said, the Reconstruction proclamation, although it exacted an 
oath of allegiance which included acceptance of the emancipation proclama­
tion and Congressional acts did not specifically demand emancipation of 
the new state constitutions. There was no guarantee that the laws under 
which slavery existed would cease to exist. Nor would swearing of the oath 
prevent the slave trade. People in Arkansas who took it could buy slaves 
from Kentucky.^"
Behind shalcy political arrangements, there were no legal guarantees.
There was an oath to respect a proclamation. But what legal standing did 
proclamation
that -have? Speech after speech queried what fate it would meet not only
1. Ibid., App. p.84 Mcirch 22nd, l864«
2. Ibid., p.1246 Llcr-’oh 22nd, l864o
3. Ibid.; pp.1243-1247 March 22nd, I864.
at the hands of the state courts, but in the Supreme Court. The matter 
was expressed most succinctly by Henry Hinter bavis, when he said,
it is therefore under the scheme of the President merely a 
judicial question, to be adjudged by judicial rules, and to be 
determined by the courts. It is a question whether each individual 
negro be free. It is a question whether the master has the right 
of seizure, or the negro can control himself. It is to be determined 
by the vfrit of habeas corpus. It is a question of personal right, 
not a question of political jurisdiction. Its fate in the State 
courts is certain. Its fate in the courts of the United States under 
existing laws is scarcely doubtful«
I do not desire to argue the legality of the proclamation of 
freedom. I think it safer to make it law.
He concluded,
the purpose of the bill is to preclude the judicial question of 
the validity and effect of the President's proclamation by the 
decision of the political authority in re-organizing the State 
governments.^'
Only Gongi?ess could exercise that authority. The President had a 
pardonning power, and good intentions. Congress had the power to set the 
terms for restored governments, and give them the magical force of law.
On this, the bill's supporters were agreed. The debate revealed a range 
of theory, from Beaman's "state suicide" to the bill's Senate sponsor
p
Ben Wade's "I hold that once a State of this Union, always a State"."' But 
a theory of Congressional powers was played down. The difference, as Beaman 
said was one of "theory rather than of practice" ~ they were agreed that 
Congress had powers under the Constitution to set terms, and the only 
important question was how to use them.^’ And so, on May 4th, I864, the 
House eschewed theory, and voted against adopting Tliaddeus Stevens' preamble 
to the bill which implied the non-existence of the states. Positive 
considerations were more important.
1. Ibid., App. pp.84-85 March 22nd, I864.
2. Ibid., p.3449 July 1st, I864.
3. Ibid., p.1247 March 22nd, 1864*
What Henry Winter bavis meant by making it a question of "political 
jurisdiction" was the exercise of these powers to regenerate governments 
resting on firm foundations of loyalty. And so the bill's supporters 
championed the firmer tests of the oath to past loyaltjf, and on May 4th 
accepted the ' sterner percentage of a majority willing to take « Uy‘My 
‘ oath^ ' Tile bill set the political terms for restoration - the exclusion 
of Confederate officeholders from government, repudiation of the rebel 
debt, and most important, a free state constitution with guarantees of that 
freedom.
But Henry Winter bavis did not mean the exclusion of legal solutions 
by political ones* The two were inextricably linked* Permanent emancipa­
tion, and a sure writ of habeas corpus in a federal court could have been 
achieved by a legal solution on its own - the proposed thirteenth amendment 
to the constitution. But it ?ms not only the fact that the resolution 
failed to pass in June with the necessary two-thirds majority which made 
the passage of this bill necessary, bavis, like most Republicans wanted 
both. But the amendment would not work changes in the political complexion 
of the states themselves. He explained,
if adopted it still leaves the whole field of the civil 
administration of the States prior to the recognition of State* 
governments, all laws necessary to the ascertainment of the will 
of the people, and all restrictions on the return to power of the 
leaders of the rebellion, wholly unprovided f o r . 2.
The Wade-bavis bill attempted to encourage political arrangements which 
would make the states safe for the operations of the Constitution and lav^ s. 
It contained a double guarantee for the permanence of freedom - first that
1. The original provision was that the oath should be taken by ten percent 
of the loyal men, Tlie archconservative Samuel ' Sunset ' Cox, even 
expressed a preference for the amendment, and a preference for the 
Wade-bavis bill over the President’s proclamation because of it. 
bemocrats and Radicals alike feared the use of lO^  ^governments in the 
South as "rotten boroughs" in the November election, to re-elect 
Lincoln. Samuel S. Cox, Three becades of Federal Legislation, 
(Providence, R.I.: J.A. & R* A. Reid, 1885)? P*435*
2. Cong. G-lobe, 38th Cong., 1 sees., App.p.84 March 22nd, I864.
an acceptable state convention should write it into its constitution; 
second, that freedom, by Section 1? was written into national law, and the 
federal courts empowered to make it good by a writ of habeas corpus against 
re-enslavement *
It was this section which Democrat J. C* Allen, a dissenting member 
of the Select Committee found most threatening to states rights. For the 
federal courts were called upon only to adjudicate the fact of an attempt 
at re-enslavement, without reference to the validity of the claim under 
state law* He objected,
the twelfth section abolishes slavery in these states as far 
as an act of Congress can abolish it. It not only abolishes it, but 
it takes away from the courts, as far as an act of Congress can take^ 
away, the power of passing upon the right of Congress to abolish it.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 had established a protective relationship
with the individual inside the state, regardless of state laws or prejudice*
It used the federal courts to do this* llie Wade-Davis bill offered the
freed negro the protection of the national law and the national courts over
state law, and state courts. It occurred to Democratic Representative
Der.lson, that it might well be part of one plot to rob the states of their
reserved rights* He referred to the passage of the recent Habeas Corpus
Act of 1863 as evidence of this Invasion, and linked it with the present
Wade-Davis bill, in that it too legalised the unconstitutional acts and
proclamations of the President, lh?esumably he had in mind the Emancipation 
2Proclamation. ’ For he was right. Henry Winter-Davis had welcomed 
Lincoln’s proclamations, but thought it "safer to make it law". Tlie Wade- 
Davis bill was the law on the subject.
The bill contained the minimum conditions of restoration acceptable 
to the Republican consensus. They could not afford to go further without 
exposing the differences inside the party. And so on May 4th when
1* Ibid., p.1739 April 19th, I864*
2. Ibid., p.2039 May 2nd, I864.
Representative Rice of Maine proposed to strike out the word "v/hite"
wherever it described electoral qualifications, Henry Winter Davis refused
to yield the floor for that or any other purpose.^' Many Republicans
were prepared to embrace the issue of black suffrage. In the same
session of Congress preliminary votes on Senator Wilkinson’s amendment
to strike out "white" from the electoral provisions in a bill to provide
a temporary government for Montana, found twenty-two senators and fifty-
four members of the House in favour. In the end, however, they would not
2 «
risk passage of the bill for the sake of pressing a divisive issue, * And 
so it was with the Wade-Davis bill. Its emancipation provisions were too 
important to risk it for. The bill was pressed to a vote on the same day,
May 4th, having avoided opening the suffrage question. Thaddeus Stevens' 
preamble to the bill, implying the non-existence of the states, and 
regarded as a test vote on the radicalism of its supporters was voted down 
by seventy-six votes to fifty-seven, Ihe Republican majority clung to the 
safety of the less controversial contents of the bill, which passed by a 
comfortable seventy-three votes to fifty-nine on the same day. It was too 
mild for Thaddeus Stevens, who abstained from the vote,^*
Tlie bill ran into some trouble in the Senate. Senator Wade reported 
it from the Committee on the Territories on May 27th,with amendments. But 
it was not taken up for debate until July 1st, dangerously close to the end 
of the session!' Like the House, the Senate resisted the suffrage issue, 
and on Ben Wade’s initiative voted against the committee’s amendment to
1. Ibid., p.2107 May 4th, I864*
2. Ibid., p.1346 March jOth I864, and Senate vote (22 to 17 in favour of
Wilkinson’s amendment), Ibid., p.ljôl March 31st. The House vote was
85 to 54 against concurring with the Senate version, Ibid., p,l652 
April 15th. There were so few negroes in Montana that it was perhaps
dropped as an issue of principle at this time for lack of practical
importance.
3. Ibid., pp.2107-2108 May 4th, I864. Tlie majority for the bill was 73 
to 59 against.
4. Eben G. Scott in Reconstruction during the Civil War in the United States 
(Boston & N.Y.Î Houghton & Mifflin & Co., 1895)? p.301 carries the story 
that there was a deliberate attempt to prevent the bill coming up earlier, 
so that Lincoln wouldn’t have to exercise a proper veto over it. Senator 
Doolittle had apparently written to a member of General Banks' staff in 
Louisiana to this effect. The story is unconfirmed.
strike out "white" from the electoral qualifications for the constitutional
la
convention, by twenty-four votes to five. “ Then events took an, unexpected
turn. B. Gratz Brown proposed a substitute, which would have had the
effect of postponing all Congressional action on the subject until the 
2
next session. It said simply that insurrectionary districts should not 
be allowed to cast votes for electors for President, Vice-President, Senators 
or Representatives until the inhabitants had returned to their allegiance.
Tlie passage of this substitute on July Ist^” by twenty votes to thirteen 
was a surprise, representing, not a planned revolt against the bill, but 
a temporary loss of direction from Wade's committee. While the issue hung 
in the balance, Senator Sumner gave further evidence of the importance 
which the bill's supporters attached to its emancipation features.' Fearing 
that the bill was lost, he offered a resolution to recognize as a 
statute the Proclamation of Emancipation, putting it under the guaranty 
and safeguard of an Act of Congress". The Senate, however, would not accept 
it in this form."^ '" Order was restored the following day when Wade re-asserted 
the authority of his committee. The Senate receded from its amendment
5»and agreed to the House bill. The V/ade-Bavis bill passed on July 2nd*
Everything waited on Lincoln's approval. Jolin Hay records Lincoln's 
dialogue with Senator 2achariali Chandler, when the President pushed the bill 
away, without signing it* Lincoln objected that the bill had been placed 
before him just a few moments before Congress was to adjourn, and that it 
was too important to deal with so summarily. Chandler expressed again its
1. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess. p.3449 July 1st, I864. Wade explained
that he would rather the amendment was not adopted since it might mean 
sacrificing the bill.
2. Ibid., p.3449 July 1st, I864. There is no evidence that support had been 
planned for it as an alternative, but it looked rather like a "maverick" 
which slipped in unexpectedly. At most it indicates a lack of wild 
enthusiasm for the bill - as in the House it was considered "the best
we can get".
3* Ibid., p.3461 July 1st, I864.
4o Ibid.V pp.346O-346I July 1st, I864*
5. The vote was 18 for, I4 against, with the high absentee figure of 17.
It was the end of session. Enthusiasms waned. Ibid., p.3491 July 2nd,l864.
importance for emancipation, when he said,
if it is vetoed, it will damage us fearfully in the Northwest* 
llie important point is that one prohibiting slavery in the 
reconstructed States*
But it was that point on which the President expressed doubts as to 
C ongre s s’ authority * ^ '
He expressed them again, on July 8th, when he issued a message
9 .explaining his reasons for pocket-vetoing the bill*"' He was not prepared, 
he said, to commit himself inflexibly to one single plan of reconstruction, 
or abandon the work which ha.d already been done in Arkansas and Louisiana*
Nor was he prepared to "declare a, constitutional competence in Congress to 
abolish slavery in the states" - rather do that by constitutional amendment * 
But then came the astonishing statement that,
nevertheless I am fully satisfied with the system for restora­
tion contained in the bill as one very proper plan, for the loyal 
people of any State choosing to adopt it, and that I am and at all
times shall be prepared to give the Executive aid and assistance to
any such people ,.*
To many Congressmen, it was a strange idea of law that the President
should offer to execute a bill which, by his refusal to sign it, was not
a law - and to execute it, at that, only if the people preferred it to his
more lenient edicts! Small wonder that the message was greeted by an
outraged response from the bill's sponsors* The Wade-Davis Manifesto
3 *was published in the Hew York Tribune on August 5th. ° The President’s 
refusal to sign the bill had made an election issue out of the differences 
between the two proposals for reconstruction. For that reason, the Manifesto
1. Quoted in Nioolay & Hay, Abraham Lincoln, Vol9, p*120.
2. Basler, Lincoln Uorks VII pp*433*”434 July 8th, I864*
3. The text of the Manifesto is reprinted in full in Harold M* Hyman (ed*),
Tlie Radical Reuublicans and Reconstruction, I86I-IO7O (Indianapolis & 
N.Y.s Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964)» pp*137™147.
has the ‘air of a Radical compaign broadside against the President* But 
in many ways it is a valnable reflection on the intentions of the framers *
It attacked the governments of Louisiana and Arkansas as "more 
creatures of his will", their free constitutions resting on the flimsiest 
of political arrangements, and on the will of the military* They preferred 
their sterner arrangements, and they preferred the rule of law. As the 
Manifesto said, the bill governs the states by law, equalizing all
before it, the proclamation commits them to the lawless discretion of 
military governors and Provost Marshals"* Lincoln’s Reconstruction 
Proclamation, they went on, contained no guarantee of freedom, "leaving 
slavery exactly where it v/as by law at the outbreak of the rebellion".
It exacted an oath in support of the emancipation proclamation* But even 
if that proclamation would stand up to a Supreme Court test, it exacted 
no guarantee of state laws, or constitutions, and "the right of a, slave 
to freedom is an open question before the State courts on the relative 
authority of the State law and the proclamation"* There was no doubt which 
authority the state courts would find the more binding* An oath to such 
a proclamation was meanj.ngless* It might bind the one-tenth who took it, 
but not the nine-tenths who would succeed to the control of the State 
government< Lhen that happened, the federal government would be left 
without any means to protect the freedman in the states, for, by defeating 
the bill, the President had defeated the freedman’s legal, remedy of a habeas 
corpus v?rit from a federal court*
And^that Lincoln should then offer to execute the bill, as "one very 
proper plan for the loyal people of any state choosing to adopt it"! How?
The Manifesto thundered, "A more studied outrage on the legislative authority 
of the people has never been perpetrated"*
Tlie outrage was felt by many more who did not feel free to express
it openly while their party's fortunes hung in the balance in the months
preceding a crucial election* Thus Republican Albert G* Riddle later 
recalled that, although the masses were strongly in support of Lincoln's 
re-election,
at the Capital, thinlcing Union men were quite unanimous in 
sustaining Mr* Wade and Mr* Davis, as was the majority of both 
Houses of Congress.
Frederick Douglass lamented Lincoln's veto as yet another example of his
2 .
policy, "Do evil by choice, right from necessity". ' Secretary of the 
Treasury Salmon Chase recorded his disappointment in his diary, as well 
as his fears that the President and his chief advisers had not rejected 
the possibility of a reconstruction with slavery. He also recorded that
Senator Pomeroy intended to go buffalo hunting and then to Europe!^'
Such action would have been, in the long run, regretted* For in the 
cold light of day. Republicans had time to thinlc more clearly about the 
failure of the Wade-Davis bill, and to stop regretting it in the light of 
later events, George Julian afterwards wrote that,
- the passage of the somewhat incongruous bill vetoed by the 
President, would probably have proved a stumbling-block in the way 
of the more radical measures which afterward prevailed.4”
Perhaps the only people who might later have regretted it, were the more
conservative Republicans. And indeed Senator John Sherman alleged many
years after the events, that in conversation with Charles Sumner, President
5,Lincoln had expressed his regret that he had not approved the bill.
1. Albert G. Riddle, Recollections of War Times (Hew York; G. P. Putnam 
& Sons, 1895) 1^ 30*5.
2. Quoted in The Liberator, September l6th, 1864»
3. David Donald, Inside Lincoln's Cabinet, Tie Civil War Diary of Salmon
P. Chase, p.230-232.
4» George W. Julian, Political Recollections I84O-I872 (Chicago:
Janson, McClung & Co., I884T? p.247»
5. John Sherman, Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and
Cabinet, (Chicago; The Werner Co., 1895, 2 vols.) I p.361,
The shortcomings of the bill were pointed out by Republicans in the 
second session of the Thirty-eighth Congress, which met in December, Many 
of them had voted for the original bill. But circumstances had changed, 
Lincoln had won in November, and some of the tensions had gone out of 
Congressh relationship with the Executive. In January when the House 
successfully passed the resolution calling for a thirteenth amendment to 
the constitution, abolishing slavery, some of the old urgency attaching 
to the Wade-Davis bill as an emancipation measure had gone. These were 
the circumstances in which James Ashley re-introduced the Wade-Davis bill 
in January, vd.th-ko important amendments.^* One required Louisiana and 
Arkansas to go through the enrolling phases of the bill, with its majority 
test of . ' loyalty. It thus challenged the existence of loyal govern­
ments there. The second amendment cast some light on the weakness of the 
original bill. It required the states to accept not only the abolition 
of slavery, but also the corollory of freedom - a guarantee of civil rights. 
It provided that in the new state constitutions,
involuntary servitude is forever prohibited, and freedom and 
equality of civil rights before the law are guaranteed to all 
persons in said State,
For the objection to the original bill which Congressmen now raised 
most frequently was that it failed as a guarantee of freedom. It is 
difficult to determine how much of this criticism sprang from an honest 
attempt to make a better bill. For the criticisms came both from those 
for whom the bill as a whole v/as now too tame, and from those who wished 
to drop it in favour of a more conservative solution. Representative Kelley 
thought that the bill would not go far enough to guarantee freedom until it 
extended the suffrage to the freedman. He proposed an amendment to that
1, Cong, Globe, 38th Cong,, 2 sess., p.280 Jaimary l6th, I865.
effect on January l6th*^* On the other side, there wore Republicans 
like Dawes and Eliot who criticised the bill's failure to guarantee
? ofreedom and equality under the la?n Yet they did not propose firmer
guarentees?* Eliot proposed a substitute bill requiring states to
establish republican governments, prohibiting slavery and guaranteeing
freedom and equality of rights before the law. But it contained no
3,machinery for doing so* * Dawes wanted a plan which would leave more
discretion to the loyal men in the states,"^' Not radical enough for
some, too radical for others, the bill had lost its attraction ar a
rallying point for Republican unity* On January 17th, the House decided
to postpone further discussion on it by 103 votes to 34» Henry hinter
Davis was right when he observed that "A vote to postpone is equivalent
to a vote to kill the bill"* Re-introduced on February 20th, it was
5tabled the following day. The Thirty-eighth Congress, like it predecessor, 
was to end without a reconstruction measure on the statute book.
One disappointed man was the bill's original House sponsor, Henry 
Winter Davis, He marvelled that representatives v/ho voted for the bill 
in the previous session should suddenly discover that it sanctioned the 
enormities of the laws of slavery. Cynically he suggested that the discovery 
was prompted by the intervening election. Patronage considerations caused 
some of his colleagues to jump on to the successful President's bandwagon.
He could not see how the bill failed as a guarantee of freedom, since,
1. Ibid., pp.281-291 January l6th, I865*
2. See Eliot's speech, Ibid., p.298 January 17th, lv65, and Dawes,
Ibid., p«935 February 20th, I865.
3» Ibid., p.234 January 12th, I865»
4» Ibid., PP»934'”937 February 20th, I865.
5. The bill was postponed on January 17th by a vote of 103 to 34, Ibid.,
p. 301. Tlie whole subject, including substitutes by Wilson and 
Eliot wa,s tabled on February 22nd by 80 votes to 65., Ibid., pp. 1102-
1103.
I took some credit to myself for putting in a brief space the 
shortest possible declaration that all men should be equal before 
the law and that I had come, in these words, as near
annihilating the black laws of the South as gentlemen could have 
done if they had spent tomes in writing out the provision for that 
purpose.I”
But, whatever their motivation, the bill's critics were right. It 
was less than a positive guarantee of freedom and equal rights under law. 
Its importance in I864 was that it contained more of a, guarantee than 
Lincoln’s plan - but it Y/as less than Bavis claimed. The section of the 
bill which made the link between freedom and the positive protection of 
rights in law, was that which set out conditions for the provisional 
governments. Section ten authorised the provisional governor not only 
to refrain from enforcing laws by which slaves were held to service, but 
also to see that "the lav/s for the trial and punishment of white persons 
shall extend to all persons". To that extent it implied a standard of 
conduct for the state which in future was to be governed by a free 
constitution. The sections which set out conditions for the restoration 
of loyal state governments did not respect even this positive provision, 
but a vague requirement that the freedom of all persons in the state v/as 
to be "guaranteed". Ttiough Republicans did associate freedom with equal 
protection under the laws, without which freemen would once more be reduced 
to a condition of servitude under "black codes", they had a habit of 
assuming that when slavery was abolished, laws made in its interest would 
go too. This was a mistake. Henry Winter Bavis perhaps took a false 
pride in "guaratiteering" freedom in the "shorest possible declaration". 
Perhaps it needed some "tomes" of definition - on such unspoken rights 
as that of giving testimony in court, without which freedom was a tenuous
1. Ibid., p.970 February 21st, I865.
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thing in any court. Tie provision of the hill which extended the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to the issuing of a habeas corpus writ 
against enslavement suffered the same limitations. It was some protection, 
though remote, against bodily re-enslavement, but no guarantee against 
other forms of slavery at the hands of discriminatory and unequal laws.
The Wade-Bavis bill, then, was a half-way stage between the Confisca­
tion Act of 1862; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It adopted one 
guarantee of freedom which Congress had considered and rejected in 1862 - 
the writ of habeas corpus from a federal court. It attempted to do more - 
to malce freedom areality by political change, based on state constitutions 
adopted b y ^ l o y a l . Because it attempted these things, it had 
more to offer than Lincoln's reconstruction plans. Hence it wan a challenge 
in an election year. But it had limitations. It crossed state barriers 
only gingerly to protect the freedman by a writ of habeas corpus. It 
applied only to the Southern States. It exacted no guarantees from the 
states of equality under the law. The Thirteenth amendment was a surer 
guarantee of freedom, a certain right to a writ of habeas corpus - 
anywhere in the Union. It v/as only then that Republicans would have to 
ask - was it enough? IVhatwas "freedom" - the absence of slavery only, or 
something more positive, which they had been hedging around in these 
reconstruction debates, a positive obligation on the part of the federal 
government to see that all men lived under the equal protection of the 
laws. Though they never got round to Henry Winter Bavis' "tomes" of 
definition, in time they would have to clarify what they meant by freedom, 
and give more attention to the machinery which would have to be employed 
to guarantee it. The attempt, if not the solution came in 1866 with the 
Civil Rights Act*
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C H A P T E R V 
TIE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
During the debate on the Wade-Davis Bill, it had become clear that 
the permanent dismantling of slavery v/as the aim of a majority of the 
Republican party* On June 15th 1864? failure of the Congressional resolu­
tion calling for a constitutional amendment abolishing slavea?y to pass by 
the necessary two-thirds vote of Congress, made the Wade-Davis Bill the 
only great antislavery measure of the session* It would have given the 
slave a right to a v/rit of habeas corpus in a federal court. In January 
1865) Congress did pass the constitutional amendment resolution* Three- 
fourths of the states ratified the Thirteenth Amendment by December 1865» 
That amendment gave the slave, anywhere in the Union, a right to a v/rit of 
habeas corpus in a federal court. But, v/as that all there was to freedom?
In the year following the adoption of the amendment, it became clear, from 
reports of the freedman's lot in the South, that the abolition of slavery 
did not automatically create conditions for the enjoyment of freedom.
The Negro was subjected to unequal and discriminatory laws and customs, 
barred from giving testimony against white men, subjected to nev/ forms of 
servitude under the notorious black codes - in short, he v/as denied the 
basic human rights which Republicans argued were the conditions of any man's 
freedom, black or white* Already, in the debate on the Wade-Davis bill, the 
Republicans had indicated the standards of justice which they believed to be 
the corollory of emancipation* In that bill, the Provisional Governor v/as 
charged with the duty of ensuring that " , the laws for the trial and 
punishment of white persons shall extend to all persons Later, when
the bill v/as revived in December 1865? Republicans were not satisfied that
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it lived up to Henry Winter Davis' claim that it embodied freedom and
equality under the laws. It did not require the states specifically to
guarantee the civil rights of all persons once they were restored to the 
Union. It did not set up any national sanctions against the failure of 
the states to observe all but the emptiest forms of "freedom". 1866, 
a majority of Republicans argued that the Thirteenth Amendment hid supplied 
this want, that it had given the nation an interest in the meaning of 
freedom, and that its enacting clause gave Congress the power to pass 
"appropriate legislation" to guarantee it against the actions of states 
or individuals. Consequently, they rested the power to pass the Civil 
Rights and Freedman's Bureau Act on the Thirteenth Amendment. The acts 
did not represent an addition to its meaning of freedom, but rather, the 
specific means to malie good its original declaration.
At least, this was the view of the majority of the Republicans, those
who supported the civil rights legislation. Some of their more conservative 
colleagues, like Senator Edgar Cowan, put a more limited construction on 
the Thirteenth Amendment, In 1866, he argued that it meant
the breaking of the bond by which the Negro slave v/as held to 
his master; that is all. It v/as not intended to overturn this 
Government and to revolutionize all the laws of the various States 
everywhere. It was intended, in other words, and a lawyer would 
have so construed it, to give to the Negro the privilege of the habeas 
corpus; that is, if anybody persisted in the face of the constitutional 
amendment in holding him as a slave, that he should have an appropriate 
remedy to be delivered.^”
In contrast to this view, was that of the moderate Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, Lyman Trumbull, who played a prominant role in the drafting of 
the Civil Rights and Freeman's Bureau Acts, which he defended as a proper
1, Cong. Globe., 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.499? January 30th, 1866. Democratic 
Senator Saulsberry expressed similar views, Ibid,, pp.476-480, January 
29th, 1866.
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sequel to the Thirteenth Amendment, arguing,
with the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the 
destruction of the incidents of slavery . Those laws that 
prevented the coloured man going from home, that did not allow 
him to enforce rights; that did not allow him to be educated, were 
all badges of servitude made in the interest of slavery. They 
never would have been thought of or enacted anyv/here but for slavery 
and when slavery falls, they fall also, ■'
The courts divided along exactly the same lines when they came to 
adjudicate cases arising under the civil rights acts. Regarding the 
legislative intentions of Congress in framing the constitutional amendment, 
as relevant to their construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, they 
followed Edgar Cowan's or Lyman Trumbull's line of argument, posing the 
one or the other as the "true" interpretation, depending on the conserva­
tism or liberalism of their own views. Thus, to Judge Robertson in the
?Kentucky case of Bowlin v. Commonwealth in 1867, a white man's appeal 
for a repeal of judgment against him for grand larceny, on the testimony
of a coloured witness, was quite proper. Tie Thirteenth Amendment meant
only the absence of slavery. It could not support legislation like the 
1866 Civil Rights Act which purported to interfere with the state's 
prohibition against the testimony of negroes. On the same question, the
right of a coloured witness to give testimony against a, white defendant,
Justice Swayne took quite the opposite view in the case of UcS. v. Rhodes, 
in the federal circuit court in 1866,^' He took the most sympathetic view 
of the legislative intention behind the Thirteenth Amendment, It meant 
freedom, rather than the absence of slaverj'", and it gave Congress the 
power to protect the individual against violations of that freedom. Tie
Civil Rights Actms "appropriate" legislation to that end.
1. Ibid., p.322 January 19th, 1866.
2. Bowlin V. Commonwealth 65 Ky 5 (I867),
3c U.S. V. Rhodes Fed, Cas. 16, I5I (1866).
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In determining the legislative intention, two questions must be 
asked of those who framed and sponsored the resolution, lhat did they 
mean by freedom? Did they intend to use the amendment, and legislation 
passed in its name, to initiate a federal revolution, to alter the balance 
between state and nation, limiting the powers of the former in their 
traditional sphere of defining and adjudicating the status and rights of 
persons under their jurisdiction?
Tie debates in Congress reveal most, if not all of the answers. The
reader might well sympathise with Republican Representative Fernando Beaman,
who remarked during the debate on the Vfade-Davis Bill, that any man who
could originate one new idea in relation to slavery should have it
patented, and be ranked as one of the greatest discoverers of any age.^*
When the resolution finally passed in January I865, the artist Clark Miller
2.made plaster casts of the crania of those who supported the measure.
Many of those who spoke for it had the air of men whose crania were about 
to be immortalised, rather than persuaders, on whose skills cmcial votes 
depended.
After considering a number of proposals, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
reported the following resolution for a Thirteenth Amendment, on February
10th, 1864.3"
1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to its 
jurisdiction.
2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation.
1, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess,, p,1246 March 22nd, I864.
2o Cornelius Cole, Memoirs of Cornelius Cole (U.Y. I9O8) p.221.
3. Several proposals were introduced in both the House and the Senate, 
calling for a constitutional amendment to abolish slavery. Senators 
Henderson and Sumner, Representatives Ashley, Horton and Windom all 
tendered such proposals, Tlie Judiciary Committee's version, introduced 
on Feb:cuary 10th; Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess. p.553 became the 
Thirteenth Amendment,
I6l,
l?/h.en the debate began in the Senate on March 28th, the ground was
already well worn. Republican speeches on the whole were concerned with
fajfliliar themes; that the preservation and future peace of the Union
depended on the removal of the source of the rebellion; that the
institution itself was a great wrong, condemning the slave to every
conceivable injustice, and now threatening to lose the liberty of both
races in a rebellion against democracy. But most of all, they were nov/
concerned with the means to end it forever. In the debate on the ¥ade-»
Bavis Bill, many Republicans had made it clear that they doubted the
legality of the President’s Emancipation Proclamation. For the present,
it depended on the army. After that, as Henry Winter Bavis argued, freedom
under it was a judicial question, to decide upon the individual freedom
of each s l a v e . A s  the Vi’ade-Bavis bill’s supporters said, there were
few doubts as to its fate in the state courts. It might fare hardly better
in the Supreme Court, It was too precarious a gauntlet to run. The courts
could hold it for nothing. An incoming administration could reverse it.
It applied only to a limited area in the South. Finally, slavery rested
on state and local law, Tlie proclamation did nothing to strike down these
2.laws. That would take more than Executive action.
It would also take more than Congressional action. Republicans had 
been aware of the problems of finding guarantees for permajient emancipation 
since 1862, when they experimented in the Confiscation Act of July 17th, 
with the idea of giving the freedman the right to a v/rit of habeas corpus 
from a federal court. The idea was dropped then, but revived in the Wade- 
Bavis Bill, which of course never became law. But it would not have 
resolved all constitutional doubts. In the Veto Message which Lincoln
1. Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess., App, p.84 March 22nd, I864.
2, Senator Trumbull's speech introducing the amendment resolution 
sums up most of these doubts on the legality of the proclamation. 
Ibid., pp.1313-1314 March 28th, I864.
prepared, but did not serve on the Confiscation Act, and then again in
the veto message which he did issue on the Wade-Davis Bill, the President
expressed doubts as to the constitutionality of Congress’ attempts to 
1 .abolish slavery. ‘ The courts might well have shar*ed his doubts. There 
was too, another loophole to the permanent extinction of the institution.
The Congressional measures applied only to the slaves of rebels, or 
specifically to the South. Residents of Alabama might still purchase 
slaves in Kentucky or Delaware. There was only one way to put the matter
beyond constitutional doubts, one way to extinguish its roots in state
law, one way to ensure against the whims of a court, or the passing political 
complexion of a President or Congress - a constitutional amendment.
The Thirteenth Amendment and the Emancipation Proclamation, were
complementary, rather than rivals. Lincoln himself bad no doubts about
that. "The original proclamation has no constitutional or legal
2,
justification, except as a military measure",•* he w3?ote to Salmon Chase 
in September I863, when Chase suggested extending it to parts of Virginia 
and Louisiana under Union control. The permanent removal of slavery had 
to be by constitutional amendment. Lincoln suggested such an amencbment 
for gradual, compensated emancipation as early as 1862.3' In his veto 
message on the Wade-Davis bill, doubting the powers of Congress to 
emancipate, he expressed his support for the proposed Thirteenth Amendment.^' 
When the resolution finally passed Congress, the New York Tribune reported 
the following remarks of Lincoln's on the relationship between the Proclama­
tion and the amendment,
1. Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New 
Brunswick; Rutgers University Press, 1953. 9 vols.) Vol.V pp.328- 
331 July 17th, 1862, Ibid., VII pp.433-434 July 8th, I864. Hereafter
cited as Lincoln, Collected Works.
2. Ibid,, Vol. VI pp.438-9 September 2nd, I863.
3. Ibid., Vol. V pp.529-532, December 1st 1862, Annual Message,
4. Ibid., Vol. VII pp.433-434 July 8th, I864.
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He thought all v/ould bear him witness that he bad never 
shrunk from doing all that he could to eradicate Slavery by 
issuing an emancipation proclamation* But that proclamation falls 
fan short of what the amendment will be when fully consummated* A 
question might be raised whether the proclamation was valid* It 
might be added that it only aided those who came into our lines
and that it was inoperative as to those who did not give themselves
up, or that it would have no effect upon the children of the slaves 
born hereafter. In fact it would be urged that it did not meet 
the evil* But this amendment is a King's cure for all the evils*
It winds the whole thing up.I”
Years later^ in 1882, the debate on the need for a constitutional
amendment was re-opened, when an article by James C* Welling in the North
American Review, denying the legal validity of the Emancipation Proclamation^
2 *sparked off a reply from one,Aaron Perris, who disagreed* “ The Thirteenth 
Amendment, he said, was unnecessary. Though the Su.preme Court had never
actually tested the Proclamation, there was every reason to believe that
they would have sustained it, as they sustained "A].most without exception", 
the other Presidential acts exercised under the war powers* He cites 
precedents for the abolition of slavery by proclamation. During the 
Revolution, the British commanders Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Dunsmore 
made use of proclamations to liberate slaves belonging to colonists.
Mr. Perris did not consider the freedom of the British commanders from 
the limitations of federalism, and the U.S. Constitution! He did, however, 
lose his ovm case for the superfluity of the Tiirteenth Amendment, when he 
argued that the Proclamation was valid, "unless subsequently reversed, 
vacated, or modified by a superior tribunal which, he said, it hasn't 
been!
The Republicans wanted to remove the "ifs" and "maybes", and they 
were agreed that the only way to do it was by a constitutional amendment.
1. Ibid., Vol. VIII pp.254-255 February 1st I865.
2, Aaron A, Ferris, The Validity of the Emaneiration Edict, North
American Review Vol. 131 p*551» See also the reply from Richard Dana,
Nulli'k/' of the Emanoination Edict, North American Review Vol. 131 p.128,
164»
As Trumbull argued, it would be difficult to show that this v/as
unconstitutional, since the Constitution provided quite clearly for its
own amendment. No such doubts were raised on the Republican side, except
as to whether three-fourths of the states then represented in Congress
should ratify it, as James Ashley argued, or three-fourths of al_l the
1.states, which was Trumbull’s argument, and the one which prevailed*' 
Incredibly, some of the Democrats trumped up an argument against the 
constitutionality of the proposed amendment. In the House, Hendricks 
of Indiana argued that slavery was especially imimne from such interference, 
since it was a domestic institution existing prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution, and over which the states had delegated no power to the
2federal government. Only a unanimous vote of the states could abolish it.
On the whole, however, arguments on the amendment had to bo about whether 
it was morally right, or politically expedient, rather than about the 
correctness of the method.
Republicans were agroed on all three counts - its justice, expediency, 
and correctness* Tiey were agreed that slavery must go. But v/hat did they 
mean by "freedom"? Tfhen Senator Clark categorised the affront of slavery 
to liberty in familiaa: terms -
she has bound men, women and children, robbed them, beat them, 
bruised and mangled them, burned and otherwise murdered them. To 
their cries she has turned a deaf ear, to their complaints shut the 
courts, and taken from them the powers to testify against their 
oppressor. She has compelled them to submit in silence and labor 
in teairs. She has forbidden their instruction, and mocked them with 
the pretence she v/as christianizing them through s u f f e r i n g . 3*
- could it not be argued that when slavery was abolished, so too, in 
Clark's eyes, were these deprivations, giving way to the right to work for
1* Compare Trumbull’s views on ratification, Cong. Globe, 38th Gong., 1
sess., pp.1313-14? March 28th, I864» with those of James Ashley,
Ibid., 2 sess*, pp.138-141, Janu.ary 6th, I865.
2, Ibid., 1 sess., pp.1456-1458 April 7th, I864.
3. Ibid., pp.1367-1370 March 31st, I864.
a living, to marry, to read and write, to testify, and maintain rights
in a court of law? Senator Johnson spoke of the inalienable rights of
1.all men, regardless of colour, * Representative Ingersoll of the free
man's right to the fruits of his own labour and the enjoyment of his
2 .family ties, rights of which he could be robbed by no white man.
The most explicit statement of a positive connection between freedom 
and rights, came from Charles Sumner in the Senate. On April 8th, I864, 
he proposed an alternative form of the amendment, to read,
All persons are equal before the law, so that no person can 
hold another as a slave; and the Congress shall have power to malce 
all laws necessary and proper to carry this declaration into effect 
everywhere within the United States and the jurisdiction thereof.^'
In a speech explaining his preference for this form, Suiiiner outlined his 
plan for the permanent abolition of slavery.^* First, he said, it must 
be attacked through the courts. Tliough the prestige of the courts had 
s.'Tik under the influence of slavery, now he thought, in this regenerated 
republic, they could be expected to interpret the Constitution on behalf 
of liberty. But action by the courts v/as not enough. Secondly, it was the 
duty of Congress to strike at slavery wherever they could, by abolishing 
the slave trade for example, or setting the federal house in order for 
equality before the law by passing the resolution he now proposed in the 
Senate, to establish the rights of coloured witnesses to testify in the 
federal courts. * Yet all this v/as not enough. Finally, it must be done
1. Ibid.. pp.1419-1424 April 5bh, I864.
2. Ibid., pp.2989-2991 June 15th, I864.
3. Ibid.* p.1482 April 8th, I864. Tiis represented a change from
Sumner's first proposal which read, "Everywhere within the limits of 
the United States, and of each State or Territory thereof, all persons 
are equal before the law, so that no person can hold another as a slave". 
Ibid., pp.521-2 February 8th, I864.
4* Ibid., pp.1479-1483 April 8th, I864*
5. Su.mner reported a bill to this effect on February 29th, I864. See
Charles Sr.mner, Rbrks (Boston; Lee & Shephard, 1870-1873? 15 vols.)
Vol. VIII pp.176-216. This did not represent an isolated attempt on 
Sumner's part to achieve equality before the law in federal courts.
As more and more bills passed Congress relying on the federal courts 
for enforcement, it seemed to him a handicap to be bound by the rule 
that the laws of the states in which the court v/as held should be the rule 
for the competence of witnesses in the federal courts. He made earlier 
attempts to abolish the rule at the time of the bill to emancipate slaves 
in the District of Columbia, and also Act of July 1862. Ibid., Vol.VII 
p p . 4 4 3 - 4 4 4  and 802-801. '
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by the people, in the form of an amendment to the Constitution. Anxious 
that this anaendment should be expressed in its most effective and perfect 
form, he suggested the language of equality before the law, sketching 
its origins in the Greek language, and its present currency in European 
constitutions. It was, he said, not a phrase common in America, but,
it will be felt at once that this expression, "equality before 
the law", gives precision to that idea of humag rights which is 
enunciated in our Declaration of Independence. '
Sumner, then, quite explicitly brought to the meaning of freedom, the
concept of equality before the law, and an obligation on the part of the
national goveriiment to extend its protection to all men in the service of
that concept. Paced, however, with the opposition of Senator Trumbull and
2.his colleagues, Sumner withdrew his proposal the same day."*
Three years later, this episode in the debate was alluded to in a 
Kentucky court case. The question at issue in Bowlin v. Commonwealth " was 
a negro's right, by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, ro give testimony against a 
white defendant. The judge held that the Thirteenth Amendment was no basis 
for such legislation, since its fraaers intended by it only the absence 
of slavery, not the guarantee of positive rights. Freedom did not raalœ 
a former slave a competent witness, in violation of state laws on the 
subject. As evidence of this, he cited the hostile reception which Sumner's 
"equality before the law" substitute received in the Senate,
Oe]:ta].nly, Trumbull did express some scepticism about borrowing the 
phrase from foreign constitutions, particularly the French, which he said 
was a notably precarious instrument of government. It was unnecessary, 
when they had a perfectly clear American precedent at hand in the Northwest
lo Cong. Globe, 38th Cong,, 1 sess., pp.1479-1483 April 8th, I864.
2. Ibid., p.1488 April 8th, I864»
3. Bowlin V. Commonwealth 65 Ky 5 (I867).
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Ordinance of 1787? on which the Judiciary Committee had modelled the 
a mendment03"' Senator Howard's reaction is more instructive* His objec­
tions to Sumner's alternative wording was that it was meaningless in a 
legal and technical sense, a phrase unlniown to a common law court, lEiy, 
he said, it might even be understood to mean that a woman would be the 
equal of her husband before the 3.aw! In conclusion, he remarked that 
the Northwest Ordinance was already well understood by the people, and
,,, no court of justice, no magistrate, no person old or 
young, can misapprehend the meaning and effect of that clear, brief, 
and comprehensive c l a u s e . 2.
It is true that the language of the Ordinance had not been construed to 
mean the positive association of freedom and civil rights. Many of the 
states to which it applied did not extend the equal protection of the laws 
to free negroes. But the same Senator, Howard, could not have meant to 
restrict the amendment based on its familiar language, to abolishing only 
the physical trappings of slavery. In retrospect, when speaking on the 
Civil Rights bill in 1866, which embodied Sumner's concept of equality 
before the law, he said that as a member of the Judiciary Committee which 
framed the Thirteenth Amendment, he knew that its "friends and advocates" 
had contemplated the possible use of the enacting clause which was now 
being made.3"
Further evidence of the unfamiliarity of some contemporaries with 
the phra,se "equality before the law", comes from Attorney-General Bates'
diary. On February 10th, I864? he wrote of a previous attempt by Sumner
to introduce the phrase into the amendment,
1. Kbat is eauality before the law?
2. Does that eouality necessarily prevent the one from becoming
the slave of the other? The ordinance of '87, and all the constitutions 
made in pursuance thereof, provide that persons may be sold in slavery 
for crime - Is that repealed?^*
1. Cong, Globe, 38th Cong,, 1 sess., p.1488 April 8th, I864.
2. Ibid., pp.1488-9 April 8th, I864*
3. Ibid., 39th Cong., 1 sess., pp.503-504 January 30th, I866.
4. Hov/ard K. Beale (ed.), Tlie Diary of Edward Bates (Washington; Govt. 
Hrinting Office, 1933) p.330 February 10th, I864.
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A few months later? he was still confused? writing’?
yet some zealous persons (and good withal) in order to 
intensify (and Frenchify) the thought, will have it (adding 
unwarrantahly? to the words of the declaration) that men are created 
equal "before the law". Now, it is precisely before the law, that 
men are not equal; because, independent of their intrinsic qualities, 
the law takes pains to make them unequal. The son of 24? though, 
possibly, a wiser and better man than his father of fifty, is not 
eligible, as his father is, to either house of Congress or to the 
Presidency, .And why not? Simply because the law says r^o_. bliatever 
he may be, by nature, nurture, and virtue, before the law, he is not 
his father's equalo-*-*
But this was to confuse political with civil rights, and to confuse 
restrictions universally applied with those applied on grounds of race. 
Republicans did not support the Thirteenth Amendment with a view to 
interfering with the electoral laws of the states. But in the debate 
on this resolution, £md on the related subject of reconstruction, they 
did connect freedom with the rights of man, the inalienable rights of life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. All men must be equal before the 
law in their right to these. If the phrase was unfamiliar, the idea was 
not. And Sumner was quick to drop it, yielding to the opposition of his 
colleagues, saying that the most homely text containing the rule would 
be more beautiful than any words of eloquence. He apparently did not 
consider that the Judiciary Committee's version excluded the rule, or 
restricted Congressional action in making it good.
The extension of the idea that a free man had rights, and that he 
was equal in them with others before the law, was the Lockean principle 
that governments were instituted among men to maintain their natural and 
inalienable rights. By the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress had power to 
enforce its guarantee of freedom by "appropriate legislation". Democrats 
had no doubts as to what that meant. Representative Mallory charged the 
Republicans with the intention of using the enacting clause to invade
1, Ibid., p.407 September 11th, I864,
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the reserved rights of the states? and protect the negro against State
1 «laws and actions which infringed his "rights". * Beyond that? Democratic
opponents of the measure were very much alive to the political consequences
of the amendment, bith the vestiges of slavery removed from the
Constitution? the rule that a slave was three™fifths of a man for the
purposes of representation would also he abolished? and southern représenta»
tion subsequently increased. So? said Democrat Edgerton? no man who Imew
the motives of the party in power, would doubt that their policy in passing
the resolution was first? to make the negro a citizen? second to protect
him everywhere in defiance of existing state laws and constitutions? and
2,
finally? make him a voting citizen, " Complaints and prophecies of this 
kind were standard Democratic fare.
The lack of slout denials from the Republicans hsc been interpretated 
by Jacobus Ten Broek as signifying agreement. He writes that the debate 
reveals,
.,, that the proponents of the measure intended thereby a 
revolution in federalism? that the opponents of the amendment under­
stood that intended purpose and made it virtually the sole basis of 
their opposition to the amendment*, that the amendment was passed by 
Congress in the face of the well-articulated fear that it would 
revolutionize the federal system and the publicity expressed 
purpose of doing so? that is? with complete agreement between 
proponents and opponents as to its effect.3»
Yet it is hard to find convincing evidence that the Republicans 
planned a revolution in federalism. They did talk about the duty of 
government to protect all men in their inalienable rights. They did not 
deny that such protection might involve a conflict between the nation? and
lo Cong. Globe? 38th Cong,? 1 sees., pp.2981-2983 June 15th? 1864*
2. Ibid., pp.2986-2987 June 15th? I864.
3» Jacobus Ten Broek? The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Berkeley & Dos Angeles; University of California Press, 195l) pp.147™
148,
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the ’reserved rights’ of the States, with the latter the loser. In the 
House, Republican Orth argued that the surest and safest way of guarantee­
ing the States a republican form of government was to provide proper guards 
and checks for the protection of individual and social rights in these 
communities; to keep a guardianship over them as long as necessary; and 
to see that both the name, and the spirit of slavery was erased from every 
state constitution. To both slaveholder and slave, the government’s duty 
was giving to each equal protection under the law"
They did associate rights with freedom. They did conceive of the
use of the enacting clause to protect the free mam in the enjoyment of
his rights - if necessary. Hut that is rather a different thing from
saying that they planned a revolution in federalism. There were certain
good reasons for not announcing such a purpose, Hie amendjiient was to
apply to the whole Union. Maryland and Ohio had their discriminating laws
and customs, and would not welcome the prospect of federal revolution. A
three-fourth vote of the states ivas necessary for ratification. For similar
reasons, Republicans had to be careful of upsetting conservative colleagues,
even some Democrats, by adopting too radical a stance. The resolution had
to secure a two-thirds vote in both Houses. The Senate did not present a
great problem, with its comfortable Republican majority. But 110 votes
were needed to carry it in the House, Possible difficulties were indicated
on May 31st, I864, when the resolution was first introduced, and a, move
2,
to table it was rejected by only 76 votes to 55°
It is not even likely that only such political considerations led 
supporters of the amendment to mask their true intentions. Men like Lyman 
Trumbull, brought up to a lifetime’s respect for the rights of states, did
lo Cong, Globe, 38th Cong., 2 sess,, p,143 .Janviary 6th, I865 
2, Ibid., 1 sess., p.2612 May 31st, I864.
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not cast off the tradition lightly. On the various debates over reconstruc­
tion, discussed in the previous chapter, it v;as obvious that they would 
only make such inroads into the domain of the states as was strictly 
necessary for the objects of peace, security and freedom on which the 
preservation of the Union in their eyes, depended. And so it was with 
the Thirteenth Amendment. Hiey would take whatever further action was 
necessary. IHien it became clear in 1866, that it was necessary, that 
the freedman was doomed to new forms of servitude under black codes, the 
Republicans invoked the enacting clause of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
pass the Civil Rights and Freedmans Bureau Acts. But events, and not a 
preordained philosophy would determine how far they would go in altering 
the balance between state and nation to protect a man in the rights inherent 
in being free. First, they would give the states the opportunity to do 
justice to their own inliabitahts. The amendment posed the tlireat of 
federal action if they did not. There is a good case, to be made in a 
subsequent chapter, that the same principle informed the Civil Rights and 
Freedman's Bureau Acts, and that they too, stopped short of federal 
revolution.
The charge, however, that the Republicans intended to make the 
freedman a "voting citizen" by the Thirteenth Amendment, can be refuted 
with more certainty. Surprisingly little was said on the Republican side 
of the House, about the effects of emancipation on Southern representation. 
The legal commentator, John N. Pomeroy in his Introduction to the 
Constitutional Law of the United States took this as evidence that the 
problem was probably overlooked at the time the amendment was adopted.^*
Yet, if the Democrats were so aware of the effects of the abolition of
1, John Horton Pomeroy, Introduction to the Constitutional History of 
the United States (H.Y.,'i886, 9th'ed^, pp\l27-128.
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the thi*ee-fifths rule on the distribution of power, it is unlikely that
the Republicans were not equally so. Shortly after the passage of the
resolution in the House on January 31st, I865, Senator Giunner introduced
a proposal for a reapportionment amendment.^* The subject, however, was
not taken up until the Thirty-Ninth Congress. The Republicans would not
risk passage of the amendment by drawing attention to the touchy subject
of black suffrage, an objective to which neither the paxty, nor the
Northern people, were as yet committed. In a negative way, they were
not prepared to say that freedom might bring the negro no political rights,.
Kentucky Senator Garret .Davis’ outrageous proposal to add a proviso to
the amendment that no person whose mother or grandmother was a negro could
be a citizen of the United States, or eligible for office not surpris-
?.Ingly, voted down, by 28 votes to 6. But as yet, they were not prepared 
to make a positive assertion that political rights were a condition of 
freedom. At the same session of Congress, they had deliberately omitted 
a proposal for open suffrage in the Rade-Davis bill, to avoid risking its 
passage, and refrained from pressing the issue in the bill to provide a 
temporary government for Montana, for the same reason. In I865, it was 
not expected that the Thirteenth Amendment would do the work of the
Fifteenth. Time and, once again, events separated the two.
On April 8th, I864, the resolution passed in the Senate with a 
comfortable margin of 38 votes to 6.^* In the House vote on June 15th, 
the vote was 93 in favour, 65 against, - short of the necessary two-thirds. 
But when the resolution was called up again on January 31st, I865, it 
passed by II9 votes to 56'^ ' A full Republican turnout, the vote of the
1. Suinner introduced the proposal on February 6th, 1865* See Charles
Sumner, Works, Vol. IX p.236.
2. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1 sess., p.l37C March 31st, I864.
3® Ibid., p.149c April 8th, I864*
4, Compare the vote of June 15th, I864, Ibid., p.2995» with the vote
on January 31st, I865» Ibid., 2 sess., p.531*
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Spealcer, and the 'Yeas’ of seventeen Democrats and Unionists, with 
eight useful Democratic abstentions, gave it the necessary two-thirds 
majority. A number of events had occurred between the first vote and 
the second, to explain this change of heart.
As Sherman marched across the South, it was clear that victory 
was at hand. It could no longer be argued that passage of the amendment 
would prevezit the South from laying down their arms and offering to 
return to the Union* It was too late to save their slaves. Already, in 
the abortive peace negotiations in the autumn of 1864? it wus clear both 
that the Confederacy \yas unwilling to make terms of any kind, and that
1 *Lincoln did not propose to offer any that did not include emancipation.
Military success decided the issue. The Democrat, Samuel Sullivan Cox
did claim, however, that he came to the House that morning prepared to
vote for the resolution, and changed his mind when he heard that peace
2 »messengers from the South were on their way to see General Grant. * But, 
for the Republicans, it v/as much too late to be sensitive to Southern 
wishes.
Signs of change from the border states, too, in the autumn of 1864? 
made Republicans less uneasy about the effect of the amendment on opinion 
there. ' In October, Maryland opted for voluntary emancipation. If the 
example was followed by the rest of the border states, as it seemed likely 
that it would, the amendment would not damage their electoral prospects 
there,
James G, Blaine in Twenty Years of Congress, emphasises the importance
1. On the subject of the peace negotiations, see Lincoln, Yorks, Vol.7? 
p.1443 July 16th, 1864? p.451 July 18th; p.461, July 25th; pp.482- 
483, August 6th; pp.489-90 August 9th; pp.517^518 August 24th; pp.499“ 
501 August 17th; Ib .d., Vol.8, pp.1-2 September 12.
2, Samuel S. Cox, Three Decades of Federal Le>crislation (Providence, 1886) 
pp.327“329« Hereafter cited as Cox, Three Decades,
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of ‘President Lincoln’s support for the measure in persuading Democrats
to vote for it.^” The President’s Annual Message of December 6th, I864
2 .recommended its passage* ‘ But he had already declared his support for 
it on June 9th, 1864? at the Baltimore Convention, " a few days before 
Congress failed to apiu'ove it by the necessary two-thirds* The difference 
in December, and the most important factor was that he then spoke from 
a position of strength, after a successful election* Tlie people had 
endorsed a President and a party who both supported the amendment *
Lincoln was able to point out that it was only a matter of time before 
the increased majority of Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress would 
pass it*
The vote itself was exciting. Samuel Cox recorded, "Every Republican
is in his seat, and for the cmendment" *^ * There v^ as a feat for party
organization! James G* Blaine attributed it to the behind-the-scenes
efforts of the skilful parliamentarian James Ashley, who had charge of
5.the resolution in the House.
The behaviour of the Democratic party is the subject of some specula­
tion* Six Democrats who voted "Nay" in June, absented themselves from 
the vote in January. Several observers agree that it wa,s deliberate,
and represented a tacit approval of the amendment.^ * Three Democrats who
abstained on the first vote, voted 'Yea' on the second* More strikingly, 
eleven Democrats and Unionists changed their votes from Nay to Yea* 
Eighty-two percent of those who changed their vote were "lameduck" Congress­
men. One possible explanation is that, with no constituents to fear, these
1. James G* Bladne, Twenty Years of Congress (Norwich, I884) PP*533'”536.
Hereafter cited as Blaine* Twenty Years.
2* Lincoln, Vforks, Vol.8, p*149» December 6th, I864*
3« Ibid.* Vol.7, p *380 June 9th, 1864*
4« Cox, Three Decades, p.326*
5. Blaine, Twenty Years, p.536.
6. Cole. Memoirs, p*221* Blaine, Twenty Years p.538,
men might he more likely to exercise independent judgment on the vote.
The significance of this statistic however, pales when a similar analysis 
whole
is made of the/Democratic party. Over two-thirds of them were "lameducks" 
and did not change their v o t e s T t i e  intervening election probably was 
significant, to the extent that it did demonstrate the will of the nation, 
to which Representatives must have been sensitive.
Several other contemporary sources suggest a different common factor
among those who changed their votes, or abstained. Charles Dana recalls
his part in persuading three Democrats, two from New York, and one from
2 0New Jersey, to vote for the amendment resolution. ' He was told, he said,
to give them what they wanted. Two wanted internal revenue collection
appointments, the other an important appointment to the New York custom
house, on behalf of a Republican. Samual CoX also claims that Republican
3 »party funds were behind Democratic votes. * Republican Representative 
Albert G. Riddle, from Ohio, recollected,
a Nevf Yorker greatly desired a federal place in New York; he 
had a brother, a Democrat, in the House, who was assured that his 
vote for the abolishing amendment would largely augment his brother’s 
chances. There was also a contest for a seat in the next House - a 
Democrat in the present House was a party to that contest; he came 
to see that the result would depend entirely upon his vote on the 
impending 13th Amendment. It was found necessary to secure the absence 
of one Democrat from the House on the day of the vote. A railroad in 
Pennsylvania was threatened with the passage of a bill by Congress 
greatly adverse to its interests - the bill was in Mr. Sumner's hands, 
ready to be reported; the road had struggled to have action on the 
bill deferred till the next Congress - thus far without avail. The . 
lawyer for the railroad was a Democratic member of the present House.
1, The Democrats and Unionists voted thus,
NO CHANGE 'NAY' TO 'YEA'
Re-elected
Lameduck
16 I 2
'34 T " 9
The relation between these variables is - x2(Chi Square) - 0,3 i.e. 
not a signifiCcUit enough difference to rule out chance.
2. Charles A. Dana, Recollections of the Civil ïïar (N.Y.; D. Appleton &
Co. 1898) pp.l74"’177® Hereafter cited as Dana, Recollections.
3. Cox, Three Decades, pp,327“329*
4. Albert G* Riddle, Recollections of Yar Times. Reminiscences of Men
and Events in Washington"1860-1865 (N.Ÿ.; 18R5) pp.324-325.
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There is no conclusive proof of bribery? but strong suggestions
of it. Certainly, Secretary of State Yilliam Seward had a lobby working
]
for the amendment.'"* It included W. N. Bilbo of Nashville, George 0.
Jones, and Richard Schell, hard at work to get the support of New York 
Democrats. That there was a price, perhaps even of a political rather 
than material na/bure, is suggested by Jolin and La Wanda Cox. Seward was 
never negligent of his own political interests, and they suggest that 
he used the shifting alliances at the time of the amendment, to build up 
a conservative coalition. They conclude,
in plain words, Seward in pursuing Democratic votes for the
Amendment had let it be understood that th^re would follow a
generous policy of peace and reconstruction, and that there would 
be a secure political berth for moderate Democrats in a new 
Conservative coalition.2.
Seward’s correspondence with Governor Perry of South Carolina, over 
the meaning of the enacting clause, may lend further substance to this
view. The Governor wired the President that he feared the clause would
give the federal government control over the race question. Seward 
replied on November 6th, 1865, assuring him that his fears were ground­
less, that "... the clause is really restraining in its effect, instead 
of enlarging the powers of Congress". Tlie President, he said, considered 
South Carolina’s ratification as indispensable to her restoration to the 
Union. Nevertheless, South Carolina, Florida, Alabama and Georgia tacked 
on provisos to their ratifications, to the effect that any attempt by 
Congress to legislate on the political status or civil relations of the 
former slaves would be contrary to the Constitution, even as amended.^"
These conditions were rejected. Seward's statement that the powers of 
Congress were restrained, however, must be explained in the context of
1. La Wanda and John H. Cox, Politics. Principle and Prejudice 1865-1866 
(N.Y.; 1963)5 Chapter 1.
2. Ibid., p.42.
3« The correspondence is quoted in Howard Devon Hamilton, Tne Legislative 
and Judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment (Urbana. 111inois;1950)
his political ambitions. It was not the meaning of the Thirteenth 
Amendment which most of his Republican colleagues in Congress would have 
given.
Georgia’s ratification of the amendment on December 6th, 1865? 
gave it the necessary three-fourths vote of the states, and Seward 
proclaimed the amendment ratified on December l8th« Johnson’s insistence 
that acceptance of the amendment was a condition of restoration, assured 
the votes of the Southern States. Even if their assent was half-hearted, 
it was better to accept Johnson's terms than be left to the mercies of 
the Congressional Republicans. Most of the Southern states ratified it 
by the time of Seward's proclamation. Florida's assenting vote came a 
few days later, on December 28th. Texas ratified it in February I87O. 
Mississippi rejected it on December 2nd, I865. The admission of Nevada 
to the Union, according to Charles Dana, was a deliberate aid to ratifica­
tion. He quotes Lincoln as saying, "It is easier to admit Nevada than to 
raise another million of soldiers".^' In the end, Nevada's vote did not 
prove so crucial, though it might have done.
It was now up to the courts to interpret the meaning of the amendment. 
By that time, however, formal freedom was a fait accompli. Slaves did not 
seek a writ of habeas corpus. Masters did not sue to recover the body of 
the former slave. But they did sue to recover his price. Tlie dockets of 
the state courts were full of cases where promissory notes for slaves had 
been given by purchasers while slavery was legal under state law. Now 
they pleaded emancipation as a defence against paying the original ovmer. 
Tlie issue was complicated by the fact that almost all the new Southern 
state constitutions, approved by Congress, contained clauses prohibiting
1. Dana, Recollections pp.174-177*
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state courts from talving jurisdiction of contracts involving notes on 
slaves, since abolition had rendered such contracts void. Yet, it wa,s 
argued, such provisions were unconstitutional. No state could impair 
the obligation of contracts. It could be further argued, that if 
legitimate contractual relationships were to be undisturbed when these 
states were restored to the Union, slave contracts, like any other contracts, 
must be respected. And that was the argument of most of the highest courts 
of the states, confirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Though these 
cases have little relevance to the question of the connection between 
freedom and civil rights, they nevertheless give some insight into just 
hov/ much or little of a "federal revolution", the courts were prepared 
to undertake.
Georgia's Supreme Court in Hand v, Armstrong in 1866, Florida's in 
Walker v. Gatlin in 1867» Arkansas' in Jacoway v. Denton in 1869,^' among 
many cases, held that the purchasers must honour slave contracts made prior 
to emancipation. The details of individual cases are unimportant. The 
arguments tended to be duplicated, and so the findings of the judge in 
Jacoway v. Denton were fairly typical. He held that the section of 
iVrkansas' 1868 constitution which nullified slave contracts was unconsti­
tutional, in that it impaired the obligation of contracts. Tliat obligation 
T/as binding by the laws in existence at the time it was made. There was 
no legal distinction between contracts for the sale of slaves, and any 
other contracts. Though the contracts stated that the slave was a slave 
for life, the purchaser, and not the seller, must bear the risk of any 
change in the status of the slave, due to accident, death, an act of God,
or emancipation. The argument was even upheld in the Illinois Supreme
?.Court in the case of Roundtree v. Baker in 1869- Holding a promissory
1. Hand v. Armstrong, 34 Ga. 232; Walker v. Gatlin 12 lUa.l; Jacoway v. 
Denton 25 Ark. 665.
2. Roundtree v. Baker 52 111. 241.
note on a slave valid? despite the amendment, the judge argued that 
the court must respect the la,ws of the place where the contract was 
made (i.e. Kentucky) rather than where it was enforced.
Not all the state courts followed this logic. Tlie argument of 
Louisiana's Supreme Court in Wainwright v. Bridges, and Austin v. Sandel, 
Loth in 1867? and both widely cited in the Louisiana courts was that? 
since property in slaves was prohibited by the sovereign power? all 
contracts based on such property were null and void.^° Georgia's highest
2
court? in Ihite v. Hart? and Shorter v. Cobb in 1869? took a similar line,"
The United States Supreme Court had to deal with samples of both 
these arguments when cases came up on a, writ of error* They were in an 
awkward situation. These cases depended not only on an interpretation 
of the Thirteenth iVmondment? but also on the effect of the new state 
constitutions. The problem was an old one in the history of judicial 
federalism? the respect due to decisions of state courts in construing 
their constitutions, In bhite v. Hart and Osborn v, Nicholson in I87I?' ” 
the court reversed state court decisions from Georgia and Arkansas 
respectively? which had denied the validity of promissory notes on slaves, 
Tlie Supreme Court held that such contracts had become vested? and like 
any other contract made under statutes which were subsequently repealed? 
their validity was not impaired. The states could not pass laws impairing
the obligations of the contract. Then the plaintiff in error in Boyce v,
4, ' the
Tabb in 1873?. argued thatTLouisiana court had refused to acknowledge
the validity of such a contract and that the Supreme Court was? by the
Thirty-fourth section of the I789 Judiciary Act? obliged to respect the
lo Wainwright v. Bridges, I9 La, Ann.. 234j Austin v, Sandel? I9 La,
Ann. 309*
2. Vihite V, Ha.rt, 39 Ga. 306; Shorter v, Cobb? 39 Ga. 285,
3. White V. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Osborn v. Nicholson I3 V/all. 654°
4. Boyce v, Tabb? 18 Wall. 54^,
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decision? Justice Davis said that the rule did not apply to questions 
"of a general nature not based on local statute or usage nor any rule 
of law affecting titles to land or settled rule of property". The 
decisions of the state courts? therefore? he said? were not conclusive? 
though they were entitled to attention and respect. Hie Supreme Court 
upheld the legal sanctity of contracts? slave or any other? respecting 
arrangements made under ante bellum state laws and constitutions? over 
the new constitutions. Neither they? nor the Thirteenth Amendment made 
such contracts invalid. Chief Justice Chase v,us a lone dissenter in 
these cases? ar-guing that contracts for the purchase and sale of slaves 
were against sound morals and natural justice? that the laws which once 
supported them were annulled by the Thirteenth Amendment and the contracts 
no longer valid. But where the price and not the body of the slave v/as 
invoked? the courts on the whole preferred to ignore moral questions of 
recognising past property in slaves? in favour of the legal sanctity of 
contracts? and the idea of continuity and social stability which lay behind 
ito
The principle in some cases also extended to contracts which involved
the welfare of the freedman more directly. Judge Robertson? in Parish v.
Hill^’ in the Supreme Court of Kentucky in 1866? held that although a
man's will in i860? freeing his slaves on his wife's death aid giving
them a legacy of two hundred dollars for the purpose of leaving America?
granted the slave a premature title to freedom? nevertheless the Thirteenth
Amendment gave them that status? which entitled them to their legacies -
without the necessity of leaving the country! However, in the case of
2.the Farmers' Panic of Kentucky v. Johnson ’ in 1868? the court held that
lo Parish v. Hill 6j Ky 396. Similar opinions were given in Neely v.
Merrill 9 Bush 346? and Todd v. Trott 64 N.C. 200.
2, Farmer's Bank of Kentucky v. Johnson 4 Bush 411*
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in destroying the obligation of the master towards the slave? as well
as his right to his labour? the Thirteenth Amendment negated the provisions
of a will for the care and burial of former slaves. Many more of these 
cases involving the effects of emancipation on inheritance rights, did 
not involve the amendment, but local and state laws, and had a mixed fate 
in the courts.
But the courts also had plenty of opportunity to pass upon the 
substantive meaning of the amendment when they came to adjudicate cases 
under the various civil rights laws which Congress passed in pursuance 
of its declaration of freedom. The questions were now turned over to 
them, That rights were inherant in freedom? bhat kind of legislation 
was "appropriate" to protect it? Could the federal government protect 
the individual, black or white, under it, only against discriminatory state
action, or could they reach the individual violator?
John Jay wrote enthusiastically to Chief Justice Chase, of his high 
expectations of the Court in answering these questions,
the decision which I most wish to see pronounced by your 
Court is that the adoption of the Amendment abolishing slavery
has destroyed the only exception recognized by the Constitution
to the great principle of the Declaration of Independence and that 
from the date of the adoption of the amendment all persons black 
and white stand upon an equal footing, that all State legislation  ^
establishing or recognizing distinction of race or colour are void.
But the courts were not to live up to these expectations. At first
it looked as if they might. Two decisions in the lower federal courts
in 1866, took a broad view of freedom under the amendment, and Congress'
2
power to guarantee it by the Civil Rights Act of I866. * The issue in
Up S. V. Rhodes was the right of a coloured witness to testify against a
1. John Jay to Salmon P. Chase, January 5th, I867, Chase Papers, L.C
V. 98 f. 14727.
2. U.S. V. Rhodes Fed. Cas. I6, I5I? In re Thrner Fed. Cas 14» 247®
white defendant in a criminal case? under the provisions of the Civil
Rights Act? but contrary to Kentucky state law. Justice Swayne was
sympathetic to the accord between the amendment and the ant pointing out
that many of the Congressmen were present in both Congresses which
passed the measures. Unlike other amendments to the Constitution, he
said, this one trenched on the powers of the States and, the people of
the states. It made the former slave not only free, but a citizen. The
Civil Rights Act merely ra.ade specific arrangements for the protection of
his rights. Hie same year, on circuit in Manryland, Chief Justice Chaoe?
in the case of Turner, held that the terms of certain indentures holding
Elizabeth Turner in apprenticeship to her former master, violated the
Thirteenth Amendment. It is unnecessary to list cases which followed
this lead. Where judges upheld civil rights legislation, they affirmed
Congress* right to enact it by the Thirteenth Amondinent, and denied that
the amendment meant only the abolition of slavery in a physic ad sense.
As the defence argued in Blyew v. U.S.^' in the Supreme Court in 1871»
the amendment was not self-executing. It had been found necessary to
legislate for the further definition and protection of freedom. "In this
age", he concluded, "no man can be called free who is denied, the right to
make contracts, sue and be sued, and to give evidence in the courts".
Significantly, in I87I, this was the argument of counsel, not the opinion
of the judge. After a hopeful beginning in I866, the federal judiciary
put an increasingly conservative construction on the Thirteenth Amendment
2.
and civil rights legislation. With a few exceptions, ' it is in the 
dissenting opinions ~ of Field in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873, of
1. Blyew V. U.S. 13 Wall. 581.
2. A happy exception was Ex Porte Virginia 100 U.S. 339 (l879)« Tliis 
case came up under the 1875 Civil Rights Act. A county judge was 
indicted for failing to select black jurors. His petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus was denied, on the grounds tliat the act enumerated 
jury service as a, right, and imposed penalties for infringements. It 
was the dissenting judges, Field and Clifford, who took the narrower 
view of the intentions behind the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
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Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, that the idea of the Thirteenth 
Amendment as more than "formal freedom" remained.
For? in a series of decisions unfavourable to civil rights legislation,
both state and federal court judges attached to the Thirteenth Amendment
the meaning which Senator Cowan and other conservatives had done at the
time of the debate on the 1866 Civil Rights Act - that it gave the freed-
man the right to a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court. And so the
Supreme Court, in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873 would not entertain
the claim of white men to the protection of their freedom to follow their
own profession, against the restraints of the Crescent City Livestock
Company in the form of a monopoly.^* The ajnendment, they said, only had
relevance to the conditions of negro slavery. Arguing against the
constitutionality of parts of the 1875 Civil Rights Act in the 1883 Civil 
2 0
Rights Cases, " Judge Bradly took a narrow view that,
this amendment (the 13th), as well a,s the Fourteenth, is 
undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation 
By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slaverer, and 
established universal freedom*
But the abolition of discriminatory laws regarding entry to hotels and 
public places was not a necessary part of that freedom. Very few rights 
were necessary to freedom, according to Judge Enimons ' Charge to the Grand 
Jury in the United States Circuit Court of Tennessee, v/hen he said,
the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery only; it did no 
more .o. It accords no more authority to enact that he should have 
the right to vote, to testify, to malc.e contracts, to hold real estate, 
exercise trade, attend public school, or any other matter or thing 
within the limits of a state, than it does to enact the same thing 
in reference to white men. The utmost effect of this great provision 
in our Constitution was to mal-ce the colored man a citizen, equal 
before the laws with the race which had enslaved him.3.
1. Tlie Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36.
2o Tlie Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3.
3c Charge to the Grand Jury 30 Fed. Cas. 18,260,
J.oq
For Trumbull and his colleagues, at least the right to make contracts, 
testify? and hold real estate were part of being a "citizen" and "equal 
before the laws" - and were rights which their legislation demanded for 
the white man as well as the black.
Approval of the Fourteenth Amendment complicated the issue further.
As judges argued that later civil rights legislation, the Ku Klux IQ,an 
Act, or the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which imposed penalties against 
individual violations and conspiracies to deprive persons of their civil 
rights, could not be justified by the Fourteenth Amendment, which applied 
only to states, they had to find airguments to deny Congress’ power under 
the Thirteenth Amendment. Tims, Judge Brady argued in the I870 California 
case of the People v. Brady,
the apparent purpose of the amendment was not to prevent the 
illegal duress of individuals. It was- aimed exclusively at the  ^
institution of slavery as established by the laws of the States.
And so subsequent civil rights legislation directed against the acts of
2.individuals, was, Justice Foods claimed in he Grand v. U.S. in 1882, ' an 
instance where the law was broader than the amendments on which it was 
based, i.e. both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth.
A broader interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, both in its 
meaning of freedom, and in the power of Congress to guarantee it against 
either state or individual infringements was temporarily revived at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In the I903 case of U.S. v. Morris 
in the district court of ^Arkansas, defendants who were charged with 
conspiring to injure and oppress black citizens in their right to lease
1* The People v. Brady 40 Cal. I98 (I870).
2. he Grand v. U.S. 12 F 577° Similarly, Justice Strong’s opinion in
Virginia v. Rives 100 U.S. 313 (1879)» linked the civil rights
legislation to the Fourteenth, rather than the Thirteenth Amendment,
3° U.S. V. Morris 125 E 322.
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and cultivate lands, challenged the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Acto The court sustained the Act* Giving the opinion of the 
court, the judge said that it was quite properly based on the Thirteenth 
Amendment rather than the Fourteenth, since it did extend protection 
against individual infringements. The right to lease and cultivate 
land was fundamental to freedom. "Shall the courts", he asked, "be less 
liberal in construing constitutional provisions in favour of freedom 
than those in favour of slavery?" Hie answer was Yes. Two years later, 
the Supreme Court in Hodges v. U.S.,^ ‘reverted to the conservative 
interpretation. The amendment applied only to "enforced compulsory 
service of one to another".
In the 1870’s, rights and freedom became dissociated in the courts*
In a sense, the legislative intention became divorced from the judicial 
application. The debate on the amendment resolution - indeed, the whole 
trend of debate on slavery and. reconstruction in the Civil War Congresses - 
revealed that Republicans associated freedom with rights. A free man had 
certain - vague » "natural" and "inalienable" rights by definition of 
being free. The enacting clause of the amendment gave warning that the 
federal government was prepared to ta.ke action to make the declaration 
of freedom a reality, for all men, in these terms. But that does not 
mean that they contemplated "federal revolution". The states wore invited 
to do justice first. When reports of their progress^particularly that of 
the Joint Committee on Reconstruction made it clear that they weren’t, 
and that rights were far from "inalienable", then the Republicans took 
further action in the shape of the Civil Rights and Freedmans Bureau Acts, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment. Hie courts stood one step fui?ther away from
1, Hodges V. U.S. 203 U.S. 1*
Congress’ in contemplating federal revolution. The Supreme Court 
recognised the validity of slave contracts made under ante helium laws - 
for the sake of stability and continuity. They shrank from using the 
amendment to strike down discriminatory and unequal laws, or to reach 
individual violations of civil rights. There was, of course, a time 
lag between the adoption of the legislation, and litigation on it in 
the courts. By the 1870's, most Northerners were as anxious to return 
to peace and quiet as the "old men" of the bench were. The possibilities 
of revolution had been within reach, but they were prepared to go only 
so far, as circumstances demanded, and no further*
lüY
G K A. P T E R VI 
IdUrmCM ARD RIGHTS: THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNDERSTANDING
All men were to be free. 'Fcee - Few words in any language could be 
so elusive of definition. If the philosopher could taîce a lifetime to 
speculate on its meaning, the Congresses which, by the Thirteenth jbnendrnent 
had "power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation", the courts 
which put a judicial construction to it, the negro whose future depended on 
it, needed a meaning for it now. For some, the meaning was clearn For 
Edgar Cowan in the Senate, the Kentucky court in Bowlin v. Commonwealth, and 
many more conservatives, the Hiirteenth Amendment meant the absence of physical 
bondage, the right of a man to a writ of habeas cornus if anyone tried to hold 
him in that condition* But for others, including the majority of Republicans 
in Congress, there was more to it than that. During the wartime debates on 
emancipation, their speeches revealed a connection in their thinlcing between 
freedom and rights. But the speeches also revealed a certain vagueness about 
the nature of these rights, beyond the briefest amplification of the 
Declaration of Independence to include the right of a man to travel freely, 
earn his own living, enjoy legal family relationships, a right to education, 
to own and dispose of property, and to seek the protection of the courts.
All men, they said, were entitled to these rights, and in the enjoyment of 
tliein, government owed them equal protection. In 1866, events forced them 
into a clarification both of the meaning of freedom in law, and the respective 
roles of national and state governments in its protection and maintenance*
Hie Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction described a situation 
in the South which was the negation of freedom. Black codes there denied
the negro even the most fundamental civil rights, and demonstrated that 
slavery had many forms, beyond remedy by a writ of habeas cornus. Freedom 
was not self-executing. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment were addressed to that problem, they were not just 
about the rights of newly freed slaves living under black codes. They 
were about the rights of all free Americans, anywhere in the Union, and the 
nation's particular responsibilities for their protection in a complex 
federal system. For that reason, it is useful to inquire into the back- 
g]:ound of these measures from a broader perspective, and to examine the 
slave’s new status in the light of the experience of those who already enjoyed 
freedom. V/hat were the rights of a free American before 1866, and to whom did 
he look for their protection?
It should not be such a difficult question to answer* After all, 
the Americans wrote constitutions and bills of rights, both federal and 
state. Bringing together the common featu3:^ es of these documents - and the 
extent of the common ground is impressive - a. list of the rights of a free 
American would include the following:
“ the right to assembly and petition, freedom of speech, of 
conscience, worship and expression,
freedom from the quartering of soldiers on private houses, 
the right to bear arms,
- the all important safeguard against arbitrary arrest and 
imprisonment, the right of a man to a writ of habeas corpus,
freedom from unreasonable search and seizures of person, house, 
papers, or effects,
- procedural rights in criminal prosecutions, including a speedy, 
public trial, indictment and presentation of charges, confrontation 
of accusers, an opportunity to answer, to introduce witnesses and 
compel them to give evidence under oath, the assistance of counsel, 
iiTimur,n/by from self-incrimination, trial by jury,
“ no double jeopardy, excessive bail or fines, no cruel or unusual 
punishments,
all governments were forbidden to pass bills of attainder or ex 
post facto lav/s,
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finally, and occupying a special place in Anglo-American 
constitutional law was the right of a man not to be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law (or 
in the case of some state constitutions, without the law of 
the land).
But such a list, isolated in time and space, would go almost nowhere
towards answering the question satisfactorily. The documents in question
were never intended to be a definitive statement of tbo rights of man.
According to the natural rights philosophy which informed much of American
thinloing on the nature of rights, rights existed prior to the creation of
governments, and continued to exist in the external sphere of nature, even
■] ,
after the functions of government had been described A ' " The Declaration of 
Independence recognised a positive relationship between the functions of 
governmentsand naiuiral, inalienable rights* Government were instituted to 
secure them. But in I787? the .American understanding of the relationship 
was a negative one, to secure rights and liberty against government. Their 
struggle for independence led them to the conclusion that it was dangerous 
to concentrate power at the centre, in monarchy, or in a parliament with 
plenary legislative powers. In 1787, the American answer was to distribute 
power in such a way that no one government, and no one broncli of government 
could exercise an arbitrary and unlimited power over the body politic.
Executive, legislative and judicial powers were separate and limited. Powers 
were divided between state and nation, and both were limited by written 
constitutions. All power was limited by the ultimate sovereignty of the 
people. Nowhere in the system, did the people lodge a power which could 
deprive them of their natural rights. Tliis v/as largely a, political solution.
If the body politic was safe from despotism, by reference, in the best of
all possible worlds, so too was the life, liberty and property of the individual,
1. Edward S. Corwin, Tie "Ilighor Law" Background of American Constitutional 
Law, 4-2 Harvard Law Review I928,
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Since governments did not possess the power to deprive a man of 
his fundamental rights, there was no reason to spell out these rights. That 
Y/as the argument of the Federalists who opposed the addition of a hill of 
rights to the Constitution. But, what if it were not the best of all 
possible worlds, and the implied reservation of power over rights was 
exceeded or ignored? Tlie Bill of Rights of the national Constitution was 
a concession to those who insisted on more explicit guarantees of individual 
rights. Though at the time, only about half the state constitutions contained 
similar bills, the fashion was quickly followed. It was no easy task, hov/ever, 
to c:rystallise a mixture of philosophical abstractions and common law 
traditions into a meaningful body of rights. The results are as unsatisfactory 
as the task is impossible. As Leonard Levy vfrites,
those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were imitative, 
deficient and irrationally selective. In the glorious act of 
framing o, social compact expressive of the supreme law, Americans 
tended simply to draw up a random catalogue of rights that seemed 
to satisfy their urge for a statement of first principles - or for 
some of them. That task Y/as executed in a disordered fashion that 
verged on ineptness.^*
Stilly however, the bills of rights of national and state constitutions 
did not advertise themselves as a definitive statement of rights. The classic 
expression of the theory that rights continued to exist "out there", and that 
the people had not relinquished power over them to earthly governments, was 
the Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which reads:
Tlie enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Bills of rights attached to state constitutions acknowledged their 
ov/n incompleteness in similar "and so on" clauses. Tie result is that it is
1. Leonard Levy, Orivins of the Fifth Amendment (N.Y.: Oxford U.P., 1968)
p.415®
impossible to measure rights by the written constitutions, for as Thomas
McIntyre Cooley v/rites, "These instruments measure the powers of the rulers,
Igbut they do not measure the rights of the governed".
Yet this suggests an alternative approach. It is only when 
legislatures, courts, President and Governors took their share in making a 
living* instrument out of a collection of words, that there was any meaning­
ful test of the reality of rights. And as they tested their powers, marked 
out their respective territories, and interpreted restraints and 3.imitations, 
they set in motion a process of change which made the Constitution of i860 
something different from the Constitution of I787. Americans v/ould argue,
and continue to argue right up to the Holmes-Brandeis era, that whatever
2else changed, rights remained eteinial and Immutable. But they argued in 
the face of much evidence to suggest that on this earth rights were far from 
inalienable and unchanging. The measurement of powers, then, is an integral 
part of the measurement of rights.
In this process of filling in the blanks of the constitutions, two 
developments are particularly important for this study. Tie first is the 
unique place which came to be occupied by the judiciary. In a society which 
claimed liberty under law, it was natural that the courts should be closely 
concerned with rights. Contests over private and public rights became court 
oases. 33ut so often, adjudication of these cases depended on the construc­
tion of a constitution. A party might claim a constitutional right, challenge 
a statute, an order of the executive, or a rule of the judiciary as unconsti­
tutional. Through the application and acceptance of the doctrine of judicial
1. Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which rest 
unon Tie Legislative Powers of the States of the American Union (Boston; 
Little, Brown & Co., I87I 2nd ed.J p.36. Hereafter cited as Cooley, Limitation
2. There were some exceptions. During the Civil v/ar*, the conservative 
commentator C. C. 3. Farrar vrote,""The inedienable rights of man" are 
spoken of with as understanding faith as if they really existed; and 
"right reason", the most undefined of all verbal imposture, is appealed 
to, as the conclusive foundation of this puerile card-house of rickety 
abstract!ons." C. C. S. Farrar, The Far. Its Causes and Consequences.
(Cairo; Blelock & Co., I864) p.82.
review, the judges carved out for themselves the role of interpreters of 
constitutions* The United States Supreme Court claimed and exercised a 
power of review over the actions of the other branches of government, testing 
their validity by the Constitution* There the boundaries between the powers 
and restraints of legislatures were arbitrated - there too, the boundaries 
between nation and state were discovered and rediscovered*
In interpreting the Constitution, the judges were not applying clear 
and straightforward rules* By choosing meanings from a variety of alterna­
tives, they themselves fashioned the law, A clear illustration of this is 
the way in which the courts brought within the pale of constitutional law 
the notion of natural rights, too imprecise to be captured on paper*
Professor Edward Corvdn describes the process as "the gradual absorption of
higher law concepts into the written constitutions through the medium of 
1.judicial reviewY * Tiie highest courts of nation and state made it a test 
of the validity of legislative acts that they should not violate a natural 
right* It was not stated so boldly, of course* The idea found a berth in 
the constitutional language of due process. Though the development came to 
fruition after the Civil Far in the Supreme Court’s substantive interpreta­
tions of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it began much 
earlier. Professor Corwin documents a number of pre-Civil War oases where 
the highest courts of both nation and state employed a substantive, natural
rights interpretation of existing due process clauses, to invalidate 
2.legislative acts. ' This themev/ill be returned to later. But it is 
important to appreciate that the special role of the judiciary requires us 
to look beyond the words of Constitutions, to judicial constructions of 
them. Meanings change, and boundaries shift in the process.
1. Edward S, Corwin, Liberty Against Government - The Pise, Flowering and 
Decline of a Famous Juridicial Concent (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State U*P,, 
1948) p*57° Hereafter cited as Corwin, Liberty Against Government*
2, Edwæ:d S. Corwin, Tbe Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil Far 
24 Harvard Law Review I9II, hereafter cited as Corwin, Due Process.
The second, and the most craioial development from the Constitution of 
1787 to that of i860, was the ways in which nation and state mapped out 
their respective territories» Power was, of course, intentionally distributed 
to avoid the possibility of its monopoly by any one government» But, hedging 
government in with sufficient restraints to avoid its infringing political 
liberty and civil rights would, if carried to extremes, endanger them from 
inaction» Rights after all were limited, as power was limited? A man's 
rights must be limited by those of his neighbour, and the community he lives 
in* Idius it is also necessary to clothe governments with sufficient power 
to protect one man's rights by limiting his neighbour's, Edward Corwin 
writes succinctly of the t'wo faces of both power and rights :
we enjoy ciyil liberty because of the restraints which government 
iranoses unon our neighbours in our behalf and constitutional liberty 
because of the restraints which government itself operates when it 
comes to impose restraints upon us,^-
Yet, as powers and restraints came to be worked out between nation and
state, the equation became lopsided. Because of the triumph of the politics
of states rights in the decades after the framing of the federal Constitution,
that instrument was interpreted almost solely by its restraints, rather than
its powers. The nation was assigned a virtually non-existent role in the
police functions of government, so that it had very little to do either with
infringing the rights of individuals, or protecting them, Tlie Bill of Rights
2,lay idle. In the Supreme Court case of Barron v, Baltimore in 1833  ^ Chief 
Justice John Marshall gave the opinion of the court that the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution were a limitation, binding on the nation, but 
not on the states. Restrained from interfering with the rights of individualsj 
the federal government was robbed of the power to protect them against the
1. Corwin, Liberty Against Government, p,7«
2. Barron v, Baltimore""7 Peters 243 \l833)
infringements of others. As the constitutional commentator, John Norton 
Pomeroy expressed it, while the United States were forbidden to deprive a 
person of any of the privileges and immunities guarded by the Bill of Rights, 
the states may, in respect to their own inliabitants, and if consistent with 
their own organic laws, infringe upon them all I^" So obsessed were the 
states-rights advocates with the one part of Corwin's equation - constitu­
tional liberty, and that solely and narrowly defined as restraining the 
powers of the nation - that they forgot many of the problems of confining 
civil liberty stateside. As one modern writer puts it^
The body politic was to be guarded from despotism; the body 
of the individual was left to the discretion of his neighbour and 
his state government.^ '
The safety of doing this was assumed. The primary right, according 
particularly to states-rights commentators, was to be left alone, free from 
national centralisation? In the local community, men could assert and 
maintain their ovm rights. Thus the Southerner John Randolph Tucker expressed 
an exaggerated faith in laissez-faire when he wrote of a man’s freedom:
to accomplish all which by nature he is fitted to accomplish, 
without hindrance from his fellows, and without help or interference 
from his government. The world the arena, man the athlete, government 
the mere police, God the arbiter, and the reward the laurel he can 
gather and the crown he can win,8 «
In this jungle, some men's rights were bound to be held for nothing, 
by the superior claim of the strong, as were the negro's. But, even with 
respect to the rights of the strong, Tucker's description fell short of 
accuracy* Trie government of the nation may well have been compelled to 
stand on the sidelines, just as he advocated, but that of the states was not.
1. John N. Pomeroy, M  Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United 
States (Boston and New York; 1886, $th ed*} I, p.l^l. Hereafter cited 
as Pomeroy, Constitutional law*
2? Jolui P. Roche, Courts and Rights: The American Judiciary in Action.
(N.Y.; Random House, I96T) p.99°
John Randolnh Tucker, Address Delivered Before the Phoenix and
Philomatbean Societies of Valliam and Mary College (Richmond: I854) n.lO.
They possessed the power to protect rights, but they possessed a consider­
able power potentially to raalœ rights alienable* The state possessed the 
power of eminent domain, the power to use private property for public 
purposes, provided the owner was compensated* Roads, bridges and canals 
were built under license of the state legislatures, touching the rights of 
property. Corporations were chartered. The states possessed the power of 
taxation, again with implications for individual rights. They set conditions 
of citizenship, deciding who voted, who served on juries, and who served 
in the militia. Most of all, they possessed the most intangible of powers- 
the police power, touching every aspect of the life of the individual, in 
matters of health, welfare, education, and the nebulous field of public 
morality. Tliere, at state level, the practical working out of the relation­
ship between powers and limitations, had the greatest consequence for the 
reality of rights.
The state-centredness of rights prior to I866, suggests further 
complications in answering the original question as to the rights of a free 
American. It will be part of the concern of this chapter to ask whether or 
not it is meaningful to talk of the rights of a free American, or whether
one must ask instead, what were the rights of a free man in Ohio, Massachusetts.
Arkansas, and so on. More than that, it is evident from even the most cursory 
examination of state legislation, that there are variations not simply from 
state to state, but within states. A negro in Ohio was "free", but he did 
not enjoy some of the most fundamental rights, freedom of ingress and egress, 
or of testifying against a white man in court. Such a situation suggests 
that 'freedom' was not the most accurate test of the rights of man, beyond
philosophical abstractions, and that there is another, legally more complex
field to explore - that of citizenship.
But, with these general qualifications to the question in mind, it 
is necessary to look more closely at certain aspects of the problem, first 
to the relationship between the nation and rights, and then to the relation­
ship between the states and rights (and by necessity between nation and 
state in these matters).
It was not the words of the Constitution which destined the federal 
government to have so little to do with the lives of her citizens. Certainly, 
there were some explicit restraints, for example against passing ex post 
facto laws and bills of attainder, or suspending the writ of habeas corpus, 
"unless v/hen in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require 
it". The Bill of Rights, too, was a limitation on what the government could 
do to infringe rights. But there was no limitation on what the government 
could do to protect rights, or against actions consistent with the mainten­
ance of rights, Everywrhere there was room for argument and interpretation. 
And although the argument against the powers of the national government had 
been the dominant one since the founding of the republic, it did not go 
unchallenged. Recent research on the anti slavery origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, demonstrates that important sections of ' public opinion on 
both sides of the slavery argument found in the Constitution, a statement- 
of rights and the power to guarantee their equal protection.^*
Abolitionist rhetoric on the rights of man has a familiar ring to it.
All men were equal in certain fundamental rights, by reason of their very 
humanity. In enumerating these, they went no further, and no less far, than
1, Hov^ard J. GraJuam, Everyman's Constitution (Madison: State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, I968), hereafter cited as Graham, Everyman * s 
Constitution. And Jacobus Ten Broek, The Anti slavery Origins of the 
Fourteenth Amendment (Berkeley - Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 
1991), hereafter cited as Ten Broek, Antislavery Origins.
the drafters of the Declaration of Independence, and the various bills 
of rights. But if their understanding of rights was familiar, their 
application of them to all men, black or white, slave or free was radical 
by the standards of American practice, if not theory. The second point of 
departure from the familiar, was in the interpretation of the respective 
roles of nation and states in the protection and maintenance of rights*
Where the Supreme Court in Barron v. Baltimore, found that the first eight 
amendments to the Constitution were a limitation on the nation, but not on 
the states, the abolitionists found in the Bill of Rights a statement of 
the rights of all Americans, binding on all governments. Not only were 
the amendments binding in the negative sense, as restraints on the power 
of government, but their protection was the positive and active concern of 
government. The rights of man were not variables, to change from state to 
state. They were enshrined in the national Constitution. And it was in 
the national constitution that the abolitionists found the correlative power 
of equal protection.
In getting these ideas across, the abolitionists played the role of 
preachers and popularisers. Describing their views on constitutional law 
perhaps gives a misleading impression of their coherance. They were not 
all of one mind. Lysander Spooner understood some of these ideas better 
than William Garrison. But mostly they groped for solutions, confusing moral 
law with enforceable constitutional law. Nevertheless, a number of them did 
relate their ideas to the Constitution, in ways which would prove significant. 
They began by interpreting the objects of the Constitution in the light of 
its Preamble, and discovered a remarkable similarity between their own noble 
purpose, and that of its framers - to establish justice, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. The substance of the 
Constitution furnished the powers necessary to accomplish the object. Among
the specific provisions to which they attached their ideas, the moat 
important were the two which would lend the same ideas to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. These were, the comity clause, "The Citizens of each State 
shall he entitled-to all privileges and immunities of Citizens in the 
several states"; and secondly, the Fifth Amendment guarantee that a man 
shall not he deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law, (interpreted by the abolitionists to mean that the government must see
that a man is not so deprived without just process of law). Their interpreta­
tions of these two constititional provisions are worth further consideration 
in the light of prevailing constitutional practice.
The abolitionists read into the comity clause, a concept of national 
citizenship to which attached fundamental rights. This national citizenship, 
involved national guardianship of its privileges and immunities, and obliged 
the states to protect them. Defence counsel William Ellsworth argued in 
the famous Prudence Crandall case in 1834» that the intention of the comity 
clause was:
to declare a citizen of one state to be a citizen of every state, 
and as such, to clothe him with the same fundamental rights, to be 
where he might, which he acquired by birth in a particular state.
(its) clear intention (was) to do away with the character and consequence
of alienage among the citizens of these United States, to the extent
of the reciprocity of the privileges and immunities secured, be they 
what they may. To this extent a citizen of any state is a citizen of 
every state ... All are ... members of one government, one state.
Behind this was the implied notion of national citizenship. It was not 
yet explicit. The comity clause after all did not spealc of the rights of 
citizens of the United States, It spoke of state citizenship. But the 
abolitionists acted on the assumption that rights held under state constitu­
tion were guaranteed and incorporated in the comity clause by reference - in
1. Quoted in Graham, Everyman's Constitution, p.179*
xyy*
other words that the clause nationalised them. They continued to talk of 
federally secured privileges of state citizenship, rather than constitutional 
rights of national citizens. But the concept of national citizenship was 
there.
The term citizen of the United States was known, but only the 
abolitionists endowed it with such a broad meaning with respect to the 
protection of fundamental rights. In more conventional constitutional 
thinking, there was some confusion as to its meaning. Attorney-General 
Bates discovered how little understood the term was in 1862, when he was 
called upon to give an opinion as to whether or not free negroes were United 
States citizens. The case came up when a schooner was detained by a revenue 
cutter in New Jersey because its captain was a negro, a position, which by 
statute was confined to citizens of the United States. Bates wrote of a
fruitless search in our law books and the records of our courts, 
for a clear and satisfactory definition of the phrase citizen of the 
United States ... For ought that I see to the contrary, the subject 
is now as little understood in its details and elements, and the 
question as open to argument and speculative criticism as it was at 
the beginning of the Government. Eighty years of practical enjoyment 
of citizenship, under the Constitution, have not sufficed to teach us 
either the exact meaning of the word, or the constituent elements of 
the thing we prize so highly.^*
Apart from the difficulty of defining what it meant in terms of rights,
there was not even a history of agreement on who was qualified to enjoy them.
In 1821, Attorney-General William Ifeit, discussing the question of the
eligibility of a coloured man to command a coasting vessel, gave the opinion
2 .that a free negro was not a citizen. * ■ In 1843, however, Attorney-General 
Legare came to the opposite conclusion on the construction of a statute for
1. Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States Vol.10 0 .383. 
See also John Pomeroy's discussion of the problem, Constitutional Law 
Vol.l pp.68-9, and Simeon E. Baldwin, The Citizen of the United States, 
Yale Law Journal 1893*
2. Opinions of the Attorneys General I p.506.
the pre-emption of public lands by citizens of the United States.^* In 1857
the United States Supreme Court threw the balance in the other direction,
2.in the Dred Scott case. * Chief Justice Taney distinguished between 
citizenship of a state, and citizenship of the nation, denying that the 
latter followed automatically from the former. A man, he said, may possess 
all the rights and privileges of state citizenship, and yet not be a citizen 
of the United States. It was true, he said, that at the time of the 
adoption of the Constitution, all the citizens of the several states became 
members of the nation. But this could not have included negroes, for at 
the time they were considered inferior beings with "... no rights or 
privileges but such as those who held power and the government might chose 
to grant them". Not only did Taney's opinion deny negroes original citizen­
ship of the nation, but it shut the door against promotion to that status.
For, even if a state conferred citizenship on a negro thereafter, it would 
not elevate him to national citizenship, since the states could not introduce 
new members to the nation. Congress possessed the sole power of naturalisa­
tion. This unhappy opinion was not, of course, the last word. In his 1862 
opinion on citizenship, Bates came to the same conclusion as the abolitionists, 
that birth in the United States, irrespective of race, v/as the qualification 
of citizenship.^* All persons born within the limits of the United States 
were citizens, owing allegiance to the United States in return for protection. 
Furthermore, he rejected Taney's argument that a man could be a citizen of 
a state but not necessarily of the United States. Every United States citizen, 
he said was a citizen of a state, and vice versa.
Ascertaining qualificiations for citizenship of the nation m s  just
1. Ibid., 17 p.506.
2. Bred Scott v, Sanford I9 How. 393 (1857)*
3. Opinions of the Attorneys General. X p.382.
the beginning of the problem. Assigning rights to it v/as still more 
difficult. There were certain recognised constitutional and statutory 
rights which were the peculiar province of the nation's protection.
They included the right to plead cases in United States courts, the pre­
emption of public lands, the rights secured by treaty between the United 
States and foreign countries, the right to use the navigable waters of 
the United States and so on. But before 1866, it did not mean the 
embodiment of fundamental civil rights, paramount over state citizenship.
The comity clause did involve the nation in rights. But not in the 
comprehensive sense in which the abolitionists invoked it. Tlie clause 
was about the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. It was about 
the rights which migrants might expect to enjoy when they moved to another 
state, and not about the rights which they carried with them anywhere in 
the Union. One of the best known and widely cited judicial definitions 
of the rights of migrants under the comity clause, was that of Justice 
Washington in the 1823 case of Corfield v. Coryell:^*
protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to 
pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such 
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good 
of the v/hole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or 
to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, 
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ 
of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in 
the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either 
real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes than are paid by 
the other citizens of the state.
Certainly, behind this, and similar opinions, was the assumption of a 
body of basic civil rights which it would be expected that all citizens 
would enjoy under their ovm state government. The comity clause was simply 
a guarantee that the outsider would not be discriminated against in the
1. Corfield v. Coryell Fed. Cas. 3,230(l823).
emjoyment of them. But a man born in Alabama, who did not enjoy these 
rights in A3.abama, could not appeal to the nation's protection via the 
comity clause. It did not purport to interfere with the business of the 
states in setting their ovm conditions of citizenship.
Furthermore, the clause was not held to restrict state governments 
from discriminating between residents and non-residents in every respect. 
Although the judge in Corfield v. Coryell listed fundamental rights, 
reciprocal between states, the case was about whether non-residents of Few 
Jersey had a right to fish for oysters in Few Jersey waters. The court 
decided that they did not. That right was a special one, not ceded to the 
United States by Few Jersey. The postwar constitutional commentators John 
Norton Pomeroy and Thomas McIntyre Cooley also wrote of rights and privileges 
which a migrant could not claim under the comity clause, including political 
rights, the right to serve on juries or in the m^itia, the benefit of 
exemption laws, or of special privileges granted only to the citizen of that 
state,
Yet another drawback against invoking the comity clause to claim equal 
protection for the rights of national citizenship, as the abolitionists did, 
was that it did not even guarantee the equal treatment of all migrants. A 
black migrant, a woman, a white man - all would find themselves, in theory 
entitled to fundamental rights (according to Corfield v. Coryell), but 
subject to quite different laws. The states, it v/as recognised, could pass 
laws which vested privileges in some individuals, or which imposed special 
burdens on others. The good order of society demanded special regulations 
for lunatics, prostitutes, drunkards, and of course, negroes. Tnus, as 
Attorney-General Bates argued in his 1862 opinion on citizenship, nobody
1. Pomeroy, Constitional Law I p.174» Cooley, Constititional Limitations 
p.438.
would deny the right of a state to make the negro ’immune' from jury 
service and so on. Migrants of different status would also be subject to 
the variations of laws affecting people of similar status in that state.
This was the argument of the judge in the Minnesota Supreme Court case of 
Davis V. Pierse in 1862, * when he argued that the clause meant:
not absolute equality of rights and privileges with every 
citizen of each state of the Union, but all such privileges and 
immunities in any State as are, by the constitution and laws thereof, 
secured or extended, to her own people of the same class, and other­
wise similarly situated.
This argument was one loophole in the idea of an equality of reciprocal 
rights, guaranteed by the comity clause. Some state courts went a stage 
further, and excluded negro migrants from the operation of the comity clause, 
on the grounds that they were not citizens. Thus in 1822 when Amy, a 
coloured woman contested the validity of a discriminatory Kentuclcy law, the 
court dismissed her counsel's argument that as a citizen of Pennsylvania
2
and later Virginia, she was entitled to the protection of the comity clause. 
She was not a citizen. The case was cited and followed in the Tennessee case 
of The State v. Claiborne in 1838, ' where after interpreting the comity 
clause in the broadest possible sense for the reciprocal rights of white 
citizens, the judge qualified its application, arguing that "... free negroes 
are not entitled to all the privileges of white persons in any of the States. 
They, therefor, are not citizens in the sense of the Constitution".
The comity clause, then, could not prevent the states from operating 
a 'sliding scale' with respect to the privileges and immunities, both of 
their own citizens, and those of migrants. The question was whether that
1. Davis V. Pierse 7 Minn. 13 (l862). Though the court decided that the
right to institute and maintain actions in the courts of the state was
one fundamental and common to all citizens.
2. Amy v. Smith 1 Litt. Ky. 326 (l822).
3. The State v. Claiborne 1 Meigs. 331 (1838(. The court upheld a state
statute prohibiting the entry of free negroes.
sliding scale operated only on special privileges, or on fundamental 
rights. The opinion of the judge in Corfield v. Coryell, suggested that 
there was an absolute standard of reciprocal fundamental rights, and that 
variations were only valid in the field of special privileges and exemptions. 
All too often, however, there was a sliding scale of basic rights, with 
negroes at the bottom of it, either as permanent inliabitants, or as migrants. 
The comity clause could certainly not be invoked by permanent residents of 
a state against their own state laws. It left the business of setting 
standards of citizenship with the states themselves. Its final disadvantage 
was that it was not framed as a clear grant of power to the nation. It did 
not imply a right of Congress to legislate for its execution. All in all 
then, the abolitionist interpretation of the comity clause was at odds with 
the practice of the times, and hampered by the terms of the clause itself. 
Nevertheless, they had established an important concept of national rights 
and its correlation of national protection. The transition had yet to be 
made from the concept to a more enforceable vehicle of constitutional power 
to make it good*
Another part of the abolitionist armoury was their contention that the 
Bill of Rights was a source of power to the national government for the 
protection of the rights it contained. Despite the Supreme Court's opinion 
in Barron v. Baltimore, they argued that the Bill of Rights had general 
application, and that the states too, were prohibited from infringing them. 
Certainly the first eight amendments refer specifically to the national 
government twice, Tlie first amendment prohibited Congress from making laws 
respecting the establishment of religion, or abridging freedom of speech or 
of the press, assembly, or petition. But, as one writer argued recently, 
that does not prohibit Congress from prohibiting the states to abridge
these rights.^* Ihrther, although the seventh amendment refers to trials 
by jury in federal courts, the rest of the procedural guarantees are 
phrased so generally to allow quite logically for the view that they 
were intended to have universal application.
Yet in practice, much of the Bill of Rights lay inactive, Tlie Court’s
opinion in 1833 that it was a limitation on the powers of the nation had
no dramatic practical effects, because in practice the legislative powers
of the nation were already so limited. Much of the bill of rights was
about procedural guarantees in criminal trials. They remained unused,
2.
because there was so little federal criminal law. * Even where Congress 
did make some crimes federal, such as the murder of a United States marshal,
3, '
or counterfeiting, the states often had concurrent jurisdiction. ' In 
other penal statutes, Congress enlisted the state courts for their enforce­
ment,^* so that, all in all, the criminal business of the federal government 
was so limited, as to make the Supreme Court’s admonition in Barron v. 
Baltimore hardly necessary in that respect at least. As one student of the 
Fourth Amendment finds;
Like some other Bill of Rights provisions the Fourth Amendment 
remained for almost a century a largely unexplored territory. One 
does not have to seek far to find the reason. Until the latter part 
of the nineteenth century, the criminal jurisdiction of the federal 
government was seldom exercised by Congress,5»
1. William ¥, Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution in the History of the 
aixtedjtaies (Chicago:
2. Apart from crimes which were made federal crimes by stature, at is a 
controversial point whether or not there was intended to be a federal 
common law of crimes, or whether there was to have been federal jurisdic­
tion of common law crimes, but applying the common lav/ of the state in 
which the crime was committed. Although early federal court opinions 
favoured the first idea, the Supreme Court twice rejected the idea of
a federal common law of crimes (U.S. v. Hudson-Goodwin 7 Cranch 32 (l8l2) 
U.S. V. Coolidge 1 Vdieat. 415 (l8l6). See Leonard V7, Levy, Legacy of 
Suppression (Cambridge: Belknap, I960) pp.238-245* But the criminal 
business of the federal courts was still very limited,
3. For example the murder of a U.S. marshal might also constitute a breach 
of the peace - a riot, assault or murder in die state. See Joel P. Bishop, 
Commentaries on the Criminal.La?/ (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1872 5th 
ed.) PP.I79-I8O0
4» An Argument which is illustrated and expanded by Charles Farren, Federal 
Criminal Lav/s and The State Courts, 38 H^irvard Lav/ Review I925.
5. Jacob Vï. Landynski, Search .:lnd Seizure And The Supreme Court (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, p.49*
But there was one Bill of Rights provision which was potentially a 
useful vehicle for the protection of the rights of man - the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee "nor shall any person ... he deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law".
In the eyes of "respectable opinion" up to the Civil War, the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, or its equivalent in state 
constitutions meant that a man must not be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, v/ithout the benefit of procedure. Usually this meant regular 
judicial procedure - a hesring, witnesses, the verdict of a judge and so 
on. It need not mean a jury trial in all civil cases. But it v/as not con­
fined to judicial procedure. A statute, perhaps a remedial one, which deprived 
a man of a right of property might v/ell conform to standards of due process, 
if it observed proper constitutional restraints and form.
A great deal has been written about the transition from 'procedural’
to ’substantive' due process. After the war, the supreme court made
increasing use of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
strike now legislation which was a violation, not of correct procedure,
but of 'just' process. In other words they made a qualitative judgment
about the substance of the legislation. But the separation of procedure
and substance is artificial. The concept of justice is inherant in both.
Certainly, there is reason to believe from recent work on the subject,
that, in many quarters due process had already acquired a substantive
2,
meaning well before the war.
Howard Graham and Jacobus Ten Broek have investigated abolitionist 
speeches, and the party platforms of the Liberty and Free Soil parties, to 
demonstrate that the substantive meaning of the Fifth Amendment was widely
1. Walton Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law in Leonard Levy (ed.) 
American Constitutional Law; Historical Essays (N.Y,; Harper, I966) 
pp.132-134? Pomeroy, Constitutional Law I pp.l6l-l62: Cooley,
Limitations p.388.
2, Corwin, Due Process; Graham, Everyman's Constitution.
understood in the l830’s and 1840's. The abolitionists understood it as 
a guarantee of the protection of all natural rights against unjust infringe­
ments. Thus slavery, and discriminatory laws made in its interest, were 
violations of the Fifth Amendment, in that they deprived a man of life, 
liberty or property without due process. Not only that, but the amendment 
vested a power in the national government,specifically Congress, to see 
that justice was done, and rights protected from such violations. Thus 
they brought natural rights within the framework of the Fifth Amendment, 
and demanded its protection a,gainst allcomers. Professor Graham argued 
that this popular development has gone unheeded by constitutional historians 
who are obsessed with judicial cases, and maintains that "Zealots, reformers, 
and politicians - not jurists - blazed the paths of substantive due process".^*
But the zealots on this occasion found themselves in the strange 
company of some conservative jurists. Edward Corwin has documented a 
dozen or more major cases in pre-civil war constitutional law, which 
foreshadowed the growth of substantive due process. It will be remembered 
that, in the framing of the Constitution, the Americans had kept a card up 
their sleeves with respect to rights. They had not enumerated them all, 
and they had not given governments a carte blanche to infringe their natural 
rights. Yet rights were not very valuable if they remained 'out there', or 
could not be pleaded in a court of law. Very early in the history of the 
Republic, the Supreme Court began to bring the doctrine of natural rights 
into the constitutional fabric through the medium of judicial review. The
earliest, and one of the most impressive examples was the case of Calder v.
2 ^
Bull, in the Supreme Court in 1798 * The issue v/as the validity of a special 
act of the Connecticut legislature. The appeal against its validity was that
1. Graham, Everyman's Constitution p.250.
2. Calder v. Bull 3 Dallas 386.
it violated the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. But 
Justice Chase strayed on to different and significant ground in his opinion, 
when he said;
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of the state legislature, 
or that it is absolute and without control, although its authority 
should not be expressly restrained by the constitution or fundamental 
law of the state. The people of the United States erected their 
constitutions ... to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, 
to secure the blessings of liberty, and to protect persons and property 
from violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will 
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are 
the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide the proper 
objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative power will limit the 
exercise of it ... There are acts which the federal or state 
legislatives cannot do without exceeding their authority ... An Act 
of the legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great 
principles of the social compact cannot be considered a rightful 
exercise of legislative authority ... A law that punishes an innocent 
action ...; a law that destroys, or impairs the lawful contracts of 
citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own case; or a law 
that takes property from A and gives it to B; it is against all 
reason and justice for a people to entrust a legislature with such 
powers; and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it.
The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our state governments amount 
to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general principles 
of law and reason forbid them.
Here the Court was invoking an extraconstitutional principle of natural 
rights and right reason, to invalidate an act of the legislature. It was 
not to be the last time that the Supreme Court would set itself up as the 
repository of right reason. But it was a dangerous precedent. In a 
dissenting opinion, Justice Iredell argued that the court was not empowered 
to defeat the intention of the legislature, except on specific constitutional 
grounds. This was the view taken by later constitutional commentators, 
notably Thomas McIntyre Cooley, who strongly denied that a court could 
set aside legislation on the grounds that it violated natural rights, or 
some ■'spirit* of the Constitution - or because in effect the judges didn't 
like it.^’
1, Cooley, Limitations Chapter VII. Though Cooley, too says that "It does 
not follow, however, that in every case the courts, before they can set 
aside a law as invalid, must be able to find in the constitution some 
specific inhibition which has been disregarded, or some express command 
which ha,s been disobeyed". For, he says, if the authority to do an act 
has not been granted, it cannot be necessary to prohibit it. Limitations 
p.183. See also John V. Cary, Limitations Of Tie Legislative Power In 
Respect to Personal Rights /md Private Property, Reports of American Bar 
Accos. 1892. Vol. XV pp.245-286.
Thus the doctrine articulated by Justice Chase, became woven into the 
safer ground of specific clauses of the Constitution. In the process, the 
arguments did not change very much, but they sounded more specific,’ The 
first route into the Constitution was found for the protection of vested 
property interests. The extraconstitutional notion this time v/as not 
"natural" but "vested" rights - that "the effect of legislation on existing 
property rights was a primary test of its validity"' This doctrine found 
its way into the Constitution through the 'obligation of contracts’ clause.
In Fletcher v. Peck, and the Dartmouth College case, the Marshall Court used 
it to strike down legislation impairing existing, or vested property rights.
Soon the doctrine spread to the states themselves, and state courts
began to impose similar limitations on the powers of legislatures over vested 
rights. It is unnecessary to document individual cases. Tlie most important 
tendency to note is the fusing of extraconstitutional principles, this time 
with the 'due process' or 'law of the land’ clauses of the state constitutions. 
With the rise of mass democracy, and the vogue of popular sovereignty, vested 
property interests had to do battle with aspiring ones, and with state powers 
of police and eminent domain on the march in service of "the public good".
One battleground was the courts, and the armoury due process of law. A liigh 
point was reached in the I856 case of Wynehamer v. The State of New York,
A state anti-liquor law was invalidated on the grounds of its adverse effect 
on liquors in existence at the time. The government had no power to work 
such an act of destruction "even by the forms which belong to due nrocess 
of law". Clearly they were using the due process argument as a thin disguise 
for the assertion of an extraconstitutional limitation.
It is fair to say that many more courts in anti-liquor cases did not
1. Corwin, Liberty Against Government p.72. For the development of the 
argument see also Corwin, Due Process.
2. Y^nehamer v. State of New York 13 N.Y. 378 (I856).
follow this lead. It was not part of generally recognised constitutional 
lav/. But then, in 1857, it v/as taken up by Supreme Court in the Bred 
Scott case, where Taney argued against the validity of the Missouri Compromise 
on the grounds that it deprived Sanford of Bred Scott without due process.*
How strangely similar this looked to the abolitionist natural rights case ~ 
except that they would have argued Bred Scott's case not to be deprived of 
his liberty without due process.
Vested property interests were aware of the similarities between the 
arguments they used to protect property rights, and the tirgument used by 
abolitionists to protect human rights. The courts were careful to restrict 
themselves to building up its protections only for property.
Nevertheless, in these two quite different strands of pre-Civil War 
constitutional thought, it is clear that important groups of public opinion 
attached a substantive meaning to due process. The abolitionists vested 
the power to secure its protection of natural rights primax'ily in Congress, 
where the property interests looked to the courts to apply a basically 
similar test of natural justice and right reason as a limitation on the 
legislature. The importance of these court cases should not be over­
estimated. After Bred Scott, there was a lapse in the application of 
substantive due process until the Fourteenth Amendment. But these develop­
ments suggest that procedure and substance were not so neatly separated in 
the pre-Civil War context.
All in all, the experience of the abolitionists in seeking a power in 
the Constitution to protect human rights, was not an altogether satisfactory 
one. They sought to bring the intangibles of natural rights into the field 
of enforceable constitutional law. Clearly there was a case for arguing 
the relevance of the Constitution to the rights of all Americans, and
claiming its power to protect them. Only politics had destined the nation 
to play such a minor and limited role. But it was difficult to malce out a 
case against the weight of orthodoxy. They reached for a concept of 
national citizenship unknown to the legal and constitutional 'Establish­
ment’. They attached that concept to the comity clause. But that clause 
was about the rights of migrants, and implied neither a Congressional 
power of legislation, nor the power to prevent states setting their own 
conditions of citizenship. They attached it to the Bill of Rights, but 
in the face of the orthodoxy that the Bill of Rights was a limitation on 
the nation's power, and not a source. They invoked the due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment as a source of Congressional power. But this v/as 
at a time when the few courts which shared some of the features of their 
substantive interpretation of the amendment used it for the protection of 
vested property rights against legislative acts. Nevertheless, by preaching, 
the abolitionists disseminated an alternative view to orthodoxy, and it v/as 
not long before the circumstances of war deemed that it would get a more 
hopeful hearing.
Meanwhile, the real testing ground of civil rights up to the Civil War 
was in the states. And here the real problems of definition and discovery 
begin. Like the national Constitution, state constitutions are far from 
being definitive statements of rights. But a study of the problem at state 
level involves additional hazards. The question of the powers and limita­
tions of the nation was a live issue, perhaps because of the sensitivity of 
states in this matter. It was well publicised and debated, and the 
limitations were particularly well loiov/n. It v/as not so in the states. 
Indeed, there was no written authority on the subject of limitations on 
state powers until after the Civil War, when Thomas McIntyre Cooley published
hi3 famous Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which rest upon the 
Legislative Powers of the States.^ * By that time the omission had been 
painfully discovered.
All along, there had been limitations. There were the direct 
prohibitions of the federal Constitution in Article 1 Section 10, including 
those against entering into treaties, granting letters of marque and 
reprisal, coining money, passing bills of attainder or ex post facto laws 
or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, or granting any title or 
nobility. One of these prohibitions had been the vehicle of a limited 
application of restraints against state legislatures by the Supreme Court.
As noted, in connection with the rise of substantive due process, the Court 
had used the contracts clause as a defence of vested property rights against 
state encroachment in Fletcher v. Peck, and the Dartmouth College case.
But it was a small inroads into the legislative power of the states, and 
in service of a narrow concept of rights. Other potential limitations, 
notably the Bill of Rights, lay buried by politics. I&ich more remarkable, 
was the broad interpretation of state powers under the Constitution, in 
the states rights view of the Tenth Amendment:
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, 
respectively, or to the people.
And these were indeed bountiful, since so few powers had been delegated 
to the United States, and so few prohibited to the states! With the rise 
of mass democracy, it became fashionable to believe that the state 
legislatures exercised near-plenary powers - that its powers could be 
assumed, unless positively restrained. They were, of course, positively 
restrained, not only by the federal constitution, but by the state 
constitution. Nevertheless, it was assumed that the tv/o constitutions
1. First published in 1868.
represented quite different functions, a view even shared by Judge 
Cooley, who wrote:
it is to be borne in mind, however, that there is a broad 
difference between the Constitution of the United States and the 
constitutions of the States as regards the power which may be 
exercised under them. The government of the United States is one of 
enumerated powers; the government of the States are possessed of all 
the general powers of legislation.
Therefore:
we look to the Constitution of the United States for grants 
of legislative power, but in the constitutions of the State to ascertain 
if any limitations have been imposed upon the complete power with 
which the legislative department of the State was vested in its 
creation.
Judging from the limitations of state constitutions, and their 
guarantees of individual rights, it would seem a rational assumption to the 
casual observer, that state governments operated under the same restraints 
with respect to rights, as did the national government. Indeed state 
constitutions were very similar to the national constitution. Normally 
they began by setting out a framework of government, announcing suffrage 
qualifications, and working out checks and balances between the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches. They denied the existence of an arbitrary 
power over the lives and property of free men, and declared that all power 
was inherant in the people, who had the right to alter and amend their 
constitutions. They v/ent on to list familiar rights - of petition and 
assembly, procedural rights, and so on, very much in the same style as the 
Bill of Rights of the federal Constitution, * They had ceased to give such 
matters much thought. Benjamin'P. BTight's studies of early constitutional 
conventions suggests that for the most part, statements of natural rights 
went undebated. They were incorporated in the state constitution largely 
as a matter of form.^’
1. Cooley, Limitations p.182.
2. The constitutions are collected in Francis N. Tiorpe, The Federal and 
Sta.te Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws, 
"(v/ashington: Govt .Printing Office, I9O9 7 vols,),
3. Benjamin F. Wright, American Interpretations of Natural Law (Cambridge) 
Harvard U.P., I931) p.185.
That v/as a pity. For the states came to exercise large, and danger­
ously vague powers over the lives of their inhabitants. There was the 
power of taxation - subject to the limitation that it v/as related to 
representation (in the case of whites at least). There was the power of 
eminent domain, the power to taJce private property for public purposes - 
subject to the constitutional limitation that the owner receive due 
compensation. But the most flexible, and potentially the greatest menace 
to individual rights was the police p o w e r . I t  was undefinable, but all- 
embracing. In theory it v/as a power to be exercised positively for the 
protection of life, liberty and property, by restraining public nuisances, 
and restricting license on behalf of liberty. It included ordinary police 
functions, together with the promotion of public health and welfarei It 
embraced the state school system, quarantine laws, legislation on pauperism
and on public morality, including a regulatory power over "houses and women
2 .of prostitution, gambling, drinking-shops and foundlings".
It recognised a power of discriminatory legislation in the public 
interest, and was exercised in ways which infringed the rights of the 
dangerous classes, notably but not solely - the negroes. Thus statutes 
emanated under the police power, which restricted their right of free move­
ment, education, assembly and so on. One North Carolina case, the State v. 
Manuel^' in I838, gives some insight into the discriminatory nature of this 
power. The issue was the validity of an I83I statute which provided that, 
when a negro was convicted of a crime, and was unable to pay the fine, he 
could be hired out. The judge said that a legislature.'
1. For a discussion of the three great powers of state, see Cooley, 
Limitations.
2. T. B, V/oolsey, Nature and Sphere of Police Powers, Journal of Social 
Science, Transactions of the American Assoc. Vol.3 I87I, hereafter 
cited as Woolsey, Police Powers.
3. The State v. Manuel 20 N.C. 144 (I838),
may rightfully so apportion punishments according to the 
condition, temptation to crime, and ability to suffer, of those who 
are likely to offend as to produce in effect that reasonable and 
practical equality in the administration of justice which is the 
object of all free government to accomplish.
To be quite fair to North Carolina in this instance, the legislature 
remedied the situation in I838 by passing a similar statute applicable to 
all persons. But the police power was obviously a difficult one to limit.
Even after the war, writers recognised its breadth, and the necessity of 
making distinctions between the inhabitants of a state. But they insisted, 
unlike most prewar contemporaries, that there must be a test of the 
"reasonableness" of these distinctions (in effect a judicial test), and 
that colour^ class or religion was no grounds for making them.^*
But, to meet the challenge of the police power - where were the 
constitutional limitations, the bills of rights? Clearly, they were in 
hiding. For they speak of the rights of all the inhabitants of the state.
The political sections of the state constitutions, dealing with representa­
tion, and suffrage qualifications, normally referred to 'citizens’. But 
the bills of rights spoke of persons, and free men. Yet once again, there 
is a confusion of concepts. The states had a widely recognised right to 
decide on standards of state citizenship, and on the nature of its 
'privileges' and 'immunities'. Again, as with the police power, there was 
an opening for discrimination. Attorney-General Bates recognised the 
right of states to vest special privileges in individuals, or, say, to make 
negroes 'immune' from service on the jury. Although Judge Cooley insisted 
that "Equality of rights, privileges, and capacities unquestionably should
1. See Eugene McQuillon, Some Observations on State Laws and Municipal 
Ordinances, 64 Central Lav/ Journal p.209; Woolsey, Police Powers;
Cooley, Limitations, excluded colour, religion etc. as a legitimate 
grounds of discrimination. Making these limitations stick was of 
course another matter and an integral part of the whole Reconstruction 
effort to achieve equality under law. The problems involved in judicial 
tests of "reasonableness" are discussed by Joseph Trussman - Jacobus Ten 
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, California Law Review XXXFII 1949'
be the aim of the law", he did allow that there were cases where a state 
legislature might grant special privileges to some citizens, for example, 
the franchise to be a corporation.^* But in many, certainly most of the 
prewar states, there v/as a confusion between 'privileges' of citizenship, 
and 'rights' of men under the bill of rights. 'By what justification could 
these fundamental civil rights be denied, on grounds either that the negro 
was not a citizen, or that he was a peculiar kind of citizen with no rights?
2,
In many cases, the logic was intriguing. In the State v, Claiborne 
in the Tennesse Supreme Court in 1838, the judge argu.ed that a citizen was
a man with rights and privileges. Looking at the negros, it was obvious
that they did not possess these. Therefore, they were not citizens J Some
court decisions didreoognise the citizenship of free coloured persons, and
their entitlement to the state bill of rights. The judge in the I838 case
of Tlie State v. Manuel in North Carolina did. But it is questionable hov/
much this meant. For that was the case already cited, in which the judge
defended discriminations under the police power according to "condition,
temptations to crime, and ability to suffer" of the convicted - black -
citizen. Clearly "citizenship" and "police power" were a way out of
acloiowledging constitutional limitations on infringing the fundamental
rights of a free man, or of failing to invoke the correlative constitutional
power to protect them.
Tlie black community was the most obvious victim of both the failure 
of state legislative power to observe limitations, and its failure to limit 
infringements by the black man's white neighbour. But there was another 
section of the community which also found itself searching for limitations 
against the onward march of the police power and the public good. These
1. Cooley, Limitations p.393.
2, The State v. Claiborne 1 Meigs 331 (I838).
were the men who had vested interests in property. Oat of their predicament 
came the cases which I have already referred to - Y/ynehamer v. The State of 
Hew York in I856, for example, where an anti-liquor law, passed in the name 
of the state police power, was contested hy those whose existing interest 
in liquor was damaged by it. In this case, as in a dozen or so earlier 
ones, the courts applied an extraconstitutional limitation in the guise of 
a specific constitutional one - that it violated the due process clause of 
the state bill of rights. The pre-Civil War development along these lines, 
was of course very limited. The successful application of restraints,
constitutional or otherwise, was not the norm.
It could be argued that this was so, because the legislatures observed 
self-restraint, used their powers sparingly and intelligently, and that 
people could afford to be lazy about analysing the relationship between 
powers - rights » restraints, because they did enjoy their rights. And 
many, like the Southern constitutional commentator John Randolph Tucker, 
would have made an argument of this. It was indeed true for most white 
Anglo-Saxon Protestants. They assumed their fundamental rights of locomo­
tion, education, petition and assembly, habeas corpus, and so on. It is 
noteworthy that where they found themselves defending rights against the 
state powers, or urging limitations, the cases were about property. Tliey 
were about vested property rights, versus aspiring property rights, or the 
’public good'. In all the constitutional commentaries, a disproportionate 
amount of space is consummed by 'property' over 'personal' rights. The
Century Edition of the American Digest of oases up to I896 contains only
nineteen pages of cases on "Personal, Civil and Political Rights", out of 
fifty volumes. How well a man was able to enjoy his rights depended on a 
good deal more than his freedom. Rights were for the white citizen of a
state, and especially for the white, property-owning citizen of a state. 
They were for the people v/ho mattered - for those who enjoyed political, 
social and economic power, wealth and education. Some men’s rights were 
superfluous, like that of Sanford not to be deprived of Dred Scott without 
due process. Other men’s rights were insufficient for the pursuit of 
happiness, as Dred Scott’s were.
To return to the original question of the rights of a free American 
in 1866. There w^ as no national understanding of rights, save where the 
abolitionists vmre groping towards one. Indeed, it could well be argued 
that there was no understanding of rights at all. Imprecise, or sentimental 
thinlcing took the place of sound analysis. Hypersensitivity to the dangers 
of centralisation robbed the federal government of the power either to 
infringe or protect the rights of individuals. The government which had 
everything to do with personal and property rights was that of the states. 
Most men assumed a benevolent use of that power. But it was not enough to 
assume. Black.rights were clearly far from inalienable. The states operated 
a sliding scale of rights, with the strong at the top and the we ale at the 
bottom. And few of the strong realised that the powers to malce some men’s 
rights alienable, could malee all men’s rights alienable.
It remains to be seen what they decided to ^  about this in 1866, 
and finally to assess the impact of what they did on the balance of powers 
and restraints between nation and state.
C T I A P T E R  V I I
EQUALITY BEFORE. THE LAW
In 1865, when Andrew Johnson took office, times had changed. The 
victorious North was committed to freedom under law. The Republican 
concept of freedom was more than the absence of slavery. It was the right 
of all to equality under law, to exercise the same rights and responsi­
bilities in civil society which belonged to man by nature. Apparently it 
was not a commitment exclusive to Republicans and those who elected them. 
It also touched the new President, indeed even the Democratic party, 
according to the New York World, which, in October I865 carried;
a conclusive refutation of the charge falsely made against the 
Democratic party that they are willing to exclude negro freedmen from 
that justice and equality before the law which is their right ...
We believe that President Johnson, as we know that we do the views 
of the gx'eat mass of the Democratic part^ r^ of the North, in saying 
that this eouality before the law ought not to be, and cannot 
prudently be, denied to negro freedmen.
Several other newspapers agreed. At the time, the-Republicans were 
still hopeful of the President’s good intentions, and willingness to see 
them translated into reality. But a few months later, it would have read 
as a news item.
The tragedy of Johnson’s Reconstruction programme is familiar - the 
black codes which brought new forms of slavery to the freedmen, the 
arrogance of Southern legislatures in voting pensions to ex-Confederates, 
harassing Unionists, and returning to power those who had so recently 
brought the Union to disaster. By the spring of I866, that story vfas
1. Quoted in Lawanda and John Cox, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice 
1865-1866. (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1963”) pil66.
becoming increasingly familiar to the Republicans in Congress, through 
the eyes of observers like Carl Schura, or the testimonials of hundreds of 
witnesses before the newly created Joint Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction. .Yhatever the bias of these eyes and ears, thèreis too 
much consistency in the evidence to ignore. There was no equality under 
law. Without the frail protection of the army and the Freedmen's Bureau, 
the freedmen and loyal whites would be subjected to the daily tyrannies 
of the unrepentant, and the Union would stand once again in peril of 
dismemberment.^  *
Behind Johnson's use of words like equality and rights, and that of 
the Republicans lay a world of different assumptions. Quite apart from 
whatever political follies Johnson was guilty of in the execution of his 
policy, or the moral blame of his less than half-hearted commitment to racial 
justice, it is clear that his background and political assumptions led him 
to share a vocabulary with men who were talking a different language.
Abstract words are the most treacherous. For Johnson, the responsibility 
for equality under the law ended where it had always done - in the states - 
which meant that it never began. In the end, he saw no need for, no 
justification for, a national intrusion into the concerns of state legis­
latures end courts in looking after their private and exclusively domestic 
business of human rights. Anything Johnson had to say, then, about justice 
was in the realm of faith, rather than good works.
It was not enough. The need for action impressed Congress first, 
indeed before they became fully aware of the limitations of the new chief 
Executive. In forming a new committee, the Committee of Fifteen on 
Reconstruction, and in shaping new'legislation to guarantee the equal
1, See the Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction at the First
Session, Thirty-ninth Gon,;pi?ess (Washington; Government Printing Office,
186657"  " " “
protection of civil rights, the Republicans ?/ere not throwing down the 
gauntlet. They were simply talcing what in their eyes were sensible and 
timely steps to deal with the situation, as they had done in the two 
previous Congresses. And the Thirty-ninth Congress which began its session 
in December I865, was to prove as effective a schoolhouse as its wartime 
predecessors. Once again, their education was the result of a collision 
between events and ideas, which threw expediency and justice into perfect 
harmony. Emancipation had been undertalcen because it was right in 
absolute terms, and because without it, the Union could not survive. So 
too with civil rights. Republican speeches on the Freedmen's Bureau and 
Civil Rights Bills, twin measures designed to honour the nation’s responsi­
bility for the protection of all men’s rights in law, were less remarkable 
for their eloquence on the rights of man, than for the urgency of their 
appeals for action in the light of the facts. Their pleas were for the 
actual existence of the Union, and for its future - spiritual, economic and 
political in varied orders of priority. The comparative absence of eloquent 
pleas for justice does not reflect any cynicism of motivation. As the bills’ 
author, Lyman Trumbull said, there is no point in talking about the abstract
truths of the rights of man - like the Declaration of Independence - if men
1.cannot avail themselves of them. * And so, perhaps the surest sign of the 
way in which the Republicans were ’growing', was the replacement of abstrac­
tions by concern for realities. The debates reveal a growing expertise on 
the specific questions at hand - the legal questions arising out of removals 
of suits to federal courts, questions of conflicts of laws, of citizenship 
and so on. In many ways, though by no means all, it was a coming of age.
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.474 January 29th, 1866.
In January 1866, Trumbull introduced two bills from the Judiciary 
Committee. The first was a bill to enlarge the povrers and extend the life 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau. It was a temporary expedient, designed to cope 
with immediate necessities, of supervising relief for the freedmen, 
tenancy and occupation of vacant lands, education, and in the South, to 
extend judicial protection to freedmen and others who were denied, or 
could not enforce their civil rights. The second bill, the Civil Rights 
Bill had universal application. It was for the whole Union, and about 
the rights of all Americans. It defined the nature of United States 
citizenship. All native born Americans, with the exception of certain 
classes of Indians, were citizens, with rights. The bill attempted a 
definition of basic civil rights, and prescribed the means for their 
protection by the nation against allcomers.
The power to make this definition and assume these responsibilities 
rested squarely on the second clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, empower­
ing Congress to enforce its guarantee of freedom by "appropriate legislation" 
For the bills’ sponsors, Trumbull in the Senate and James Wilson in the 
House, there was no doubt that what they were doing now was entirely
appropriate, the legislation in perfect accord with both the spirit and
1.the letter of the Constitution as amended. * Several colleagues who had 
been active in support of the amendment agreed. Senator Howard, who had 
served on the Judiciary Committee of the Thirty-Eighth Congress which 
framed it said:
I take this occasion to say that it was in contemplation of 
its friends and advocates to give to Congress precisely the power 
over the subject of slavery and the freedom which is proposed to be 
exercised by the bill now under our consideration.^• (The Civil 
Rights Bill).
1. Ibid., p.322 January 19, 1866; p. 1118, March 1, 1866,
2. Ibid., p.503 January 30, 1866.
Representative Thayer in the House;
when I voted for the second section of the amendment, I felt 
in my o-\vn mind certain that I had placed in the Constitution and 
given to Congress ability to protect and guaranty the rights which 
the first section gave them.^*
That is not to say that the Republicans premeditated the actual form
of the legislation they now sought to enact - whatever their Democratic
opponents may have suspected at the timeJ But events had made it clear
that freedom was not self-executing, and sharpened the need to define and
realise it. They saw little that was revolutionary in that. They
insisted all along that the rights they sought to protect were not new -
as old, indeed older,than the Constitution. Tie means might have disturbed
them more than the ends. Traditionally it was for the Supreme Court to
interpret the meaning of the Constitution. Conservative opponents would
frequently remind them of that during the debate. Congress could not
legislate a meaning for the Constitution, overriding state laws. If state
laws conflicted with the Constitution, if for example, argued Senator Cowan,
Louisiana passed an unconstitutional law abridging the negro's 'freedom',
the Supreme Court sat for the purpose of adjudicating such questions. The
Negro, he said, was just as much entitled to avail himself of that protection
2.as a man "of the fairest complexion and the brightest Saxon mold".
There is no evidence, however, of an attempt by Congress to pre-empt 
the ultimate function of the Court as interpreter of the Constitution, It 
must have weighed with them that the remedy suggested by Cowan was, in the 
situation, like taking a broom to sweep up an earthquake. This v/as the 
nation's first entrance into the complex question of rights and remedies 
traditionally confined to state boundaries. There were bound to be
1. Ibid., p.1151 March 2nd, I866,
2. Ibid., p.342 January 22nd, I866.
difficulties in testing boundaries not only between state and nation, 
but between Congress and Court, Congress and Executive and so on. Such 
questions were important to men whose loyalty to the Union and the 
Constitution was inseparable. John A. Bingham, a long-term friend of the 
objects of the legislation had sufficient scruples about the constitution­
ality of the means to vote against the Civil Rights bill in the end, and
pilot the Fourteenth Amendment to put the issue beyond constitutional 
1 .doubt. * But the majority of his colleagues were convinced of the right­
ness of the remedy, and their clear mandate by the Thirteenth Amendment.
They were also in a hurry.
On January 5th, 1866, Trumbull introduced a bill, S60, for the
extension of the life and powers of the Freedmen's Bureau. He reported
2,it vdth amendments, from the Judiciary Committee on January 11th. ’ The 
Bureau had been established by Congressional act in 1865• As its originally 
prescribed life-span of one year drew to a close, it was clear that it had 
by no means outlived its usefulness. Its commissioner, General 0. 0.
Howard worked for a bill to extend the life of the Bureau. He had influential 
friends in Washington, and indeed co-operated closely vdth Senator Trumbull 
in its framing.^* The result was this bill. It was designed, as Trumbull 
said, to help the helpless until they were strong enough to help themselves.^'
It provided for the organisation and distribution of relief supplies 
to refugees and freedmen in all parts. It dealt with the question of 
occupancy, and possible future purchase of 'unoccuplied public lands' in 
Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Arkansas. It instructed the
1. For a- discussion of Bingham's position, and its implications for the 
meaning of the enacting clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Robert 
A. Burt, "Mranda and a Morganatic Marriage", SSEtlbKlZ; in Philip B. 
Kurland, 1969 The Sunreme Court. Review (Chicago-London: University of 
Chicago Press, I969).
2. Cong. Globe., 39th Cong., 1 sess. p.129 January 5th; Ibid., p.l84 
January 11th, 1866.
3. William S. McFeely, Yankee Sterfather (Hew Haven: Yale University Press, 
1968) pp.190-199» hereafter cited as McFeely, Yankee Stepfather.
4» Cong. Globe,, 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.319 January 19th, 1866.
building of asylums and schools on such lands. But judging from the 
tenor of the debate, the parts of the bill which excited the greatest 
controversy were its judicial arrangements « In places where the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings had been interrupted by the rebellion, in 
cases v/here any civil rights belonging to white persons were denied to 
freedmen, refugees or others by local law, police regulation, custom or 
prejudice, where these people were subjected to different punishments for 
the same offence as whites, the President, through the Bureau commissioners, 
Vfas authorised to extend to them military protection and jurisdiction.
Pines and prison sentences awaited those who infringed their rights. 
Jurisdiction of such questions, and all cases affecting freedmen, refugees 
and others so discriminated against, was placed with the officers and 
agents of the Bureau. By the act, these agents themselves were placed 
under 'military jurisdiction and protection*.
Hendricks of Indiana led off the Democratic attack.^* It v/as a bill 
which would undermine the states. Under it, irresponsible courts were 
given the power to adjudicate disputes between citizens of the same state 
involving state law. It was monstrous. And to whom were these courts 
responsible? By placing Bureau men under military jurisdiction and protec­
tion, was this another plot to put Republican policies beyond the reach of . 
(state) law? Perhaps with the procedure of the I863 Habeas Corpus Act in 
mind, Hendricks wanted to know whether an agent offending state laws in 
the course of his duties could be held accountable from suits in the state 
courts. He did not voice these objections for the sake of Georgia or 
Alabama - but for Indiana, fearing the act's application there.
Trumbull reassured him on all counts. The judicial features he said, 
unlike the relief features, applied only to those states where ordinary
1. Ibid.. pp.314-319 January 19th, I866.
judicial proceedings had been interrupted by the rebellion, and not to 
states which enjoyed their full constitutional rights. The section of 
the bill putting Bureau officers and agents under military protection 
(although that did apply to aJl parts) was not intended to put them 
outside the law, but to make them responsible to any rules and regulations. 
A man as committed to the supremacy of civil over military law, was not 
about to make a virtue out of the strong presence of the army in the bill. 
But he was not about to shirk the situation either. The bill v/as a 
temporary expedient. It would cease to have effect when the states were 
fully restored. After that its functions would be taken over by a civil 
procedure. Indeed, he said, there was a bill coming up, designed to supply 
a more permanent protection for all men's rights in law. That could 
hardly have been a comfort to the Democrats. But Trumbull offered no 
easy way out. There was only one way to avoid the operation of these 
bills, but it required the states themselves to accomplish the objects.
In words which became very familiar in the course of the debates, their 
currency suggesting their importance, Trumbull advised:
If the States will not do it, then it is imcumbent on Congress 
to do it. But if the States will do it then the Fieedmen's Bureau 
will be removed, and the authority proposed to be given by the other 
bill will have no operation.^*
And of course the states historically preferred to do things for 
themselves.' At every turn, the bill's opponents betrayed their unease 
at the taking over of state functions by a federal agency, and the 
implications that would have in their own states. Senator Edgar Cowan's 
thoughts on relief arrangements echo down through the Hew Deal;
I say that the freedmen of Pennsylvania ask no relief from the 
Freedmen*s Bureau. Pennsylvania relieves her own destitute and her 
own poor. She is not a pensioner upon the United States Government 
for any favors of that kind. I say too, that if it is to extend 
beyond relief, and to administer municipal law there for the benefit^ 
of the freedmen, Pennsylvania administers her ov/n municipal law ...
1. Ibid., p.323 January 19th, I866,
2. Ibid., p.345 January 22nd, 1866.
But Cowan's attempt to amend the bill by confining its operation to
states "such as have lately been in rebellion" failed, defeated by 33
votes to 11.^' Also rejected was Kentuclcy Senator Garret Davis' amendment
to strike out that section which placed Bureau agents under military 
2,
jurisdiction. * He spoke at length of the dangers of these courts 
adjudicating matters between citizens of the same state, and themselves 
being beyond the reach of state law. Perhaps his home state of Kentucky 
had special reason to feel sensitive about such measures, in view of the 
estimated 1,500 suits pending against federal officers in the courts of 
that state, and the threat of their removal to federal courts under the 
Habeas Corpus Act.
But such arguments were lost on the Republicans. In the Senate, the 
bill passed on January 25th, by Thirty-seven votes to Ten, on a roll call 
only notable for its demonstration of Republican unity.
In the House, Thomas D. Eliot of Massachusetts took charge of the 
bill arguing convincingly on the necessity and justice of such a measure, 
without which, "much injustice will be done to these freedmen, and there 
will be no one there to tell the s t o r y " . O t h e r  Republicans spoke 
enthusiastically of the bill's provisions for education. Hot all the 
talk was to such noble purpose. The Democrats urged the same objections 
as their Senate colleagues. And the bill's supporters were not free from 
considerations of their own states that they could afford consistent puri'ty, 
as Representative Moulton, a Democratic maverick who voted with the 
Republicans, demonstrated when he urged those who wanted to keep blacks
1. Ibid.. p.347 January 22nd, 1866,
2. Ibid., p.348 January 22nd, I866.
3. See Chapter III, supra.
4* Cong. Globe, 39th Cong,, 1 sess,, p.421 January 25th, I866.
5* Ibid., p.517 January 30th, 1866; Ignatius Donnelly was enthusiastic
about the educational features of the bill, Ibid., pp.585-589.
out of the North, to vote for the hill:
Why? The very object of this bill is to protect the freedmen 
and refugees in their rights; and let me say, whenever the coloured 
man is completely and fully protected in the Southern States he will 
never visit Illinois and he will never visit Indiana, and every 
Northern State will be depopulated of colored people as will be 
Canada.^'
Such a sentiment might have TOankled with the purist, and indeed
suggest a few problems for the future, but shades of grey do not show on
the roll call. On February 6th, the bill passed by a resounding 136 votes 
2,
to 33, * There was a slight delay while adjustments were made between 
House and Senate on amendments, and. agreement was reached on February 9th. 
Then came the bombshell. On February 19th, Joinson vetoed the bill.^*
According to the veto message, Joinson shared with Congress, the 
"strongest desire" to protect the freedmen in their freedom and property 
and their "independence and equality" in malcing contracts for their labour. 
In fact. Congress wanted more. They wanted equal protection of the laws. 
And.Johnson was not saying so much. The rest of the message was a long 
and detailed explanation of his objections, many of them already voiced by 
the Democrats in Congress. They included the extension of military 
jurisdiction and protection to the Bureau in all parts of the United 
States, and specific complaints about the jurisdiction of the Bureau with 
respect to civil rights in the Southern states - that there were to be no 
appeals to existing courts, and that the absence of a jury trial violated 
the Constitution. And anyway, he said, it was all so unnecessary in time 
of peace, now that the freedman was guaranteed freedom by constitutional
1. Ibid.. p.631 February 3rd, I866.
2. Ibid., p.688 February 6th, I866. Tie House had amended the bill to 
apply only to places where the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended 
on February 1st, 1866. But Trumbull clearly meant the bill's relief 
features, and its military protection of agents to have universal 
application. The Senate struck out the House amendment. Ibid., p.747 
February 8th, I866, and the House agreed. Ibid., p.775 February 9th,
1866.
3. Ibid., pp.915-917 February 19th, 1866.
amendment., and survival by the laws of supply and demand.' Government 
money had never been spent on the care, the feeding, clothing and education 
of white people. To do so for black people was insulting, weakening to the 
moral fibre, and expensive. Perhaps the saddest omen, however, in the light 
of the purposes of the bill, was Johnson's contention that the protection 
of the freedman be left with existing civil authorities and courts. It 
was a denial of the necessary machinery to ensure protection. Tlie message 
ended on a controversial political note, with an objection to the passage 
of divisive legislation at a time when.unity should be the object, and 
eleven states affected by it were unrepresented - though in his eyes they 
were restored, Johnson did make one sound observation. The bill resided 
too much power in the Executive. And indeed, that was a pity.^'
If Lincoln was reputed to lag just a few weeks behind Congress on 
important issues, it is clear from the veto message that Johnson was not 
even travelling, let alone in the same direction. Tlie negro's future, like 
his past, was state business, and the recent memory of that past did not 
inspire confidence.
The bill had not been thrown do^ vn as a direct political challenge 
to Johnson over Reconstruction. It was born of historical Congressional
2.concerns and present exigencies. Trumbull had not anticipated the veto.
In the Senate, he went over the ground, ansv/ering the objections point 
for point. He emphasised the consistency of the legislation with the 
President's annual message in which he had said that "we shall but fulfil 
our duties as legislators by according equal and exact justice to all men,
1. As William R. Brock remarks, some of Johnson's objections were valid 
if one assumed thab everybody, including Johnson was going to act 
badly. Willipun R. Brock, An American Crisis: Congress and Reconstruction 
1865-1867 (H.Y.: Harper, I963) pp”.105-106.
2. Ibid., p.105.
special privileges to none",^'’ It was too late, however, to either reason 
or shame the President into accord. Johnson and Congress had talcen an 
important step towards alienation and deadlock. But it was not the last.
In the Senate, the bill failed to re-pass over the veto by one vote short 
of the necessary two-thirds. In the House, it re-passed with ease. For 
Johnson, the veto was political folly. The moderate men v/ho had championed 
it, were Johnson's best hope. The vote showed that their patience was 
frayed. Less than two months later, it was quite ended.
But, if fears for the usurpation of state functions in their own 
constituencies had lain behind many of the comments on the Freedmen's 
Bureau, its sister bill seemed to give them substance. 8one,tor Saulsbury 
had reminded his colleagues during the debate on the Bureau bill, that 
worse was to come and that :
for the first time in the history of the legislation of this 
country it is attempted by Congress to invade the States of the 
Union and undertake to regulate the law applicable to their oto
citizens.2.
Introduced on the same day, S6l, the Civil Rights Bill, was intended 
to be the structure which would stand once the military scaffolding of 
the Bureau bill ?7as removed. It applied to all parts of the Union, and to 
all men. It began with a definition of national citizenship. All native- 
born persons, excluding untaxed Indians, were citizens. That status 
carried with it an equal right to malce and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, inherit, purchase, and convey property, and to 
enjoy the equal benefit of laws, and equal punisliment under the law with 
white citizens. The rest of the bill was concerned with the means to 
make good the nation's protection of these civil rights. Tlie courts of 
the United States were to have exclusive jurisdiction of offences under the
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., pp.936-943 February 20th, 1866.
2. Ibid., p. 363 Januaary 23rd,, I866,
provisiorfâof the act, and of cases affecting persons denied, or unable to 
enforce their rights. In such a case, civil or criminal, the person would 
have the right to remove their case to the federal court, in the same way 
as the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act. Confirming the suspicion of the Democrats 
as to the meaning of the clause in the Freedman's Bureau Bill which put 
the Bureau agents under military protection, this bill also included army 
and Bureau officers in the right of removal. Other pieces of enforcement 
machinery were borrowed from the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. District 
attorneys, marshals, Bureau agents, and commissioners appointed by the 
courts, were authorised to institute proceedings against those who violated 
the law. Anyone hindering or obstructing any officer in the execution of 
the act, preventing arrests, or attempting rescue, would be liable to fine 
and imprisonment in the district court. The difficulties and dilemmas 
of enforcement, however, are illustrated by the contrast of the last two 
clauses of the act - the one authorising the President to employ land 
or naval forces if necessary, to execute the act, the other providing for 
final appeal to the Supreme Court on questions of lavf. In I866, the sword 
and the judicial ermine were never quite untangled.
In an extensive debate over the nature of citizenship, Republicans
made some of the same connections by now familiar to abolitionists -
between birth in the country, allegiance to it, in return for protection;
between the Preamble and the rest of the Constitution; and between
1.privileges and immunities - due process - equal protection. * Judge 
Washington's opinion on the comity clause in Corfield v. Coryell was 
widely cited, and indeed formed the basis of the civil rights outlined
1. See the Senate debates of January 30th and 31st, which were almost
exclusively about the nature of citizenship; Morrill’s remarks, Ibid., 
pp.570-571 February 1st; Thayer, pp.1151-4» March 2nd; Broomall's 
p.1263 March 8th; Shellabarger pp.1293-4 îiarch 9th, 1866. Trumbull 
argued Congressional power over citizenship from Congress' 
constitutional power of naturalisation.
in the opening section of the hill. They were not, they insisted,
claiming any new privileges and immunities.^* Opponents pointed out,
however, that when these rights were spoken of in connection with the
comity clause, the context was quite different. That clause was about
the rights of migrants, and it did not regulate state citizenship. It
would entitle a migrant negro from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts only
2,
to the rights of Massachusetts negroes. * And so,Representative Kerr 
did think they were doing something revolutionary, in attempting to 
■enlarge the privileges and immunities of blacks, not as subjects or 
citizens of the nation, but of the states. He warned ag’ainst confusing 
these two things.^* It was not that Trumbull, for one, was so poor a 
lavjyer that he did not knov/ the meaning of the comity clause with respect 
to migrants. He said simply "... how much more are the native born citizens 
of the State itself entitled to these rights.'"^*
Whatever historical arguments could be made for the "true" interpre­
tation of the Constitution, this venture into national protection of 
explicit rights of national citizenship was new. The definition of rights 
was no more satisfactory than the Bill of Rights. And so plenty of
questions would still have to be answered. Would a state violate the act,
by
for example, by denying negroes jury service, or the ballot, or/lav/s 
against inter-racial marriage? Tnis last point was a sure way for opponents 
to drum up emotional reactions to "equality under the law", A dialogue on 
the subject between Hendricks and Trumbull reveals the conservatism of the 
bill's author, at least as to the difference between social equality and 
an equality of civil rights. Hendricks wanted to loiow what the effects
1, Trumbull made use of the Corfield decision to make this point, 
bbid., pp.474-476 January 29th, 1866.
2, Bavis in the Senate, Ibid., p.597 February 2nd, I866.
3, Ibid., p,1258 March 8th, I866.
4' Ibid., p.475 January 29th, 1866,
of the bill would be on Indiana's laws against mixed marriages. Trumbull 
replied:
I beg the Senator for Indiana to read the bill. One of its 
objects is to secure the same civil rights and subject to the same 
punishments persons of all races and colors. How does this interfere 
with the law of Indiana preventing marriages between vfhites and 
blacks? Are not both races treated alike by the law of Indiana?
Does not the law make it just as much a crime for a white man to 
marry a black woman as for a black woman to marry a white man, and 
vice versa? .,. Make the penalty the same on all classes of people 
for the same offence, and then no one can complain.I*
As with the bill's intention with respect to social equality, so too
with political equality. Traditionally, law writers and courts made a
distinction between the civil and political rights belonging to 'citizens'.
Women and children were citizens, entitled to the full and equal protection
of the lav/s in the enjoyment of their rights of life, liberty, and property.
But that did not mean that they could hold office, vote, or serve on
juries. These distinctions were implicit in the debate. In the eyes of
Republicans, the right to be a witness was clearly divorced from the right
to jury service. Only the former was covered by the bill. The cynic might
point out that one reason for this was that there were few occasions where
a black jury was an essential ingredient to white justice, while there
were many others where black testimony was. A successful suit against the
white robbers of a white man's property might depend on the testimony of
a sole black witness. But traditionally, testimony was a basic civil
right. For the moment, the states were left with their discrimination
2 .
intact regarding the selection of jurors.
Opponents also voiced alarm as to the connection between civil rights 
and suffrage. Senator Saulsbury expressed his fear that the courts might
1. Ibid., p.322 January 19th, I866.
2. For a discussion of Republican attitudes to jury service in the 
debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, sea Alfred Aviss, Tee Fourteenth 
Amendment and Jury Discrimination; Tie Original Understanding,
Federal Bar Journal Vol. XXVII 1967*
interpret, "property" to include the elective franchise, which had, he
1.said been defined in that way before, as a means of securing property. 
Attempts were made to rule out such a possibility. On February 2nd, 
Saulsbury's amendment to insert "except the right to vote in the States", 
was defeated by 39 votes to 7* A similar attempt in the House also 
failed,
Undoubtedly, in the eyes of many Republicans, there was a connection
between suffrage and equality before the law. Speaking to constituents
on November 7th, 1866, Representative George Boutwell of Massachusetts
not
made the point that he did/think it possible to speak of equal protection 
of the laws as a thing separate from participation in government, without 
which there could be no protection. Tlie negro must be the principal, as
well as the agent, the maker as well as the subject of law,^’ And
although political and civil rights were usually distinguished, there was 
also a tradition of overlap. After enumerating the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship in Corfield v. Coryell, Judge Washington had 
mentioned the elective franchise.'^* Tnat sentence was often omitted in
quotations. He did, however, qualify his inclusion of suffrage, with
the proviso that it must be exercised under the laws or constitution of 
the state in which it was exercised. In this bill at least, the Republicans 
were not about to alter the rights of states in that respect. Though to 
many of them civil and political rights were inseparable - in this bill 
they were.
But, even with respect to what the bill did do, the Democrats and
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess. pp. 477-478 January 29th, 1866.
2. Ibid., p.606 February 2nd, 1866; and House amendment, p.1162 March 2nd.
3. George S, Boutwell, Sueoches and Papers Relating to the Rebellion and
tlie Overthrow of Slavery ^Boston: Little, Brown~& Co., 186T» 2 vols), 
p.522. This was in contrast, however, to the clearer separation made 
by men like Thrumbull,
4. Corfield V. Coryell Fed, Cas. 3,230 (l823). After enumerating 
fundamentfil privileges and immunities, the judge went on, to vdiich 
may be added, the elective franchise; as regulated and established by 
the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised."
some of the Republican conservatives like Cowan anticipated a federal
revolution. The all-pervasive complaint of opponents throughout the
debate was against this federal invasion into the traditional sphere of
the states' business in regulating private and domestic concerns relating
to their ov/n citizens. It would mean the ruination of the state courts,
and the aggrandisement of federal jurisdiction in these cases. By now,
these were familiar fears. Over the I863 Habeas Corpus Act, feelings had
run high against a, procedure which could taJce cases between citizens of
the same state, and cases involving state law, out of the hands of the
state courts. Tlie same points were raised again now. When these cases
were transferred to federal courts, it was feared that they would be tried
^  npyo, without regard to the law of the state. Since the removal
procedures applied to criminal as well as civil cases, the states were
particularly sensitive to the possible loss of their all-important police
power. On these questions, they argued, there could be no law but state
law - where was the federal law on murder, arson and so on^committed in
the states, and what v/ould be the federal courts guidelines there?^*
After the war, in The Justices v. itirray, the Supreme Court dampened some
of these f e a r s de novo judgments, by holding that the section of the
Habeas Corpus Act allowing for removals of cases which had been tried by
2,
a jury, for retrial as to both facts and law, was unconstitutional. * But 
that was in I869. How, this Civil Rights Bill proposed to give the 
federal courts 'exclusive' jurisdiction in an even wider range of civil 
and criminal matters than the Habeas Corpus Act, The word 'exclusive' 
worried its opponents a lot. This invasion of the v/hole field of the state 
police power, together with intolerable enforcement features, especially
1. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., pp.476-480 January 29th, I866; pp. 
595-599 February 2nd.
2. The Justices v. Murray 9 Wallace 274*
tlie penalties against state judges and officers, in effect for the 
crime of obeying state law, was the beginning of the end. The bill, said 
Eldridge in the House:
seeks to layprostrate at the feet of the Federal Government 
the judiciary of the States. It not only proposes to enter the 
States to regulate their police and municipal affairs, but it 
attempts to destroy the independence of the State judiciary.^*
But the bill did not amount to the federal revolution which opponents
2 .
at the time, and admirers recently have claimed. * Senator Trumbull 
assured his Senate audience that the ’exclusive’ federal court juris­
diction did not mean that in all cases involving a civil right, the state 
court would be denied jurisdiction. Tlie states retained their right with 
respect to criminal law, their private and domestic concerns and so on.
The federal courts would interfere only where there was a federal 
question, i.e. the denial of a civil right.^* Again, the states could 
avoid the situation altogether, for:
The bill draws to the Federal Government no power whatever if 
the States will perform their constitutional obligations.4*
From a purely practical point of view, the federal courts could not 
have coped with the whole area of private rights normally contested in 
the state courts. The intention was not 'exclusiveness' in that sense, 
but rather the opposite - of making the state courts the auxiliaries of 
the federal, with a view to enforcing federal law there. But, where it 
was necessary to exercise federal jurisdiction, they were going to make 
sure that it was exclusive. If they were not above using a little
CO-ereion in the way of penalties against judges and other obstructive
1, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.1154 March 2nd, 1866. The section
of the bill allowing punishments against state officers was a
particularly favourite objection of the opponents.
2, Jacobus Ten Broek, in The Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment
(Berkeley & Los Angelos: University of California Press, 1951) argued
that the Civil Rights Act did indeed "revolutionize the laws of the 
states everywhere", and give Congress a large substantive power over 
these issues in the states.
3, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., pp.1755-1761. April 4th, 1866.
4* Ibid., p.600 February 2nd, 1866.
officers, it was a symptom of their frayed temper with the problems of 
unco-operative state courts. The problem was even at that very moment 
being amply demonstrated in the border states, over enforcement of the 
Habeas Corpus Act. Writs for removal were not enough. Y/hen the 1863 
Act was amended in the same session, it too, included a procedure for the
punishment of judges. Tliey had had enough.
As to the possibilities of ^  novo judgments in the federal courts, 
the bill is ambiguous. Jurisdiction was to be exercised in conformity with 
the laws of the United States. But in cases where the law was not adapted 
to the subject (perhaps with criminal cases in mind), then the common law, 
as modified by the constitution and laws of the State, would, if consistent 
with, the laws of the United States, be the rule of trial and, in criminal 
cases, punishment. If re-assurances could not be drawn from this state­
ment, it was all that could be expected in the circumstances. It had to 
leave room for manoevre. But it does not indicate a deliberate design to 
have all causes tried ^  novo in the federal courts, and disregard all 
state law.
Most Republicans were satisfied on these constitutional questions. 
T’i'ieir prime concern was simply the pressing need to protect freedmen and 
loyalists in the South. As for the implications of the act in the North, 
they pointed out that they asked nothing for the black man that they did 
not ask for the white - simple justice and equal protection for all.
Still, there was a nagging doubt in the Republican corner. John A.
Bingham’s doubts arose from the method, rather than the object. He had 
long been committed to the idea, and the reality of equality before the law. 
But this bill worried him.^' Bingham’s interpretation of the enforcement
1. Ibid., pp.1291-1293 March 9th, I866.
clause of the Thirteenth Ajnendment, did not take him as far as Wilson's.
He argued that tlie bill's objects could only be achieved by a further
amendment to the Constitution. Among his specific objections were to
the lack of provision in the bill as it then stood, for a final appeal to
the Supreme Court, and to those sections which might make it an offence
for the Governor of ChJ.o to obey the la,ws of his ovm. State. But he
attempted to make his objections constructive, and worked tov/ards removing
some of the bill's flaws, as he saw them. He moved to strike out the
original opening section of the bill ("there shall be no discrimination
in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United States in any
State or Territory of the United States in any State or Territory of the
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery"),
and those parts of the bill which v/ere penal, or authorised criminal
proceedings. But his motion to amend a proposal to re-commit the bill to
the Judiciary Committee with these instructions, was defeated on March 9th,
1.
by 113 votes to 37* All but two of those who voted with him, however, were
Republicans. Further evidence of the doubts of a minority of Republicans
comes from the vote to re-commit the bill to the Judiciary Committee.
This time Bingham wa,s on the right side of a vote to re-commit by 82 to 
2.
70. The Republican majority voted against the motion, fearful perhaps 
that the bill would be weakened in committee. YAien the bill returned, 
there were a few changes, some of them along the lines suggested by 
Bingham. There wa,s an additional section allowing a final appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Hie opening section which Bingham had attempted to strike
1. Proposed amendments - Ibid., pp.1271-1272 March 8th, Rejected Ibid., 
p.1276 March 9th, I866. Using David Donald's categories from The 
Politics of Reconstruction 1863-1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1965*) Appendix, the breakdown of the 35 Republicans 
shows a preponderance of moderate, conservative, and non-factional 
Republicans - 3 'Ultra' Radicals, 5 'Stevens' Radicals, 3 'Independent' 
Radicals, (i.e. 11 Radicals), and 13 'Moderates', 6 'Conservatives', 
and 5 either not identified with a particular faction, or not voting 
often enough to be identified,
2. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1 sess., p.l296 March 9th, 1866.
out had been replaced by the one which was to stand, declaring all persons
born v/it’oi'^ the United States citizens, entitled to an equality of civil
rights. With these and other minor changes, the bill came to a final
1vote on March 13th, and passed by 111 votes to 38, * .Bingham took his 
constitutional scruples as far as 'Hay'. He was joined by Republican 
W. n. Randall of Kentucky, whose voting record in that Congress suggests 
that his dissent was to ends as well as means. Hie thirty-odd Republicans 
who had shown signs of sharing Bingham's doubts, returned to the fold on 
the final roll call.
For all its problems and imperfections, the bill showed some of what
the Republicans had been learning over the years. It was part of a jig-saw.
Some of the interlocking pieces have been noticed by historians - but not
all of them. Its connection with the Freedmen's Bureau bill are well Icnown.
Trumbull made the connection clear. The Bureau bill was a temporary
expedient, applying in some respects only to the South, relying for its
execution on the sustaining hand of the array. The Civil Rights bill was
permanent, for the whole Union, for everybody, relying for its execution
2.on the civil courts. It was said, Trumbull, a court bill.
This transition from military to civil jurisdiction was an important 
part of the motivation for the Civil Rights bill in the first place, and 
it provides clues to further connections in Republican policy, Emeuicipation 
and confiscation policies had been started, in practice,by army men on the 
spot. V/hile Congress approved executive action on these things, they had 
worked hard to "get a law on the subject". Always, they were aware of 
the dcingers of travelling across the boundaries of federal power without 
regularity, and law. Always, they were aware of the need to keep the civil
1. Ibid., p.1367 March 13th, 1866.
2, Ibid., p.605 February 2nd, I866.
authority supreme over the military, and net to risk their policies on 
the whim of individual commanders. These thoughts were prevalent in 
earlier debates over tlie Confiscation Acts, and the various Reconstruction 
proposals. And it was important again here.
For, faced with the situation in the South where the troops themselves 
were not safe from harassment, and even murder, the army had talien steps 
to protect themselves, and their charges from "improper civil suits and 
penalties" in the former rebel States. On Janusiry 12th, the T/ar Department 
issued General Orders No,3, which addressed itself to the problem. 
Commanders were to protect from suits in state courts - their ovm men, 
for offences allegedly committed under orders; loyal men for acts during 
the rebellion; persons charged with occupying abandoned lands; coloured 
persons charged with offences for which white persons were not prosecuted, 
or not punished in the same way. "Protection", under General Order No,9, 
consisted of discontinuing all such prosecutions pending in any other than 
a federal court, and forwarding all papers to military headquarters.^'*
Hie Republicans cared that the same object should be accomplished by 
civil process, and that the necessarily close relationship between the law 
and the sword should be regulated to mutual advantage. So, said James 
Wilson;
We may provide by law for the same ample protection through 
the civil courts that now depend on the orders of our military 
commanders; and I will never consent to any other construction of 
our Constitution, for that would be the elevation of the military 
above the civil power,8»
Yet, of course, the bill was not designed primarily to bring to heel 
a wayward or dangerous military power. The supremacy of the civil 
authority was simply a constant factor in their thinking, rather than an
1, Cited by James Wilson, Ibid., pp.1115-1119 March 1st, 1866.
2. Ibid., p.1119 March 1st, 1866^
alarm. The real present need was to assert the supremacy of one civil 
law over another, one civil power over another, nation over state. And 
both bills recognised that the army had an important role to play in 
effecting that.
The Feedmen's Bureau bill recognised the temporary impossibility 
of achieving equality before the law in Southern civil courts. Although 
the federal district and circuit courts were re-opening as soon as possible, 
they would not have been adequate to the task. Apart from the practical 
difficulty, that they would have been overrun, they would have been hard- 
pressed to argue constitutional justification for taking jurisdiction in 
most cases. Ownership of a knife, disputed between two blacks, matrimonial 
difficulties, all the way to contracts, murder, and lynching - the range 
and frequency of disputes called for greater discretion and speed. lYhat 
was needed was more like an Ombudsman's court, to deal with the million 
and one everyday squabbles of a society in transition. It was by the 
handling of the everyday, and the ordinary, as well as by the 'great* 
question of freedom, that rights would be known. And so, Bureau courts 
for the moment, were to fill the void.
Yet the question,/^vhich General Order No.3 had attempted a rough and 
ready answer was - who v/as going to protect the army and the agents of 
the Bureau while they were busy protecting others? Tlie question was far 
from academic. During the preceding year, the army and Bureau had already 
suffered, sometimes in the form of harassing suits, sometimes mob violence, 
sometimes injury or death. A plea for their protection was xkkx made in 
the House debate.^* Congressional awareness and concern for this aspect 
of the problem, was reflected in the machinery of the two bills. The
1, e.g. by Broomall, Ibid., p.1263 March 8th, 1866.
Freedmen’s Bureau bill put Bureau agents, civil and military under 'military 
protection and jurisdiction’. As noted, this raised the alarm among the 
bill's opponents that they intended to provide an escape route from 
prosecutions in state courts. They did. The Civil Rights bill included 
these men in its removal procedures. The procedure was to be the same as 
that of the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act. For, the similarity of the situation 
led to similarity in the remedy. They learned. The freedmen and others
were to be protected by the Bureau and the army, who in turn were to be 
protected by the federal courts.
Small wonder that to Senator Garret Davis of.Kentucky, this was the 
last s t r a w . H e  had been the first to recognise the Republican plot to 
subvert state courts and put their policies and personnel beyond accounta­
bility in the state. He saw this in 1863, over the Habeas Corpus Act. But 
there was no plot. The Republicans often stumbled towards solutions, their 
progress too haphazard to be called a plot. But by 1866, the edges were 
less frayed, the shape clearer. They were consciously dravdng on experience, 
like the machinery they borrowed from the I85O Fugitive Slave Law, and the 
1863 Habeas Corpus Act. And they were consciously seeking to improve it.
One further piece of the jig-saw illustrates this - the amendment to the 
Habeas Corpus Act, debated at the same time as the Freedmen's Bureau bill, 
and Civil Rights bill, and particularly relevant to the latter.
By early 1866, the deficiencies in the original act were showing. 
Explaining the need to amend the act, Representative Cook said that it 
had come to the attention of the Judiciary Committee that there were 
literally thousands of suits pending against federal officers in state 
courts, especially Kentucky, But state courts were refusing to give up
1. Ibid., p.347 January 22nd, 1866, and attempt to strike that section
conferring military protection on the Bureau from the Freedmen's Bureau 
Bill.
jurisdiction, often construing t\o terms of the act to give a remedy in
the federal court, only to those vlio could produce an actual order of
the President as the 'authority' under which they had acted when the
alleged offence took place* Dae act needed t e e t h , T h u s  the amendment
clarified the nature of "authority", to explicitly include verbal orders,
and orders by the military commanders on the spot, and the Secretary of
War. But, in the light of the Civil Rights bill, the most interesting
feature of t:ie amendment was that section making state court judges liable
to prosecution and damages for refusal to comply with the act. This
element of co-ercion found its place in the Civil Rights Act, both in the
section authorising prosecutions against officers of the state for
obstructing the execution of the act, and directly in the stipulation
that removal procedures should be carried out in the manner prescribed by
the 1863 act, "and all acts amendatory thereof". This phrase had been
inserted into the Civil Rights bill at a fairly late stage, on March 13th
when the bill returned to the House after its recomraital to the Judiciary 
2,Committee, * It v^ as not an afterthought, however - but a forethought.
For the amendment to the Habeas Corpus Act did not become law until May 4th, 
that is, after the Civil Rights biH.l. Tlie Civil Rights bill passed the 
Senate on February 2nd, the House on March 13th, Perhaps thinking of the 
overlap of these pieces of machinery, Senator Cowan referred to "this 
brood of transferring cases from the state courts to the United States 
courts".
Just as it was beginning to look like a deliberately constructed 
structure, the demolition nan moved in again. Jolinson announced another
1, Ibid., pp.1387-1388 March Utli, 1866.
2, Ibid,, pp.1366-1367 March I3t]i, 1866 (i.e. the day before Cook 
addressed the House),
3, Ibid., p.2057 April 20th, 1856,
veto on March 27th.■*"* The tone of the message was set by its opening 
complaints that this law, (which made citizens of Chinamen and gypsies as 
well as negroesi) discriminated against.intelligent and patriotic 
foreigners, who still had to wait for citizenship. He went on to echo 
objections so lately uttered by the Democrats. The rights of citizenship 
enumerated in the bill had been considered as belonging exclusively to 
the states. True, he said, there are limitations on state powers. No 
State shall pass a law impairing the law of contracts, pass ex post facto 
laws, make anything but gold and silver legal tender. But there was no 
power against their discriminating between people with respect to the right 
to hold real estate. If Congress can say who can hold real estate, testify 
and so on, then they could say who should vote, and sit on juries. , The 
rest of the message was concerned with the means employed to obtain these 
ends of which he had stated his disapproval. These included the section 
allowing penalties against judges, sheriffs and so on who might well be 
adhering to laws passed by their o t o legislature. The bill thus "invades 
the judicial power of the states", depriving the state judge of his 
independence of judgment in deciding in favour of the validity of a state 
law as opposed to a national one. Johnson went on to voice fears for de 
novo judgments in the federal court, referring to that section which 
made the laws of the United States the rule, except where modifications 
based on common law as modified by the state were necessary. In other 
words;
over this vast domain of criminal jurisprudence provided by each 
state for the protection of its ovm citizens, and for the punishment 
of all persons who violate its criminal laws, federal law, whenever 
it can be made to apply, displaces State law.
That was an exercise of judicial power quite beyond the Constitution.
1. Ibid., pp.1679-1681 March 27th, I866.
For the President, "... the details of the hill seem fraught vdth 
evil". It was also unnecessary. Slavery was ended. Labour and capital 
could be left to find a nev/ relationship. This bill was an unwarranted 
invasion of the states. And the message ended on the most improbable of 
all notes:
I will cheerfully co-operate with Congress in any measure that 
may be necessary for the protection of the civil rights of the 
freedmen, as well as those of all other classes of persons throughout 
the United States, by judicial process, under equal and impartial laws, 
in conformity with the provisions of the Federal Constitution.
But it ViTas too late for any President to endorse the principle, and
deny the means to make it a reality. The tenuous line between Johnson and
the moderate Republicans snapped. In a display of integrity and unity,
tinged with despair for those who had hoped for more from their President,
Congress accomplished a constitutional "first" by re-passing the bill
over the veto. On April 6th, it passed the Senate with the required two-
thirds majority,, aided by the unseating of New Jersey Democrat John P.
Stockton.^* The House needed no aid in its resounding vote of April $th,
2 .
122 to 41« * Having stood firm once, it was easier to do so twice, and 
on July l6th"another" Freedmen’s Bureau bill was also repassed.^ For 
Johnson - political suicide. For American citizens - the possibility of 
equality before the lawn
But it was not to be. Far away from Washington, and from the speeches 
on rights, citizenship and federal powers, it was left to Bureau officers 
and the Army to relate these things to real everyday issues. General 0. 0. 
Howard, Chief of the Freedmen's Bureau, later estimated that their courts
1. Ibid., p.1809 April 6t;'i, I866. Stockton had been elected as senator for 
Hew Jersey, despite Republican attempts there to prevent it. Unpopular 
even with some of his own party, Stockton’s election had depended on a 
change of rules to allow for election by a plurality rather than a 
majority. The election v/as nov/ successfully contested in the Senate.
2. Ibid., p.1861 April 9th, I866.
3. Essentially the same as the original bill, it did nevertheless have a 
more limited application in its civil rights jurisdiction - to places 
where conditions of ’rebellion’ existed.
dealt with about 100,000 complaints a year.^‘ Some of these cases were 
lax-ge issues, some petty, some contested between white andblack, many 
between black and black. Ihe Bureau officer’s tasks were many and delicate.
One Union officer, John Be Forest, described his duties succinctly:
Indeed, a Bureau officer was an offical jack-of-all trades.
He must understand the ,lrmy Regulations; he must be able to lead 
troops on occasion; he must have an idea of civil law; he was a Poor 
Commissioner; he was a statistician. With all this multifarious 
knowledge, he must be a man of quick common sense, with a special 
faculty for deciding what not to do. His duties and powers were to a 
great extent vague, and in general he might be said to do best when 
he did least.
One of the problems which consistently dogged them in the execution 
of these tasks, was the way in which the civil andmilitary power over­
lapped, and often conflicted. The Army had to walk a tightrope between 
two civil powers, one in the locality of their operations, the other at 
Washington. On the field, the success of the Bureau’s operations depended 
either on their ability to co-erce, or co-operate with the local white 
majority. In some instances, they resorted to co-ercion. In September 
1865, during the first year of the Bureau, an agent in Shreveport, Louisiana» 
imprisoned the judge, sheriff, and all twelve jurors of a local civil court 
which had unjustly found against a negro for stealing a h o r s e . Y e t  
although this would not be the last show of force by the army against the 
civil authorities, it was not typical. Instead, the history of the Bureau 
is one of attempted, though often frustrated co-operation with and utilisa­
tion of existing courts and local civil authorities.
In part,this was dictated by circumstances. The local agent was the 
representative of federal authority in a hostile area, himself often
1. George R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen’s Bureau (Philadelphia, 1955)» 
p.155' Hereafter cited as Bentley, A History of the Freedman's Bureau.
2. John William Be Forest, A Union Officer in the Reconstruction, ed. 
by James H. Croushore and David Morris (New Haven: Yale University 
Press 1948) pp.41-42. Hereafter cited as Be Forest, A Union Officer.
3. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen's Bureau p.155
threatened with force if he construed that authority too broadly. In 
many districts, there was simply not sufficient military strength for the 
Bureau to call on to enforce their decisions, even had they wished to do 
so. But the utilisation of the local civil institutions was policy, as 
well as necessity. It was a policy outlined by Trumbull and his Congression­
al colleagues, when they said they would rather the states did justice, than 
have the army do it for them. General Howard attempted to translate the 
policy into practice.
Even before the 1866 Fx-eedmen’s Bureau Act, the Bureau had been 
handing over cases to the civil courts. For the ex-Confederate states 
themselves were beginning to put laws on the statute books which recognised 
some civil rights. And so, in I865» Assistant Commissioner Thomas closed 
his Bureau courts after Mississippi agreed to admit negro testimony in 
cases involving negroes. The experiment was not successful. General Howard 
warned the commissioners to be wary of such laws until they had actually 
been tested. And in December I865, he recommended the extension of the 
Bureau’s functions on the grounds that the civil authorities could not be 
relied upon in places where co-operation had been tried.
But the policy continued in I866, John De Forest chronicled the same
practice in his area, even expressing confidence in the local magistrates
2,
to deal with the cases fairly. ' A recent close-up study of a Louisiana 
agent also confirms the t r e n d , T h e  agent, Cornelius, interpreted his 
duties as affecting mostly the newly freed negroes. Tlie already free, and 
the poor whites,he considered largely outside the scope of the Bureau's 
activities. And so, a high percentage of the cases he dealt with were
1. Ibid,. pp.67-68.
2. De Forest, A Union Officer pp.30-32.
3. J. Thomas May, The Freedmen's Bureau at the Local Level : .A Study of 
of a Louisiana Agent Louisiana History IX I968,
240.
between blacks. Ris practice was to refer more serious disputes to the 
local Justice of the Peace. At no time did he call on the assistance of 
troops to co-erce the white population. Instead, he continued to use the 
civil authorities, even when he ivas unimpressed with the quality of 
justice they meted out. He did not conceive of the Bureau's work as the 
promotion of social revolution, Y.lien he v/as concerned with cases involving 
the relationship between the tv/o races, it was generally in the field of 
labor contracts between white employers and black labour. He took the 
sanctity of these contracts from both sides very seriously.^’ For, in 
Cornelius' eyes, the immediate priority was the regeneration of agriculture. 
Education for blacks would keep until later. This order.of priorities suited
the local population very well, accounting for the relative success of the
Bureau's work in this field, as against education, welfare, or land owner­
ship. In other words, this agent at least was no artery of Washington
'Radicals'. He preferred to use existing authorities, and attempted no
2 .revolution, but rather stability, and regeneration.
Another recent investigation of the Bureau's policy suggests that 
the appointment of men who would not attempt a social revolution was 
deliberate, VZilliam McFeely cites the careers of a number of radical 
assistant commissioners who were out of sympathy with Johnson's Reconstruc-
3,
tion policies, and who were transferred to safer jobs at headquarters.
Other radical men, like Rufus Saxton and Thomas Conway could not always 
count on the undivided loyalty and support of their superiors.
The conservatism of the Bureau often annoyed local Republicans who 
were trying to press on with more radical policies in the state conventions.
1. For the conservative implications of this policy and the ways in which, 
in practice they worked against the freemen. See McFeely, Yankee 
Stepfather, Ch,8.
2.These points are also reinforced by Bawanda and John Cox, General 0. 0,
Howard and The Misreoresented .Bureau. Journal of Southern History, 
Noveinber, 1953.
3. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, pp.67-68.
Thus one of Chase's correspondents wrote from South Carolina of their 
isolation,since:
The Military here, as a general rule do not co-operate with ^
radical men; and the Bureau is a little inclined to conservatism.
And so the traditional picture of the close connections between 
'Radicals' in Congress and the Freedmen's Bureau has had to be rethought - 
but not simply in the light of the 'conservatism' of the Bureau, or indeed 
even intrigues at Washington * There was an accord between some of the 
moderate men who framed the legislation of 1866, and the men who executed 
it. The policy of utilising state courts and encouraging them to do 
justice first was also Trumbull's. So too with the "life goes on" attitude 
of the Bureau in upholding labour contracts. It was not so different from 
the policy of the Supreme Court in the years after the war, already noted 
for exam%)le in its enforcement of the obligation of contracts on promissory 
notes made prior to the Thirteenth Amendment.
Tne wisdom and success of the Bureau's policy with respect to the 
civil authorities w^ as another matter. One Florida agent reported that 
ninety-nine percent of cases adjudicated in the civil courts there went 
against the negro, Where juries were involved it seemed, justice was not. 
But the Bureau did not have an open choice on this question, and they were 
not simply trying to appease white majorities. President Johnson's 
Proclamation of April 1st, 1866, officially declared the end of the 
rebellion, and the return of civil order. Anticipating the Milligan 
decision, he ordered an end to military trials of civilians. In December, 
the Supreme Court's decision in the Milligan case was a further handicap 
to the Bureau courts, in outlawing the military trial of civilians in 
areas where the courts were open. Indeed, Johnson used the decision to
1, Gilbert Pillsbury to Salmon P. Chase, September 24-th, I867, Chase Papers, 
B.C., V. 99 f 14959.
justify taking an important case out of the Bureau's jurisdiction, that
of Doctor James Watson of Virginia, who had been accused of killing a
1 .negro. He was subsequently discharged.
A further complication occurred vfhen, with the official return to 
civil order, the Civil Rights Act went into operation in the South, 
obliging the civil adjudication of civil rights cases where possible.
It was a little premature under the circumstances. Responding to the 
situation, the War Department issued Order No,26 on May 1st, 1866, to 
the effect that, where possible, cases should be handed over to the civil 
authorities. That was the official word. On April 9th, however, a secret 
circular from Grant and Stanton had reminded commanders of the existence 
of both the Freedmen's Bureau and the Civil Rights Act, and to the means 
of their protection.^*
And so, with one arm tied behind its back, the Bureau continued to do 
its best. And its record in adjudicating disputes, supervising the 
regeneration of agriculture, relief work, and education, is a creditable 
one for all that, however limited.
As to the question of the protection of Bureau officers themselves, 
"under military protection and jurisdiction", the picture is incomplete. 
Successful removals of suits to the federal courts under the Civil Rights 
Act are not conspicuous. This may be so because the cases very often did 
not emerge from the web of local circumstances, of intimidation and so on. 
In some instances, it may be because the agent was rescued by military, 
rather than judicial action. Such a case was the one which beset General 
Heintzelman in Texas, The case is interesting because it reveals so many
1,Bentley, A History of the Freedmen*s Bureau.
2.Benjamin P. Thomas azid Harold M, rlyraan, Stanton: The Life and Times of 
Lincoln's Secretary of Far (N.Y . : Knopf, 196r")* p.478.
of the local and national problems of protecting the protectors. It 
was a case about who protects the army for protecting a Freedmen's Bureau 
agent, for protecting freedmen.
General Getty, the commanding officer, instructed Heintzelman to
release Mr, Longworth from civil custody,^* Longworth was a Bureau Agent
who had been "illegally arrested" for acts done under his official capacity.
In ordering-the release, on 29th September, 1866, Getty referred to the
Army's General Order No.3, ordering the protection of agents, freedmen
and others from prosecutions in the state courts, (in later correspondence,
the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Act were cited as additional authority,
perhaps illustrating the confusion of men on the spot as to their authority).
Heintzelman complied with the order, and removed Longworth, and all the
papers in the case, from local custody. The clerk of the county proceeded
to instruct the sheriff to arrest Heintzelman. Heintzelman refused to obey
the capias. He appealed to the Adjutant General's office at Galveston
saying, "I would not consider my life safe in the hands of the Texas civil 
2
authorities". * The appeal went right the way up the Army echelons.
General Grant approved the action, and requested information from the War 
Department.as to whether Heintzelman would be sustained by the Government.
The ball passed from one corner to another without anyone picking it up. 
Stanton wrote to the President for instructions on January 2 9 t h . O n  
January 30th, the President instructed Stanton to refer it to the Attorney- 
General. Meanwhile, events intervened. Y/hether these events brought com­
fort to General Heintzelman or not, the Attorney-General's office was at 
least off the hook, when the case closed with this postscript of 15th July, 
1868, over a year later:
Belay and subsequent events supervened and the case is superseded.^'
1. Brevt. Maj. Gen. Getty to Brevt. Maj. Gen. Heintzelman, September 29th, 
1866, Attorney-Generals Papers, National Archives, Record Group 60.
2. Heintzelman to the Acting Asst. Adjt, Gen., Galveston, December 22nd,
1866, Ibid.
3. Stanton to Johnson, January 29th, 1866. Ibid.
4. Stanton to Henry Stanbery, January 30th, 1866, Ibid.. endorsed on July
15th, closing the case.
Thus, for all the Congressional logic of removal procedures, and the 
connections from one bill to another, in practice, the army and Bureau had 
to cope as best they could in the face of 'delay and subsequent events'.
The confusion over the boundaries between civil and military 'protection' 
and 'jurisdiction', reached all the way back to Washington. Meanv/hile, 
on the field, men sitting on a local powder keg could not wait for removal 
suits, and self-help might be the alternative to no help. Such problems, 
of course, were expected to be temporary, and the real test v;as to come 
when the supports were removed, and the Civil Rights Act brought equality 
under the law, to victors as well as vanquished.
As with the judicial application of the Habeas Corpus Act, there are 
some surprises, some state courts which act contrary to one's preconceptions, 
and give full credence to the legislative intentions. The highest courts 
of former Confederate states affirmed the negro's right under the Civil 
Rights Act to be a competent witness in cases involving whites as well as 
blacks - the Texas court in Ex parte Warren in 1868, the Arkansas court in 
the 1869 case of Kelly v. The State.Indeed, in this latter case, where 
the court was adjudicating an appeal against a conviction for robbery on 
the grounds of the illegality of the evidence of coloured witnesses, and 
the unconstitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, the judge expressed a 
startingly optimistic view that such a case was unlikely to occur in the 
state again, for the lapse of time, and the judgment of other tribunals 
were passing with "unerring certainty" towards the conclusive establish­
ment of the right to testify against a white man. In California, the
question of testimony received an unusual twist. In the People v.
2,
Washington, ' the court upheld a lower court decision discharging a 
mulatto from custody on the grounds that the only witness to his alleged
1. Ex part Warren 31 Tex. 143 (I868); Kelly v. The State 25 Ark. 392 (I869),
2. Hie People v. Washington 36 cal. 658 (IS69). But - overruled in People v.
Brady 40 Cal. I98.
crime of robbery was the testimony of a Chinaman born in the Chinese 
Empirej debarred from testifying by state law. Thus, under the Civil 
Rights Act, the Native born mulatto citizen was to enjoy the same rights 
as the white, one of which was not being testified against by a Chinaman.’
Many more cases concerned the rights to make and enforce contracts.
Hie case of Smith v. Moody came to the Indiana Supreme Court on appeal in 
1866.^ " Smith was black. He had sued Moody in a lower court for failure 
to honour a promissory note. The court sustained Moody in his refusal 
to pay up, on the grounds that Smith had moved to Indiana, and a state 
statute, forbidding the immigration of negroes into the state, made all 
contracts after that date, I85I, void. The supreme court now upheld the 
negro's citizenship, and overruled the lower court's decision.
An even thornier subject was the marriage contract. In most of these 
cases, the state courts did not think that laws forbidding interracial 
marriages contravened the Civil Rights Act. Though there were exceptions.
In 1868, a lower court in Alabama held such a state law unconstitutional.
2 .
But, on appeal, in Ellis v. The State, * the higher court disagreed, on 
the grounds that the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in punish­
ments, on account of race, rather than in the making of race a criteria 
for the original offence. Four years later, however, the same court 
changed its mind in Burns v. Tne State, ' when it reversed a judgment 
against a justice of the peace for solemnising an interracial marriage. 
Discriminatory laws, the court said, had arisen because of the black man's 
condition, rather than his colour, and now, under the Civil Rights Act, the 
object was to end such discrimination, and admit the negro to the same 
rights with respect to contracts as whites, including the marriage contract.
1. Smith V. Moody 26 Ind. 299 (I866),
2. Ellis V. The State 42 Ala. 525 (I868).
3. Burns v. The State 48 Ala. 195 (I872).
In 1874, the Louisiana Supreme Court alas sustained the right of children 
of an interracial marriage to their inheritance, on the grounds that the 
state laws forbidding such unions had been superceded by the Civil Eights 
Act.^' But in many more cases, the courts took the line that the Civil 
Rights Act ordxy: outlawed discrimination only in punishment.^* Beyond that, 
the whole question of marriage was still very much within the province of 
the states. But such judgments were not necessarily hostile to the 
legislative intention. It was, after all, only the same line of argument 
which Senator Trumbull had tal^ en in the Senate debate vdien Hendricks of 
Indiana had raised such a hypothetical case. Trumbull had said then, observe 
equal punisliments for the same offence, and you observe the act.
Over and above the model behaviour of some state courts in observing 
civil rights without prompting from the federal authority, others also 
exhibited a willingness to observe federal jurisdiction under the Act, The 
opinion of Judge Ogden of the Texas Supreme Court in the l873 case of Caines 
V. Tne State,would have been enough to warm the hearts of the Republicans 
who championed the bill. Allowing a motion for the removal of a case 
against a negro, on the grounds of local prejudice, he argued that, under 
the terms of the act, the remedy applied not only to those who were denied 
rights, but to those who were "unable to enforce them", due, for examide, 
to prejudice. It wus one thing, he said, to have equal laws on the statute
books, as they now ; ad in Texas, but there were still plenty of places in
the state where a coloured mon could not get justice. Of jurisdiction in 
these questions, he went on;
we think tnat State coui'ts should be exceedingly cautious 
in attempting to settle questions of grave importance which belong 
peculiarly to a different and higher tribunal.
1. Hart V. Hose 26 La Ann. 90 (l874-)»
2. Green v. Tlie State 58 Ala. I90 (1877); The State v. Gibson 36 Ind.
389 (1871).
3. Gaines v. The State 39 Tex. 606 (l873).
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The opinion was cited and followed by the North Carolina Supreme
1.
Court in The .State v. Dunlop.
Such behaviour, in the light oi" Congressional fears for the injustices 
of state courts, and later evidence to confirm the absence of equality 
before the law in the states, requires an explanation. One possibility,
f
at least with respect to the South, is the influence of carpetbag justices.
The career of one of these men, George Andrevfs has recently been illumina-
2,
ted by Professor Harold Hollingsworth. * In 1868, Andrews was appointed 
to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, by the Governor, He was no bandwagon 
dilettante, no Yankee failure gone South to seek compensatory success.
Nor was he a Republican pavm. His decisions reflect a conscientious
search for impartiality, and equality before the law. The same may be
said of the career of Albion Tourgee, who occupied a seat in the bench 
of North Carolina’s Supreme Court from 1868 to 1876.^ ' But not all the 
judges by any means were carpetbaggers.
New state constitutions in the South had also changed conditions of 
judicial appointment and tenure. The Georgia constitution of I865 
provided for the election of supreme court judges for six years by the 
legislature. In I868, this was changed again. This time, the Governor 
was to malve the appointments, for a still longer period, twelve years 
instead of six. Thus, perhaps the judges who were appointed were a little 
more free from the excitement of public opinion or prejudice. Under the 
new constitution, the new chief justice v/as appointed - Joseph E. Brovaai 
Brown v^ as no carpetbagger, but a former state judge and governor. As an 
ardent champion of states rights he had been a wartime thorn in the flesh 
to Jefferson Davis. He was joined on the bench by H. If. McCoy, again a
1. The State v. Dunlop 65 N.C. 491 (I871)»
2. Harold LI. Hollingsworth, George Andrews, Carpetbagger Tennessee
Historical Quarterly Vol.28, I969.
3. See Otto H, Olsen, Carpetbagger’s Crusade: The Life of Albion Vfinegar 
Tourgee (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, I965) pp.143-155*
local lawyer, a Unionist, and Republican in the constitutional convention.
The third judge was Hiram Warner, originally from Massachusetts. But he
had moved to Georgia in 1821, Of the three, the former Yankee Warner was
the most conservative, often finding himself in opposition to his colleagues
in their pro-Union decisions - as for example, in Vhite v. Clements, where
1.the court upheld the rights of negroes to hold office.
A similar story comes from South Carolina. By an act of 1868, a 
Supreme Court consisting of a chief justice and two others was to be 
elected by the legislature for a period of six years (though here, judges 
had previously enjoyed life tenure). The chief justice Franlclin Moses, 
again was a local man. Indeed, he had to wait for the removal of his 
political disabilities by Congress before he took office in 1868, But 
apparently, he went on to serve with distinction until his death in 1877*
The remaining composition of the court was diverse - A. J. Willard, a 
carpetbagger from New York (who remained till l880); Solomon Hoge, a 
graduate of Cincinnati Law School, and a Union Officer, But he served for 
only eighteen months; finally Jonathan Yhright, a black lawyer from 
Pennsylvania,- former adviser to the Freedmen's Bureau, and now the first 
negro to serve as a judge in South Carolina, from I87O to 1877» The 
verdict of one historian on this court:
In spite of the fact that the Supreme Court was composed of a 
Scalawag, a carpetbagger, and a Negro, its administration was fair 
and its decisions equitable,^*
Certainly the carpetbag element should not be overemphasised, for 
there is reason to believe that the integrity of certain Southern state 
courts v/as a continuation of their ante bellura performance, A. B, Keir 
Nash's recent study of the record of the Texas Supreme Court from 1845 to
lo C. Mildred Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia (N.Y,: Columbia U.P.
1915), PP.352-3ÈO.
2. Pi’ancis B. Simlcins & Robert H . Woody, South Carolina During 
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1932) p.144.
i860, although it admits that Texas was never classed with the really 
’bad' states of the Deep South, suggests that an honest attempt was being 
made there to extend the benefit to the negro of whatever laws there were 
for his protection, and to treat slaves as humans rather than simply 
property,^' There were no common biographical factors among the judges. 
Nash suspects that one reason for their behaviour vias their relative 
independence. Despite theirtheorectical control by popular election, 
the same judges were regularly re-elected. Once on the bench, the judge 
was comparatively free from the positive imperatives acting on his 
législative colleagues to be seen to reflect public opinion. His pro­
fessional interest was in individuals, rather than broad sweeps of policy.
But a great deal more work on state judges must be undertaken - 
and not only in Southern courts- before any more satisfactory picture 
can be drawn. More important still is the caution against equating even 
a significant number of favourable decisions with justice. This was the 
gilt on the ginger bread. The Supreme courts were the end of the road 
in the process of obtaining justice in the state. All too often, the 
process never began, or got lost in mid-passage. Thus, in a letter to 
Secretary of War Stanton on January 19th, I867, General Howard of the 
Freedman's Bureau was cautious about the record of the supreme courts;
I am of the opinion that in the courts of superior jurisdic­
tion, the judges are generally disposed to deal fairly with the 
Negro, but it is notorious that he stands little or no chance before 
a. magistrate or inferior jurisdiction,2*
Often there was a tale or two behind apparently well functioning 
judicial systems in the former Confederate states. A Texas judge, 7/inston 
Banks, wrote to Washington, testifying that he was holding court un­
interruptedly in his district. Later, as he wrote to General Buell in
1, A. H. Keir Nash, Tie Texas Supreme Court and Trial Rights of Blacks, 
1845-1860 The Journal of American History, December, 1971•
2, Quoted in Bentley, A History of The Freedmen's Bureau.
February, I869, it dawned on him that the statement had been elicited
from him by certain parties for their ovm. interest in perverting 
1.justice. * They were attempting to procure the release from federal 
custody of men charged with the murder of New York carpetbagger, G.
Smith, and have the case dealt v/ith in the state courts. They v/ished, 
therefore, to convey an over-favourable impression of the peaceful 
functioning of the judicial system in the district. Judge Banks set 
the record straight. Although he v/as holding court, it was against a 
background of lawlessness and intimidation which had forced some of his 
colleagues to seek military protection. He related the problems, not 
unique to his area - the scourge of outlaws, whose victims included Union 
soldiers and the local Freedmen's Bureau agent; the murder of several 
freedmen; the intimidation of another Bureau agent, finally rescued from 
his office by troops disguised as citizens; an attack on the home of the 
Republican candidate to the state convention; the harrying of loyal men. 
Juries would not convict for these offences. As a result of this letter, 
the application to transfer the prisoners to the state court v/as refused.
Without denying the honest endeavours of some state courts to abide
by the spirit of the Civil Rights Act, it is a very small part of the
story. And, of course, there were decisions of state supreme courts which
took a less liberal view of the act - though the classic came from Kentuclcy.
2 •In Bowlin v. Commonwealth, * the court found against the constitutionality 
of the Civil Rights Act. Tliat act did not alter state laws preventing 
the testimony of black against white. The Thirteenth Amendment had ended . 
slavery, as physical bondage, and warranted nothing more.
Bigger disappointments in the construction of the act were to come from
1. Y/inston Banks to General George P. Buell, February 1st, I869, Attorney- 
Generals Parers, National Archives, Record Group 60.
2, Bowlin V. Commonwealth 65 Ky. 2 Bush 5 (I867).
the federal courts - bigger since these courts were the key to enforce­
ment •
. This was not true in the beginning, however. Tie first two outings 
of the act in the federal circuit courts brought sympathetic and hopeful 
constructions.^* These cases have already been referred to in connection 
with the fate of the Thirteenth Amendment in th.e courts. On circuit in 
Maryland in 1866, in the case of Turner, Chief Justice Chase took the 
view that indentures of apprenticeship, unequal in their application to 
white and black children contravened the Civil Rights Act. Tie same year, 
his colleague, Justice Swayne upheld the constitutionality of the act in 
U.S. V. Rhodes, in the circuit court of Kentucky. Federal jurisdiction in 
this case was contested. It was a criminal case. The defendant Rhodes, 
had been found guilty of entering a black woiiian's house. Tie issue now, 
on this appeal for arrest of judgment, was the illegality of the woman's 
testimony under state law. It was ax'gued that in a criminal case, the 
only parties affected were the sovereign state which prosecuted, and the 
defendant. Since the defendant was white, there was no federal question, 
and it was purely a matter for the state. But Swayne thought not. He 
upheld the right of the black woman to testify, under the Civil Rights 
Act. And he went on to urge a liberal construction of the act "to carry 
out the wise and bénéficient purposes of Congress in enacting it". Judgment 
against Rhodes stood.
And then the tide turned. It began before the well-known Slaughter­
house opinion. In 1868, the federal circuit court in Kentucky took 
jurisdiction in a criminal case, a case of murder, where the defendants 
were white, and the victim black, on the grounds that a federal question
!• In re Turner Fed. Gas. 14,247 (I867); U.S. v. Rhodes, Fed. Cas,,
16,151 (1866).
arose out- of the denial of testimony of black witnesses to the crime.
Tlie defendants, Slyev/ and Eennard were convicted. The case v/as taken
to the Supreme Court on a writ of error, contesting the jurisdiction of
the federal circuit court. As in U.S. v. Rhodes, the question which
states were anxious to settle, was the extent of federal jurisdiction
in criminal oases where the defendant was white. This was a test case.
The legislature of Kentucky passed a resolution directing the Governor
to employ counsel in the case to take steps to test the constitutionality
of the law. According to B. H. Bristov/, the United States Attorney for
the District, the counsel for Blyew and Kennard failed immediately to
lodge the record of the case with the Supreme Court because the case was
not a happy one on which to challenge the Act. Tie defendants were
1 .clearly guilty, a fact which might put their case in a bad light. * But 
the appeal eventually v/ent ahead. The case of Blyew v. U.S. v/as decided 
in 1871.^*
Blyew'8 counsel argued against federal court jurisdiction on the 
grounds that in a criminal case in which the defendants were v/hite, the 
case was solely cognizable in the state court. Giving^^^inion of the 
Court, Justice Strong agreed. An indictment prosecuted by the government 
against an alleged criminal concerns only the parties, and not the witnesses 
The purposes of the Civil Rights Act, he said, were only to protect 
coloured persons where a decision of the court might affect them injurious­
ly in their personal or property rights. He rejected the secondary argu­
ments of the U.S. Counsel ths,t the case did'affect' black rights directly, 
to the extent that the murdered woman was black. Strong thought that she 
was "beyond" being "affected". And the circuit court had no jurisdiction
1. B. U. Bristow to The Attorney-General, April 22nd, 1869, Attorney- 
Generals Papers, National Archives, Record Group 60,
2. Blyew V. U.S. 13 Wall. $8l (I871),
under the act because of the colour of the witnesses.
It v/as left to two dissenting justices, Sv/ayne and Bradley to give 
an ampler meaning to the act in their dissenting opinions. Bradley- 
defended the act as a proper sequel to the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
had abolished slavery, and placed negroes on an equality of rights and 
privileges with other citizens of the United States". Federal juris­
diction extended not only to circumstances under the first section of the 
act, i.e. a direct denial of a civil right, but also, by the terms of 
the third section of the act,where coloured or other persons were unable 
to enforce their rights in court. Thus, he said;
if the state should refuse to allow a freedman to sue in its 
courts, thereby denying him judicial relief, or should fail to provide 
laws for the punishment of white persons guilty of criminal acts 
against his person or property, thereby denying him judicial re­
dress, there can be no doubt that the case would come within the 
scope of the clause under consideration. (Clause 3).
And this was such a case. It v/as not that all cases where negroes
were witnesses came within federal jurisdiction. In some cases, the 
party against v/hom the crime was committed might not be affected. But 
here the right of testimony affected the murdered person. If she had 
lived, the case would have come under federal jurisdiction. All the more 
so, since the degree of violence was greater, leading to her death.
In the 1870's a string of cases were to follow the pattern in the 
Biyew case - impressive dissenting opinions in which the spirit of the act 
v/as retained, but attached to limited constructions by the majority of the
court. So it was in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873.^* In I867, the
legislature of Louisiana confirmed a monopoly on a slaughterhouse business. 
The butchers who were consequently edged out of the business claimed that 
the monopoly was a violation of their rights, principally under the
1. The Slaughterhouse Cases 83 U.S. 36 (I872),
Fourteenth Anendiaent, but the Thirteenth, and the Civil Rights Act was 
also cited. Tie Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, held that the 
statute conferring the monopoly was a legitimate exercise of the state's 
police power. The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal.
Upholding the Louisiana court decision, Justice Miller for the 
court, dealt a blow to the trilogy of privileges and immunities - due 
process - equal protection, Tlie most devastating blow of all fell on 
the concept of national citizenship which had informed Republican think­
ing on the Civil Rights Act. Miller's opinion separated national, and 
state citizenship. The privileges and immunities which were subject to 
national protection, and- beyond infringement by the state were .... and 
then he tried to dodge the issue by saying;
we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can 
abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make'it 
necessary to do so.
Still, he could not resist citing a few, including free access to 
seaports and land offices, and federal protection on the high seas. This 
left the whole area of private, personal and property rights precisely 
where it had been before 1866, under the control of the states. Judge 
Miller disposed quickly of due process and equal protection. The monopoly 
was not a deprivation of property without due process. As for equal 
protection, the Court said that it only applied to discrimination against 
Negroes as a class. Miller then took a narrowly 'black' view of the 
amendment, ignoring its application to all men,
Tie dual citizenship doctrine expounded by the Court was clearly 
in conflict with the policy of the Congress which framed the Civil Rights 
Act, that being the same Congress which framed the Fourteenth Amendmento
That was one of the points expressed by Justice Field in his dissent.
He quoted Trumbull on the connections between freedom, and the right to 
equality before the law. The privilege and immunities of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, he said, were those of the Civil Rights Act. They were more 
extensive than the right to protection on the high seas and so on,— But.'
The fundamental rights, privileges and immunities which belong 
to him as a free man and a free citizen, now belong to him as a 
citizen of the United States, and are not dependent upon his 
citizenship of any State.
Bradley and Swayne, although putting more emphasis on the 'due 
process' clause, joined him in the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment 
was a limitation on the states in respect of these rights, and they 
dissented from the majority opinion of the Court.
Although the case had centred primarily on construction of the 
Fourteenth jhnendment, it had important repercussions for the fate of the 
Civil Rights Act, Tlie Court was beginning to separate the pieces of 
Republican policy, snd isolate them from their historical connections.
The next step was to isolate the Civil Rights Act in chronological terms 
too. Finding a conservative meaning for the Fourteenth Amendment, they 
proceeded to associate the Civil Rights Act with that amendment, although 
the act had passed first, and in pursuance of a power claimed under the 
Thirteenth Amendment.
Tills dislocation was most noticeable over the question of whether the 
federal authority could exercise jurisdiction in cases of individual 
infringements of private rights, irrespective of whether the state, or 
its officers were at fault. In I876, the Supreme Court in United States 
V. Gruickshank,^' gave the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment v/as a
1, U.S. V. Cruickshank $2 U.S. 542.
federal guarantee against infringement of rights by the states, and did 
not reach violations by private individuals. As a result, later civil 
rights legislation which did attempt to govern private as well as public 
denials of rights, was held to go beyond the constitutional power on 
which it v/as based. Thus, in Le Grand v. U.S. in the Texas circuit 
court, Justice Woods reversed a judgment against private citizens for 
denying a black man the right to testify - by beating him up.^* He held 
that the Enforcement Act of I87I, under which federal protection was 
claimed was an instance;
where an act of congress is directed exclusively against the 
action of individuals, and not of the states, the law is broader 
than the amendments by which it is attempted to be justified, and 
is without constitutional warrant.
In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, the same argument was used
2
against the 1875 Civil Rights Act. * The Fourteenth Amendment applied 
only to state action. In these cases, the courts did not consider the 
Thirteenth Amendment as the proper basis of power for the legislation - 
although in his dissenting opiru.on Justice Harlan did make the point that 
the 1875 act did draw itspowers from that amendment, which had application 
to all men. He also pointed out that it v/as quite proper to pass legisla­
tion reaching individuals. Had CongroEss not done that with the Fugitive 
Slave Lav/? Had not the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
doing so in I842 in Prigg v. Pennsylvania? Harlan was right. As one 
historian says, if constitutional law had ended v/ith the Prigg case, it 
could be asserted with confidence that there is "... nothing in the nature 
of American federalism that disables the Congress from controlling private
1. Texas v. Gaines Fed. Cas. 13,847 (I874).
2. The Civil Rights Cases I09 U.S. 3 (l883).
conduct affecting the civil rights of others",^'*
But the postwar Court changed that, .And the 1866 Civil Eights Act,
was an incidental casualty. And so, on circuit in Texas in 1874? Justice
2 .Bradley in Texas v. Gaines, "refused to take a case on removal under the 
1866 Act on the grounds of local prejudice. The original opinion in the 
Supreme Court of Texas, had been remarkable for its liberal construction 
of the act.' But here the federal court took a more limited view. It 
was not intended to protect civil rights against private infringements, 
where the laws themselves were impartial and sufficient. And yet Bradley 
was not consistent. In the I883 Civil Rights Cases, he referred to the 
1866 act with approval, and to the fact that under the Thirteenth Anend- 
ment, legislation could be direct and primary, operating on individuals, 
while under the Fourteenth, it could only be addressed to state action.
Perhaps he could afford to be more generous in construction, since the 
issue was not the 1866, but the 1875 act, and the Court had decided that 
it rested on the Fourteenth Amendment. ^ " But the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 got caught in the baclav3.sh of these opinions on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the later Civil Rights legislation.. There was so much 
legislation by the l870’s, that cases tended to be pleaded under a variety 
of headings, and it was easy for differences, of chronology and power base, 
to be ignored in the courts' tendency to treat the legislation as a package 
deal under the Fourteenth ibuendment,
1. Mark Be Wolfe Howe, Federalism and Civil Eiph'ts, Massachusetts 
Historical Society Proceedings CTJTl I965. Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
16 Peters 539 (1842), came to the court on appeal. Edvrard Prigg, a 
slaveovmers agent was convicted in the Pemsylvania Supreme Court, of 
carrying off a slave to Maryland without legal proceedings, thus violat­
ing a Pennsylvania state 'liberty' law. But the Supreme Court reversed 
the judgment, holding that state law unconstitutional, interfering as it 
did with the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution. Tne execution of 
that law was exclusively federal business, Its intention was to reach, 
and cause the return of runaways i.e. exercise a power over individual 
rights directly.
2. Texas v. Gaines Fed. Cas. 13,847 (1874)*
3. Bradley had taken a similar line in his opirmon in U.S. v. Cruickshanlc, 
Fed. Cas. 14,897 (1874), v/hen he gave a liberal interpretation of the 1866 
Act, but held the Enforcement Act of May 31st, I87O unconstitutional in 
its application to individual violations. Tne judgment was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court in U.S. v. Cruickshanlc.
Zbb,
The disappointing judicial history of the postwar amendments, and 
acts ’appropriate' to their enforcement, prompted a group of black lav/yers 
in the l880’s, to v/rite a volume lamenting the growing gap between the 
legislative intention, and the judicial application.^* Tliey urged a 
return to the original meaning, which had become obscured behind the 
doctrine of dual citizenship, and ’state’ as opposed to universal applica­
tion of the civil rights legislation, and the Fourteenth Amendment, They 
spoke of "the silent circumspection with which the courts have walked 
round the Fourteenth Amendjnent". But their disappointment was not just 
in the Court, but in the way that both political parties had betrayed the 
goal of equality before the law. Tliey imagined a conversation between an 
observer, ignorant of the situation, and a "sarcastic reviewer" who might 
explain what had happened so:
You must pardon my mixed metaphors and apparent digression, I 
wanted to explain to you that, if there is a sick patient in this 
country, in our opinion, it is the civil rights man; but you see, 
he does not belong to any of the old nor is he a member of either 
of the modern great parties of the country, and therefore he cannot 
legitrnately share in the treatment practised by their moderators.
One party, for the time being, has placed him in quarantine, in one 
or another of its judicial harbors, to await the disinfecting process, 
or the expediences of the future. The other has banished him into 
an infirmary called the State courts. There he will either die an 
unnatural death, or if ever under their tyrannical treatment he 
recovers his health, he will be permitted without further molestation 
to talce up liis bed and walk, only because his recovery will be 
universally accepted as a miraculous interposition of Providence.^*
Certainly, the responsibility for the failure to achieve equality 
before the law was far flung. It goes back through the long history of 
prejudices in men's minds, and the generations in which they had exercised 
them to assert their own rights in law, and deprive others of the same. 
Certain assumptions, both about negro inferiority and about the nature of 
federalism dogged the experiment. In the framing of the legislation itself,
1. Brotherhood of Liberty, Justice and Jurisprudence; an inquiry
concerning the constitutional Limitations of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth amendments (N.Y.: Ne^n Universities Press. I969. Reprint). 
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Trumbull and his colleagues hesitated to go too far. They would rather 
that the states did the work of justice themselves. There are other 
criticisms which one would make of its Congressional backers, that they 
had a naive optimism in the power of law, or that their attempt to enshrine 
'natural' law in positive law was unsatisfactory. And yet, that would be 
to ignore what v/as satisfactory about their attempt, both in motivation, 
and.design, -
For, in design, the Freedman's .Bureau and Civil Rights Acts contained 
more power than anyone was willing or able to use. This enforcement 
mechanism was, of course, deficient, both by Twentieth century standards, 
and by the needs of the situation whiori. they had to cope with. But still, 
on paper, there was a touch of boldness - in the power, for example, of 
commissioners, marshals and so on to institute proceedings against those 
who infringed the act, in the threat of the authorisation to the President 
to use land and naval forces to carry out the act if necessary, and in the 
possibility of prosecuting state officers, including judges, for obstruct­
ing the execution of the act.
But, on the v/hole, the boldness remained on paper. There were many 
reasons. There was local prejudice, and determination that the law should 
not work. Against this, the minima], presence of the army and the Bureau 
v/as often powerless.
State court judges were seldom prosecuted. Immediately after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act, the legislature of Maryland passed a law
to reimburse magistrates and judges for any costs which they incurred for
rendering decisions adverse to the act. One historian, however, cites a
1,case of a state judge who was prosecuted. " Judge' Abell of Louisiana was
1, Horace Edgar Flack, The Abortion of The Fourteenth Amendment (Baltimore 
1908) pp.50-51.
arrested in July 1866, charged with ’’wickedly, wilfully and with malice 
aforethought" declaring the Civil Eights Act unconstitutional, }3ut I ha,ve 
been unable to find the record of such prosecutions reaching the federal 
courts. It would have been more surprising if they had done. In the 
light of a history of sensitivity to respective jurisdictions between 
nation and state, it would not have been easy to throw off all restraint. 
The men of 1866, both as framers and executors did not want "federal 
centralisation" or "the invasion of the states" much more than their 
opponents did, and they were not eager to use the bill’s machinery with 
too heavy a hand.
A more deliberate obstacle to the successful enforcement of the
Congressional policy, was the non-co-operation of President Johnson. On
January 8th, I867, a Senate resolution called for information from the
President on violations of the Civil Rights Act, and what steps, if aiiy,
had been taken by him to enforce the law and punish the offenders. At
the V/ar Department, Stanton showed some energ^r in collecting information.
General Grant sent him a chilling list of offences from his knowledge in
the Southern States including the rape of negro girls, the imirder of
freedraen and loyalists, and the murder of a former Bureau agent by a man
1 .on whom he had once imposed a, fine. * And yet,when the Attorney-General, 
Henry Stanbery wrote to the President, in connection with the same resolu­
tion on January 21stj I867, he had no report in his office of such viola­
tions. He cited one case, from Georgia, of a black man who was being held 
to involuntary servitude, without being charged with any crime. But he 
concluded!
I an not advised of any other case which requires Executive 
action under those sections which have been enumerated, or under any 
other section of the Civil Rights Bill.8.
1, General U. S. Grant to Stanton, February 8th, I867, Attorney-Generals 
Papers, Rational Archives, Record Group 60.
2. Attorney-General Henry Stanbery to President Jolinson. January 21st,
1867. Ibid,
It was not that such cases were wanting. But, even with better 
information from the Attorney-General's office, Johnson was not disposed 
to £iid the execution of the bills he vetoed.
But no single factor can be isolated, and there can be no one 
scapegoat. The fate of the 1866 civil rights legislation was the fate 
of Republican Reconstruction as a whole. Time passed, urgency faded, and 
some of the common factors on both sides of the liason-Bixon line came to 
stand out more than old differences. And some of these common factors 
did not help to bring equality before the law. Racial prejudice vfas one.
So too were old habits of decentralised governraent. The federal courts 
reflected, rather than created the conservatism of the 1870's, and 1880's.
But that is not to say that the goal was unattainable in 1866. The men 
of the Thirty-ninth Congress worked with all the enthusiasm and skill at 
their disposal to make it happen. And their achievement is not small.
There were men who were able to claim their rights, and who did claim 
them in law for the first time. And the legislation, like the Constitutional 
Amendments would remain on the statute books, not only for future use, but 
cis a symbol of a real change. The clock would never be turned back. It 
was not enough. But it would also be hard to join with Albion Tourgee, 
one of the men committed to the idea at the time, in looking back at the 
work as "A Fool's Errand",
CONCLUSION
Something had been dreadfully amiss with the Union of l86l. Very 
soon after the war began, it became clear that there was to be no return 
to "The Union as it was, the Constitution as it is". Events put that 
beyond free choice. But the relationship between men and events was not 
so chaotic that one can study the Union and Constitution of 1866 as some­
thing which had been washed up on the beaches after a storm. Men made a 
study of what had gone v/rong in 1861 with a view to putting it right.
T/hile they were involved in crisis, they studied, and made choices. If 
they were not master-planners of the Union's destiny, they were certainly 
conscious and intelligent participants.
Gone were the days when Americans were content with self-satisfied 
reverence for their Constitution as the last word on liberty. They had 
slept too long. It was v/ar, wrote Orestes Brownson, which finally 
compelled the nation;
to pass from thoughtless, careless, heedless, reckless adolescence 
to grave and reflecting manhood. The nation has been suddenly compelled 
to study itself, and henceforth must act from reflection, understanding, 
science, statesmanship, not from instinct, impulse, passion or caprice, 
knowing well what.it does and wherefore it does it.^'
But Brownson saved himself from the self-satisfaction of his predecessors 
by admitting how unfinished the task was, and that there was still much work 
to be done in enabling the nation to understand its own idea, and its 
Constitution. But basically, like the Republicans in Congress, he was 
pleased with the evidence of lessons already learned. Another learned
1. Orestes Brownson, The American Republic. Its Constitution. Tendencies. 
and Destiny (Louisville; Lost Cause Press, 1969* Reprint), pp.2-3.
constitutional commentator, Joel Parker, was less impressed early in the 
war when he observed:
The innumerable speeches in Congress and out of Congress, within 
the last few years, may serve to show with what diligence, if not with 
what success, constitutional law has recently been studied.Ï*
Yet, for Congress, this very "diligence" had its rewards in under­
standing. As they studied particular problems at hand - making emancipation 
secure against state action, confiscating, regenerating Southern state 
governments, or indemnifying federal officers - they did not compartmentalise 
the issues. This is evident in the ways in which they transferred machinery 
from one act to another, for example the direct transplant of the removal 
procedures of the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act to the 1866 Civil Rights Act. But 
these things would only be a curiosity to the student of legislative history, 
if they did not also betoken a cumulative appreciation of the ways in which 
the problems themselves were interrelated. But they did grasp that it was 
the nation which was on trial. The power to compel obedience to its 
Constitution and laws was as necessary over habeas corpus jurisdiction in 
the border states as it was over emancipation in the South, For it was the 
lack, of such a power which had threatened the nation’s very existence. 
Moreover, as the slogan ran, Freedom was National, Slavery Sectional. In 
1866, when the Republicans invoked the power to define that freedom and 
provide for its maintenance, it was important for New York as well as for 
Georgia. Tlie rights of a free American were potentially as alienable there 
if the state chose to make them so. The liberty of the individual was not 
safe while he could not count on the protection of his nation's government. 
Nations v/hich did not boast of their freedom and democracy could promise 
that much. The corollary v/as that the collective liberty of the nation was 
not safe while it could not offer that protection. And so, the Republicans
1, Joel Parker, "Constitutional . North American Review, April 1862.
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aspired to believe that on the road from the Crittenden-Johnson 
resolutions to the Civil Rights Act, they had discovered a Constitution 
with the power to protect the nation and the individual against the 
excesses of 'state'.
If there is a sense of disappointment, it is that the power was in 
practice used so sparingly. It is tliat the opportunity to do more was 
lost. It is that the Civil War generation could not contemplate more 
radical structural changes in their federal system to make a real commit­
ment to the equal rights of individuals. They did not bridge the gap from 
the formalities to the realities of equal protection - from using enough 
power to require states to observe equal laws, to using enough power to 
compel them, and everybody else to treat and respect these rights equally.
Racism persisted, and sapped the North's will to make such a commit­
ment. But there is more to it than that. It would have involved a change 
in their concept of the functions and responsibilities of the national 
government in the federal system, which they perceived, but did not like. 
When the Republicans took the first steps across state boundaries in the 
earliest Reconstruction measures, it was clear that they wished to avoid 
basic structural change. They claimed the power to strike down the states' 
laws on one subject only - slavery. All other state law was to be respected. 
The incessant debate on reconstruction theory v/as another symptom of how 
uneasily they assumed nev/ powers for nation over state. It had to be seen 
to be justified under the Constitution. And, for the mostpart they avoided 
theories which either ignored the existence of states, or which granted 
them more than the most temporary of powers to accomplish the necessary 
changes, and leave the states to work out the details of their own future.
1. See Chapter IV, supra.
With the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau Acts, they claimed a potentially 
broad power for. the nation to cross state boundaries and protect the rights 
of citizens in areas which were the traditional, and sensitive,province 
of the states. It was not that they thought they were bluffing. But it 
is clear from the debate that they hoped they would not be forced to use as 
much power as they had put on paper. They invited the states to malce the 
appropriate changes in their laws first. Again, in 1866, they accepted 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the negative form which left the primary 
responsibility for equality before the law with the states, rather than 
the more positive form which read:
Congress shall have power to malce all laws necessary and proper 
to secure to the citizens of each State all■the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in 
the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, 
and property.
True, constitutional amendments were traditionally framed in the 
negative. Later historians have used that argument to suggest that the 
intention behind the form that Congress did adopt remained as positive, 
and the amendment as full a guarantee in the states.^* But that interpre­
tation is not consistent with their cautious and limited approach to state 
powers until then.
Frederick Douglass recognised the extent to which the reluctance to 
assume legislative powers over the states was a national phenomenon. Writing 
of recent changes in December 1866, he said:
The Civil Rights and the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the proposed 
constitutional amendments, with the amendment already adopted and 
recognised as the law of the land, do not reach the difficulty, and cannot^ 
unless the whole structure of the government is changed from a govern­
ment by States to something like a despotic central government, with 
power to control even the municipal regulations of States, and to make 
them conform to its own despotic will. While there remains such an 
idea as the right of each State to control its local affairs - an idea, 
by the way, more deeply rooted in the minds of men of all sections of 
the country than perhaos any other political idea - no general 
assertion of human rights can be of any practical value.
1, Jacobus Ten Broek, An tislavery Origins pp.200-203.
2. Frederick Douglass, "Reconstruction", Atlantic Monthly, December 1866, 
Emphasis nine.
Douglass was right. Nobody would contemplate such a degree of 
centralisation. And he offered an alternative - Give the black man the 
vote. Ke had advocated such a step when it was radical and unfashionable 
to do so. But now it was not. The Reconstruction Act of I867 provided 
for universal suffrage as a condition of restoration. Until the states 
agreed to write that into their constitutions, they were to be subject to
a period of military government. But it was a, measure advocated by 
conservatives like Blaine as well as Radicals like Stevens. For con­
servatives, it was an alternative to proposals for a more far-reaching 
and prolonged assumption of federal power over the defeated states.^' Carl
Schurz used this argument to make a broad appeal for the proposals:
Far from desiring centralization repugnant to the genius of 
this country, it is in the distinct interest of local self-government 
and legitimate states rights that v/e urge these propositions, and 
nothing can be more certain than this is the only way in which a 
dangerous centralization of power in the hands of our general 
government can be prevented.^*
It was not that they were solicitous for the South's sensitivities. It 
was their own sensitivities that caused them to draw back from radical 
alterations in the balance between nation and state, which must be permanent. 
Of course, there was a, spectrum of opinion inside the Republican party, For 
many Republicans, the acceptance of universal male suffrage put an end to 
Reconstruction, again leaving the future to the states. Others, like 
Stevens and Sumner^could contemplate more in the way of federal change.
But at the heart of the Republican party was a great unease about clothing 
the federal government with powers traditionally exercised by the states. 
They would go so far, but no further.
And so it is hardly surprising that- the courts acted on many of the
1. Michael L, Benedict, "Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative 
Basis of Radical Reconstruction". Unpublished Paper, Rice University, 
1970, used with the permission of the author,
2. Carl Schurz, "The True Problem", Atlantic Monthly, March, I867, quoted, 
Ibid.
same conservative instincts. Generalisations about the record of the 
courts should of course be made cautiously, for their opinions reflect as 
varied understandings of the laws as the speeches of the men who debated 
them. Often the courts of both nation and state put broad and sympathetic 
constructions to recently made laws for the protection of individual 
rights in the states. State courts had been known to co-operate in making 
removal procedures work. But, particularly in the l870's it did seem that 
there was a growing gap between the original legislative intentions, and 
later judicial constructions - notably in such questions as whether civil 
rights legislation reached individual violations where the laws themselves 
were "sufficient". Just as the pre-war Supreme Court had built up judicial 
conventions which affected the ways that Americans perceived their 
Constitution, and hence affected its real application (Barron v. Baltimore 
is a ready example), so too the post-v/ar Court built conventions around the 
amended Constitution which in 'burn altered the way it worked. Judges might 
claim that they simply applied the laws, in a mechanical fashion. But they 
did more. The "dual citizenship" doctrine, or Conkling theory of the 
intention of the framers to protect corporations under the Fourteenth 
Amendment^ were part of this process of change. Supporters of equal civil 
rights might resent such "extraconstitutional" deviations from the "true" 
Constitution, just as abolitionists resented Barron v. Baltimore, or Bred 
Scott. But there were no final truths to be achieved by changes in words.
They had to be part of the living political fabric of the nation, of which 
the Constitution was the framework, and not the end. Courts and Congresses 
were part of that fabric, neither operating in a vacuum. And ten years 
after Appomattox, neither had the will to keep alive the original meaning 
of the words.
But the historian who confines his study of the failure of Reconstruction
to bring a real equality of civil rights, to what went wrong with the 
commitment in the 1870's, should study the nature of the original commit­
ment. It was sincere - even idealistic. It was worth the cost of war - 
but not perpetual "centralization". At the height of their emotional 
commitment in the l860's, they still tread carefully into the states.
Row much more so when they began to doubt the wisdom of the commitment.
But it would be too easy to end on a note of disappointment with the 
Civil V/ar generation for allowing old notions of the limitations of 
government from preventing a real change in the service of equal rights.
The incompleteness of our own education to the problems, suggests the 
proverbial restraints on people who live in glass houses. It would also 
obscure the value of the lessons they did learn and apply, and undervalue 
what was now right with the Union and Constitution by comparison with what 
had been wrong with it.
Slavery, and its supports in state law had been rooted out. That 
itself was good news for four million men, women, and children. It was 
also good for the nation. It took away the most obvious and dangerous 
fuse for states rights, dissipating some of the energies which had served 
it in the past, and making it less lethal for the future.
The nation demonstrated the will to survive, and found the means under 
the Constitution. It was an important precedent. And the cost put a high 
price on its future.
Moreover, it was not just the fact of victory which strengthened the 
Union. Tliere were changes going on under the surface. increasing the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, commensurate with the increase of 
subjects which were now federal questions - confiscation, indemnification, 
freedom, civil rights and so on - the nation was sending out roots to the
states, and establishing its presence there. By comparison with what was 
needed to secure racial justice, these roots were indeed frail. But they 
served the victors in other ways. It would he too strong a claim to say 
that here was the. cement which held the Union together, forever to make 
a resort from law to arms impossible. Machinery itself can hold no such 
place in a democratic Union, held together by the extent to which ideas 
and interests are commonly shared. But it helped to have a foot in the 
door.
Making the national authority credible in the states was not a purely 
patriotic endeavour, or an exercise in the science of government. The 
national authority was no more an abstract good than "The Constitution". 
Both were given life by the ideas and interests they served. The 
Republicans were concerned to strengthen nation over state - to make 
policy decisions, on confiscation, reconstruction and so on work. Those 
who opposed the policies, also opposed the extent to which the states were 
being "invaded" on their behalf. In the reconstructed nation, the 
Republicans wished the machinery of Union and Constitution to go on serving 
the. political will of the majority - in effect, the dominant section. It 
had not done so in I86I. In 1866, with the foundations laid, the prospects 
were brighter.
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All Act to confiscate Property used for Insurrectionary Purposes, August
6th, 1861.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That if, during the present 
or any future insurrection against the Government of the United States, 
after the President of the United States shall have declared, by proclama­
tion, that the laws of the United States are opposed, and the execution 
thereof obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the 
ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the power vested in the 
marshals by law, any person or persons, his, her or their agent, attorney, 
or employe, shall purchase or acquire, sell or give any property of 
whatsoever kind or description with intent to use or employ the same, or 
suffer the same to be used or employed in aiding, abetting, or promoting 
such insurrection or resistance to the laws, or any persons or persons 
engaged therein; or if any person or persons, being the owner or owners 
of any such property, shall knowingly use or employ, or consent to the use 
or employment of the same as aforesaid, all such property is hereby 
declared to be lawful subject of prize and capture wherever found; and 
it shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause the 
same to be seized, confiscated and condemned.
And be it further enacted, That such prizes and capture shall be condemned 
in the district or circuit court of the United States having jurisdiction 
of the amount, or in admiralty in any district in which the same may be 
seized to which they may be taken and proceedings first instituted.
And be it further enacted. That the Attorney-General, or any district 
attorney of the United States in which said property may at the time be, 
may institute proceedings of condemnation, and in such case they shall be 
wholly for the benefit of the United States; or any person may file an 
information with such attorney, in which case the proceedings shall be 
for the use of the informer and the United States in equal parts.
And be it further enacted. That whenever hereafter, during the present 
insurrection against the Government of the United States, any person 
claimed to be held to labor or service under the law of any State, shall 
be required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or service is 
claimed to be due, or by the lawful agent of such person, to take up arms 
against the United States, or shall be required or permitted by the
person to whom such labor or service is claimed to be due, or his lawful
agent, to work or be employed in or upon any fort, navy yard, dock, armory,
ship, entrenchment or in any military or naval service whatsoever, against 
the Government and lawful authority of the United States, then, and in 
every such case, the person to whom such labor or service is claimed to 
be due shall forfeit his claim to such labor, and. law of the State or of 
the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. Any whenever there­
after the person claiming such labor or service shall seek to enforce his 
claim, it shall be a full and sufficient answer to such claim that the
person whose service or labor is claimed had been employed in hostile
service against the Government of the United States, contrary to the 
provisions of this Act.
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An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to 
seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other purposes,
July 17th, 1862.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That every person who shall 
hereafter coinmit the crime of treason against the United States, and 
shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death, and all his slaves, 
if any, shall be declared and made free; or, at the discretion of the court, 
he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and fined not less than 
ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and 
made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all the 
property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person 
so convicted was the owner at the time of committing the said crime, any 
sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding.
Any be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set 
on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the 
authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or 
comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such 
existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person 
shaJ-1 be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years; 
or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of 
all his slaves, if any he have ; or by both of said punishments, at the 
discretion of the court.
And be it further enacted. That every person guilty of either of the 
offences described in this act shall be forever incapable and disqualified 
to hold any office under the United States.
And be it further enacted, That this act shall not be construed in any way 
to affect or alter the prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person 
or persons guilty of treason against the United States before the passage 
of this act, unless such person is convicted under this act.
And be it further enacted, That, to ensure the speedy termination of the 
present rebellion, it shall be the duty of the President of the United 
States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, money, stocks, 
credits, and effects of the persons hereinafter named in this section, and
to apply and use the same and the proceeds thereof for the support of the 
Army of the United States, that is to say:
First. Of any person hereafter acting as an officer of the army or 
navy of the rebels in arms against the Government of the United States.
Secondly. Of any person hereafter acting as president, vice 
president, member of congress, judge of any court, cabinet officer, 
foreign minister, commissioners or consul of the so-called confederate 
States of America.
Thirdly. Of any person acting as governor of a State, member of a 
convention or legislature, or judge of any court of any of the so-called 
confederate States of America.
Fourthly, Of any person who, having held an office of honor, trust, 
or profit in the United States, shall hereafter hold an office in the so- 
called confederate States of America.
Fifthly. Of any person hereafter holding any office or agency under 
the government of the so-called confederate States of America, or under 
any of the several states of the said confederacy, or the laws thereof, 
whether such office or agency be national. State, or municipal in its name 
or character: Provided, That the persons thirdly, fourthly, and fifthly
above described shall have accepted their appointment or election since 
the date of the pretended ordinance of secession of the State, or shall 
have taken an oath of allegiance to, or to support the constitution of 
the so-called confederate States.
Sixthly. Of any person who, owning property in any loyal State or 
Territory of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, shall 
hereafter assist and give aid and comfort to such rebellion; and all sales, 
transfers, or conveyances of any such property, shall be null and void; 
and it shall be a sufficient bar to any suit brought by such person for 
the possession or the use of such property, or any of it, to allege and 
prove that he is one of the persons described in this section.
And be it further enacted. That if any person within any State or Territory 
of the United States, other than those named as aforesaid, after the 
passage of this act, being engaged in armed rebellion against the Govern­
ment of the United States, or aiding or abetting such rebellion, shall not, 
within sixty days after public warning and proclamation duly given and
made by the President of the United States, cease to aid, countenance, 
and abet such rebellion, and return to his allegiance to the United 
States, all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, and credits of such 
person shall be liable to seizure as aforesaid, mid it shall be the duty 
of the President to seize and use them as aforesaid or the proceeds 
thereof. And all sales, iransfers, or conveyances of any such property 
after the expiration of the said sixty days from the date of such warning 
and proclamation shall be null and void; and it shall be a sufficient bar 
to any suit brought by such person for the possession or the use of such 
property, or any of it, to allege and prove that he is one of the persons 
described in this section.
And be it further enacted, Triat to secure the condemnation and sale of 
any such property, after the same shall have been seized, so that it 
may be made available for the purpose aforesaid, proceedings in rem 
shall be instituted in the name of the United States in any district 
court thereof, or in any territorial court, or in the United States 
district court for the District of Columbia, within which the property 
above described, or any part thereof, may be found, or into which the same, 
if movable, may first be brought, which proceedings shall conform as 
nearly as may be to proceedings in admiralty or revenue cases and if said 
property, whether real or personal, shall be found to have belonged to a 
person engaged in rebellion, or who has given aid or comfort thereto, the 
same shall be condemned as enemies' property and become the property of 
the United States, and may be disposed of as the court shall decree and 
the proceeds thereof paid into the Treasury of the United States for the 
purposes aforesaid.
And be it further enacted, That the several courts aforesaid shall have 
power to make such orders, establish such forms of decree and sale, and 
direct such deeds and conveyances to be executed and delivered by the 
marshals thereof where real estate shall be the subject of sale, as shall 
fitly and efficiently effect the purposes of this act, and vest in the 
purchasers of such property good and valid titles thereto. And the said 
courts shall have powers to allow such fees and charges of their officers 
as shall be reasonable and proper in the premises.
And be it further enacted. That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter 
be engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who
shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons 
and taking refuge within the lines of the Army; and all slaves captured 
from such persons or deserted by them and coming into the control of the 
Government of the United States; and all slaves of such persons found on 
(or) being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards 
occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of
war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as
slaves.
10. And be it further enacted, That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, 
or the District of Columbia, from any other State, shall be delivered up,
or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime, or 
some offense against the laws, unless the person claiming said fugitive 
shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such 
fugitive is alleged to be due is his lawful owner, and has not borne arms
against the United States in the present rebellion, nor in any way given
aid and comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military or naval 
service of the United States shall, under any pretense whatever, assume 
to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or 
labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, 
on pain of being dismissed from the service.
11. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States is
authorized to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem 
necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this 
purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best 
for the public welfare.
12. And be it further enacted. That the President of the United States is
hereby authorized to make provision for the transportation, colonization,
and settlement, in some tropical country beyond the limits of the United 
States, of such persons of the African race, made free by the provisions 
of this act, as may be willing to emigrate, having first obtained the 
consent of the Government of said couiitry to their protection and settle­
ment within the same, with all the rights and privileges of freemen.
13' And be it further enacted, Tnat the President is hereby authorized, at any 
time hereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may have 
participated in the existing rebellion in any State of part thereof, pardon
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and amnesty, with such exceptions and at such time and on such conditions 
as he may deem expedient for the public v/elfare.
14. And be it further enacted. That the courts of the United States shall have 
full power to institute proceedings, malce orders and decrees, issue 
process, and do all other things necessary to carry this act into effect.
zoo.
c) An Act relating to Habeas Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in 
Certain Cases.
March 3rd, 1863.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, during the present rebellion, 
the President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public 
safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ 
of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part 
thereof. And whenever and wherever the said privilege shall be suspended, 
as aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer 
to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any person or persons 
detained by him by authority of the President; but upon the certificate, 
under oath, of the officer having charge of any one so detained that such 
person is detained by him as a prisoner under authority of the President, 
further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended by 
the judge or court having issued the said writ, so long as said suspension 
by the President shall remain in force, and said rebellion continue.
2. And be it further enacted. That the Secretary of State and the Secretary of 
War be, and they are hereby, directed, as soon as may be practicable, to 
furnish to the judges of the circuit and district courts of the United 
States and of the District of Columbia a list of the names of all persons, 
citizens of states in which the administration of the laws has continued 
unimpaired in the said Federal courts, who are now, or may hereafter be, 
held as prisoners of the United States, by order or authority of the 
President of the United States or either of said Secretaries, in any fort, 
arsenal, or other place, as state or political prisoners, or otherwise 
than as prisoners of war; the said list to contain the names of all those
who reside in the respective jurisdictions of said judges, or who may be
deemed by the said Secretaries, or either of them, to have violated any 
law of the United States in any of said jurisdictions, and also the date 
of each arrest; the Secretary of State to furnish a list of such persons 
as are imprisoned by the orders or authority of the President, acting through 
the State Department, and the Secretary of War a list of such as are 
imprisoned by the order or authority of the President, acting through the
Department of War. And in all cases where a grand jury, having attended
any of said courts having jurisdiction in the premises, after the passage
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of this act, and after the furnishing of said list, as aforesaid, has 
terminated its session without finding an indictment or presentment, or 
other proceeding against any such person, it shall he the duty of the 
judge or said court forthwith to malce an order that any such prisoner 
desiring a discharge from said imprisonment be brought before him to be 
discharged; and every officer of the United States having custody of such 
prisoner is hereby directed immediately to obey and execute said judge's 
order; and in case he shall delay or refuse so to do, he shall be subject 
to indictment for a misdemeanor, and be punished by a fine of not less 
than five hundred dollars and imprisonment in the common jail for a period 
not less than six months, in the discretion of the court: Provided, how­
ever, That no person shall be discharged by virtue of the provisions of 
this act until after he or she shall have taken an oath of allegiance to 
the Government of the United States and to support the Constitution thereof: 
and that he or she will not hereafter in any way encourage or give aid and 
comfort to the present rebellion, or the supporters thereof: And provided,
also, That the judge or court before whom such persons may be brought, 
before discharging him or her from imprisonment, shall have power, on 
examination of the case, and, if the public safety shall require it, shall 
be required to cause him or her to enter into recognisance, with or without 
surety, in a sum to be fixed by said judge or court, to keep the peace and 
be of good behaviour towards the United States and its citizens, and from 
time to time, and at such times as such judge or court may direct, appear 
before said judge or court to be further dealt with, according to law, as 
the circumstances may require. And it shall be the duty of the district 
attorney of the United States to attend such examination before the judge.
3. And be it further enacted. That in case any of such prisoners shall be 
under indictment or presentment for any offence against the lav/s of the 
United States, and by existing laws bail or a recognizance may be taken for 
the appearance for trial of such person, it shall be the duty of said judge 
at once to discharge such person upon bail or recognizance for trial as 
aforesaid. And in case the said Secretaries of State and War shall for 
any reason refuse or omit to furnish the said list of persons held as 
prisoners as aforesaid at the time of the passage of this act within twenty 
days thereafter, and of such persons as hereafter may be arrested within 
twenty days from the time of the arrest, any citizen may, after a grand
jury shall have terminated its session without finding an indictment or 
presentment, as provided in the second section of this act, hy a petition 
alleging the facts aforesaid touching any of the persons so as aforesaid 
imprisoned, supported hy the oath of such petitioner (or any other credible 
person^ obtain and be entitled to have the said judge's order to discharge 
such prisoner on the same terms and conditions prescribed in the second section 
of this act: Provided, however, That the said judge shall be satisfied such
allegations are true.
And be it further enacted, That any order of the President, or under his 
authority, made at any time during the existence of the present rebellion, 
shall be a defence in all courts to any action or prosecution, civil or 
criminal, pending, or to be commenced, for any search, seizure, arrest, or 
imprisonment, made, done, or committed, or acts omitted to be done, under 
and by virtue of such order, or under color of any law of Congress, and 
such defence may be made by special plea, or under the general issue.
And be it further enacted, Tliat if any suit or prosecution, civil or 
criminal, has been or shall be commenced in any state court against any 
officer, civil or military, or against any other person, for any arrest or 
imprisonment made, or other trespasses or wongs done or committed, or any 
act omitted to be done, at any time during the present rebellion, by virtue 
or under color of any authority derived from or exercised by or under the 
President of the United States, or any act of Congress, and the defendant 
shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such court, or if such 
appearance shall have been entered before the passage of this act, then at 
the next session of the court in which such suit or prosecution is pending, 
file a petition, stating the facts and verified by affidavit, for the 
removal of the cause for trial at the next circuit court of the United 
States, to be holden in the district where the suit is pending, and offer 
good and sufficient surety for his filing in such court, on the first day 
of its session, copies of such process and other proceedings against him, 
and also for his appearing in such court and entering special bail in the 
cause, if special bail v/as originally required therein. It shall then be 
the duty of the state court to accept the surety and proceed no further in 
the cause or prosecution, and the bail that shall have been originally 
taken shall be discharged. And such copies being filed as aforesaid in 
such court of the United States, the cause shall proceed therein in the 
same manner as if it had been brought in said court by original process,
*whatever may be the tunount in dispute or the damages claimed, or whatever 
the citizenship of the parties, any former law to the contrary notwithstand­
ing, And any attachment of the goods or estate of the defendant by the 
original process shall hold the goods or estate so attached to ansv/er the 
final judgment in the same manner as hy the laws of such state they would 
have been holden to answer final judgment had it been rendered in the 
court in which the suit or prosecution was commenced. And it shall be 
lawful in any such action or prosecution which may be now pending, or 
hereafter commenced, before any state court whatever, for any cause afore­
said, after final judgment, for either party to remove and transfer, by 
appeal, such case during the session or term of said court at which the 
same shall have taken place, from such court to the next circuit court of 
the United States to be held in the district in which such appeal shall be 
taken, in manner aforesaid. And it shall be the duty of the person taking 
such appeal to produce and file in the said circuit court attested copies 
of the process, proceedings, and judgment in such cause; and it shall also 
be competent for either party, within six months after the rendition of a 
judgment in any such cause, by writ of error or other process, to remove 
the same to the circuit court of the United States of that district in which 
such judgment shall have been rendered; and the said circuit court shall 
thereupon proceed to try and determine the facts and the law in such action, 
in the same manner as if the same had been there originally commenced, the 
judgment in such case notwithstanding. And any bail which may have been 
taken, or property attached, shall be holden on the final judgment of the 
said circuit court in such action, in the same manner as if no such removal 
and transfer had been made, £is aforesaid. And the state court, from which 
any such action, civil or criminal, may be removed and transferred as afore­
said, upon the parties giving good and sufficient security for the prosecu­
tion thereof, shall allow the same to be removed and transferred, and proceed 
no further in the case: Provided, however, That if the party aforesaid
shall fail duly to enter the removal and transfer, as aforesaid, in the 
circuit court of the United States, agreeably to this act, the state court, 
by which judgment shall have been rendered, and from which the transfer and 
removal shall have been made, as aforesaid, shall be authorized, on motion 
for that purpose, to issue execution, and to carry into effect any such 
judgment, the same as if no such removal and transfer had been made. And 
provided also, That no such appeal or writ of error shall be allowed in any
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criminal action or prosecution where final judgment shall have been 
rendered in favor of the defendant or respondent by the state court. And
if in any suit hereafter commenced the plaintiff is nonsuited or judgment
pass against him, the defendant shall recover double costs.
6. And be it further enacted, That any suit or prosecution described in this
act, in which final judgment may be rendered in the circuit court, may be 
carried by writ of error to the supreme court, whatever may be the amount 
of said judgment.
7. And be it further enacted, That no suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,
shall be maintained for any arrest or imprisonment made, or other trespasses
or wrongs done or committed, or act omitted to be done, at any time during 
the present rebellion, by virtue or under color of any authority derived 
from or exercised by or under the President of the United States, or by or 
under any act of Congress, unless the same shall have been commenced within 
two years next after such arrest, imprisonment, trespass, or wrong may have 
been done or committed or act may have been omitted to be done: Provided,
That in no case shall the limitation herein provided commence to run until 
the passage of this act, so that no party shall, by virtue of this act, be
debarred of his remedy by suit or prosecution until two years from and
after the passage of this act.
An Act to guarantee to certain States whose governments have been usurped 
or overthrown a republican form of government.
July 2nd, 1864« Pocket-vetoed, July 8th, I864,
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congi/ess assembled, That in the States declared in 
rebellion against the United States the President shall, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, appoint for each a provisional governor, 
whose pay and emoluments shall not exceed that of a brigadier-general of 
volunteers, who shall be charged with the civil administration of such State 
until a State government therein shall be recognized as hereinafter provided.
And be it further enacted, That so soon as the military resistance to the 
United States shall have been suppressed in any such State and the people
thereof shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the Con­
stitution and the laws of the United States the provisional governor shall
direct the marshal of the United States, as speedily as may be, to name
a sufficient number of deputies, and to enroll all white male citizens 
of the United States resident in the State in their respective counties, 
and to request each one to take the oath to support the Constitution of the 
United States, and in his enrollment to designate those who talce and those 
who refuse to talce that oath, which rolls shall be forthwith returned to 
the provisional governor; and if the persons taking that oath shall amount 
to a majority of the persons enrolled in the State, he shall, by proclama­
tion, invite the loyal people of the State to elect delegates to a conven­
tion charged to declare the will of the people of the State relative to 
the re-establishment of a State government, subject to and in conformity 
with the Constitution of the United States.
And be it further enacted, That the convention shall consist of as many 
members as both houses of the last constitutional State legislature, 
apportioned by the provisional governor among the counties, parishes or 
district of the State, in proportion to the vhite population returned as 
electors by the marshal in compliance with the provisions of this act.
The provisional governor shall, by proclamation, declare the number of 
delegates to be elected by each county, parish, or election district; name 
a day of election not less than thirty days thereafter; designate the places 
of voting in each county, parish or district, conforming as nearly as may be
convenient to the places used in the State elections next preceding the 
rebellion; appoint one or more commissioners to hold the election at each 
place of voting, and provide an adequate force to keep the peace during 
the election.
And be it further enacted, That the delegates shall be elected by the loyal 
white male citizens of the United States of the age of 21 years, and 
resident at the time in the county, parish, or district in which they 
shall offer to vote, and enrolled as aforesaid, or absent in the military 
service of the United States, and v/ho shall take and subscribe the oath of 
allegiance to the United States in the form contained in the act of Congress 
of July 2nd, 1862; and all such citizens of the United States who are in the 
military service of the United States shall vote at the headquarters of 
their respective commands, under such regulations as may be prescribed by 
the provisional governor for the taking and return of their votes; but 
no person who has held or exercised any office, civil or military. State 
or Confederate, under the rebel usurpation, or who has voluntarily borne 
arms against the United States, shall vote or be eligible to be elected 
as delegate at such election.
And be it further enacted. That the said commissioners, or either of them, 
shall hold the election in conformity with this act, and, so far as may be 
consistent therewith, shall proceed in the manner used in the State prior 
to the rebellion. The oath of allegiance shall be taken and subscribed 
on the poll book by every voter in the form above prescribed, but every 
person known by or proved to the commissioners to have held or exercised 
any office, civil or military, State or Confederate, under the rebel 
usurpation, or to have voluntarily borne arms against the United States, 
shall be excluded though he offer to take the oath; and in case any person 
v/ho shall have borne arms against the United States shall offer to vote, 
he shall be deemed to have borne arms voluntarily unless he shall prove 
the contrary by the testimony of a qualified voter. The poll book, showing 
the name and oath of each voter, shall be returned to the provisional 
governor by the commissioners of election, or the one acting, and the 
provisional governor shall canvass such returns and declare the person 
having the highest number of votes elected.
And be it further enacted, That the provisional governor shall, by proclama­
tion, convene the delegates elected as aforesaid at the capital of the State
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on a day not more than three months after the election, giving at least 
thirty days' notice of such day. In case the said capital shall in his 
judgment be unfit, he shall in his proclamation appoint another place,
He shall preside over the deliberations of the convention and administer 
to each delegate, before talcing his seat in the convention, the oath of 
allegiance to the United States in the form above prescribed.
7. And be it further enacted, That the convention shall declare on behalf 
of the people of the State their submission to the Constitution and laws 
of the United States, and shall adopt the following provisions, hereby 
prescribed by the United States in the execution of the constitutional 
duty to guarantee a republican form of government to every State, and 
incorporate them in the constitution of the State; that is to say;
First. No person who has held or exercised any office, civil or 
military (except offices merely ministerial and military offices below 
the grade of colonel), State or Confederate, under the usurping power, 
shall vote for or be a member of the legislature or governor.
Second. Involuntary servitude is forever prohibited, and the freedom 
of all persons is guaranteed in said State.
■ Third. No debt, State or Confederate, created by or under the sanction 
of the usurping power shall be recognized or paid by the State.
8. And be it further enacted. That when the convention shall have adopted 
those provisions it shall proceed to re-establish a republican form of 
government and ordain a constitution containing those provisions, which 
when adopted, the convention shall by ordinance provide for submitting to 
the people of the State entitled to vote under this law, at an election to 
be held in the manner prescribed by the act for the election of delegates, 
but at a time and place named by the convention, at which election the said 
electors, and none others, shall vote directly for or against such Consti­
tution and form of State government. And the returns of said election 
shall be made to the provisional governor, v/ho shall canvass the same in 
the presence of the electors, and if a majority of the votes cast shall be 
for the constitution and form of government, he shall certify the same, 
with a copy thereof, to the President of the United States, who, after 
obtaining the assent of Congress, shall, by proclamation, recognize the 
government so established, and none other, as the constitutional government
of the State; and from the date of such recognition, and not before,
Senators and Representatives and electors for President and Vice-President 
may be elected in such State, according to the laws of the State and of 
the United States.
9. And be it further enacted, That if the convention shall refuse to re­
establish the State government on the conditions aforesaid the provisional 
governor shall declare it dissolved: but it shall be for the duty of the 
President, whenever he shall have reason to believe that a sufficient 
number of tlie people of the State entitled to vote under this act, in 
number not less than a majority of those enrolled as aforesaid, are willing 
to re-establish a State government on the conditions aforesaid, to direct 
the provisional governor to order another election of delegates to a 
convention for the purpose and in the manner prescribed in this act, and 
to proceed in all respects as hereinbefore provided, either to dissolve 
the convention or to certify the State government re-established by.it to 
the President.
10. And be it further enacted, That until the United States shall have recognized 
a republican form of State government the provisional governor in each
of said States shall see that this act and the laws of the United States 
and the laws of the State in force when the State government was overthrown 
by the rebellion are faithfully executed within the State; but no law or 
usage whereby any person was heretofore held in involuntary servitude 
shall be recognized or enforced by any court or officer in such State; 
and the lav^ s for the trial and punishment of white persons shall extend 
to all persons, and jurors shall have the qualifications of voters under 
this lav/ for delegates to the convention. Tkie President shall appoint such 
officers provided for by the laws of the State v/hen its government was 
overthrown a.s he may find necessary to the civil administration of the 
State, all which officers shall be entitled to receive the fees and emolu­
ments provided by the State laws for such officers.
11. And be it further enacted, Itiat until the recognition of a State government 
as aforesaid the provisional governor shall, under such regulations as he 
may prescribe, cause to be assessed, levied, and collected, for the year 
1864 and every year thereafter, the taxes provided by the laws of such 
State to be levied during the fiscal year preceding the overthrow of the 
State government thereof, in the manner prescribed by the laws of the State,
as nearly as may be ; and the officers appointed as aforesaid are vested 
with all powers of levying and collecting such taxes, by distress or sale, 
as were vested in any officers or tribunal of the State governnrient afore­
said for those purposes. The proceeds of such taxes shall be accounted 
for to the provisional governor and be by him applied to the expenses of 
the administration of the laws in such State, subject to the direction of 
the President, and the surplus shall be deposited in the Treasury of the 
United States to the credit of such State, to be paid to the State upon 
an appropriation therefor to be made when a republican form of government 
shall be recognized therein by the United States.
12. And be it further enacted, That all persons held to involuntary servitude
or labor in the State aforesaid are hereby emancipated and discharged
therefrom, and they and their posterity shall be forever free. And if 
any such persons or their posterity shall be restrained of liberty under 
pretense of any claim to such ser\rice or labor, the courts of the United 
States shall, on habeas corpus, discharge them,
13. And be it further enacted, That if any person declared free by this act, 
or any law of the United States or any proclamation of the President, be 
restrained of liberty with intent to be held in or reduced to involuntary 
servitude or labor, the person convicted before a court of competent juris­
diction of such act shall be punished by fine of not less than J?l,500 and 
be imprisoned not less than five nor more than twenty years.
14. And be it further enacted, That every person who shall hereafter hold or
exercise any office, civil or military (except offices merely ministerial
and military offices below the grade of colonel), in the rebel service, 
State or Confederate, is hereby declared not to be a citizen of the United 
States.
(e) An Ac^ to amend an act entitled "An act to establish a Bureau for the 
relief of Freedmen and Refugees", and for other purposes,
February 9th, 1866, Vetoed, February 19th«
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the act to establish a 
bureau for the relief of freedinen and refugees, approved March three, 
eighteen hundred and sixty-five, shall continue in force until otherwise 
provided by law, and shall extend to refugees and freedmen in all parts 
of the United States; and the President may divide the section of country 
containing such refugees and freedmen into districts, each containing one 
or more States, not to exceed twelve in munber, and, by and with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, appoint an assistant commissioner for each of 
said districts, who shall give like bond, receive the compensation, and 
perform the duties prescribed by this and the act to which this is an 
amendment or said bureau may, in the discretion of the President, be 
placed under a commissioner and assistant commissioners, to be detailed 
from the army; in which event each officer so assigned to duty shall serve 
without increase of pay or allowances.
2. And be it further enacted, That the commissioner, with the approval of the 
President, and v/hen the same shall be necessary for the operations of the 
bureau, may divide each district into a number of sub-districts, not to 
exceed the number of counties or parishes in such district, and shall 
assign to each sub-district at least one agent, either a citizen, officer 
of the army, or enlisted man, who, if an officer, shall serve without 
additional compensation or allowance, and if a citizen or enlisted man, 
shall receive a salary of not less than five hundred dollars nor more than 
twelve hundred dollars annually, according to the services rendered, in 
full compensation for such services; and such agent shall, before entering 
on the duties of his office, talce the oath prescribed in the first section 
of the act to which this is an amendment. And the commissioner may, when 
the same shall be necessary, assign to each assistant commissioner not 
exceeding three clerks, and to each of said agents one clerk, at an annual 
salary not exceeding one thousand dolltirs each, provided suitable clerks 
cannot be detailed from the army. And the President of the United States, 
through the War Department and the commissioner, shall extend military
jurisdiction and protection over all employes, agents, and officers of 
this bureau, in the exercise of the duties imposed or authorized by this 
act or the act to which this is additional.
3. And be it further enacted, That the Secretary of War may direct such
issues of provisions, clothing, fuel and other supplies, including medical
stores and transportation, and afford such aid, medical or otherwise, as 
he may deem needful for the immediate and temporary shelter and supply
of destitute and suffering refugees and freedmen, their wives and children, 
under such rules and regulations as he may direct: Provided, That no
person shall be deemed "destitute", "suffering", or "dependent upon the 
Government for support", within the meaning of this act, v/ho, being able 
to find employment, could by proper industry and exertion avoid such 
destitution, suffering, or dependence.
4. And be it further enacted, That the President is hereby authorized to
reserve from sale, or from settlement, under the homestead or pre-emption 
laws, and to set apart for the use of freedmen and loyal refugees, un­
occupied public lands in Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and 
Arkansas, not exceeding in all three millions of acres of good land; and 
the commissioner, under the direction of the President, shall cause the 
same from time to time to be allotted and assigned, in parcels not exceed­
ing forty acres each, to the loyal refugees and freedmen, who shall be 
protected in the use and enjoyment thereof for such term of time and at 
such annual rent as may be agreed on between the commissioner and such 
refugees or freedmen. The rental shall be based upon a valuation of the 
land, to be ascertained in such manner as the commissioner may, under the 
direction of the President, by regulation prescribe. At the end of such 
term, or sooner, if the commissioner shall assent thereto, the occupants 
of any parcels so assigned, their heirs and assigns, may purchase the land 
and receive a title thereto from the United States in fee, upon paying 
therefor the value of the land ascertained as aforesaid.
5. And be it further enacted, T!.iat the occupants of land under Major General 
Sherman’s special field order, dated at Savannah, January sixteen, eighteen 
hundred and sixty-five, are hereby confirmed in their possession for the 
period of three years from the date of said order, and no person shall be 
disturbed in or ousted from said possession during said three years, unless
a settlement shall be made with said occupant, by the former owner, his 
heirs or assigns, satisfactory to the commissioner of the Freedmen's 
Bureau; Provided, That whenever the former owners of lands occupied under 
General Sherman's field order shall make application for restoration of 
said lands, the commissioner is hereby authorized, upon the agreement and 
with the written consent of said occupants, to procure other lands for 
them by rent or purchase, not exceeding forty acres for each occupant, 
upon the terms and conditions named in section four of this act, or to set 
apart for them, out of the public lands assigned for that purpose in section 
four of this act, forty acres each, upon the same terms and conditions.
6. And be it further enacted, That the commissioner shall, under the direction 
of the President, procure in the name of the United States by grant or 
purchase, such lands within the districts aforesaid as may be required
for refugees and freedmen dependent on the Government for support; and 
he shall provide or cause to be erected suitable buildings for asylums 
and schools. But no such purchase shall be made, nor contract for the 
same entered into, nor other expense incurred, until after appropriations 
shall have been provided by Congress for such purposes. And no payment 
shall be made for lands purchased under this section, except for asylums 
and schools, from any moneys, not specifically appropriated therefor. And 
the commissioner shall cause such lands from time to time to be valued, 
allotted, assigned, and sold in manner and form provided in the fourth 
section of this act, at a price not less than the cost thereof to the 
United States.
7. And be it further enacted. That whenever in any State or district in which 
the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the 
rebellion, and wherein, .in consequence of any State or local law, ordinance, 
police or other regulation, custom, or prejudice, any of the civil rights 
or immunities belonging to white persons, including the right to malce and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and
to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of person and estate, including the constitutional right of bearing arms, 
are refused or denied to negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, refugees, or any 
other persons, on account of race, color, or any previous condition of 
slavery or involuntary servitude, or wherein they or any of them are
subjected to any other or different punishment, pains, or penalties, for 
the commission of any act or offence than are prescribed for white persons 
committing like acts or offences, it shall be the duty of the President 
of the United States, through the commissioner, to extend military 
protection and jurisdiction over all cases affecting such persons so 
discriminated against.
And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any State 
or local law, ordinance, police, or other regulation or custom, shall, 
in any State or district in which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings 
has been interrupted by the rebellion, subject, or cause to be subjected, 
any negro, mulatto, freedman, refugee, or other person, on account of race 
or color, or any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, 
or for any other cause, to the deprivation of any civil right secured to 
white persons, or to any other or different punishment than white persons 
are subject to for the commission of like acts or offences, shall be deemed 
guilty of a misdemeanour, and be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand 
dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both; and it shall be 
the duty of the officers and agents of this bureau to take jurisdiction of, 
and hear and determine all offences committed against the provisions of 
this section, and also of all cases affecting negroes, mulattoes, freedmen, 
refugees, or other persons who are discriminated against in any of the 
particulars mentioned in the preceding section of this act, under such 
rules and regulations as the President of the United States, through the 
War Department, shall prescribe. The jurisdiction conferred by this and 
the preceding section on the officers and agents of this bureau shall 
cease and determine whenever the discrimination on account of which it 
is conferred ceases, and in no event to be exercised in any State in 
which the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has not been interrupted 
by the rebellion, nor in any such State after said State shall have been 
fully restored in all its constitutional relations to the United States, 
and the courts of the State and of the United States within the same are 
not disturbed or stopped in the peaceable course of justice.
And be it further enacted, That all acts, or parts of acts, inconsistent 
with the provisions of this act, are hereby repealed.
(f) An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, 
and furnish the Means of their Vindication.
April 9th, 1866 f.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the 
United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not 
taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such 
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same 
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, (lease), sell, (hold), and convey real and personal property, 
and to full and. equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be 
subject to like punishment, (pains, and penalties, ) and to none other, 
any law, (statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,) to the contrary 
not wi thstanding.
2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color of any law,
(statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,) shall subject, (or cause to
be subjected,) any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation 
of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, 
(pains, or penalties) on account of such person having at any time been 
held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punislxment 
of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour, and, on 
conviction, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, 
or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the 
court.
3. And be it further enacted, That the district courts of the United States,
within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts
of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed 
against the provisions of this act, (and also, concurrently with the circuit 
courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal affecting 
persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals
of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured to 
them by the first section of this act;) and if any suit or prosecution, 
(civil or criminal) has been or shall be commenced in any State court, 
against any such person, for any cause whatsoever, or against any officer, 
civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment, 
trespasses, or wrongs done or committed by virtue or under color of 
authority derived from this act or the act establishing a Bureau for the 
relief of Freedmen and Refugees, and all acts amendatory thereof, or for 
refusing to do any act upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with 
this act, such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for 
trial to the proper district or circuit court in the manner prescribed 
by the "Act relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings 
in certain cases", approved March three, eighteen hundred and sixty-three, 
and all acts amendatory thereof. The jurisdiction in civil and criminal 
matters hereby conferred on the district and circuit courts of the United 
States shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the 
United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into 
effect; but in all cases where such laws are not adapted to the object, 
or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies 
and punish offences against law, the common law, as modified and changed 
by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having 
jurisdiction of the cause, civil or criminal, is held, so far as the same 
is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
shall be extended to and govern said courts in the trial and disposition 
of such cause, and, if of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punish­
ment on the party found guilty.
4. And be it further enacted, That the district attorneys, marshals, and
deputy marshals of the United States, the commissioners appointed by the 
circuit and territorial courts of the United States, with powers of 
arresting, imprisoning or bailing offenders against the laws of the 
United States, the officers and agents of the Freedmen's Bureau, and 
every other officer who may be specially empowered by the President of the 
United States, shall be, and they are hereby, specially authorized and 
required, at the expense of the United States, to institute proceedings 
against all and every nerson who shall violate the provisions of this act, 
and cause him or them to be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case
may be, for trial before such court of the United States or territorial 
court as by this act has cognizance of the offence. And with a view to 
affording reasonable protection to all persons in their constitutional 
rights of equality before the law, without distinction of race or color, 
or previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, 
and to the prompt discharge of the duties of this act, it shall be the 
duty of the circuit courts of the United States, and the superior courts 
of the Territories of the United States, from time to time, to increase 
the number of commissioners, so as to afford a speedy and convenient 
means for the arrest and examination of persons charged with a violation 
of this act; and such commissioners are hereby authorized and required 
to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred on them by 
this act, and the same duties with regard to offences created by this act, 
as they are authorized by law to exercise with regard to other offences 
against the laws of the United States.
5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of all marshals and 
deputy marshals to obey and execute all warrants and precepts issued under 
the provisions of this act, when to them directed; and should any marshal 
or deputy marshal refuse to receive such warrant or other process when 
tendered, or to use all proper means diligently to execute the same, he 
shall, on conviction thereof, be fined in the sum of one thousand dollars, 
to the use of the person upon whom the accused is alleged to have committed 
the offence. And the better to enable the said commissioners to execute 
their duties faithfully and efficiently, in conformity with the Constitu­
tion of the United States and the requirements of this act, they are 
hereby authorized and empowered, within their counties respectively, to 
appoint, in writing, under their hands, any one or more suitable persons 
from time to time, to execute all such warrants and other process as may 
be issued by them in the lawful performance of their respective duties; 
and the persons so appointed to execute any warrant or process as afore­
said shall have authority to summon and call to their aid the bystanders 
or posse comitatus of the proper county, or such portion of the land or 
naval forces of the United States, or of the militia, as may be necessary 
to the performance of the duty with which they are charged, and to insure 
a faithful observance of the clause of the Constitution which prohibits 
slavery, in conformity with the provisions of this act; and said warrants
shall run and be executed by said officers anyv/here in the State or 
Territory within which they are issued.
6. And be it further enacted, That any person v/ho shall knowingly and v/il- 
fully obstruct, hinder, or prevent any officer, or other person charged 
with the execution of any warrant or process issued under the provisions 
of this act, or any person or persons lawfully assisting him or them, from 
arresting any person for whose apprehension such v/arrant or process may 
have been issued, or shall rescue or attempt to rescue such person from 
the custody of the officer, other person or persons, or those lawfully 
assisting as aforesaid, when so arrested pursuant to the authority herein 
given and declared, or shall aid, abet, or assist any person so arrested 
as aforesaid, directly or indirectly, to escape from the custody of the 
officer or other person legally authorized as aforesaid, or shall harbor 
or conceal any person for whose arrest a warrant or process shall have 
been issued as aforesaid, so as to prevent his discovery and arrest after 
notice or knowledge of the fact that a warrant has been issued for the 
apprehension of such person, shall, for either of said offenses, be 
subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, and imprisonment 
not exceeding six months, by indictment and conviction before the district 
court of the United States for the district in which said offence may have 
been committed, or before the proper court of criminal jurisdiction, if 
committed within any one of the organized Territories of the United States,
7» And be it further enacted, That the district attorneys, the marshals, their 
deputies, and the clerks of the said district and territorial courts shall 
be paid for their services the like fees as may be allowed to them for 
similar services in other cases; and in all oases where the proceedings 
are before a commissioner, he shall be entitled to a fee of ten dollars 
in full for his services in each case, inclusive of all services incident 
to such arrest and examination. The person or persons authorized to 
execute the process to be issued by such commissioners for the arrest of 
offenders against the provisions of this act shall be entitled to a fee 
of five dollars for each person he or they may arrest and take before 
any such commissioner as aforesaid, with such other fees as may be deemed 
reasonable by such commissioner for such other additional services as may 
be necessarily performed by him or them, such as attending at the examina­
tion, keeping the prisoner in custody, and providing him with food and
lodging during his detention, and until the final determination of such 
commissioner, and in general for performing such other duties as may be 
required in the premises; such fees to be made up in conformity with the 
fees usually charged by the officers of the courts of justice within the
proper district or county, as nearly as may be practicable, and paid out
of the Treasury of the United States on the certificate of the judge of
the district w.i thin which the arrest is made, and to be recoverable from
the defendant as part of the judgment in case of conviction.
8. And be it further enacted, That whenever the President of the United States 
shall have reason to believe that offences have been or are likely to be 
committed against the provisions of this act within any judicial district, 
it shall be lawful for him, in his discretion, to direct the judge, marshal, 
and district attorney of such district to attend at such place within the 
district, and for such time as he may designate, for the purpose of the 
more speedy arrest and trial of persons charged with a violation of -this 
act; and it shall be the duty of every judge or other officer, when any 
such requisition shall be received by him, to attend at the place and for 
the time therein designated.
9. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the President of 
the United States, or such person as he may empower for that purpose, to 
employ such part of the land or naval forces of the United States, or of 
the militia, as shadl be necessary to prevent the violation and enforce 
the due execution of this act.
10. And be it further enacted, That upon all questions of law arising in any 
case under the provisions of this act a final appeal may be taken to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.
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